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1INTRODUCTION
The subject of this thesis is Soviet pressure for economic cooperation and 
integration within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), an 
organisation for economic cooperation of Soviet bloc countries, from its 
establishment in 1949 until its dissolution in 1991, and the explanation of the causes 
of the persistent failure of Soviet attempts to integrate East European economies.
The economic integration of CMEA countries was not based on a voluntary 
agreement among interested states, but was an integral part of the Soviet Union's 
policy of political and ideological domination over other members of the Soviet 
bloc. This thesis evaluates the impact of the subordination of East European 
countries on the strategies, structures, processes and outcomes of integration. In 
the following discussion of the dynamics of the interrelationship of political and 
economic factors within CMEA, the central issue is the relative importance of 
economic, as opposed to political, criteria in the Soviet pressure for integration 
within CMEA.
This thesis examines the Soviet Union’s relations with Eastern European 
countries as a function of the following interrelated Soviet political objectives: to 
ensure the stability and legitimacy of its own socio-economic and political system, 
to protect its political, economic and ideological interests within the region through 
the maintenance of Soviet control in the region, and to maintain its international 
position.
The central argument of this thesis is that as a result of these political 
considerations the decision-making criteria of the Soviet Union with regard to 
economic integration within CMEA were primarily political, i.e. the basic criterion 
applied in the determination of CMEA objectives and mechanisms of cooperation
2was their contribution to the maintenance of the Soviet system of domination in 
Eastern Europe and to securing the political stability of the Soviet domestic system, 
rather than the economic criteria of efficiency of mechanisms of cooperation and of 
economic profitability of cooperation.
I demonstrate that as a result of the primacy of political criteria in decision­
making, CMEA objectives and strategies were aimed primarily at the strengthening 
of the Soviet Union’s political position in the region and the perpetuation of the 
political subordination of East European states through the expansion of Soviet 
control over their economic policies. In other words, CMEA economic cooperation 
was to create levers of Soviet influence over CMEA members’ economic decisions, 
thus enhancing the Soviet Union’s political leverage.
Consequently, in order to achieve these objectives CMEA mechanisms and 
forms of cooperation were designed primarily as means of securing the Soviet 
Union's dominant position in the economic activities of the bloc through 
subordinating East European economic planning to Soviet economic priorities, 
forcing Eastern Europe into a relationship of dependency on the Soviet Union and 
the formation and consolidation of a separate socialist market with its concomitant 
objective of weakening of links with the West.
Moreover, in accordance with the Soviet objective of ensuring stability of its 
domestic political system, another political criterion in CMEA decision-making was 
the requirement that CMEA mechanisms of cooperation conform with the principles 
of the Soviet model, in particular the public ownership of the means of production 
and planned management. The conformity to the management structures of the 
Soviet national economic system was considered by the Soviet leadership as an 
essential element legitimising the Soviet Union’s authority in intra-bloc relations 
and the basis for the bloc’s ideological cohesion.
3The argument that political criteria were of critical importance in CMEA 
decision-making does not mean that CMEA was set up for purely political 
purposes. The discussion demonstrates that in Soviet calculations there was also an 
economic dimension, and economic considerations played a major role in the 
formulation and implementation of CMEA strategies. From the beginning, a long­
term Soviet objective was to ensure that CMEA strategies were subordinated to the 
requirements of Soviet economic policy. Since the late 1950s CMEA economic 
agenda had included the implementation of the regional division of labor based on 
specialization and cooperation in industrial production, and the rational utilization 
of the scientific and technical resources of the CMEA countries, the improvement 
of the quality and the technological level of production and the creation of an 
internationally competitive industrial sector in CMEA countries. In addition, 
specific Soviet economic concerns included ensuring the contribution of East 
European members to the Soviet economic development program, rendering the 
existing model of cooperation more profitable from the point of view of Soviet 
interests and the transformation of the composition and quality of intra-CMEA trade 
in favour of Soviet needs.
I argued, however, that even though economic considerations have played a 
major role in determining CMEA cooperation strategies, they were consistently 
subordinated to political considerations; that is CMEA objectives and mechanisms 
could not conflict with Soviet political objectives in the region and were seen as a 
useful, or necessary instrument in the achievement of these political goals.
The dominance of political criteria in defining what constituted functional 
behaviour meant, moreover, that the CMEA did not have effective mechanisms of 
cooperation to implement these objectives. This was due to the fact that the 
principles underlying CMEA cooperation, dictated by the logic of securing the 
Soviet Union’s political position, were more important than the potential economic
4benefits which could be obtained through the introduction of efficient mechanisms 
of cooperation which would have provided economic incentives for the 
development of production for export and a rational basis for the allocation of 
resources and intra-branch specialisation.
The discussion in this thesis shows that the Soviet policy of economic integration 
with Eastern Europe was a primary foreign policy objective of the Soviet leadership 
which involved formulation of several major programs and the creation of a 
substantial organisational structure supporting the operation of CMEA. Despite these 
political measures aimed at the development of economic ties within CMEA, and the 
Soviet Union’s success in determining CMEA strategies and its mechanisms of 
cooperation the Soviet Union was, however, unable, apart from the early years under 
Stalin’s rule, to implement successfully these policies of integration.
In order to provide an explanation of the failure of the Soviet policy of integration 
the discussion in the thesis is focused on two main areas of CMEA operation. The 
first area is concerned with Soviet measures aimed at the development of economic 
ties among CMEA member countries and the factors determining CMEA objectives 
and mechanisms of cooperation. I examine the dynamics of the process of economic 
subordination of Eastern Europe as a part of the Soviet Union’s policy of maintaining 
control over the region, and changing Soviet perceptions of Eastern Europe’s 
importance in its strategic, political and economic calculations. I show that the role of 
CMEA was subordinated to the Soviet Union’s domestic and foreign policy 
objectives and was consistent with other methods of bloc management such as 
pressure on uniformity of political and economic systems and subordination through 
direct Soviet interference in the political and economic affairs of satellite countries. I 
also discuss the relative importance of economic factors in Soviet political decision­
making regarding intra-CMEA economic relations i.e. considerations of economic 
profitability in the maintenance of the CMEA model of cooperation.
5The second area deals with the process of implementation of CMEA strategies 
within these systemic constraints. I shall analyse the ‘internal logic’ of the basic 
domestic economic mechanisms and CMEA mechanisms and their limitations as 
effective instruments of cooperation. By identifying the incentives produced by these 
mechanisms I seek to explain the actual reasons behind those policies and actions of 
individual countries which tended to hinder the implementation of CMEA programs.
I identify the following factors as direct reasons for the failure of Soviet pressure 
for integration. First, the deliberate policy choices made by East European members 
aimed at avoiding commitments to the CMEA in an effort to counteract Soviet 
measures which were perceived by them as unprofitable, or encroaching upon their 
sovereignty, or jeopardising their economic stability. Second, the failure by East 
Europeans to fulfil their obligations because of their limited capacity to invest due to 
economic difficulties and financial constraints. Third, the inability to respond to 
Soviet demands due to inherent limitations in the system of management of Soviet 
bloc countries which inhibited their ability to innovate, to improve the quality of 
products, to raise technical standards and to develop viable export-oriented 
industries. Fourth, the lack of interest of all CMEA members in the development of 
specialisation because of the absence of incentives to invest in new technologies and 
the cumbersome mechanisms of CMEA cooperation. Fifth, the East Europeans’ lack 
of interest in cooperation because of the Soviet Union’s relative technological 
backwardness.
Thus, I present the outcomes of cooperation as the result of the rational actions of 
individual countries seeking to maximise the benefits to be derived from cooperation 
within the constraints imposed on CMEA by Soviet domination and the institutional 
limitations to integration imposed by the central planning system. I argue that these 
actions derived from the internal logic of domestic and CMEA mechanisms, which 
did not provide adequate economic incentives for the development of export-oriented
6sectors and for the improvement of quality of manufactures and a rational basis for 
the allocation of resources. As the institutional arrangements of the economic system 
of CMEA members were imposed by the Soviet Union, I argue that ultimately, the 
primary factors responsible for the failure of integration were Soviet political 
objectives in the region which hampered the creation of the conditions necessary for 
successful cooperation.
This thesis is divided into five chapters and conclusion.
Chapter 1 is concerned with factors determining functions of the CMEA during 
the Stalinist period. It argues that the ultimate motives for setting up of the CMEA 
were primarily political: Stalin’s aim was to integrate East European economies with 
the Soviet Union’s by the re-orientation of trade and the formation of industries to 
engender dependence of East European economies on the Soviet market and 
resources. In the process, Soviet bloc economies would be isolated from the West. 
The achievement of economic subordination was perceived to be the best guarantee of 
ensuring political stability and securing Soviet strategic interests in the region. I 
demonstrate that the operation of CMEA was constrained by the other main Soviet 
strategies of managing relations with Eastern Europe: subordination through direct 
Soviet interference in the political and economic affairs of satellite countries; the 
standardization of their models of economic development and the imposition of 
Soviet-type autarkic economic strategy. I argue that within these systemic constraints 
on the actions of Soviet bloc states and in the conditions of the extremely limited 
political and economic autonomy of East European states, during the Stalinist period, 
East European countries could not resist Soviet policies and the Soviet Union was 
able to succeed in the implementation of its integration policies.
Chapter 2 focuses on the limitations imposed on the process of cooperation by the 
‘internal logic’ of the CMEA’s economic mechanisms, principles and procedural
7rules. The first section looks at the domestic economic mechanisms of CMEA 
countries showing that inherent in the logic of their operation was the lack of effective 
mechanisms for participation in the international division of labor. Thus they lacked 
effective instruments for adjusting economic directions to the requirements of external 
markets. There were insufficient incentives to develop export-oriented sectors, such 
as mechanisms necessary for the assessment of comparative advantages and for 
determining areas of specialisation. The second section examines the principles of 
formation and the functions of CMEA instruments of cooperation. It identifies the 
main limitations of the CMEA mechanism, namely rigid bilateralism, chronic 
problems related to currency inconvertibility, and lack of instruments to determine the 
effectiveness of foreign trade and provide incentives for production specialisation 
showing that they were consistent with the principles of the domestic mechanisms of 
the Soviet model of centrally planned economy. The third section addresses the 
issues of the relative ‘fairness’ of CMEA mechanisms defined in literature in terms of 
‘exploitation or subsidization’. By this, I mean the extent to which CMEA members 
might have derived any ‘special’ political and economic advantages from cooperation. 
The analysis shows that the Soviet Union did not design ‘implicit subsidies’ related 
to trading with Eastern Europe at allegedly subsidised prices as a political tool of 
pressure. However, the analysis of negotiations of trade and specialisation 
agreements demonstrates conclusively that the terms of cooperation were determined 
by the political and strategic importance of the region and that the Soviet Union 
consistently used CMEA mechanisms for structural subordination of East European 
economies and thus as an indirect instrument of political control.
The fourth section is concerned with organisational principles, formal CMEA 
organisational structures, and informal bodies involved in the decision-making 
process. It examines the powers and functions of CMEA organs and their 
relationships with national planning agencies and other bodies directly responsible for
8particular spheres of economic and scientific-technological activity in each member 
country. It contrasts the limited authority of formal CMEA bodies, which lacked 
powers to enforce the implementation of CMEA recommendations, with the formal 
political and economic autonomy of the national authorities of CMEA members. It 
demonstrates that those CMEA principles and procedures which guaranteed the 
preservation of the sovereign rights of member states in the process of economic 
cooperation were a major impediment to the development and implementation of 
CMEA strategies. This guarantee of sovereignty allowed East European members to 
defend their national economic interests and thus to limit cooperation to those forms 
which would not conflict with the preservation of formal economic sovereignty. Thus 
the rules of CMEA operation provided opportunities for smaller countries to resist 
direct Soviet interference. They gave individual members substantial control over 
their economies despite Soviet political dominance and forced the Soviet Union to 
rely on other means of pressure.
In the next part of the thesis I will describe how this ‘internal logic’ of CMEA 
mechanisms and rules produced coherent outcomes in the process of CMEA 
cooperation. I will demonstrate how, on the one hand, these mechanisms and 
principles of operation constrained CMEA cooperation, and how, on the other hand, 
CMEA members could use these instruments for their own benefit to maximise their 
advantages from cooperation, while failing to fulfil commitments which they 
perceived as disadvantageous or unfair.
Chapter 3 discusses determinants of the formulation and implementation of 
CMEA strategies of cooperation in the years 1953-1984. It examines CMEA 
objectives and the postulated mechanisms for their implementation as outlined in the 
programmatic documents and contrasts them with the actual political and economic 
functions of CMEA. The chapter looks at the direct reasons for the failure of the 
policy of cooperation, including factors, such as CMEA members’ lack of interest in
9the development of specialisation and cooperation agreements, and problems with the 
fulfilment of commitments because of financial constraints and shortages. It then 
identifies the underlying causes of the problems which prevented the achievement of 
CMEA objectives and shows that these were partly a consequence of the limitations 
of domestic and CMEA economic mechanisms, which did not provide incentives to 
undertake specialisation, and partly the result of East European resistance to Soviet 
measures which imposed unfair terms of cooperation. By demonstrating that the 
problems with the implementation of CMEA strategies derived from the internal logic 
of the Soviet-type model and its consequences as well as from the Soviet Union’s 
attempts at subordinating CMEA to its objectives, the analysis supports the main 
argument of this thesis that, ultimately, the factors which were primarily responsible 
for the failure of the CMEA were the constraints on its operation imposed as a result 
of the primacy of political criteria in Soviet decision-making.
Chapters 4 and 5 examine CMEA’s role in Soviet bloc politics and the attempts at 
reform of the CMEA undertaken from 1985 until 1991 by Gorbachev. Chapter 4 
describes the proposed objectives and methods of CMEA cooperation as an integral 
part of Gorbachev’s strategy to redefine the relationship with Eastern Europe and to 
increase the economic contribution of the region to Soviet objectives. It also 
discusses the impact of the increase in political autonomy of East European countries 
on the politics of integration.
Chapter 5 assesses the implementation of two main Gorbachev’s initiatives: the 
Comprehensive Program for the Scientific and Technical Progress of the CMEA 
Member-Countries up to the Year 2000 (CPSTP), and the campaign to develop direct 
cooperation between enterprises. The discussion demonstrates that the failure of these 
two major strategies was the result of inadequate domestic and CMEA economic 
mechanisms which did not provide incentives for East Europeans to participate, the 
lack of organisational and economic conditions necessary for the postulated
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functioning of CMEA mechanisms and a conflict between the economic interests of 
the East European countries and the requirements of Soviet policy. Moreover, East 
European’s reasons to avoid commitment to CMEA were related to their own 
economic difficulties and lack of prospects that any further investment in CMEA 
would decrease the technological gap between East and West in view of the Soviet 
Union’s relative technological backwardness.
Another approach to the analysis of the reasons for CMEA’s failure is the 
application of regional integration models to the study of CMEA integration. As 
convincingly argued elsewhere (Korbonski in Marer, P. and J. M. Montias, eds.
1980, 356-8) using Western integration theories to the study of Soviet bloc 
integration processes can be regarded as a legitimate method which provides a useful 
analytical tool for making comparisons. In this thesis I will therefore examine CMEA 
experience against the background of existing theories of regional integration which 
outline the conditions necessary for successful integration. While the CMEA practice 
defies almost all of it, that in itself provides grounds for comparisons that highlight 
the reasons for CMEA’s failure.
The process of economic cooperation of Soviet bloc countries was one of several 
attempts at regional integration undertaken in different parts of the world in the post­
war period. Regional economic groupings have also been formed in Western Europe, 
Latin America, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, West, East and Southern Africa and, 
since 1989, in North America. Integration has been seen by participating countries as 
a means to the improvement of the performance of their economies and the 
strengthening of their economic competitiveness in the world market through more 
efficient allocation of resources, increased international specialisation and cooperation 
in production, economies of scale and expanded trade within the region.
The most successful example of these attempts at regional integration has been 
integration of West European countries. It is the only contemporary regional 
organisation characterised by strong integrative tendencies in all major spheres of 
integration: economic, monetary and political, and accompanied by the emergence of 
a sense of supra-national socio-economic community. In this part of the introduction 
I will, therefore, briefly examine the evolution of concepts and integration measures 
in Western Europe and discuss theories aimed at providing an explanation of the 
dynamics of European integration. The discussion will concentrate on the political, 
institutional and economic principles underlying Western European integration and 
will provide an analytical framework for comparisons that highlight the reasons for 
CMEA’s failure.
There is a substantial literature on the subject of regional integration presenting 
theories of integration and testing against the theoretical background the practice of 
integration. Theories of economic and political integration have a lineage that dates 
back at least to the early work of David Mitrany in the 1930s. The basic principles of 
the concept of economic integration in its current form were developed in the wake of 
World War II. The concept was initially concerned primarily with processes of 
economic consultation and cooperation with a view to harmonising economic 
decisions among members of a regional group, and with the forecasting of the 
outcomes of national economic policies. Subsequently, standard theories of regional 
economic integration have defined as the main necessary and sufficient conditions for 
economic integration the following factors: the complementarity of economic 
structures of the cooperating countries, technical infrastructure sufficiently developed 
to permit an increase in the flow of goods and factors of production, and the 
commitment of participating governments to the pursuit of national economic policies 
aimed at facilitating the process of integration. Bela Balassa, in his classical study
(1961, 2) on integration theory has distinguished in the process of economic 
integration the following five consecutive stages:
I. A free trade area which entails the removal of all trade restrictions 
within the area;
II. A customs union - created when a group of countries removes all 
restrictions on mutual trade and also adopts a common system of tariffs 
and quotas with respect to trade with third countries;
III. A common market - created when countries forming a customs 
union remove all restrictions on the movement of factors of production 
(goods, persons, services and capital);
IV. An economic (and monetary) union which has all the features of a 
common market and, in addition, involves the adoption of a joint 
economic strategy which is based on the close coordination of member 
states’ economic policies and the definition of common objectives, the 
conduct of a single monetary policy and exchange rate policy, the 
introduction of a single monetary system, a central bank and a unified 
fiscal system;
V. A full integration which involves the setting up of supranational 
economic structures, unification of economic and monetary policies and 
legislative frameworks of individual states and which entails pressure for 
political integration leading to a political union.
According to regional integration theorists, progress towards integration can be 
measured by examining advancement of integrative tendencies in specific spheres of 
cooperation. Hurwitz (1980, 3-23) has identified three such spheres: institutional, 
socio-psychological and economic exchanges.
For Hurwitz, a key indicator of the strength of integrative tendencies in the 
institutional dimension is the scope and significance of the policy areas subject to 
common decision-making. With regard to the social sphere he suggests that the 
progress of integration is manifested by an appreciation of the need for, and the 
willingness to undertake, the necessary changes in political principles and practices. 
Finally, he argues that the progress of integration in the sphere of economic 
exchanges is indicated by an increase in the flow of goods, services, capital, labor, 
technology and capital.
As mentioned earlier, in the contemporary world, out of several attempts at 
integration, only in one regional grouping - the European Union, have integrative 
processes manifested themselves in all three dimensions. The integration processes 
leading to the establishment of the European Union have also by and large followed 
the stages outlined by Balassa. If present trends continue, analysts predict that its 
evolution towards a full integration involving economic, monetary and some kind of 
political union is inevitable.
The idea of Western European integration originated during World War II. It was 
originally considered in the context of the creation of a security community, where 
differences between individual states are resolved by peaceful means. Jean Monnet 
and Robert Schuman, commonly credited with creating the foundation of a European 
Union were inspired by the idea of creating a European federation - a body that 
would replace national governments.
The development of postwar European economic cooperation was encouraged by 
US policy, and in particular by the Marshall Plan of 1948-51 whose implications for 
Soviet bloc countries will be discussed in Chapter 1. While in the short term the 
Marshall Plan was to assist in the post-war recovery of Western Europe through 
financial assistance and provision of capital goods and raw materials, one of its larger
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objectives was the creation of permanent political and economic institutions and 
mechanisms for a closer economic union within Western Europe, leading ultimately 
to closer political ties and the consolidation of the Western bloc.
The first step towards Western European economic integration was made with the 
creation in 1952 of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) - a limited 
economic association including France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg. The ECSC was based on a sectoral approach to 
integration and was concerned with promoting cooperation and increased efficiency 
of European industry in only one sector - the production and distribution of coal, 
steel and iron.
The progress in the reconstruction of national economies, an increase in their 
potential and the improvement of balance of payments led, however, to the revival of 
concepts of broader economic integration, including all sectors of member 
economies. As a result, in March 1957, in a move aimed at the expansion of their 
cooperation, ECSC members signed the Treaty of Rome establishing the European 
Economic Community (EEC). At the same time they signed a separate Euratom treaty 
to create the European Atomic Energy Community. The Treaty of Rome set the 
timetable for the progressive development of a customs union within twelve years.
The next stage in the development of economic integration was reached with the 
establishment in 1967 of a single European Community (EC) incorporating the three 
existing economic communities: the EEC, Euratom and the ECSC. The ultimate 
objective of the EC was the achievement of economic and monetary union.
Despite numerous initiatives undertaken in the 1970s and the first half of the 
1980s aimed at the formation of a common market and economic union, progress 
towards economic integration was stalled by the impact on member economies of two 
oil crises. The impasse was broken with the signing of the Single European Act
(SEA) in February 1986 amending the Treaty of Rome and setting the objective of the 
completion of a common market by 1992 with the ultimate goal of establishing an 
economic and monetary union. In February 1992 West European integration 
proceeded to the next phase with the signing in Maastricht of the Treaty on European 
Union which paved the way for the completion of economic and monetary union 
including the introduction of a single currency, the ecu, and the conduct of a single 
monetary policy, by 1999 at the latest, and setting up new political structures.
This process of expansion of integration has been the subject of a number of 
theories seeking to explain the motives of member states and the dynamics of 
European integration. The most conventional explanation why states cooperate is 
provided by realism - a school of thought explaining the nature of international 
relations by referring to competition and conflict among national states. Realists argue 
that states are the most important actors in integrational relations, and assume that 
states act rationally and are guided in their actions by self-interest. Realists emphasise 
the importance of military security as a primary consideration in determining the 
policies of the states. Realists accordingly see Western economic integration as a 
process conducted by sovereign states which retain authority over their own affairs, 
delegate power to new cooperative bodies only when it coincides with their national 
objectives, and retain the right to take back that power at any time. In short, they 
believe that the EU exists only because the member states have decided that it can be 
instrumental in protecting their national interests.
Realism, with its stress on the self-interest of cooperating states, provides, 
however, only a partial explanation of how the EU has evolved. The major theories 
of integration attempting to fill in this gap and explain the dynamics of European 
integration by examining the influence of other factors on the integration processes 
are federalism, functionalism and neofunctionalism.
For the proponents of federalism the prime factors at work in European 
integration are institutional structures and processes. The federalists regard them as 
the actual ‘driving forces’ behind the development of cooperation, including in the 
economic sphere. The federalist concept of regional integration is based on the 
assumption that the participants give up overall sovereignty to a new central authority 
while retaining a large measure of autonomy over local government. The federalist 
concept inspired the initial integration schemes proposed by Monnet and Schuman 
who saw it as the first step in a process that would lead to a political integration 
replacing national governments.
In practice, however, the European Union is still far from reaching the stage of 
political integration federalists had envisaged, as the governments of the member 
states continue to make the key policy decisions and have not yet transferred as many 
powers to EU institutions as the federalists postulated. They have given up powers 
over technical, social and economic tasks but have been so far unwilling to give up 
political powers to the ‘governing’ body. As Keohane and Hoffmann (1990, 199) 
have noted, central institutions are largely inter-govemmental, more concerned with 
establishing a common framework than with detailed regulations, and willing to 
tolerate a vast amount of national diversity in standards and practices through a 
mutual recognition. Thus, while in comparison with the authority of contemporary 
international organisations, the community has considerable autonomy, by standards 
of highly institutionalised modem states, its powers are relatively constrained 
(Keohane and Hoffmann 1990, 279).
The practice of the EU also does not conform to the conception of integration 
outlined by the classic functionalist theory, which offers a conflicting view of the 
nature of inter-state relations to that provided by realists. Functionalism is based on 
the assumption that the primary goals of states are peace and prosperity, to be 
achieved by economic instruments and political action. Functionalists place emphasis
on the common interests of integrating states and argue that states cooperate out of 
need and the motive of integration in Western Europe is mutual convenience or the 
improvement of economic efficiency.
Functionalism is based on the idea that rather than trying to coordinate major 
issues such as economic or defense policy at the national level, regional integration 
can be attained ‘by instalments’ by means of international organisations with 
authority in functionally specific fields. Their cooperation in particular sectors of 
industry would create a network of increasingly stronger international ties and 
processes which would encourage cooperation in other areas. For example the 
harmonisation of technical norms would lead to the need for the elaboration of new 
legal regulations. In short, functionalists argue that integration is a process that has its 
own internal dynamic which gradually generates conditions under which it is more 
advantageous for member states to continue their participation in cooperation than to 
opt out (Haas 1958).
Functionalists, like federalists, envisage a transfer of power to institutions whose 
authority would not derive from the governments of the member states, and a transfer 
of political powers to the central authority. They stress, however, the importance of 
the separation of national political institutions from the cooperation of functionally 
specific international organisations. They argue that functional changes would lead 
national governments to adapt their political and administrative institutions to the 
pressures from sectoral integration from below, ultimately leaving the regulation of 
political aspects to the supranational authority (Mitrany 1966, 73-84). Economic 
integration was thus seen as the first step in a long process that would lead to political 
integration and ultimately to a federal political structure. As Schuman (1992, 58-9) 
put it in the Declaration of 9 May 1950: ‘Europe will not be made all at once or 
according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first 
create a de facto solidarity.’
Functionalism dominated the theoretical debates explaining the dynamics of 
European integration throughout the 1950s. It was influential in the first attempts at 
Western integration embodied in the formation of the ESCS which was based on a 
belief that cooperation in a specific area of the coal and steel industry would 
encourage integration in other areas. However, by the end of the 1950s the functional 
approach was already considered inadequate to explain forces necessary for an 
expansion of integration. Haas’s (1958) study of the ECSC and Lindberg’s (1963) of 
the EEC led to a modification of functionalist theories and the development of 
neofunctionalism. At the core of the neofunctionalist school is the concept of an 
expansive logic of sectoral integration, or a ‘spillover’ effect that Haas saw as being 
inherent in the ESCS (Haas 1958, 283 ff). Haas defined ‘spillover effect’ as a 
situation in which the progress of integration in one sector of individual economies 
increased the pressure for extended cooperation in related sectors. Haas emphasised 
however that the process of spillover was far from automatic. Another proponent of 
neofunctionalism, Nye (1971, 200) defined ‘spillover’ as a situation in which 
‘imbalances created by the functional interdependence or inherent linkages of tasks 
can press political actors to redefine their common tasks’.
Neofunctionalists distinguish between several kinds of ‘spillover’ depending on 
the sphere of their operation. The functional spillover implies that as a result of the 
impossibility of isolating one economic sector from another, if states integrate one 
sector of their economies, this will lead to an increase in the level of cooperation in 
other sectors. This process will ultimately lead to a complete economic and political 
union as the growth of many functional international organisations would cause the 
decline in the relative power of national governments. The technical spillover denotes 
the process leading individual states to adopt uniform standards. The political 
spillover is based on the argument that once different functional sectors become 
integrated, politics would increasingly be played out at the regional rather than the
national level as transnational interest groups would increasingly press for an increase 
in the extent of Community decision-making in new areas (George 1990, 21).
Neofunctionalists emphasise that an analysis of forces behind the progress of 
regional integration has to take into account other elements in addition to the 
functional linkage of tasks. Haas (1968, xiv-xv) in the revised edition of ‘The 
Uniting of Europe’ argued that functional theory had paid too little attention to the 
influence of external factors such as economic and military threats from the outside, 
changes in attitudes following the formation of regional organisations and social and 
political changes taking place separately from the process of integration. Central to 
the revised neo-functionalist framework developed by Nye (1971, 208-14) was the 
notion that the progress of integration depends on forces and process mechanisms 
that influence political decision-makers to move towards integration. Some of these 
processes are generated by the establishment of new institutions and some result from 
previous policy decisions. Nye identified as process mechanisms of crucial 
importance for the expansion of integration: functional linkage of tasks, rising 
transactions, coalition formation, elite socialisation, the emergence of regional interest 
groups, the development of a sense of collective identity and the involvement of 
external actors. The response of decision-makers to these pressures depends also on 
the strength of structural and perceptual conditions that taken together constitute the 
‘integrative potential’ of the region or country. The conditions that Nye refers to as 
‘structural’ are determined by factors independent of the integration process, while 
the ‘perceptual’ conditions are strongly influenced by the process of integration. 
‘Structural’ conditions include the economic equality or compatibility of the states 
involved, the nature of a central motive force behind integration efforts, the similarity 
of values of groups that control economic policy in the member states, the capacity of 
the member states to adapt and respond to integration pressures and the existence of
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pluralism or interest group activity. ‘Perceptual’ conditions include perceived equity 
of distribution of benefits, perceived external cogency and low visible costs.
While in comparison with other integration theories, neofunctionalists provided 
many new insights into the mechanism of expansion of integration, they could not, 
however, adequately explain unexpected changes in the dynamics of integration, in 
particular the slowing down of integration processes in the mid-1970s, or a dramatic 
shift towards centralisation of decision-making in the mid-1980s. According to the 
theory, inherent in the internal logic of spillover is the systematic deepening of 
integration process. In practice, however, despite numerous initiatives in the 1970s 
aimed at the formation of economic and monetary union, this objective could 
materialise only as a result of the Single European Act in February 1986.
Furthermore, according to neofunctionalist theory, common integrational 
problems can be easily resolved by an expansion of regional economic ties provided 
there are legal and institutional processes and structures in place. In reality, however, 
the European Commission was not providing the kind of leadership that was vital to 
the idea of neofunctionalism. Moreover, in many instances supranational problems, 
for example transport policies in the 1960s and research-development initiatives in the 
1970s, were adequately solved by the measures of individual governments.
Some theorists have even questioned the notion that progress of integration is 
caused by ‘spillover’. In their opinion, the Western European experience has shown 
that deliberate political decisions rather than functional or technical pressures are the 
main reasons for the expansion of integration (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990, 459).
These criticisms were addressed by new followers of neofunctionalism.
Keohanne and Hoffmann (1990) in their study of decision-making in the European 
Community agree that spillover does not account adequately for the major decisions, 
such as those of the Milan summit in 1985 and the SEA. They acknowledge that if
spillover and pressure from the European institutions had been sufficient to create 
such a substantive change, it would have been accomplished much earlier. In their 
opinion, this does not mean, however, that spillover is not an important concept in 
explaining task expansion in the Community, but that it needs to be seen in 
conjunction with other broader influences and pressures (Keohanne and Hoffmann 
1990, 285-7).
In order to explain the unexpected institutional change of the 1986 Single 
European Act, and the strengthening of Community institutions which has occurred 
in the 1980s they make a number of arguments about the nature of integration. First, 
they stress the crucial role of governments in the negotiations and ratification of the 
SEA, arguing that the treaty was a consequence of a series of mutually beneficial 
intergovernmental bargains. Once a bargain has been made, there can be an 
expansion of integration processes as a result of linkages amongst sectors, as 
envisaged by the functionalist theory (Keohanne and Hoffmann 1990, 292-3).
Second, Keohanne and Hoffmann argue that rather than a direct consequence of 
the internal logic of spillover, the SEA must be seen as a form of adaptation to 
pressures from the global economy, especially the turmoil in the global currency 
markets in the 1970s and growing economic competition from Japan and the United 
States in the mid-1980s. The fear of losing their economic position created an 
incentive for the member countries to initiate common policies in order to attain 
sufficient economies of scale and the technological capability essential to compete 
successfully in world markets (Keohanne and Hoffmann 1990, 285).
Finally, they argue that changes in the European Community policy and policy­
making structures resulted from a convergence of national government preferences 
rather than from internal or external pressures. The convergence of the interests of the 
member countries depended primarily on a definition of national interest based on a
22
perception that a greater involvement in integration is beneficial for their economic 
policy goals. Furthermore, the intergovernmental bargain was conditional on shared 
objectives with respect to proposed integration policies, and on subjective similarity - 
a belief on the part of the policy-makers that a similarity of objectives exists 
(Keohanne and Hoffmann 1990, 288).
In the case of the SEA its ratification resulted from a convergence of national 
interests around a new, neo-liberal, deregulatory pattern of economic policy-making 
of the 1980s. Furthermore, the incentives for institutional change were created as a 
result of the enlargement of the Community to 12 members which made it necessary 
to change the existing voting procedures to outvote recalcitrant governments. Under 
those conditions member countries began to see the institutionalisation of the 
deregulatory process and increases in the power of the Commission, as well as the 
introduction of qualified majority voting, as necessary for attaining measurable 
benefits from deregulation. In particular, these changes were seen as the most 
credible guarantee of ensuring that their partners would also open their markets. This 
resulted in the decisions by governments to focus on the removal of physical, 
technical and fiscal barriers rather than on the establishment of common means of 
intervention in the economies and to press, in their own interest, for institutional 
changes that would permit such a policy to be carried out. Without this new 
perception of the EC and corresponding policy shifts no consensus could have been 
reached on a program to dismantle barriers within Europe, and on the renunciation of 
the practice of unanimity under which decision-making was becoming virtually 
impossible. These underpinnings for the intergovernmental bargain of the SEA had 
little to do with spillover which explains neither mutual recognition nor deregulation 
or incentives for change as a result of enlargement (Keohanne and Hoffmann 1990, 
288-9).
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The preceding summary of major theories of regional integration suggests that 
each of them provides only a partial explanation of the forces behind the process of 
Western European integration. In essence, the three major theories differ on the 
question as to which of the major spheres of cooperation should be regarded as 
having been of critical importance for the expansion of integration. For federalists, 
institutional structures and processes have been of decisive importance. For 
functionalists an expansion of integration processes takes place as a result of 
cooperation between international agencies regulating and coordinating issues in the 
specific sectors of the sphere of exchanges. Finally, neofunctionalists emphasise the 
important role of shared values and perceptions among policy makers and interest 
groups, and the development of a sense of identity, as the prerequisites for the 
expansion of integration resulting from spillover. The experience of West European 
integration, characterised by the progress of integrative processes in all those 
spheres, defies, therefore, some of these assumptions of integration theories.
Moreover, terms such as federal, confederal, intergovernmental, and 
supranational have only limited value in describing and understanding the decision­
making processes within the Community. Keohane and Hoffmann (1990, 280) have 
noted that all the intergovernmental bargains that were essential to the development of 
a single market were consistent in general terms with the confederal model. 
Confederalism alone does not, however, adequately explain the complexity of the 
interest-based bargaining that characterised the process of negotiations in the 
Community and the relative balance of power among national governments and the 
EU institutions. To define the nature of this decision-making process they suggest 
adopting Haas’s (in Graubard ed. 1964, 64, 66) notion of supranationality, 
understood as a style of decision-making in which the participants seek to attain 
agreement by means of compromises for their mutual benefit. In other words, 
Keohane and Hoffmann (1990, 277) argue, that the EC institutions did not exercise
authority over national governments, and West European integration can be best 
described as an attempt at pooling sovereignty, not at transferring it from states to 
supranational institutions.
Despite these problems with defining the nature of West European integration, 
and the nature of its decision-making, these major theories of integration provide 
many useful concepts which help to explain the progress of integration. While CMEA 
experience defies most of these explanations, that in itself provides ground for 
comparisons that highlight the reasons for CMEA’s failure which is the subject of 
this thesis. In this section, I will therefore identify the political, institutional and 
economic principles and mechanisms of CMEA cooperation and contrast them with 
the principles underlying the successful EU integration. Moreover in an attempt to 
provide a conceptual framework for the comparative analysis of the CMEA and the 
EU, I will use the neo-functionalist framework developed by Nye which examines 
the factors and process mechanisms which were of critical importance for the 
expansion of West European integration. I will argue that, in comparison with 
Western European integration, the CMEA was characterised by low levels of process 
mechanisms and weak integrative potential and that, despite the Soviet Union’s 
pressures, these characteristics militated against CMEA integration.
In terms of underlying political principles West European integration has been 
based on an agreement among formally equal nation states which had strong 
institutional safeguards built into the Rome Treaty to protect the weaker members. 
This does not mean that some states, in particular Germany and France, have not 
exercised considerably more influence than others because of their size, economic 
potential, and political leverage. However, these obvious differences among the 
member states notwithstanding, the process of cooperation has been the outcome not 
of coercion but of the voluntary cooperation of sovereign countries perceiving their 
participation in integration as beneficial for the performance of their national
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economies and willing to enter intergovernmental bargains, make compromises and 
closely coordinate their economic policies.
These principles stand in contrast to CMEA’s experience which was characterised 
by an asymmetry between the Soviet Union’s political and military power and 
economic resources and the position of the remaining member countries. Most 
importantly, the integration of CMEA countries was not a voluntary act of interested 
states, but the result of the Soviet Union's political domination over other members 
of the Soviet bloc. As a consequence, the Soviet Union exercised enormous political 
influence on CMEA decision-making, an influence which, as is argued throughout 
the thesis, was not guided by economic criteria alone. Thus, apart from having 
economic objectives, cooperation was undertaken as a means of using economic 
subordination to secure effective Soviet political control over the region. These wider 
political conditions meant that the framework for agreement and disagreement among 
CMEA members was different from that of Western integration, as East European 
countries tried to avoid participation in those CMEA undertakings which could have 
resulted in the Soviet Union’s increasing its control over their economic policies or 
might have involved major costs for their economies.
These differences with regard to political principles also had major consequences 
for the institutional principles and the decision-making processes of both 
organisations. The European Union is governed by common policy-making 
institutions: the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European 
Parliament and Court of Justice. These institutions have authority to formulate and 
negotiate a framework of economic policies on behalf of its members, with the 
Council of Ministers being the major decision-making body. As McCormick (1996, 
3) has noted, the EU is not yet a political federation or even a confederation, but its 
autonomous powers have grown steadily since the 1950s at the expense of states’ 
sovereignty. As a result of this process, individual states no longer have supremacy
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over all other authorities within their traditional territory and on certain issues can no 
longer veto proposals before the Council. Moreover, member countries agreed in 
1986 to adopt decisions by a qualified majority not only on issues related to the 
internal market, but also on issues related to the common agricultural policy and 
external trade policy. Despite the considerable autonomy of the EU’s policy-making 
institutions, national governments continue to play a dominant role in the decision­
making process, as the EU institutions have full power to act for states only in 
external trade matters, with no more than a power of coordination over the rest of 
foreign policy.
The EU has also its own set of laws adopted by the Council of Ministers 
and interpreted by the Court of Justice. Member countries of the EC adopted 
the principle of supremacy of Community laws over the laws of member 
governments and the obligation of member states to implement binding national 
acts consistent with Community directives. By the standards of an international 
organisation EU members have been observing these rules to an unprecedented 
degree. At the same time, in comparison with the authority of a modem state, 
there are many instances of deliberate non-compliance or faulty compliance of 
Community laws as a result of problems with enforcement at lower levels of 
administration (Keohane and Hoffmann 1990, 278-9).
In the case of CMEA, the fear of subordination of national economic 
policies to Soviet priorities, in particular by means of supranational authority 
with directive powers to allocate resources, which would allow the Soviet 
Union to impose directly its own economic preferences on East European 
countries, led to procedures safeguarding formal sovereignty and voluntary 
participation of each country in any CMEA undertaking. These powers 
accorded to the national governments determined the formal powers of CMEA 
organs and decision-making procedures. As formal decision-making authority
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rested entirely with the individual countries, CMEA institutions did not have 
powers to issue directives binding on national economic bodies but possessed 
only advisory and recommendatory powers. Thus CMEA was an organisation 
with consultative and coordinating functions but without effective formal 
powers to enforce its recommendations. These limited powers of CMEA 
bodies further strengthened the formal autonomy of the national authorities of 
CMEA members based on the State ownership and regulation of economic 
activities through the State plan.
Finally, there were fundamental differences between the economic 
principles on which CMEA and West European integration were based. In 
Western economies regulated by market instruments, international exchanges 
are conducted primarily by private enterprises guided by profit considerations. 
Hence West European integration policies are aimed at the liberalisation of 
regional exchanges through a gradual elimination of barriers to the movement 
of goods, factors of production and capital across national boundaries and the 
harmonisation of national monetary and fiscal policies.
By contrast, CMEA integration involved centrally planned economies, 
with the State and planned regulation of economic processes substituting for the 
market as the regulator of economic processes. As a consequence, CMEA 
integration relied on direct administrative methods for the management of 
economic relations between its members, primarily the bilateral coordination of 
plans for the basic sectors of the national economies and trade agreements. The 
main decision-making functions were fulfilled by the individual states and 
central national planning bodies which decided major economic issues on 
behalf of enterprises. Until Gorbachev’s reforms, direct links between 
enterprises consisted in the implementation of decisions in accordance with the
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terms of agreements previously decided at the central level during the 
coordination of plans.
Another tool for analysing the reasons for the failure of CMEA integration 
is Nye’s neo-functionalist model which has been outlined earlier. By 
integrating this theoretical framework with an empirical analysis of CMEA 
integration it is possible to demonstrate that the process mechanisms and the 
‘integrative potential’ of the region which had been of critical importance in 
relation to the development of EC integration were either insignificant or had 
little applicability in relation to CMEA.
First of all, by using the neo-functionalist criteria the discussion in the 
thesis demonstrates that process mechanisms which should have been of 
decisive importance for an increase in the levels of cooperation, such as 
spillover effect, rising transactions, in particular an increase in cooperation 
based on specialisation and production ties, coalition formation, elite 
socialisation, the emergence of regional interest groups, the development of a 
sense of collective identity and the involvement of external actors, in CMEA 
practice did not have a major impact on the progress of integration.
Furthermore, it will be shown that process mechanisms related to regional 
group formation, elite socialisation and the development of a sense of collective 
identity had little applicability to CMEA because of conflicting interests among 
national political leaders, central planners and interest groups. On the contrary, 
CMEA cooperation was characterised by the continued existence of divergent 
national interests articulated by different countries in the region which stood in 
the way of reaching mutually beneficial compromises necessary for the 
expansion of integration.
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An analysis of CMEA operation shows also that the structural and 
perceptual conditions were also not conducive to integration. With regard to 
structural conditions, the ‘integrative potential’ of Soviet bloc countries was 
weak because of the differences in the levels of economic development, and in 
the natural resource endowments among individual countries and the similarity 
of national industrial structures. In addition, the capacity of member states to 
adapt and respond to signals and pressures originating in the integrative process 
was low, both because of the unwillingness of members to act in concert with 
each other, and because of the limited actual power of political and economic 
decision-makers to control the economy due to the lack of workable 
mechanisms to implement integration policies effectively. Other structural 
conditions had little relevance to CMEA. For instance, interest or pressure 
groups which have played a major part in strengthening integrative tendencies 
in Western Europe were not an important factor in CMEA political and 
economic decision-making. One of the reasons was that political and economic 
elites, including managers, were not interested in exports and powerful 
interests groups had a vested interest in the maintenance of the status quo rather 
than in the introduction of new technologies or raising the standards of 
production. Furthermore, there was little value complementarity among CMEA 
policy-makers which was manifested in strong differences of opinion over the 
pace and direction of economic reforms, conflicts of commercial interests and 
fears among some members for their economic sovereignty. Finally, perceptual 
conditions also did not encourage East European decision-makers to further 
integration as CMEA integration was perceived by most East European partners 
as a primarily political rather than an economic integrative device operating 
largely for the benefit of the Soviet Union.
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By arguing the importance of political factors in determining the CMEA 
mechanisms and the choices made by participants, this thesis aims to make a small 
contribution towards the task of filling a significant gap in the literature on CMEA 
integration.
The subject of economic relations between Soviet bloc countries in general and 
the operation of CMEA in particular have been examined in numerous studies, both 
in Western and Soviet bloc literature. These studies were, however, primarily 
concerned with economic mechanisms involved in economic integration within 
CMEA, not with strategic and political factors which produced dysfunctional 
institutional arrangements leading to the actions of individual countries which 
undermined cooperative arrangements. For example, major Western studies on 
CMEA integration and its specific forms by Kaser (1965), van Brabant (1989), 
Holzman (1974, 1987) and Zwass (1989) were concerned with the economic aspects 
of the integration mechanisms such as trade, payments and economic cooperation 
arrangements. These studies focused on the flaws of CMEA economic mechanisms 
and their ineffectiveness in the achievement of the CMEA’s objectives as the main 
reason for the failure of integration efforts. This does not mean that these studies 
analysed the operation of CMEA in a political vacuum. However they did not 
undertake a comprehensive examination of the connection between the political 
objectives of the Soviet Union in the region and the dynamics of integration.
This approach, which ignores the fact that the Soviet integration policy was 
driven by political considerations, does not offer a wholly adequate explanation for 
the failure of CMEA. While an analysis of basic economic integration mechanisms is 
necessary to explain the technical barriers to cooperation, it is not sufficient to explain 
the persistence of dysfunctional CMEA mechanisms, and proved to have little 
predictive value. Furthermore, approaches which ignored the predominant 
importance of political factors implied that all CMEA members had equal decision-
making powers. This approach led to misinterpretation of the motives of individual 
members and incorrect assessments of their actual power to determine the outcomes.
Towards the completion of my thesis a study written by Stone (1996) was 
published whose objective was also to analyse Soviet integration policies from the 
perspective of political science and economics. His book provides a detailed account 
of the formulation of CMEA strategies and the negotiation process as well as the 
implementation of programs, based on confidential reports from Soviet and East 
European archives and interviews with highly-placed Soviet bloc trade officials. In 
what follows I have used the findings from Stone’s research to support arguments 
which I had earlier formulated on the basis of official publications and reports.
Stone’s study has involved conclusions complementary to my own, and has 
confirmed many of the points I have made. However, Stone’s principal explanations 
of the failure of CMEA polices have differed from mine. His study is based on an 
assertion that since the late 1950s, Eastern Europe was subsidised by the Soviet 
Union. His evidence for this claim is that East European states ran a trade surplus 
with the Soviet Union in the overpriced categories of machinery and equipment and 
ran a deficit in the subsidized categories of energy and raw materials. He also claims 
that the Soviet subsidy spiralled out of control, a claim that is not supported by 
evidence.
Stone has argued that the the size of the Soviet subsidy to each country was a 
primary issue in trade negotiations, and determined the implementation of strategies 
by East European members. Thus, the CMEA strategies could not be implemented 
because the East Europeans opposed the Soviet Union’s attempts to restrict subsidies 
by improving its terms of trade and pursued policies to optimise the structure of their 
exports and to avoid costly investments. He also blames for the lack of progress in
the implementation of CMEA programs the Soviet bureaucracy which did not have 
incentives to represent Soviet national interests.
Stone has also argued that the Soviet Union did not exploit East European 
economic dependence and did not link subsidy and pressure on individual countries 
because institutional constraints prevented Soviet negotiators from making effective 
linkages between between trade negotiations and political issues. On this basis alone, 
he disagrees with the proposition, well-established in studies of Soviet-East 
European relations, that Soviet trade and economic policy was linked to security 
objectives and political relations.
I disagree, first of all, with Stone’s conclusion regarding the role of Soviet trade 
policy in advancing Soviet political interests. I argue that the Soviet Union used 
economic links instrumentally for political ends by maintaining the system of 
exchanges based on an artificial pricing system, and through the imposition of export 
specialization directions and joint investments which encouraged dependence of East 
European members on the Soviet economy and prevented East European countries 
from developing economic ties outside the CMEA.
Furthermore, I disagree with Stone’s claim that the failure of CMEA policies was 
the result of the East European countries’ desire to maximise subsidies. Even if the 
subsidies were as substantial as claimed by some writers, (albeit I cite evidence to the 
contrary), there is no evidence that East European countries were motivated by the 
size of the subsidies in making decisions about their exports or participation in 
specialisation agreements. The main preoccupation of East European countries was to 
secure Soviet market for their manufactures, and to maintain and, indeed, increase the 
levels of raw material imports from the USSR. This task began to be increasingly 
difficult from the mid-1970s due to factors such as Soviet cuts of deliveries and 
specific demands regarding the composition and quality of East European imports.
Given these constraints on East European exchanges with the Soviet Union, the 
desire to ensure supplies of the raw materials vital for the stability of their economies 
can not be equated with an attempt to maximise subsidies.
Finally, I disagree with Stone’s limitation of the explanation of the failure of 
Soviet bloc integration efforts to the issue of subsidy, and commercial interests.
While I adopt a similar approach to the explanation of the failure of CMEA 
integrationist policies by looking at the motives of the basic units involved in 
integration, in explaining their actions I consider it necessary to look at the internal 
logic of the underlying mechanisms of cooperation involving the basic economic 
instruments of CMEA economies, the constraints on CMEA mechanisms and the 
conditions of cooperation. Thus I argue that while East European resistance to Soviet 
initiatives contributed to the failure of CMEA, the main reason was the lack of 
effective instruments for international economic cooperation among Soviet bloc 
economies, and structural barriers to economic cooperation stemming from domestic 
economic difficulties and the technological gap dividing CMEA market from world 
economies. Furthermore, I argue that as the institutional arrangements of the 
economic system of CMEA members were imposed by the Soviet Union, and CMEA 
objectives and mechanisms could not conflict with Soviet political objectives in the 
region, then, ultimately, the primary factor responsible for the failure of integration 
was the dominance of political criteria in Soviet decision-making on CMEA which 
hampered the creation of the conditions necessary for successful cooperation.
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CHAPTER ONE
1949-1953: PRESSURE FOR COOPERATION WITHIN THE COUNCIL 
FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE UNDER STALIN.
This chapter discusses pressure on cooperation within the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA) during the Stalinist period until 1953. It begins with a 
discussion of political relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern European 
countries. The discussion includes the examination of the objectives of Soviet foreign 
policy in Eastern Europe and methods applied by Stalin to establish and maintain Soviet 
hegemony over the region. The chapter also examines the ideological doctrines justifying 
Soviet domination of the bloc, and enshrining principles governing intra-bloc relations. 
Furthermore, the chapter looks at a relationship between Stalin’s strategy in Eastern 
Europe and the dynamics of the international situation during that period, in particular, 
Soviet perceptions of and responses to post-war Western policies and integration 
measures. This analysis highlights interrelationships between the role of CMEA and 
Soviet foreign and domestic priorities.
The discussion of CMEA operation includes postulated and actual CMEA objectives, 
policies and mechanisms of cooperation, and the actual structure and dynamics of 
economic links. This part of the chapter focuses on the political aspects of CMEA 
operation such as the Soviet approach to economic cooperation and the response of East 
European countries and the relative importance of economic considerations in the process 
of formulation and implementation of intra-bloc economic policies. It also demonstrates 
how the conflicts between the formal and informal methods of managing bloc relations 
affected the functioning of CMEA. I will argue that the major constraints on the 
formulation and implementation of CMEA cooperation strategy were political in nature: 
the CMEA operation was determined above all by Soviet political objectives in Eastern 
Europe and by mechanisms established for the subordination of bloc countries.
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For the purpose of this dissertation, the Stalinist period is regarded as a distinct stage 
in Soviet-East European relations, which should be examined separately, for the 
following reasons. Firstly, Stalinist policies in Eastern Europe represented in their later 
phase an extreme case of Soviet domination of the region in ideological, political and 
economic spheres and thus will provide a useful comparative background for a study of 
the relationship between subsequent changes in the pattern of Soviet-East European 
relations and intra-bloc economic policies. Secondly, the policies implemented during 
this period laid the foundations of the economic institutions and industrial structures 
which determined, to a large extent, the process of integration within the CMEA for the 
next forty years, and therefore the discussion of their origins will place in proper 
perspective an analysis of the functioning of CMEA in the following chapters.
1945-1947: Origins of Soviet domination. Early pattern of Soviet policy
in Eastern Europe.
The foundations for the political division of Europe and the subordination of Eastern 
Europe to Soviet domination were laid during the Second World War as a result of 
military operations and the political calculations of the allied powers. The region was 
deemed to be vital to Soviet security, and the Soviet Union was determined to use its 
hard-won victories in the war to protect itself from another invasion from the West by the 
creation of a buffer zone to the west of the Soviet border. Stalin apparently regarded it as 
his inalienable right to decide the political order of those territories which were occupied 
by the Red Army (Djilas 1962, 114), and his claims to the Soviet sphere of influence 
were apparently acknowledged by the Western powers. Apart from a conference in 
Tehran in November 1943, and an agreement in 1944 on the occupation zones in 
Germany, this process had primarily an informal character and entailed tacit acceptance 
by the Western allies of the policy of accomplished facts in the sphere of Soviet military 
operation (Kersten 1995, 22). Throughout 1943-44 Roosevelt had also indicated that he 
understood the need for a Polish government that would be friendly to the Soviet Union.
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In October 1944 Churchill promised to recognize Soviet domination in Rumania and 
Bulgaria in return for British primacy in Greece, and thus tacitly recognised the division 
of Europe into spheres of influence (La Feber 1980, 13-6).
The Yalta agreements in February 1945 were a natural consequence of this process 
and therefore its terms seemed to indicate to Stalin that his allies had at least acquiesced to 
his domination over Eastern Europe. On the one hand, the letter and spirit of the 
agreements expressed Western principles on post-war order and provided for the 
formation of interim governments which would be democratic and representative of each 
country’s various political parties, and would be pledged to the holding of ‘free and 
unfettered elections’ (Davis 1974, 183). On the other hand, however, the terms of 
agreements reflecting the existing balance of power were so broad that in practice they 
gave Stalin unlimited freedom of action in Eastern Europe. The final diplomatic act which 
placed the region under Soviet influence was the division of Europe along the Laba River 
at the Potsdam conference in July 1945.
The assessment of the responsibility for the post-Yalta division of Europe and the 
inevitability of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe is a separate issue, which obviously 
cannot be dealt with in this dissertation. 1 For our purposes the important point is that in 
the course of the first post-war years Stalin’s policy was consistent in its ruthless pursuit 
of securing Soviet control over strategic areas by both diplomatic and military means, 
and that by the beginning of 1948 East European countries were under total communist 
domination.
The first step in establishing control over Eastern Europe was the setting up of 
communist-controlled coalition governments, based on national fronts. Regardless of the 
actual representation of political forces, communist parties were placed in charge of key
1 In Western literature, two distinct schools of opinion have emerged concerning the responsibility 
for the division of Europe and the Cold War. For conservative scholars the more ‘politically 
correct’ line has been to blame Stalin for breaking the ‘contract’. On the other hand, liberals, not 
to mention those on Ithe left, have argued that the responsibility rests with the imperialist US 
policy.
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ministries: the military and security apparatus. In Poland, the Polish Committee of 
National Liberation (PKWN), controlled by communists, was formed by Stalin as early 
as 22 July 1944 on the Polish territory newly liberated by the Red Army. In June 1945, 
at a conference held in Moscow, it was replaced by the government of national unity 
which was nominally a coalition of five parties and included more representatives of non­
communist parties, but de facto was dominated by the Polish (Communist) Workers 
Party (PPR).l
The Soviet Union’s direct interference in internal politics of East European countries 
was also evident in the support lent to local communist parties in their struggle with 
political opponents (Dmitrow 1989, 13).2 In Poland, for instance, Soviet military 
backing and the involvement of NKVD agents, who occupied key positions in the Polish 
intelligence, in the mechanism of repression were critical factors in the gradual taking 
over of political power by local communists. Furthermore, in the economic sphere, East 
European governments, under Soviet pressure, initiated socialist transformations of 
national economies, such as land reform and collectivisation, the nationalisation of major 
industries, banks, domestic and foreign trade and monetary reforms, which secured an 
increased role for the state in the management of the economy.
However, despite Soviet military presence and interference in internal politics, East 
European ‘coalition’ governments were still allowed in the course of the next two years 
to pursue domestic economic policies which diverged from Soviet experience and 
reflected differences in local social and economic needs and constraints. As a
^The government was recognised a few days later by the United Kingdom and the United States 
upon the condition that this government would be an interim one until free elections could be 
held. In the opinion of a distinguished Polish historian, this represented the next step in the 
‘betrayal’ of Poland by Western powers which had begun before the Yalta agreement (Kersten 
1995, 22).
^At the close of war in the majority of East European countries, communist parties had a narrow 
popular base, insufficient for them to secure power by democratic means. Only in the 
Czechoslovakian elections in 1946 did communists gain a relatively high share of votes, 38 per 
cent (Albert 1991, 569).
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consequence, the nature of systemic transformations varied considerably from country to 
country and their pace was more cautious than the original Soviet pattern. 1
These differences in approach to the post-war reconstruction of economies and the 
formation of the basis for industrial expansion were also reflected in differing annual 
rates of capital investment. Likewise, the introduction of planning in economic 
management, including the drawing up of the first comprehensive developmental plans in 
1947, took place independently, with the end years of the plans different for each 
country. The plans focused on reconstruction and full utilization of resources, but there 
were considerable variations in the relative importance given to particular sectors of the 
economy. To a large degree the plans had the character of general directives and were 
worked out in detail only for such important economic sectors as large-scale industry and 
transport.
The degree to which the policies diverged from the Soviet model varied from country 
to country. A Polish communist leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, who was against speedy 
collectivisation and imitation of Soviet methods without regard for peculiarities of the 
country’s social and economic structures had insisted on a course which differed in so 
many respects from Soviet practices, that it was branded as the distinct Polish road to 
socialism (Dziewanowski 1976, 211-2).
The pursuit of a relatively independent political line did not mean that these local 
leaders were not committed to the ultimate goal of a purely communist government or 
were disloyal to Moscow. It was rather the case that they accepted the participation of 
communist parties in national fronts and the gradual increase of influence of their parties 
as a temporary tactical necessity in the transitional period.^
^For differences in economic policies in individual countries during the phase of reconstruction see 
Economic Commission for Europe 1953, 21-6. In Poland the pace of collectivisation was much 
slower than in other bloc countries and until the middle of 1948 rumours of impending 
collectivisations were branded as ‘reactionary gossip’ or an ‘oversimplification of the tempo of 
historical process’ (Dziewanowski 1976, 198).
2 According to a Polish historian, both Stalin and local communist party leaders as early as 1945- 
46 excluded the possibility of operation of independent political forces opposed to the political and
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Moreover, as will be discussed later, a political approach of ‘nationalistic 
communists’, which has been also defined by Brzezinski (1979, 52-8) as ‘domesticism , 
was consistent with Soviet policy prescriptions in the ‘new democracy’ doctrine 
espoused until the end of 1947 which allowed East European countries a degree of 
political and economic autonomy and institutional diversity.
A similar strategy, combining control and relative autonomy, characterised Soviet 
policy towards inter-state relations within its sphere of influence. On the one hand, the 
Soviet Union began to develop a network of bilateral relations with East European 
countries. On the other, Moscow sanctioned initiatives advanced by the individual 
communist leaders to form regional political federations or multilateral commissions for 
economic cooperation embracing several socialist countries. For example Stalin endorsed 
the proposal of Tito and Dimitrov, the Yugoslav and Bulgarian communist leaders to 
form the Balkan Federation scheme. He also approved of the July 1947 agreement of the 
Czechoslovak and Polish governments to establish a permanent economic council for the 
economic integration of the two national economies, which Hungary was to join later 
(Brzezinski 1979, 55).
The dual focus also characterised the Soviet approach to foreign economic relations 
in the region. The degree of independence was indicated by the active role assigned by 
East European states to foreign trade in their strategies of economic reconstruction and 
development, and in the geographical directions of their foreign trade exchanges. During 
1945-48 the countries of this region regarded foreign trade as an important instrument of 
economic growth, with the overwhelming share of their imports, in particular of 
machinery, equipment and raw materials coming from the West (Economic Commission 
for Europe 1948, 144).
economic transformations. Wladyslaw Gomulka, expressed his commitment to the idea of purely 
communist government as early as 1945. He stated that in Poland the only kind of opposition 
which might be permitted is the one which ‘does not seek to overthrow existing government’ 
(Duraczynski 1989, 14).
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For example, in the first half of 1947, Czechoslovak imports from Western Europe, 
the United States and other overseas countries represented 87 per cent of her total 
imports, while imports from Eastern Europe were 10 per cent and from the Soviet Union 
3 per cent. Her exports to these areas were 80 per cent, 15 per cent and 5 per cent 
respectively. In the first half of 1948 Czechoslovakia imported from the West 68 per cent 
of her iron ore, 95 per cent of her copper, 98 per cent of her aluminum, 85 per cent of 
her wool and 93 per cent of essential materials for chemical industries.
In the case of Hungary 63 per cent of imports and 57 per cent of exports came from 
outside Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Economic Commission for Europe 1948, 
144). In Poland’s foreign trade the share of the Soviet Union and other East European 
countries amounted in 1948 to 27 per cent. Exchanges between such countries as 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland and the West continued to grow in 1947-48 at the 
cost of transactions within the bloc. By 1948, only Bulgaria and Rumania depended on 
the communist bloc for more than 50 per cent of their foreign trade (Skilling 1966, 213).
These strong trade ties with the West were partly a result of Western assistance and 
its ability to provide capital goods essential for the reconstruction of economies and 
meeting their industrialisation objectives, and partly a continuation of a traditional system 
of interdependencies and exchanges between Western and Eastern Europe. In the inter­
war period the main trading partners for East European countries were West European 
countries, principally Germany, to which they exported chiefly foodstuffs and raw 
materials, and from which they obtained manufactured goods. Their trade with other East 
European countries, and particularly the Soviet Union, constituted a marginal percentage 
of their total foreign exchanges (Economic Commission for Europe 1949, 139). 1 In 
1938 mutual trade of East European countries accounted for only 10 per cent of their total 
exchanges, with trade with the Soviet Union accounting for only 1-2 per cent. The
* Imports and exports with the USSR and other People’s Democracies amounted in 1937 to 12 per 
cent of total in the case of Bulgaria, 13 for Hungary, 7 for Poland, 18 for Rumania and 11 for 
Czechoslovakia (Brzezinski 1979, 127).
reason for such a small share of mutual trade in their total foreign exchanges was the 
complementarity of economic structures and the resultant similarity of export potential 
and import needs. The only country which developed trade relations with the other 
countries of the region on the basis of exchanges of raw materials and agricultural 
products for industrial goods was Czechoslovakia.
This continuing importance of economic ties with Western countries in satisfying the 
requirements of East European economies explained also the initiative of the Polish and 
Czechoslovak governments to accept assistance under the Marshall Plan, a massive US 
aid program for Europe announced in March 1947, which will be discussed later.
This policy of allowing East European countries relative autonomy in the conduct of 
their foreign economic relations was paralleled by the policy of subordination of their 
economies to Soviet interests. This policy had two distinct directions and in part had a 
distinctly exploitative character. One direction, which assumed a form of structural 
subordination, was to acquire a dominant position in the East European economies. 
Another direction was aimed primarily at meeting the short-term needs of the Soviet 
domestic economy.
Key elements of this strategy included bilateral trade and payment treaties and 
agreements on economic co-operation which the Soviet Union began to conclude as early 
as 1945 (Kaser 1965, 43). Their long-term objective seemed to have been to tie East 
European economies to the Soviet one by creating a network of commercial and financial 
ties at the expense of links with other countries, while in the short-term they met 
immediate needs of the Soviet economy devastated by war. Some of these initial trade 
agreements were manifestly exploitative in nature as they were concluded on terms 
clearly advantageous to the Soviet Union, at prices much below current world market 
prices. 1
* The best documented example of such transactions was the export of Polish coal in the period 
1945-53 on the basis of the agreement of 16 August 1945. In November 1956 the Soviet Union
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Another element of Soviet economic policy towards Eastern Europe serving the 
immediate requirements of the Soviet economy were measures such as the acquisition of 
former Axis countries’ assets, dismantling of factories, reparation payments imposed on 
ex-enemy states and the operation of joint stock companies. While the execution of war 
reparation claims was a legitimate policy, joint ventures were exploitative in character.
The joint companies were run by Soviet advisers and administrators and served as 
instruments of Soviet control over key economic sectors: the development and use of 
resources, manufacturing and transport industries and the banking sector. Capital and 
resources obtained through mixed companies assisted Soviet post-war economic 
recovery and the realization of the exceptionally ambitious objectives of the 1946-1950 
five-year-plan. They exported manufactured goods directly to the Soviet Union, and 
Soviet profits from their activities were tax free. In Rumania, for example, during 1944- 
47 the Soviet Union appropriated through the operation of joint ventures 57 per cent of 
that country’s petroleum output (Sulzberger 1949 a, 14). Marer (in Terry ed. 1984, 156) 
estimated the value of the uncompensated flow of resources from Eastern Europe to the 
Soviet Union during the first post-war decade by the Soviet Union to be roughly US $
14 billion.
The new democracy doctrine and its functions
Until 1947 East European states were thus not fully independent, yet they were not 
fully subordinated either. They were characterised by a considerable institutional 
diversity of political and economic systems. The Soviet Union provided justification for 
this relative autonomy of East European countries in conducting their domestic policies in 
doctrines which defined the character of the socio-political order of East European states 
in Marxist-Leninist terms. The elaboration of a Marxist-Leninist theoretical basis for the
was compelled to annul Polish debts as compensation for those deliveries (The Polish-Soviet 
declaration of 18 November 1956, Trybuna Ludu 19 November 1956, quoted in Zinner ed., 1957, 
311).
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justification of its policies towards Eastern Europe was another way of declaring that the 
Soviet Union regarded the region as a part of its sphere of influence.
The initial authoritative interpretation concerning the class nature of the socio-political 
order and the objectives of the newly established states of Eastern Europe was 
expounded in the years 1946-47 and rationalised Soviet policy in the period when East 
European communists shared power in coalition governments. The doctrine referred to 
these states as ‘new democracies’ or ‘democracies of a new type’ stressing that their 
features represented ‘a new phenomenon of social life, created by the unique conditions 
of the contemporary transitory stage of world development’ (Leontiev 1947, 67)
While emphasising the apparent originality of the socio-political and economic 
system of the 'new democracies', the doctrine located these countries in the historical 
process, as viewed by Marxists, as representing ‘a transitory political form on the road 
from capitalism to socialism’ (Varga 1947 in Daniels 142). The identifying feature of 
their political organisation which allowed a classification in these terms was the character 
of the state which was an instrument of political power of the working people (Leontiev 
1947, 67). The doctrine emphasised that despite outward characteristics of bourgeois 
parliamentary democracy, the parliamentary form of the ‘new democracies’ had acquired 
a new meaning, different from bourgeois parliamentarism (Varga 1947 in Daniels 144).
This definition of the political objective and the organisation of a society was thus in 
some respects consistent with the Marxist-Leninist concept of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat which identified it as the political organisation in transition from capitalism to 
communism formed following the socialist revolution and the overthrow of the 
bourgeoisie state, where the power is exercised by the working class in the alliance with 
the peasantry (Brzezinski 1979, 23-4).
^The chief exponents of the doctrine were I.P.Trainin, E.S.Varga and A.Leontiev, all of them 
distinguished Soviet scholars in their respective fields. For a comprehensive discussion of their 
views, and those of their critics see: H.Gordon Skilling, 1951-52, 'People's Democracy' in Soviet 
Theory.' I and II, Soviet Studies 1:16-33; 2:131-149.
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However, despite the pronouncement that the political objective of these countries 
was a transition to socialism, the doctrine did not interpret radical social and economic 
transformations taking place in East European countries, as socialist or proletarian 
revolutions. Nor was it claimed that these measures would lead to socialist revolution. 
Similarly, despite defining the state as the instrument for the political domination of the 
working class, the ‘new democracy’ doctrine did not claim that the ‘new democracies’ 
established the dictatorship of the proletariat as had the Soviet Union.
In accordance with these characteristics of the ‘new democracy’ not as a form of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, but as a new, unique form of social order, the doctrine did 
not prescribe for the newly formed East European states any obligatory organisational 
forms. It accepted the continued existence of parties other than the communist parties and 
their sharing of political power in coalition governments, and considered as equally 
legitimate public, private and cooperative forms of the ownership of means of production 
(Leontiev 1947, 76). In the sphere of international economic relations the 'new 
democracies' were encouraged to cooperate within the bloc, but they were also not 
forbidden from maintaining trade relations with the non-bloc countries as along as the 
latter's aim was not ‘the economic enslavement of the small nations’ (Leontiev 1947,
79).
One purpose of this definition was to legitimize the nature of relationship between the 
Soviet Union and Eastern European states. By stating that the ‘new democracies’ were 
on the way to socialism, the doctrine on the one hand justified Soviet involvement in 
Eastern European affairs and Soviet guidance in policy formulation. At the same time, 
however, by stating that the dictatorship of the proletariat was still considered 
inapplicable to the 'new democracies’, the Soviet Union apparently declared that it was 
committed to the acceptance of diversity and flexibility and did not intend to impose a 
direct Soviet rule over the region. Thus, while the doctrine of ‘new democracy’ did not 
address itself directly to the question of the applicability of Soviet experience in the
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countries of Eastern Europe, these assumptions, by implication, meant the Soviet 
strategy of building a socialist state was not an obligatory but an elective pattern for the 
organization of the political and economic structures of East European countries and that 
they could pursue their own national and distinct roads towards socialism different from 
the Soviet model.
These tenets of the ‘new democracy’ doctrine also had unintended implications. For 
some Soviet and East European theorists such as Eugene Varga, a prominent Hungarian 
economist living in the Soviet Union, the unique character of the political organisation of 
East European states was evidence that the political domination of the working people 
and, hence, the transition to socialism, could be realised in forms other than the 
dictatorship of the proletariat led by a communist party. This interpretation raised also the 
possibility that the ‘new democracies’ represented an original social order neither 
capitalist, nor socialist, but a synthesis of socialist and capitalist elements, ‘a third road’ 
between capitalism and socialism, understood as Soviet-type communism. While it was 
not certainly Varga’s intention, such doctrinal views posed a challenge to the Soviet 
Union’s authority.
In terms of actual policies of Eastern European countries, given the existence in some 
communist parties of opposing factions divided over the scope and pace of the political 
and socio-economic transformations appropriate in given circumstances, the espousal of 
a doctrine which considered new democracies as representing a distinctive and unique 
pattern of transition from capitalism to socialism 1 provided ideological justification for 
the arguments of those East European leaders who, like the Polish communist leader 
Gomulka, insisted that the new regime would follow the ‘specific Polish way to 
socialism’.
 ^Varga (1946, 14) cited in Skilling 1951, 21. Izmenienia v Ekonomike Kapitalisma v Itoge 
Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny (Changes in the Economics of Capitalism as a Result of the Second World 
War) Moscow.
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From the perspective of relations with the West, Soviet endorsement of a degree of 
political pluralism was well positioned to allay some Western fears of Soviet intentions. 
At that time relations between former War allies were already tense, with a gradual 
deterioration beginning in the late spring of 1945 over the political future of Poland, 
German reparations and the US loan promised to the Soviet Union. 1 Tensions had 
increased further in 1946 over delays in the promised withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Iran, conflict with Turkey and Soviet control of Poland. They came to the surface during 
the early part of 1946 when Stalin in his February election speech, and Churchill in his 
‘iron curtain speech’ in March had characterised the international situation in terms of the 
fundamental contradictions between the capitalist and communist systems thus declaring 
the beginning of the cold war.2 This view of the world splitting into two fundamentally 
hostile camps was advanced again in November 1946 by Stalin’s chief ideologue Andrei 
Zhdanov who expounded the doctrine of a division of the world into two diametrically 
opposed camps, with the Soviet Union leading democratic countries (Brzezinski 1979, 
45). Tensions further escalated when the United States officially joined the Cold War 
with the announcement in March 1947 of the Truman doctrine which espoused as a 
guiding principle of US foreign policy the ‘containment’ of communist influence and 
outlined the ideological and economic rationale for economic assistance to Europe 
through the Marshall Plan - a multibillion-dollar aid program for national economic 
reconstruction and development (La Feber 1980, 50-9).
However, despite hostilities, as long as the Soviet Union hoped that the US would 
grant credit which would help to implement the five-year plan and rebuild the Soviet 
economy, it was prepared to make some sacrifices in its policy towards Eastern Europe
^The Soviet Union lodged its first formal request for a formal loan on 3 January 1945 after 
negotiations which had begun in October 1943. The question of credit was tied into overall 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and was used by American diplomacy to obtain 
political advantages, the deliberate stalling in 1945-46 of the negotiations on the US $ 1 billion 
loan. It was hoped that the promise of credit would force the Soviets to accept the American 
interpretation of the Yalta accords and cease Soviet interference in East European internal affairs.
2 In an interview with Pravda on 13 March 1946 Stalin commented that Britain's position 
represented ’a call for war on the USSR’ (cited in Lafeber 1980, 139).
in terms of the progress towards consolidation of its domination over the region. 
Continuing cooperation depended on cordial relations and the avoidance of any major 
diplomatic crisis. In pursuit of these goals Stalin allowed a degree of political pluralism 
in Eastern Europe.
1947-1953: The political framework for CMEA intra-bloc economic 
cooperation.
This stage, described by Miller (1991, 29) as semi-fictitious independence, during 
which the East European communist parties enjoyed relative autonomy in formulating 
domestic and international policies lasted until mid-1947. From the summer of 1947 
there was, however, a definite shift in Soviet policy direction towards the consolidation 
of Soviet power over the bloc. In the economic sphere, fne objectives shifted towards 
greater integration of East European economies with the Soviet Union’s and 
subordinating them to meeting Soviet economic goals. The shift in Soviet policy in 
Eastern Europe also found expression in the new methods of managing the bloc. In 
political relations there was tightening of control over internal and external policies in 
East European countries and a transition from the phase of diversity to enforced unity. In 
the sphere of intra-bloc economic relations there was pressure on the establishment of 
permanent ties linking East European economies with the Soviet economy which 
included the setting up of CMEA in January 1949.
The first sign of Stalin's new approach was the conclusion in July 1947 of bilateral 
agreements on economic assistance and cooperation between the USSR and Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia and Poland which were followed later by similar agreements with 
Hungary and Rumania (La Feber 1980, 71). The conclusion of trade agreements, the so 
called ‘Molotov Plan’, created prerequisites for the reorientation of the foreign trade 
directions of People's Democracies in favour of relations within the bloc and ensuring 
the Soviet Union’s dominating position in the East European trade relations.
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This move was paralleled in the political sphere by the announcement of a decision to 
establish the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), ostensibly to intensify 
contacts and organize exchange of experience among the ‘fraternal’ parties and 
coordinate their activities on the basis of mutual agreement in order to represent and 
express ‘the tasks and interests common to the parties of various countries’ {For a 
Lasting Peace, fo r  a People 's Democracy! 1947:1, 1). ^
These steps directly followed the rejection by the Soviet Union of Marshall Plan 
assistance1 2 on the grounds that its conditions - which required giving access to 
information about the state of the economies of the Soviet Union and East European 
countries - represented an attempt by the West to interfere in the nationalization policies 
being implemented by the countries of the communist bloc and threatened the sovereignty 
of these nations (Deutscher 1972, 567). Following the Soviet rejection, the Soviet Union 
in July 1947 instructed the Polish and Czechoslovak governments to refuse participation 
in the Marshall Plan.
In the next months Cominform was used by the Soviet Union to put pressure on East 
European communist parties to follow a unified ideological line set by the Soviet Union 
on questions of internal development and foreign policy. For example, during sessions 
in the fall of 1947 and the summer of 1948 East European communist leaders were 
ordered to eliminate independent socialist and peasant parties in their countries. Its 
founding signalled thus tightening of discipline over methods used by communist parties 
and a return to a close directing of the communist movement through an organisation 
uniting communist parties with the centre in Moscow. In this role of an authoritative 
centre for elaborating the general line of the Soviet bloc the Cominform represented thus
1 The text of the first resolution passed by the Cominform on 10 November 1947 - ‘Resolution 
on the Interchange of Experience and Coordination of Activities of the Parties Represented at the 
Conference’.
^The establishment of Cominform was announced four days after the rejection by the Soviet 
Union of the terms of the Marshall Plan.
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the resurrection of the idea of Comintern abolished in 1943 in order to appease Western 
powers and persuade them of a non-ideological orientation of Soviet foreign policy.
The assertion by the Soviet Union of ideological and political leadership in the bloc 
was also evident in setting of new rules on direct relations between individual East 
European countries. In an article published in Pravda on 29 January 1948 and at a 
conference in Moscow with Bulgarian and Yugoslav delegations in early February the 
same year East European communists were advised of the undesirability of direct 
consultations and agreements, federations and custom unions. These pronouncements 
made it clear that relationships between the satellites' parties were to be limited to matters 
approved by Stalin and had to be conducted through Moscow. 1
The fate of a country which would insist on its political and economic autonomy and 
was not prepared to obey the new rules and recognise the Soviet leadership in the bloc 
was exemplified by the treatment of Yugoslavia. Until late 1947 Yugoslavia was the 
most loyal ally of the Soviet Union and a strong supporter of moves aimed at the 
formation of the Cominform. The relations between both countries deteriorated, 
however, when the Yugoslav communist party expressed resentment at Soviet 
interference in its domestic affairs, such as infiltration through diplomatic 
representatives, and military as well as civilian advisers (Singleton 1985, 220-1). The 
criticism was also levelled at the operation of Soviet-Yugoslav joint companies and 
complaints were made about the prices the Soviet Union paid for the import of raw 
materials from Yugoslavia, which were ten times lower than world market prices 
(Sulzberger 1949b, 4). Furthermore, at the time of the espousal of the ‘new democracy’ 
doctrine, the Yugoslavs came into conflict with the Soviet Union by claiming that the 
class nature of the Yugoslav state was in essence the same as the Soviet state’s and thus 
did not differ from the dictatorship of the proletariat which was established in the Soviet 
Union in 1917 (Brzezinski 1979, 37). These actions and pronouncements implied a
1 see Djilas (1962, 171-81) for his account of the meeting.
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claim to an equal status with the Soviet state and thus presented a challenge to the Soviet 
Union’s authority. Tito’s refusal to accept Soviet right to limit the autonomy of East 
European communist leaders ended in the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform 
on 28 June 1948 following the campaign of discriminatory measures and condemnation 
of Tito’s policies. 1
As a justification for a new phase in Soviet policies towards Eastern Europe the 
Soviet Union invoked the alleged external threat from the imperialist camp, in particular 
the implications for the security of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp of the 
Marshall Plan, which required a unified response from ‘the fraternal communist parties’. 
Following Soviet refusal of the Marshall Plan, a number of high-ranking Soviet party 
officials and the Politburo issued pronouncements describing the Marshall Plan as an 
attempt by the US at economic and political domination of Europe and as a means of 
restoring the German and Japanese economies (La Feber 1980, 61).2 Molotov warned 
that its implementation laid the basis for Western bloc hostility to the Soviet Union and 
its allies and thus was bound to lead to the division of Europe into two groups of states 
(La Feber 1980, 70).
This dichotomous approach towards world affairs and the call for vigilance continued 
on the occasion of the establishment of the Cominform in September 1947. Andrei 
Zhdanov in his opening address, described the international situation in terms of division 
into two hostile camps: an anti-communist bloc led by the US and the anti-imperialist and 
democratic camp under the Soviet Union’s leadership (Zhdanov 1947, 2-4). He warned 
of the expansionist ambitions of the USA implicit in its broad program of ‘military, 
economic and political measures designed to establish US political and economic 
domination in all countries marked out for American expansion’ (Zhdanov 1947, 2). He
1 Cominform resolutions were full of vicious attacks on the Yugoslav party. For example 
‘Resolution of the Information Bureau on 29 November 1949’, accused the communist party of 
Yugoslavia of being in the power of murderers and spies and declared that the Tito clique 
transformed Belgrade into an American centre for espionage and anti-communist propaganda (For a 
Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy! 1949:28, 2).
2 Andrei Vyshinsky, 18 September 1947 cited in Lafeber 1980, 161-2.
5 1
contended that the Marshall Plan represented a scheme to create a bloc of states under US 
domination. In relation to Eastern European countries, he accused the US of using the 
Plan to undermine their independence by means of credits and make them renounce their 
close political and economic ties with the Soviet Union (Zhdanov 1947, 3).
At the same time, since May 1947 Soviet scholars, such as Andrei Vosnesensky, a 
chairman of State Planning Commission, had highlighted the intensifying contradictions 
within the capitalist system and pointed to the inevitability of a further ‘general crisis of 
world capitalism’ arguing that world market would be weakened by the withdrawal of 
socialist countries as a result of the development of the world socialist system (Raina 
1983, 64). This analysis led to the conclusion that the alleged favourable swing in the 
global balance due to ‘the arrival of the second stage in the general crisis of capitalism’ 
made the militant Soviet policy feasible, and the violent hostility of the imperialists made 
such a policy essential (Vosnesensky in Raina 1983, 70). This claim was exploited by 
Soviet propaganda to urge the necessity of mobilizing communist forces for an 
offensive, so that the next stage in the general crisis of world capitalism could be decided 
in favour of the Soviet camp.
This line of argument strongly contradicted earlier interpretations of Western politics 
and economics. In a book ‘Changes in the Capitalist Economy as a Result of World War 
II’ published in 1946 Varga claimed that the development of state regulation would delay 
the onset of a general crisis in world capitalism. He argued that the post-war capitalist 
economy was not facing an imminent crisis and therefore no armed conflict between the 
Western powers over competition for world markets was probable. The prescription 
from this analysis was that Soviet activist foreign policy and preparation for challenge of 
the West was not appropriate. 1
1 For the Varga-Voznesenski debate concerning possible developments in capitalist economies see 
Ra'anan 1983, 62-75.
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The doctrine of People's Democracy
The shift in Soviet objectives resulted also in a redefinition in ideological terms of the 
principles governing inter-state relations within the Soviet bloc and the prescription of the 
proper direction of socio-economic transformations in Eastern Europe. This was 
necessary in order to provide a framework for debates on policy in the Soviet bloc and 
indicate ‘correct’ principles to be implemented by local parties in political practice to 
ensure conformity with Soviet objectives.
The theoretical basis of the rationalisation for the change in the Soviet Union's 
methods of political domination was provided by the doctrine of the People's Democracy 
which redefined the class nature of the political organisation of the newly established 
states of Eastern Europe and their stage of development. The main assumptions of the 
doctrine, which replaced the earlier doctrine of 'new democracy', were put forward by 
Soviet party theoreticians during 1948 in the course of an ideological campaign 
conducted chiefly in the Cominform journal and the main theoretical party journals. The 
culmination of the campaign took place at the communist parties' congresses at the end of 
1948, when East European leaders proclaimed the class nature of their states as the 
legitimate form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
The class character of the state in the countries of Eastern Europe and its 'historic' 
objectives expounded in the People's Democracy doctrine, appeared to be no different 
from the ideological categorisations of the ‘new democracy’ doctrine. The new doctrine 
similarly identified the class nature of the socio-political order of the Eastern European 
states as representing ‘the rule of the toiling people under the leadership of the working 
class’ and defined its ideological character as being ‘a state in the transitional period 
destined to ensure the development of the country along the road to socialism’ {For a 
Lasting Peace, For a People’s Democracy! 1 January 1949, 3).l
1 Dimitrov's concluding speech at the Bulgarian party congress published as ‘Report of Comrade 
G.M.Dimitrov to the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communist).
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The People's Democracy doctrine changed, however, the ideological definition of 
political and economic transformations in East European countries which it characterized 
as ‘revolutions of a socialist type’. The new interpretation was advanced on the grounds 
that, despite initial characteristics of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, the objectives 
and direction of these transformations were essentially always anti-capitalist and socialist 
since they served the interests of the working class and the peasantry, which were the 
decisive class forces in the system of exercising power (Mankovsky 1949, 7). According 
to Marxist-Leninist theory of socialist revolution and communist construction these 
elements provided sufficient basis to identify the political organisation in the countries of 
Eastern Europe as the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
In terms of the arguments advanced the People’s Democracy doctrine represented a 
very schematic and unconvincing theory. The main problem stemmed from the fact that 
the process of acquisition of power by communists did not quite fit the ideal notions of a 
genuine proletarian revolution. While the doctrine acknowledged these differences, the 
explanation that the transformation of democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe into 
socialist ones could be successful because of Soviet assistance was at odds with Marxist 
theory of social transformation as a rational process subject to the objective laws of the 
development of the specific socio-economic formations and transition from one 
formation to another. *
The central thesis of the doctrine was an alleged identity of the class character of the 
People's Democracy and the Soviet state. As Dimitrov put it, ‘The Soviet regime and the 
people's democratic regime are two forms of one and the same power - the power of the 
working class, allied with the toilers of town and country, and heading this alliance.
These are two forms of the proletarian dictatorship.’ {For a Lasting Peace, For a
* The doctrine acknowledged that these transformations differed from those which characterised Soviet 
revolution. Mankovsky (1949,.7) argued, that despite these differences the class essence of process and its 
tasks made it closer to a socialist or proletarian than to a bourgeois revolution, and therefore comparable to 
the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. As Mine (1950, 94-5) explained, ’At the foundation of our difference 
from the Soviet road lies the all-sided aid of the Soviet Union and reliance on the experience and 
achievements of the victorious dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR’.
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People's Democracy! 1 January 1949 1, 3). This thesis had important functions in 
political practice. In connection with other aspects of Soviet doctrine it provided 
ideological justification for assertion of Soviet primacy in the bloc and the general 
validity of the Soviet model.of socialism. The justification of Soviet leadership was 
achieved by making a distinction between these two forms of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. Thus, while stressing the identity of the class character, the doctrine of 
People's Democracy made a distinction in terms of the stage or degree of their 
advancement towards the communist goal. According to this conception the People's 
Democracy was still ‘a state in the transitional period destined to ensure the development 
of the country along the road to socialism’, in other words a state ‘in which Socialism 
has not yet conquered ultimately’, while the Soviet Union ‘has already completed the 
building of Socialism and commenced the period of a gradual transition toward 
Communism’ (Mine, 1950, 88).1 The Soviet Union as more advanced in socialist 
construction could by definition claim ultimate ideological and political authority in the 
socialist camp.
Alleged evidence of the Soviet Union's advanced historical stage in the transition 
towards communism was the persistence in the socio-political order of People's 
Democracies of many institutions, norms and practices of the bourgeoisie period such as 
private and cooperative economic sectors, which constituted a socio-economic base for 
the exploiting antagonistic social classes and capitalist production relations, and 
hampered the development of socialist construction. By contrast, the Soviet Union was 
described as a political system where ‘there are no antagonistic social classes, capitalism 
has been totally liquidated, Socialism has been built and a Communist society is being 
built.’(Minc 1950b, 96).
1 The Soviet Union declared in 1936 that it had become a socialist society - until then it was the dictatorship 
of the proletariat.
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In addition, the Soviet Union’s advanced stage of socialist development provided a 
basis for the Soviet Union’s claim to the general applicability of the Soviet socio­
economic order for all the countries in transition to communism, as by definition its 
principles represented a more mature expression of the universal laws of the transition to 
communism. A classic statement of the principle of the universality of Soviet experience 
in the construction of socialism which appeared in 1948 in an authoritative Soviet source 
read: ‘The general laws of transition from capitalism to socialism, discovered by Marx 
and Engels, and tested, put to concrete use, and developed by Lenin and Stalin on the 
basis of the experience of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet State, are binding upon all 
countries.’ (Farberov in Skilling 1951, 141). In practice, the significance of People’s 
Democracy doctrine for East European states was that they were now obliged to 
acknowledge the general applicability of the Soviet experience and had to adopt the 
Soviet principles of socialist development defined by the doctrine as socialist 
industrialization, socialist collectivization, transition to the rule of the communist party 
and the liquidation of exploiting classes because of the alleged intensified class struggle 
(Bierut 1949, 27-31).
The coercive character of the People's Democracy doctrine and the prescription of the 
principles of the Soviet model as the normative elements of the framework of acceptable 
policies in Soviet bloc countries meant that East European countries had no right to a 
national road to socialism. As an official text put it ‘the countries of People's Democracy 
do not march along some new, distinct road from that which the Soviet Union took to 
reach socialism. This kind of statement would mean the negation of the international 
significance of the experience of the Soviet Union and the basic laws of the transitional 
period’ (Farberov 1948 in Brzezinski 1979, 76).
Soviet doctrine permitted in principle some institutional diversity in the 
implementation of specific policy issues by East European countries in accordance with 
national traditions and local conditions and the degree of economic development.
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However as a chief ideologist asserted, ‘The distinctiveness of form is manifested within 
the framework of the general patterns of the transitional period, established by the 
teachers of Marxism-Leninism’ (Farberov in Skilling 1951, 139-40). In the light of the 
People’s Democracy doctrine, the internal political autonomy was thus severely 
constrained by the principles of the Soviet model of development.
The doctrinal determinants of Soviet bloc relations.
The People’s Democracy doctrine thus clarified three central issues in Soviet-East 
European relationship. It provided a rationale for the Soviet Union’s leadership and 
therefore a justification of the political subordination of East European countries to the 
Soviet Union. Moreover, it stressed the universal validity of the Soviet experience for 
‘socialist construction’. And finally, it set the rules on the acceptable degree of internal 
autonomy of subordinate countries in deciding their own political and economic systems.
For our purposes, the critical issue is that these doctrines of institutional and 
ideological uniformity and of the limited political autonomy of East European countries, 
remained central in determining the framework of acceptable policies of Soviet bloc 
countries until Gorbachev’s reforms in the late 1980s. As will be discussed in detail in 
the following chapters, until then the Soviet doctrines of the socio-political order 
essentially represented a continuation of the tenets and prescriptions of the Stalinist 
interpretation of the ‘correct road to communism’. Even when after 1956 East European 
countries were allowed a considerable degree of internal autonomy in deciding their 
policies and their institutional structures, this institutional diversity had still to be 
reconciled with adherence to the essential features of the Soviet model. Any serious 
attempt to determine independently their political and economic system was regarded as 
an infringement of Soviet interests and created a danger of Soviet military intervention.
However, the question still remains, why was there in the Soviet bloc only one set of 
principles of transition to communism which only the Soviet Union could interpret, and
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why was the uniformity of the model of transition to communism so crucial to Soviet 
domination as to justify the use of force against formally sovereign countries?
The answer to this question lies in the rationalist approach, to use Michael 
Oakeshott’s term, 1 to politics and the hierarchical nature of Soviet bloc politics. Inherent 
in the allegedly scientific nature of Marxist-Leninist ideology was the notion that there is 
only one theoretically possible road of transition to communism as the manifestation of 
the scientifically proven laws, or rational rules, of development. This rationalist 
conception of only one set of rules to achieve the communist goal, by definition set limits 
on diversity in individual communist states, but did not exclude a considerable degree of 
diversity of institutional arrangements. However, in practice, in the case of an 
association of states whose legitimacy is based on ideological tenets, any kind of 
institutional diversity which conflicted with prescribed rules would automatically 
undermine the legitimacy of another government as well as the scientific premises of the 
ideology. Therefore, in the Soviet bloc there could be only one set of explicit and binding 
universal rules regarding the acceptable principles of socio-political order.
It is conceivable that this one set of rules could be established and interpreted as a 
result of common agreement of the Soviet bloc countries. However, this situation would 
be inadmissible from the point of view of Soviet interests. Firstly, if the principles 
differed from the Soviet model, this would undermine the principles on which the 
CPSU's claims to exercise power rested, and thus affect the cohesion and stability of the 
Soviet system. Secondly, it would also mean that the Soviet bloc states formed a loose 
federation bound by common interests, and not a system of states with the Soviet Union 
as a central political and ideological authority.
1 Michael Oakeshott (1962, 1-36) describes as rationalist mode of thinking, or rationalism, in 
politics an approach to politics, based on a belief that the proper organisation of society and the 
conduct of its affairs can be based on abstract principles which can be defended on rational grounds.
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Thus, the proclamation of the principles of Soviet order defining the only correct way 
of the transition to communism all the other communist countries had to follow, and the 
establishment of the Soviet Union's ultimate authority to interpret the universal laws 
were the vital aspects of political legitimation of the Soviet domestic system and Soviet 
domination and as such had to be protected by all possible measures.
The methods of consolidation of power and management of bloc 
relations.
The change in the nature of Soviet-East European relations also manifested itself in 
new Soviet methods of exercising control over the satellites to ensure the consolidation 
of power by communist parties. Initially, the enunciation of the People’s Democracy 
doctrine was accompanied by the intensification of terror, which was a real force behind 
the implementation of these ostensibly ‘objective tendencies’ in political practice. The 
methods of struggle for power included the infiltration of decision-making bodies by 
Soviet agents, false propaganda, intimidation, manipulated elections and arrests, show 
trials and the physical liquidation of political opponents (Dziewanowski 1976, 183-207). 
The redefinition of doctrinal concepts was used from the end of 1947 by factions within 
the leaderships of local communist parties willing to give precedence to Soviet national 
interests and to wage campaigns against those communists who previously displayed 
‘nationalistic’ tendencies and followed domestic policies in keeping with the peculiarities 
of their countries’ social and economic structures. In Poland, for example, the 
‘Muscovite’ faction accused Wladyslaw Gomulka of anti-state activity and plotting 
against ‘the people’s regime’, and ‘underestimating the relevance of Soviet experience’. 
They branded his politics as an indication of dangerous nationalist, or even right-wing, 
pro-imperialist deviations and argued that the time had arrived for the communist parties 
to claim a monopoly of power (Bierut 1948, 20). In September 1948 he was removed 
from the post of secretary-general of the party.
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By the end of 1948 in every People's Democracy the non-communist parties had 
been either liquidated or absorbed into national fronts and thus effectively deprived of 
any influence on national political life (Albert 1991, 569; Brzezinski 1979, 85). The 
establishment of the monopoly of political and socio-economic power by communist 
parties subservient to the Kremlin marked the beginning of a new phase of Soviet 
political hegemony in Eastern Europe.
In the course of the next few years these factional power struggles resulted in mass 
purges and the staging of show trials of former communist leaders who held ideas too 
independent of Moscow. High-ranking military officers were accused of spying for the 
US and Great Britain (Laczynski and Przyjemski 1988, 14). This process was described 
by the official propaganda as elimination of class enemies and was presented as 
confirming Stalinist theory of the intensification of class struggle in the Peoples’ 
Democracies. Charges of treason were used to demonstrate the link between an alleged 
threat from external and internal imperialist enemy forces and the need to intensify 
vigilance.
The party and state apparatus did not use their powers of intimidation and repression 
with equal force in all People’s Democracies. Nevertheless, in all those countries brutal 
violations of the rule of law, rule by fear, the destruction of civil society and the 
limitation of Church influences were all-pervasive phenomena of social life. A crucial 
element of the repression was direct Soviet penetration of the secret police and armed 
forces by agents who were directly accountable only to Moscow. In Poland, for 
example, in staging trials a crucial role was played by Soviet secret police agents who 
operated independently even of the Polish Politburo Commission for Public Security 
which was supposed to supervise secret police organs (Rykowski and Wladyka 1988, 
14). Other informal methods of the control of East European countries by the Soviet 
Union included the interference of Soviet ambassadors and diplomatic personnel in their 
internal affairs and the appointment of Soviet officers to key positions in their armies
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(Pioro 1988, 14). For example, in November 1949 a Soviet Marshall, Konstantin 
Rokossovsky, was appointed as Polish Minister of Defence and Marshal of the Polish 
Army.
While repression, terror and Soviet infiltration remained critical mechanisms in 
maintaining Soviet domination, the Stalinist system of rule came gradually to depend on 
other mechanisms of political control to ensure the consolidation of Soviet power in 
Eastern Europe and the achievement of Soviet objectives. These mechanisms entailed the 
organisational unification of the bloc through a network of institutional and informal 
links in political, ideological and economic spheres, together with pressure to ensure the 
uniformity of internal socio-economic systems and the development strategies in 
conformity with the Soviet model. In practice, as the following discussion demonstrates, 
they were primarily informal in character.
The main element in this network was the cultivation and co-operation of indigenous 
political elites, with the local communist parties becoming the principal instruments of 
Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe. By 1949 the monopoly of power in all People’s 
Democracies belonged to communist leaders subservient to Stalin. Within their parties 
these leaders established for themselves a cult status similar to that of Stalin in the 
USSR. They valued their loyalty to Stalin more than the traditions and interests of their 
own societies and identified the interests of their own countries with those of the Soviet 
Union. As Dimitrov put it, ’The People’s Democracy is built in cooperation and 
friendship with the Soviet Union. Any tendency towards a weakening of cooperation 
with the USSR is directed against the very foundations of the People’s Democracy.’ {For 
a Lasting Peace, For a People’s Democracy! 1 January 1949, 3).
Their ‘sense of common legacy, and ideological closeness’ (Passent 1988, 16) 
ensured the total submission of their regimes to CPSU authority and strict adherence to 
the prescriptions of the People’s Democracy doctrine in following what Boleslaw Bierut
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described as ‘our road to socialism’ (Bierut 1949, 33). The classic example of the 
sycophantic attitudes which characterised politics in the Soviet bloc at that time was a 
statement of Hilary Mine (1950, 88), one of the three most powerful men in Stalinist 
Poland, who declared in 1950, ‘The states of People's Democracy develop on the basis 
of the experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat and Socialist construction in the 
USSR, of the theoretical generalization of this experience given by Comrade Stalin and 
of the priceless direct indications and advice of the CPSU (Bolshevik) and Comrade 
Stalin personally.’
The imposition of uniform political and economic patterns in East European countries 
took place over a period of about two years, from mid-1947. The main features of this 
policy were the adoption by satellites of ideologically, organisationally and functionally 
uniform institutions, control mechanisms and structures modelled on the Soviet system.
In the economic sphere this involved the introduction of Soviet-style planning, which 
substituted for the market as the regulator of economic processes, and allowed the 
assumption by the state of responsibility for both day-to-day and long term direction of 
key economic processes, and the implementation of economic development strategy 
based on the Soviet experience. The effective rights of East European countries to take 
into consideration the specific historical and national features of each country in 
conducting their policies were restricted by the extremely rigid application of the 
doctrine. *
The introduction of uniform institutional arrangements in individual states of the 
region enabled the Soviet Union to impose structural control upon its satellites which 
served to facilitate Soviet interference in their internal political and economic processes. It 
enabled the penetration of such organizations as planning bodies, specific ministries and 
other key national structures by Soviet advisers, and facilitated contacts between
1 As Jakub Berman (1956, 89) later admitted at the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee of the 
Polish United Workers' Party on 19-21 October 1956, ’there was plenty of mechanical copying of 
practices which originated in the Soviet Union’.
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institutional counterparts in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. In this way 
the functioning of their systems was made easily subjected to Soviet manipulation and 
subordinated to the realization of Soviet aims. For example, through the imposition of 
the Soviet system of planning and management, the Soviet planning office, Gosplan, 
could easily control the planning offices of Eastern Europe through the same planning 
methods and institutional arrangements and be directly involved in the restructuring of 
socialist economies, the implementation of strategies of growth and their militarisation in 
1950-53. In addition to joint companies which operated in every country except Poland, 
Soviet direct involvement in the drawing up of long-range plans was the primary 
mechanism through which the Soviet Union imposed its economic preferences on 
Eastern Europe in the Stalin era.
Another feature of the strategy of uniformity was the transformation of national 
economies on the basis of the Soviet economic development strategy which originated in 
the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s and was implemented in the course of the first 
Soviet five-year plan. The strategy was aimed, firstly, at accelerated development of the 
nationalised sector of the economies. In Eastern Europe the first nationalization decrees 
of 1945-46 had left many areas of the national economies, even manufacturing 
enterprises, in private hands. The exception was Poland, where the implementation of 
the Nationalization Law of 3 January 1946 rapidly increased the importance of the state 
sector in the economy. 1 However, the second wave of nationalisation associated with 
adoption of the Soviet model and aimed at the elimination of ‘capitalist elements’ which 
started at the end of 1947 led to the complete transformation of the Eastern European 
systems of property relationships by 1952. It resulted in an extension of the socialized 
sector to embrace all banking and insurance, all wholesale trade, a substantial section of 
retail trade, the construction industry and all but the smallest industrial enterprises, and
* Already by the end of 1946 the production of the ‘socialist sector’ of industry was 91.2 per cent 
of total industrial production, while that of the private sector amounted to 8 per cent. In 1948 this 
ratio amounted to 94 per cent and 6 per cent respectively.
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the almost total elimination of the private and cooperative sectors (Economic Commission 
for Europe 1953, 28, 37). 1 In the agricultural sector forced collectivisation led to the 
rapid increase in the number of collective farms and establishment of cooperatives in the 
villages (Economic Commission for Europe 1953, 37).
The second major objective of the economic strategy was creation of comprehensive 
maximally self-sufficient industrial structures based on heavy industry and machine 
building. The economic plans adopted by the People’s Democracies in 1949-50 aimed at 
rapid industrialization by means of an increase in the share of investment in GNP to very 
high levels - 19-27 per cent - at the expense of consumption (Economic Commission for 
Europe 1953, 27). The investment funds were allocated primarily for the development of 
heavy industry, particularly the mining, metallurgy, and machine-building industries at 
the expense of the consumer and agricultural sectors of the economy.2 As a result the 
production plans in all of East European countries showed very similar increases for 
many groups of products in such key areas as engineering industry, coal, steel and 
electric power, in spite of big differences in their natural resources for such production 
(Economic Commission for Europe 1953, 217). The original asymmetry of planning 
targets in favour of heavy industry was further distorted following the outbreak of the 
Korean War in 1950, when an expansion of armaments production was given an 
absolute priority in all East European countries. The revisions of plans at the expense of 
light industries and agriculture in the wake of the war resulted in the CMEA economies 
functioning as ‘half-war economies’ between the years 1951 and 1953 (Mine 1956, 
123).* 3
' For detailed information on the degree of nationalisation of industry and socialization in Eastern 
Europe in 1952 see Table 9, 28 and Table 13, 37 (Economic Commission for Europe 1953).
^For example in Poland 46 per cent of total investments were allocated to the development of 
industry, and in this latter portion, 85 per cent to heavy industry (Montias 1962, 61-62). See also 
Table no 7 in Economic Commission for Europe 1953, 24.
3 East European governments began to devote considerable sums to expenditure on defence in 
1950. The estimates published in government budgets suggested that in 1952, the ratios of direct 
defence expenditure to investment expenditure were about one-quarter in Czechoslovakia, one-third 
in Poland and Hungary, and nearly one-half in Bulgaria (Economic Commission for Europe 1953,
29).
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The consequence of the comprehensive development of individual economies 
without specialisation consistent with their natural resources and technological potential, 
and the lack of coordination of investment programs between the Soviet bloc countries 
was the development of identical industrial branches in national economies and creation 
of mutually competitive rather complementary industrial structures within the bloc. 
Furthermore, ignoring dynamic ‘comparative costs and the possibilities of securing 
maximum advantage from international trade’ (Economic Commission for Europe 1955, 
127) led to a grossly inefficient allocation of resources and production of commodities 
which could not even in the long run be produced economically (Bakos 1987, 20).
From the point of view of Soviet political objectives, the long-term effect of the 
imposition of the Soviet-style development strategy on the East European economies was 
beneficial, however, as it engendered a dependence of Eastern Europe on the Soviet 
economy. By forcing its satellites to specialize in heavy industrial products regardless of 
their raw material base or the construction of large steel works dependent on iron ore 
supplies from USSR* the Soviet Union generated structural dependence on deliveries of 
vital Soviet raw materials.1 2 As the discussion in following chapters will demonstrate, the 
dependence on Soviet economy became a major determinant of the course of postwar 
economic development in East European countries as well as the subsequent model of 
their intra-CMEA trade exchanges and commercial relations with the rest of the world.
Factors determining the establishment of the CMEA. Postulated strategy 
and mechanisms of economic cooperation.
1 These steel works were located not in port cities to maximize the advantages of cheap water 
transportation, which is the standard practice, but at the sites where iron ore from the distant 
Soviet mines could be delivered (Economic Commission for Europe 1955, 127).
2 H.Minc (1950 b, 17) in his speech at the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish 
United Workers' Party on 15 July 1950, on the Six-Year Plan of Economic Development and 
Laying Socialist Foundations in Poland, thus rationalised Poland’s dependence on Soviet raw 
materials, ’The reliance of the economic development on imported raw materials, to the extent 
they come from capitalist countries, always poses a serious threat for industrial development. On 
the other hand, it is self-evident that we should seek to develop our raw material base as a part of 
the economic potential of the great anti-imperialist camp led by the Soviet Union.’
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The establishment of CMEA in January 1949 took place at time when the 
consolidation of Soviet political, ideological and economic domination of Eastern Europe 
had been virtually completed. In all the countries of the region local communist parties 
run by leaders loyal to the Soviet Union and accepting its authority, had a monopoly of 
power. Domestic transformations were patterned after the Soviet model guaranteeing 
State control of the economies and planned regulation of economic processes. Their 
domestic economic policies followed Soviet industrialisation strategy and their priorities 
were effectively determined by Soviet preferences.
The official communique on the creation of the CMEA published on 22 January 1949 
did not reveal much about the purpose and functions of the organisation. As the main 
reason for its establishment it nominated the West’s boycott of trade relations with the 
People's Democracies because of their rejection of the Marshall Plan. The communique 
also stressed economic motives leading to the organization's creation: the apparently 
significant successes in the development of economic relations between the People's 
Democracies and the USSR, which allegedly formed an objective basis for the 
establishment of wider economic cooperation. The professed aim of the CMEA was the 
exchange of economic experience, extension of technical aid to one another and 
rendering of various types of mutual assistance. Cooperation was to be conducted 
voluntarily - decisions were to be taken only with the agreement of ‘interested countries’. 
However, the communique did not set out specific methods and instruments of future 
cooperation (Butler ed. 1978, 123). 1
The causal relationship between a decision to establish CMEA and the completion of 
consolidation of Soviet power over East European countries and tensions in East-West 
relations has not been disputed in the literature. Scholars agree that the political 
significance of this decision was to demonstrate enforced unity of members of the Soviet
 ^ On The Creation Of The Council Of Mutual Economic Assistance’, fully cited in Butler ed. 
1978, 123.
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camp in the conditions of confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. They also 
point out that the decision had an economic motive. It was a reply to the Marshall Plan 
and to the economic integration of the West European countries that the Plan was 
intended to promote. It was also a response to the policy of isolation of Soviet bloc 
countries which was reinforced by the US by the introduction in March 1948 of a 
comprehensive system of export licences on all goods intended for export to socialist 
countries - a policy which was later adopted by countries in receipt of assistance under 
the Marshall Plan.
However, the fact that these developments provided stimulus for the establishment of 
CMEA explains neither what the founding countries sought to accomplish, nor the role 
played subsequently by the organisation. In order to answer these questions, it is 
necessary to analyse other statements and primary and secondary sources on the 
Council’s early policy meetings outlining postulated principles of economic cooperation 
and the actual CMEA functions. It must be noted that CMEA activities were hardly 
mentioned in official contemporary Soviet pronouncements and the documentary 
evidence is still limited. Therefore, most information pertaining to this period comes 
from high-ranking East European politicians who participated in the preparations for the 
setting up of CMEA and attended those meetings or may legitimately claim to have had 
access to authentic documents.
According to these sources, East European leaders who embarked on 
industrialisation strategies while facing the disintegration of traditional European 
economic links, and denied access to the Marshall Plan by the Soviet Union, held high 
expectations of the CMEA (Rozanski 1987, 15). They expected that CMEA would 
facilitate multilateral economic cooperation between member states through such 
mechanisms as: the coordination of national development plans, the introduction of a 
common currency, multilateral clearing in trade relations and the setting up of a 
multilateral clearing centre in Moscow. They were also interested in the new
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organization’s assisting in the coordination of trade policies of its members towards 
capitalist countries (Rozanski 1987, 15-6). Selucky (1985, 5-6) referring to information 
by Slansky, a Czechoslovak representative at the CMEA constitutive meeting, has 
confirmed these comments, adding that Czechoslovakia was interested in economic 
specialisation, the coordination of foreign trade and of the development of a raw material 
base. Poland hoped to introduce coordination of both foreign trade and long-term 
economic plans, and the transfer of know-how and technology. Hungary proposed the 
coordination of economic plans and the unification of planning methods, and Bulgaria 
and Romania sought economic aid. Implicit in East European proposals was the concept 
of a joint regional development strategy of multilateral economic cooperation by means of 
coordination of economic plans by economically sovereign countries.
Furthermore, several sources claim that apart from the official communique, 
members signed also a ‘secret protocol’, which was quite specific about the intended 
functions of CMEA and its methods of cooperation (Sulzberger 1949, 1 and 4; Brabant 
1989, 20-3; Sprawy Miedzynarodowe 1994: 3, 130). 1 This protocol was allegedly 
discussed at the high-level conference on 5-8 January 1949, and signed on 18 January, 
thus preceding the CMEA’s official founding date.
The provisions of the secret protocol seemingly reflected Eastern European priorities. 
The protocol set out as the principal CMEA objectives the development of a strategy of 
regional economic interdependence based on specialisation in key areas by means of the 
coordination of economic plans of member countries, the coordination of foreign trade 
plans and exchange of scientific and technical information (Ciamaga 1965, 49). To avoid 
parallel development of high-cost industrial sectors and save on scarce capital resources, 
the protocol also envisaged investment coordination including the long-term transfer of
* The document ‘Informacja o Dzialalnosci Rady Wzajemnej Pomocy Gospodarczej: 1949-1956’ 
was prepared at the request of the Polish Prime Minister on 8 December 1956 and circulated only 
amongst inner government officials. It was marked ‘strictly confidential’ and held securely in the 
Archives of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs until its publication in S p r a wy  
Miedzynarodowe in 1994.
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capital resources through mixed companies, in particular in fuels, energy and the 
extraction of basic raw materials. The protocol, furthermore, provided for the 
establishment of a joint fund, worth 100 million rubles (ca US$ 20 million at the 1949 
official ruble-dollar exchange rate) whose purpose is difficult to determine, as it was too 
small for any important clearing operations and could not possibly contribute to 
multilateral cooperation and settlements. The protocol also established as the highest 
organ of the organisation the Council Session, with a Secretariat as the executive organ 
(Sulzberger 1949, 4).
In light of the provision empowering the CMEA Secretariat to develop a general 
common plan for member countries, these provisions assumed, however, quite a 
different meaning to that originally proposed by the East Europeans. In practice, a 
common economic plan was to be drawn up initially, during the transition period until 
1950, on the basis of the national economic plans of the members, which were to be 
elaborated in accordance with regional requirements as advised by the Secretariat. After 
1950, the plan was to be drawn up directly by the Council organs which were to hand 
down instructions to the national planning agencies of the individual members (Brabant 
1989, 21). Furthermore, the CMEA was entitled not only to detailed and full information 
from its members, but it was also authorized to send both observers and advisers to 
member states, which were ‘obliged to accept and follow their advice’. Each member 
was also obliged to furnish monthly reports of its economic and financial situation 
(Sulzberger 1949, 4).
The provisions thus defined the CMEA’s task as the formulation of the regional 
economic cooperation strategy on a basis of a common plan. They gave also the CMEA 
Secretariat the powers of a de-facto supra-national authority with full access to pertinent 
information and wide-ranging decision-making powers to allocate resources and to make 
decisions about international specialisation, with the national planning agencies clearly 
subordinate to its authority. The protocol in effect formalised the supervision of East
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European economies by Soviet advisers. Indeed the goal was apparently to eliminate 
during a transition phase all attributes of economic sovereignty in national economies 
(Cizhkovsky 1970, 254 in Brabant 1989, 37).
These powers given to CMEA and the conduct of cooperation under a joint economic 
plan were clearly incompatible with East European proposals. Given the extent of 
political subordination of Eastern European members, the inevitable outcome of the 
transferral by the national states of Eastern Europe of their sovereign rights in the areas 
of planning and management of the economy to a supra-national body would have been 
the determination of directions of their economic development by the Soviet State 
Planning Commission and of their policies by the CPSU; in other words, the de-facto 
incorporation of Eastern Europe into the Soviet Union with only the appearance of 
formal independence.
The protocol’s implications leave no doubt that the conception of CMEA’s powers 
and its functions was a Soviet proposal. The Soviet motive for the establishment of the 
organisation was to use it as an additional instrument of subordination of Eastern Europe 
to Soviet objectives in the region through ensuring the implementation of their production 
plans in accordance with the Soviet Union’s priorities. Thus the motives for establishing 
the CMEA were primarily political. The Soviet’s aim was to integrate East European 
economies with the Soviet Union’s. While the provisions of the protocol indicated that 
there were significant differences between East European members and the Soviet Union 
with regard to the powers, objectives and methods of CMEA, ultimately the Soviet 
Union controlled the agenda and Soviet position set the framework for cooperation.
The formulation of principles of CMEA economic cooperation until 1954.
The activities of the CMEA from 1949 till mid-1954 can be divided into two distinct 
stages. The first, one of considerable activity, covered the period until November 1950 
when the highest CMEA organ, the Council, met three times. The second was
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characterised by the limitation of CMEA’s functions to technical facilitation of trade 
contracts and lasted until the fourth Session which was held in March 1954, a year after 
Stalin's death.
The first official Session in April 1949 discussed the main objectives and methods of 
cooperation. CMEA members expected that the organisation would assist in solving the 
issues of critical importance for their economic strategies: the economic reconstruction of 
individual economies, acceleration of growth, elimination of differences in national levels 
of development and scientific-technical cooperation. The Session’s agenda included a 
comprehensive array of areas which seemed to reflect the preoccupations of East 
European leaders with establishing proper mechanisms for fostering regional economic 
cooperation, which had been raised earlier during the initial negotiations. Members 
agreed on the need to discuss the coordination of economic plans to foster production 
specialisation and cooperation, the coordination of foreign trade plans and expansion of 
mutual trade, plans to widen transport and transit facilities, multilateral clearing, proper 
exchange rates, regional settlements, regional prices, and the stimulation of the 
development of scientific-technical cooperation (Brabant 1989, 31). There is, however, 
no record of discussions concerning the granting of supra-national powers to CMEA.
The agenda also included issues which were clearly chiefly political: the conduct of 
trade relations with the West (especially measures to offset or counteract the effects of the 
restrictive export policy measures which had been undertaken by the West) and economic 
relations with Yugoslavia, whose application to join the CMEA was turned down by the 
Soviet Union which had accused it of hostile policy toward the Soviet Union and the 
People's Democracies.
The first Session also established the Bureau of the Council, an executive organ of 
the Council, which had decision-making powers between Council Sessions, and was to 
prepare background materials and recommendations for higher-level negotiations on
policy issues and for decisions and recommendations to be discussed at the plenary 
meetings of the Council. It was thus a supervisory and policy-making body (Brabant 
1989, 27-8). The working apparatus of the Bureau was the precursor of the Secretariat 
officially established in 1954.
The second Session, in August 1949, discussed issues raised at the first session. The 
issues on which members reached agreement can be divided into two categories. The 
first was concerned with coordination of foreign economic policies of CMEA members 
and included principles that should govern the exchange of East-West trade and the 
imposition of sanctions against Yugoslavia. The Session recommended that CMEA 
members coordinate their policies vis-a-vis the West, in particular their export and import 
plans for products of critical importance for their economies, and export and import 
pricing policies, and advocated maximum possible self-sufficiency of the region. 
Members also committed themselves to an exchange of information on economic 
negotiations with capitalist countries, and agreed on measures to counter Western 
discriminatory measures and embargos. These measures clearly gave CMEA effective 
powers to control the volume and directions of foreign trade. In fact a special 
commission of the Bureau on trade with capitalist countries was established in order to 
control exports of critical goods (Slama 1979, 26 in Brabant 1989, 3).
The second category of recommendations related to issues of intra-bloc cooperation, 
such as pricing policies, the change of mutual trade agreements from an annual to a long­
term basis in line with a change in planning in the national economies, the provision of 
scientific-technical documentation free of charge, questions of normalisation and 
standardization of production, and agreements on specialisation in ball bearings (Kaplan 
1977, 85-6 in Brabant 1989, 32-3).
The Session, however, did not adopt any recommendations on mechanisms of 
cooperation, such as the coordination of plans and setting specialisation directions, and
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the introduction of conditions for multilateral trade. On these issues ol fundamental 
importance for implementation of a joint cooperation strategy no definitive consensus 
was reached. The discussions were marked either by irreconcilable differences, as in the 
case of resource allocation and the coordination of plans, or only partial agreement was 
reached on matters such as the introduction of multilateral clearing. While the meeting 
endorsed a number of principles for the introduction of multilateral clearing as the main 
mechanism for settling trade and payment accounts, a final decision was put off until 
1950 (Brabant 1989, 32-3).
The proceedings of this Session thus seem to indicate that CMEA members had 
opposing views on the strategy the organisation should pursue and the autonomy of 
individual economies in the decision-making process. There seem to have been two 
groups: one interested in fostering economic cooperation and a regional division of 
labour by means of plan coordination supported by indirect economic coordination: 
proper exchange rates, adequate pricing and a multilateral clearing centre, but against 
comprehensive planning at the regional levelJ The second group was opposed to this 
strategy and presumably supported the formulation of a common economic plan for the 
entire region. This group probably included the Soviet Union and less industrially 
developed CMEA member countries, which were interested in economic aid in order to 
carry out their industrialization and modernization strategies and would not have 
benefited from cooperation based on comparative costs.
The outcomes of the Session suggest that the Soviet Union controlled the agenda and 
its conception of the CMEA functions prevailed. As a result, CMEA’s role was 
subordinated to Stalin’s objective of securing Soviet control over the region’s economic 
policy, in particular its trade with the West and Yugoslavia, and investment decisions. 
Soviet actions effectively deprived East European countries of mechanisms necessary to
^The Bureau and other research agencies were apparently actively engaged until at least mid-1950 
with research on goals and means of plan coordination and trade and financial instruments which 
would be suitable for the economic cooperation of planned economies (Faddeev 1974b, 130-1).
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elaborate a joint strategy of economic cooperation. The absence of any record of 
discussion concerning the granting of supranational powers to the CMEA suggests that 
the Soviet Union decided not to formalise this policy. ^
This discussion of the outcomes of CMEA Sessions contradicts Brabant’s 
interpretation of early CMEA policies. Brabant has argued that all members were 
interested in the formation of an organisation for the elaboration of regional economic 
policy in order to enhance regional economic interdependence through a common 
economic plan (Brabant 1989, 36-7). Furthermore, there is no evidence that all CMEA 
members involved in the initial debates agreed to pool resources to foster the international 
socialist division of labor under the umbrella of CMEA and that their aim was to 
eliminate national planning (Brabant 1989, 35, 37-8).
1949-1950: The actual functions of CMEA.
Even though a formal decision to grant CMEA supranational powers was never 
announced, in actual practice, in the period from its establishment until the 3rd Council 
Session in November 1950, the CMEA operated as a de facto supranational authority. 
This role of the CMEA was confirmed by an authoritative Polish document, dated 8 
January 1957, marked ‘strictly confidential’, which was released in 1994 after the 
disintegration of the Soviet bloc (Sprawy Miedzynarodowe 1994: 3, 129-41). According 
to this document the CMEA determined the directions of development and set production 
targets to be met by key sectors of individual national economies of the member 
countries. It also controlled the volume of mutual deliveries of selected, usually strategic, 
goods through the pressure for conclusion of long-term trade agreements (Sprawy 
Miedzynarodowe 1994: 3, 129).
1 According to a Polish historian, even the most pro-Soviet Polish communist leaders seemed to 
have understood the importance of the maintenance of formal attributes of sovereignty for ensuring 
social support for their policies (Dmitrow. 1989, 13).
In this period economic relations of CMEA members were thus decided unilaterally 
by the Soviet Union which issued directives to East European national bodies and 
determined the levels and structure of intra-bloc exchanges by means of trade 
agreements. Trade agreements were also used by the Soviet Union as means of the 
enforced reorientation of foreign trade in favour of relations within the bloc, in line with 
the objective of achieving self-sufficiency for the bloc.
These functions of CMEA were consistent with Soviet objectives in the region.
Firstly, by determining production targets and forcing East European countries to take 
into account the import requirements of other bloc states and to supply them with 
required capital goods they were aimed at mobilising resources needed to achieve 
industrialisation objectives. Secondly, this policy was instrumental in a reduction of trade 
with the West, thus weakening traditional economic links with Western Europe, which 
was a prerequisite for integration of East European economies with the Soviet Union’s.
The redirection of foreign trade towards intra-bloc exchanges must have been, 
however, partly not a matter of choice but a consequence of the economic embargo 
imposed in 1948 by the US involving the restriction of sales of machinery and equipment 
to the Soviet bloc countries, and the creation of the Coordinating Committee for East- 
West Trade Policy (COCOM) in November 1949. These discriminatory measures led to 
contraction in 1949 of Western exports to Eastern Europe to one third of the volume in 
1938.
In particular, pressure was put on Czechoslovakia and the GDR, which had been 
forced to reduce their trade with the West and supply capital goods to less advanced 
CMEA members. Thus Czechoslovakia was forced in 1949 to adjust its economic plan 
of industrial production to the requirements of other bloc countries and to take over to a 
large extent Germany's role in the field of engineering production. As a result of this 
enforced reorientation of trade, the share of Eastern European economies in the total trade
of Czechoslovakia rose from 20 per cent in 1947 to 37.9 per cent in 1948 (Economic 
Commission for Europe 1950, 94). In dollar terms, Czechoslovakia’s trade with other 
East European countries tripled from 1948 to 1953 (Economic Commission for Europe 
1955, 113).
The Soviet Union used also CMEA as an instrument of control of economic policies 
of its members to advance its foreign policy objectives. In this function the CMEA 
replaced Cominform which by 1949 ceased to be an active instrument of Soviet foreign 
policy in Eastern Europe having proved totally ineffective in forcing Yugoslavia to accept 
the Soviet Union’s authority. Firstly, CMEA was used by the Soviet Union as an 
instrument of the implementation of economic sanctions and blockade following the 
breaking of political relations with Yugoslavia. Under Soviet pressure, individual East 
European countries unilaterally abrogated all trade agreements with Yugoslavia, and 
Yugoslavia's foreign trade with the Soviet bloc countries virtually ceased to exist from 
1950 to 1953. This move to isolate Yugoslavia economically was clearly incompatible 
with the economic priorities of East European countries which tried to maintain their 
trade commitments as long as it was possible. For instance, Czechoslovakia and Poland 
did not cease trade deliveries to Yugoslavia until a year after its expulsion from the 
Cominform. 1
Secondly, far from fostering multilateral cooperation links, CMEA served as an 
instrument of preempting bilateral contacts between individual East European countries 
and endeavours for multilateral economic cooperation in the region. On Stalin's orders 
the activities of the bilateral Polish-Czechoslovak Commission for Economic 
Cooperation were suspended and plans for co-operative efforts were abandoned in the 
early 1950s. Similarly, the plans for the Balkan federation were stopped. Instead, in an
1 In May 1949, in an act of retaliation, Hungary stopped at its border Czechoslovakian deliveries 
of trucks, spare parts and tires. Czechoslovakia maintained economic relations with Yugoslavia 
until June 1949, observing its trade commitments. In fact the two countries signed on 2 March 
1949 an agreement maintaining trade at the 1948 levels. Poland suspended all trade deliveries to 
Yugoslavia in July 1949 following similar action to that already taken by Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Albania (Singleton 1985, 219).
attempt to control economic relations between its satellites, the Soviet Union put some of 
the issues which were the subject of the unsuccessful project of Polish-Czechoslovak 
cooperation on the agenda of the first CMEA Session.
These moves on limitations of possible interaction between East European economies 
paralleled the reliance on a radial pattem of relationships between the Soviet Union and 
individual East European countries in the political sphere. This pattem of chiefly bilateral 
economic relations between the Soviet Union and its satellites had beneficial political 
ramifications, as it provided Stalin with much more effective levers of control over 
economic activities of local parties than would be possible in multilateral dealings and 
thereby prevented the building up of a politically stronger Eastern Europe.
Conclusion
In the initial two years of CMEA operation, even though the Soviet Union apparently 
chose not to pursue a formal policy of supranationalem, it pursued it nevertheless in 
practice by interference in domestic economic policies of the East European countries. 
The CMEA was thus effectively an umbrella under which Gosplan integrated their 
economies into Soviet economic planning and forced them to redirect their trade links. 
CMEA was thus an effective instrument of achievement of Soviet political and economic 
objectives in the region. In this role CMEA supplemented the other informal instruments 
of direct interference in domestic policies and economic exploitation described earlier.
The permissible methods of economic cooperation based on long-term bilateral 
agreements were also determined by the Soviet Union which did not allow to establish a 
mechanism for coordination of economic policies. As the decision-making powers 
regarding the strategy and methods of cooperation belonged to the Soviet Union and 
served its objectives, none of the East European proposals for genuine economic 
cooperation was accepted and CMEA did not play the role of an organisation for regional 
cooperation based on specialisation and multilateral cooperation.
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The consequences of CMEA operation for East European economies were largely 
negative as they resulted in breaking traditional links with the West and reinforced the 
negative results of Soviet-style development strategy which disregarded economic 
scarcities as criteria for allocation of resources. These links which were formed between 
member economies were characterised by the subordination of economic criteria of 
efficiency to political considerations as allocation of resources was determined by Soviet 
allocation priorities.
1950-54: Intra-bloc economic cooperation and operation of CMEA
The 3rd Council Session, held in November 1950, seemed to promise a return to 
genuine multilateral co-operation as it renounced the functions of CMEA as a 
supranational authority as ‘erroneous’ (Sprawy Miedzynarodowe 1994:3, 130). The 
actual implication of the Session’s decisions was, however, the reduction of CMEA’s 
role to the regulation of intra-bloc trade, by means of bilateral long-term trade agreements 
(Ciamaga 1965, 49). In effect this decision, given the inherent limitations of long-term 
trade agreements as a tool of coordination of economic policies, which will be discussed 
in chapter 2, put an end to discussions on the fundamental questions of economic 
cooperation such as the coordination of plans, pricing and financial mechanisms, and 
meant a formal renunciation of idea of CMEA as an organisation for the coordination of 
national economic policies.
It also represented the formal recognition of the actual downgrading of the CMEA’s 
role which occurred when the Soviet Union abruptly ceased active participation in the 
CMEA’s Bureau at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 (Brabant 
1989, 39). Ausch (1972, 44), who at that time was a member of the CMEA Bureau 
stated that the reason for putting an end to CMEA activities as an organisation for 
economic cooperation was Stalin’s intervention. Stalin proposed that instead of work on 
the coordination of plans and attempts to elaborate the common economic policy, intra-
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bloc economic relations should be based on bilateral agreements and autonomous 
national decisions.
Without access to original documents it can be only deduced that Stalin must have 
decided that the continuation of CMEA’s functions could have led to the allocation of 
industries on the basis of more rational principles than those which could have been 
imposed by the Soviet Union by direct plan instructions. This decision must be linked to 
new Soviet foreign policy objectives, in particular the guaranteeing of the Soviet bloc’s 
conventional military superiority in Europe. These new Soviet military objectives led in 
turn to broadening of its goals in the region to include the restructuring of the satellite 
economies and their militarisation.
The need for an expansion of armaments production was promoted by a propaganda 
campaign, which had begun in 1949, emphasising the imperialist threat and fostering a 
‘siege mentality’. Scholars, who like Eugen Varga disagreed with the official 
interpretation, were forced to retract their views (New York Times 28 April 1949, 11).  ^
The campaign intensified in November 1949, when NATO was formed and a number of 
high-ranking Soviet party and military officials warned of the danger of a new war 
against the countries of the Soviet bloc, the preparation for which was being openly 
conducted by imperialists in the US and England (Shulmann 1963, 118-19). At the 
height of the Korean War the campaign gained another dimension, with the official 
Soviet line claiming that increased US war spending was bound to cause a ‘tremendous 
economic crash’ in the capitalist world. This apparently justified further military 
spending in the Soviet bloc in preparation for an eventual attack on a weakened enemy 
(Pravda 23 March 1951, 1).
*In his book ‘Changes in the Capitalist Economy as a Result of World War II’ Varga argued that 
the post-war capitalist economy was not facing an imminent crisis and that an armed conflict 
between the Western powers over competition for world markets was improbable. Following self- 
criticism Varga advanced a new interpretation in line with the official Soviet view (New York 
Times 13 June 1949).
The achievement of these objectives and subordination of the East European 
economies to the requirements of the military sector was much easier through the direct 
involvement of the Soviet planning office, Gosplan, in the drawing up of long-range 
plans and its control of the planning offices of Eastern Europe than by using 
consultations within CMEA. By then, the Soviet Union had already established the 
pattem of structural-institutional control described earlier, allowing the management of 
bloc relations through direct interference by Soviet political, economic and military 
decision-making bodies in the activities of their East European counterparts.Jt was 
through these methods of structural subordination, especially through Soviet direct 
intervention in the formulation and implementation of national economic plans, that the 
Soviet Union primarily determined economic policies of satellite countries, and put direct 
pressure on plan revisions of 1950 and 1951 to subordinate their economic development 
to the requirements of the military sector (Mine 1956, 123). In other words, the 
discontinuation of CMEA activities at the policy-making level was the result of a potential 
conflict of its operation with immediate Soviet political and economic interests.
This interpretation of the reasons for the redefinition of CMEA’s role following 
Stalin’s intervention is consistent with the official account of CMEA activities contained 
in a Polish government document Tnformacja o dzialalnosci RWPG w latach 1949- 
1956’ (Sprawy Miedzynarodowe 1994: 3, 130) and the report by Henryk Rozanski 
(1990, 43-5), a Polish representative in the CMEA. According to these accounts, in the 
years following the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from the active participation in CMEA 
until the 4th Session in 1954, the Bureau, with reduced staff numbers, concentrated on 
economic collaboration among East European members, and limited its work to the 
practical questions of facilitating trade relations and scientific-technical cooperation. 
Consequently, the CMEA’s activities were limited to the organisation of trade links 
between member countries, facilitating regional transportation, the standardization of 
foreign trade contracts and statistics, the coordination of exchanges with capitalist
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countries and the elaboration of permanent arrangements for scientific and technical co­
operation such as joint commissions (Sprawy Miedzynarodowe 1994, 130). It was not 
involved in negotiating trade agreements but was concerned with finding ways to remove 
bottlenecks and shortages of strategic raw materials. The Soviet Union, while strictly 
controlling its actvities, did not supply it with any information (Sprawy Miedzynarodowe 
1994: 3, 139).
The CMEA was however useful in meeting other Stalin’s objectives of weakening of 
links with the West and the formation of a separate socialist market. Stalin’s viewed the 
progressive establishment of stronger economic ties within the Soviet bloc, with a 
concurrent deterioration in the East-West trade relationship, which led to the formation 
and consolidation of ‘two parallel world markets’ as a positive development. In his 
‘Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR’ which appeared in the spring of 1952, 
he regarded ‘[t]he disintegration of the single, all-embracing world market as the most 
important economic sequel of the Second World War and of its economic consequences’ 
(Stalin in Franklin ed. 1973, 468). He believed that his strategy of development of intra­
bloc relations would lead not only to self-sufficiency of the bloc, but in time also to 
expansion of its exports at the cost of capitalist nations. This in turn would contribute to 
the deepening general crisis of world capitalism, including wars between capitalist 
countries which could be exploited by the communist bloc to achieve ultimate victory. He 
argued
‘It may be confidently said that, with this pace of industrial development, it will soon 
come to pass that these countries will not only be in no need of imports from capitalist 
countries, but will themselves feel the necessity of finding an outside market for their
surplus products......It follows from this that the sphere of exploitation of the world's
resources by the major capitalist countries ....will not expand, but contract; that their 
opportunities for sale in the world market will deteriorate, and that their industries will be 
operating more and more below capacity. That, in fact, is what is meant by the deepening
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of the general crisis of the world capitalist system in connection with the disintegration of 
the world market’ (Stalin in Franklin ed. 1973, 468-9).
The most tangible outcome of this pressure for reorientation of trade were increases 
in intra-bloc trade both in absolute and relative terms and overall changes in the pattem of 
foreign trade of this group of countries in favour of regional exchanges as a result of 
reorientation of trade away from Western Europe. By 1952, the communist countries 
conducted from 67 per cent to 100 per cent of their foreign trade within the bloc, and 
from 29 to 58 per cent with the USSR.l
However, the expansion of trade within the region did not in itself mean that a 
regional division of labour had been initiated. The indication of such a division of labour 
would not be the growth of trade exchanges per se, but a growth of exchanges resulting 
from production specialisation. As discussed earlier, the coordination of production and 
capital investment policies, which is essential for production ties, was never implemented 
even between the Soviet Union and the smaller communist countries except for 
agreements on ball bearings, and, as a result, production ties were of marginal 
importance in intra-bloc economic exchanges.
Furthermore, not only there was no regional division of labor implemented, but East 
European countries pursuing strategies with autarkic tendencies, in the absence of any 
mechanism for coordination of economic policies, developed parallel high-cost industrial 
branches without regard of their raw material base. Mutually competitive rather than
1 The dramatic reorientation of the Polish foreign trade geographical pattern is illustrative for other 
East European countries. By the early 1950s, the Soviet Union became the major trading partner; 
its share in Polish foreign trade increased from 1 percent in the interwar period to 22 percent in 
1948, and 32 percent in 1952. At the same time the share of capitalist countries in Polish foreign 
trade declined dramatically from 93 percent in the 1930s, to 66 percent in 1948, and 33 percent in 
1952. Before the forced reorientation the share of capitalist countries in Poland’s exports increased 
between 1946 to 1950 from 40 to 47 percent, and in imports- from 20 to 40 percent.
The diminishing trade contacts between CMEA members and capitalist countries were also 
evidenced by the fall of the communist bloc's imports from the Co-Corn countries from US$900 
to $450 billion between 1947 and 1953. Before the embargo was imposed the socialist countries 
were obtaining more than 25 percent of their import requirements from the Co-Corn nations,the 
proportion fell to less than 7 percent in 1952 (Wilczynski 1969, 284).
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complementary industrial structures within the bloc inevitably had a detrimental influence 
on the export opportunities of individual countries.
CMEA also presided over other moves towards the development of a separate market 
area. The 3rd Session made a decision to change the pricing system used for intra-CMEA 
trade from current world market prices to an artificial pricing system of the so called 
‘stop’ prices based on ‘cleansed’ and averaged world market prices, that is, prices on the 
main capitalist markets of an earlier period (Soldaczuk et al. 1983, 396-7). 1 This move 
away from world prices was officially explained as a result of a rapid increase in world 
prices during the Korean war and a desire to protect domestic economies against cyclical 
and speculative fluctuations of world prices. However, its main purpose seemed to be to 
separate the Soviet bloc market from markets of capitalist states.
The CMEA also elaborated in 1952 ‘Basic Indicators for the Application of 
Operational Reports on Foreign Trade’, permitting the creation of uniform foreign trade 
classifications. As it was approved very soon after the United Nations Organisation 
elaborated its own Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) and the Soviet bloc 
classification hardly diverged from the SITC procedures and it was implemented only in 
1959, this implies a deliberate symbolic step towards a further separation of the ‘socialist 
market’ from the capitalist one (Kaser 1965, 48-9).
Conclusion. The results of intra-bloc economic cooperation in the 
Stalinist period.
This chapter demonstrated that during the Stalinist era the primary factor which 
determined CMEA strategy, its functions and methods of cooperation were Soviet 
political and economic objectives in the region and methods of managing bloc relations. 
CMEA was established for primarily political reasons in order to integrate East European
^One of the main methods of ‘cleansing’ of world prices, or their objectivisation, was a formula of 
‘averaging’ world prices over a preceding five-year period and maintaining fixed or stable contract 
prices for a predetermined period.
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economies with that of the Soviet Union. This was considered by Stalin to be the best 
guarantee of ensuring political stability and securing Soviet strategic interests in the 
region. The priority was to ensure the Soviet Union's dominant position in the economic 
activities of the bloc and self-sufficiency through control over the economic policies of 
individual economies. This was not an easy task, because of traditional trade links of 
Eastern Europe with Western European countries.
CMEA was used by the Soviet Union to implement Soviet objectives through 
reorientation of trade, creation of industries which would permanently tie East European 
economies to the Soviet market and making the region dependent on Soviet resources.
The main objective of Stalinist economic policy was thus not the integration of the 
bloc by means of a common strategy based on specialisation and comparative advantage 
but the economic subordination of Eastern Europe, (complementing its political and 
ideological subordination) and the imposition of a Soviet-style autarkic strategy of 
economic growth.
The Soviet Union was able to achieve its objectives because of the extremely limited 
political and economic autonomy of East European states. Within the constraints of 
Soviet domination, with mechanisms of economic coordination replaced by one single 
policy imposed by the Soviet Union and the establishment of structural mechanisms of 
control of political and economic affairs of satellite countries there were no methods 
available to East European countries to resist Soviet pressures.
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CHAPTER TWO
1953-1984: INSTITUTIONAL AND ECONOMIC MECHANISMS OF CMEA 
INTEGRATION. THEIR DETERMINANTS AND FUNCTIONS IN CMEA 
COOPERATION.
This chapter examines CMEA institutional and economic mechanisms and their 
effectiveness in attaining the political and economic objectives of the organisation 
before Gorbachev’s reforms. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first outlines 
briefly the main organizational characteristics of the socio-political order of CMEA 
states as the major systemic determinants of the institutions and instruments of foreign 
trade activities including intra-bloc cooperation. The discussion is limited to those 
aspects of the economic mechanisms that had a specific bearing on management of 
international economic relations within the CMEA. The second examines the principles 
of formation and the functions of specific instruments of cooperation. It identifies the 
main limitations of the CMEA mechanism arguing that they were caused by the passive 
functions of commodity-money instruments inherent in the premises of the socio­
political order of CMEA states. The third section addresses the issues of the relative 
‘fairness’ of CMEA mechanisms, that is the extent to which CMEA members might 
have derived any political and economic advantages from these principles of 
cooperation. The fourth discusses the organisational principles governing CMEA 
economic cooperation and the formal and informal structures involved in the CMEA 
decision-making process regarding the objectives, principles and methods and forms of 
economic cooperation. I will discuss the powers and functions of CMEA organs and 
their relationships with national planning agencies and other levels of management of 
national economies. This chapter aims to show basic mechanisms involved in economic 
integration and the ‘internal logic’ of their operation. In the next part of the thesis I will
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relate them to broader institutional arrangements in order to explain the underlying 
mechanism which undermined the implementation of CMEA strategies.
The defining features of the socio-political order of CMEA states.
As discussed in chapter 1, the main consequence of consolidation of Soviet 
domination over East European countries was the imposition on these countries of the 
uniform Soviet-type system of economic planning and management. This original, 
Stalinist, highly centralised economic model functioned, in its main aspects, in all 
Soviet bloc countries until Gorbachev’s reforms, although local conditions and different 
advancement of economic reforms led to a diversity of organisation and management 
forms and a different degree of centralisation of decision-making in individual 
economies.
The basic features of the Soviet-type economy were the public ownership of the 
means of production and the centrally planned management of the economy. The nature 
of basic relations of production, that is the public ownership of means of production, 
made certain features of the operation of a socialist economy an indispensable part of 
the system. As nationalisation liquidated economic interests and mechanisms, such as 
the profit incentive and capital market, it was necessary to substitute for the 
informational and regulatory functions of the market mechanism a reliance on political 
and administrative levers of control in the regulation of the economy. This in turn 
necessitated the formation of a new system of economic management, in particular 
centralization of at least some kinds of major economic decisions and coordination of 
economic activities by a central decision-making and planning body (Brus 1972, 13, 
136).
In the Soviet bloc countries the domination of the political sphere over the 
national economy manifested itself in the exercise by the state organs of considerable 
control over all the phases of planning, production and distribution. The scope of
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decision-making included not only the main macro-economic decisions, such as the 
determination of the major proportions in the economy (i.e. the share of investment and 
consumption in the national income, and the major economic variables: price levels and 
wage rates), but also the micro-economic decisions involving the setting of detailed 
production targets for individual sectors or enterprises such as the size and detailed 
structure of output, specific methods of production, the sources of supplies and 
direction of sales (Brus 1972, 116).
Although formally the state was the main centre of economic decision-making, its 
actual authority was qualified by the principle of the guiding role of the communist 
party which meant that the party effectively exercised control over domestic and foreign 
policy-making. The decision-making powers in practice belonged to the leadership of 
the party. This was a result of the hierarchical nature of internal party organisations, 
based on the principle of democratic centralism, which gave the party leaders 
unrestricted political powers.
A Soviet-type system was thus characterised by a reciprocal relationship between 
the highly centralised management of the economy and a centralised system of 
exercising power. A central role in maintaining this relationship was played by the state 
plan which was the main instrument through which the party-state apparatus exercised 
its exclusive rights to regulate economic activities and allocate productive factors.
The instruments of economic management in a centralised model.
In the system of directive centralized planning and management the broad 
directions of party policies were formulated in long-term plans for a 10-15 year period 
and in five-year plans which specified the growth rates of production for individual 
sectors of the economy, and which established the basis for investment programs. These 
plans did not contain instructions for enterprises and as such were not ‘operational’. The 
detailed targets concerning the levels and structure of production, investment and
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consumption were set out in physical terms in an annual plan which directly and 
indirectly allocated targets to all state-owned enterprises and specified the methods of 
their achievement (Brus 1972, 117-9).
The allocative decisions were taken by the state which elaborated the hierarchical 
structure of goals consistent with the priorities of economic strategy. Planned targets 
were determined by planning procedures relying on material balances in physical units. 
Material balances were based on the priority principle which considered certain 
industries as ‘strategic’ and favoured them in the allocation of resources. As a basis for 
taking strategic decisions served thus the economic calculus on the central level which 
was of a macro-economic nature i.e. the alternatives were considered from the point of 
view of the national economy as a whole and not from of particular sectors. It had also 
predominantly the features of the so-called 'direct calculus' i.e. a calculus which was 
expressed in physical magnitudes.
The state plan and arbitrary planning and allocation procedures ensured complete 
and direct subordination of lower economic units to the political center which issued 
direct administrative orders, expressed in terms of physical units, to ministries and 
enterprises. In the unreformed centrally planned economy their fulfilment was the major 
measure of effectiveness of the functioning of enterprises. Consequently their capacity 
to determine their own production levels and prices and to make decisions about the use 
of their assets was very limited (Soldaczuk et al. 1983, 364).
The functions of commodity-money relations.
Necessarily connected with the absence of a ‘real’ market and the regulation of the 
Soviet bloc economies primarily by means of administrative methods was the largely 
passive role of commodity-money instruments. In the economic system relying on 
directives, the monetary instruments such as profit, prices, credit and financing logically 
could not constitute the basis of choice, but could serve merely as accounting tools,
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used for aggregation and monitor compliance with the central decisions (Soldaczuk et 
al. 1983, 363, 377).
In accordance with this logic of the centrally planned economy internal prices in 
CMEA countries were used primarily for aggregation in the process of formulation and 
implementation of plans and as an accounting instrument in settlements of enterprises 
with the state budget account. They were set at the central level and did not accurately 
reflect the real costs of production as well as real relative scarcities of inputs and 
outputs in the national economy. Similarly, monetary instruments fulfilled primarily an 
accounting function, necessary for the comparison of production costs and results. This 
comparison was not, however, a basis for decisions by individual enterprises concerning 
the levels and structure of production, since, as noted earlier, such decisions were taken 
at the central level and in the form of administrative directives were sent down for an 
enterprise to fulfil. The enterprise accounting was done not before but after receiving 
these instructions. Monetary instruments and individual enterprise accounting thus 
passively reflected the realisation of decisions of the central level and were used as a 
means of exercising operational supervision over the activities of enterprises to ensure 
that they operated according to plan instructions (Soldaczuk et al. 1983, 364).
The passive role of money was thus functional from the point of view of the 
central planning authorities, as it prevented an enterprise from responding to signals 
from outside the planning system. The lack of financial autonomy at the enterprise level 
and the lack of instruments of economic calculus had, however, negative consequences 
as these features resulted in the absence of economic mechanisms for enforcing 
effective management or providing incentives to make improvements in the methods of 
production as the financial results of enterprises operation did not have an impact on the 
evaluation of their effectiveness.
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Economic reforms undertaken in Soviet bloc countries during the period examined 
did not fundamentally change this logic of operation of national economies. They were 
implemented according to a doctrinal Marxist-Leninist position, according to which a 
socialist economy should be centrally planned not only in a general sense, but in all its 
aspects; thus while economic instruments had to be temporarily tolerated they were, in 
principle, incompatible with central planning. The practical implications of this position 
for the functioning of Soviet bloc economies were apparent in the tendency to 
concentrate on analysis of the shortcomings of the system without questioning the 
fundamental principles of the socialist economy and socialist growth strategy.
As discussed in chapter 3, economic reforms undertaken in the mid-1960s to 
improve the effectiveness of economic planning and management were limited to the 
combination of the streamlining of the existing system of command planning with an 
increase of the operative and economic independence of enterprises (Pravda 6 May 
1966, 4). The decentralisation of decision-making was supported by intensification of 
the role of economic incentives and an increased emphasis on economic accountability. 
The enterprises were given the right to determine many of the plan indices themselves 
and to dispose of a part of the profit (Miroshnichenko 1967, 3).
Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 these elements of reforms 
which involved partial decentralisation and price reforms were however replaced by the 
stress on rationalisation of centralized economic management (Inozemtsev 1969, 4). At 
the 24th Congress of the CPSU in 1971 the Soviet Prime Minister Alekseii Kosygin 
declared that, ’The premise that directive planning is the leading and decisive factor and 
commodity-money relations can and must be used in the interests of strengthening the 
planned guidance of the national economy and developing the initiative of enterprises 
and associations on the basis of economic accountability’. He added, ‘Commodity- 
money relations in our country have a new, inherently socialist content. We reject all
90
erroneous conceptions that substitute market regulation for the leading role of state 
centralized planning.’ (Pravda 7 April 1971, 3).l
The exception was the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in Hungary which was 
introduced in 1968, and the attempts at economic reform in Poland since 1982. As a 
part of reform measures economic organisations obtained some rights to make decisions 
on investments. Their independence was increased also by a decrease in the number of 
central directives and the substitution of some physical targets by value indicators. As a 
result of these reforms, economic organisations in Hungary and Poland enjoyed much 
greater autonomy than in other bloc countries. The limits on an enterprise’s autonomy 
were greatest in Romania, while in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia they could make certain decisions about their current but not 
investment operations.
However, even Hungarian and Polish reforms were limited to the ‘administrative’ 
decentralisation of the economy with the preservation of the fundamental role of central 
planning subordinated to political authorities. Reforms did not fundamentally alter the 
primary role of central planning by physical yardsticks, although some elements of the 
planning process underwent significant streamlining (Kaminski 1991, 73-6). 
Consequently, while the reforms of centrally managed economies in the Soviet bloc 
allowed enterprises a degree of independence in decisions on allocation of resources, 
this did not undermine in principle the passive role of money-commodity relations.
As the Polish experience with economic reform demonstrated, even far-reaching 
reform which introduced financial instruments, which made enterprises more sensitive 
to financial indicators, did not succeed in the objective of establishing a link between 
the economic performance and the financial situation of an enterprise in the absence of 
conditions essential for proper functioning of indirect controls. Instead the measures
1 The Directives of the 24th CPSU Congress For The Five-Year Plan For The Development of the USSR 
National Economy in 1971-1975 - Report by Comrade A.N.Kosygin
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introduced produced pressures towards increasing direct intervention by the state, 
although increasingly at lower levels of administration, and replacing administrative 
commands by financial parameteres shaped not by the market, but by the central 
planning authorities (Kaminski 1991, 73-6).
The instruments of involvement of CMEA countries in the international division of 
labour and their functions.
These principles and mechanisms of political and economic management of 
centrally planned economies were the major factors determining the role assigned to 
economic foreign relations and the institutions and methods of conducting foreign trade 
in CMEA countries. Their uniformity necessarily led also to the uniformity of the main 
features of the organisation of foreign trade activities of CMEA members with diversity 
limited to the organisational forms and the rights of enterprises to engage in foreign 
trade transactions.
The central management of economies determined first of all the planned 
character of regulation of foreign ties. The plans of the development of foreign trade 
relations in CMEA countries constituted a part of the system of national economic 
planning. 1 The character of planning of foreign economic relations in centrally planned 
economies was determined primarily by their function in national economic growth. In 
the conditions of largely autonomous development, which characterised CMEA 
countries in the period examined, the foreign trade plan had a residual character with 
regard to the national economic plan. A set of preliminary export and import targets was 
developed only after establishing preliminary estimates for the annual economic plan.
At that time, major importance was assigned to imports essential to meet the needs of 
the economy and the balance of the national economic plan. Exports were considered
^The foreign trade planning included a number of forms, such as long-term, medium term and 
one-year plans regarding foreign economic exchanges, the coordination of plans and the 
framework of trade agreements with other centrally-planned countries.
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not as end in themselves but primarily as the means of financing imports. The level of 
trade, as well as its commodity composition and geographic distribution were thus 
determined originally and primarily by import needs (Soldaczuk et al. 1983, 346). Since 
material balances were used as the primary tool to determine the level and commodity 
composition of the structure of trade, these decisions ignored relative production costs, 
domestic and external comparative advantages. Conversely, since macroeconomic 
decisions about accumulation and investments were taken not on a basis of economic 
scarcities, whether domestic or external, foreign economic ties did not actively 
influence the production, investment and consumption plans. A consequence of the 
passive role of foreign trade in the economic strategies of Soviet bloc countries was the 
autarkic character of a substantial part of their economies, i.e those enterprises which 
were set up only to produce import substitutes, but proved unable to compete with 
foreign organisations (Bozyk 1989, 4).^
The systemic factors were also major determinants of the principles and 
procedures governing foreign trade activities and the behaviour of economic 
organisations in Soviet bloc economies. The principal feature of the organization of 
foreign economic activities in all CMEA countries was the state monopoly of foreign 
trade, which empowered the state to exercise exclusive control over the development of 
external economic ties. The monopoly was thus consistent with the public ownership of 
the means of production which rendered the state the main center of political and 
economic decision-making. It was also consistent with the overriding role of the state 
plan in regulating the participation of a country in the international division of labour, 
as it ensured the conduct of foreign economic ties in accordance with macro-economic 
priorities reflected in the provisions of the state plans (Soldaczuk et al. 1983, 344). The
1 Detailed central planning could also independently stimulate mechanism of the autonomous 
development of the national economy. These tendencies stemmed from a desire of the national 
planning authority to eliminate in domestic planning as far as possible the elements of instability 
and uncertainty which could disrupt the fulfilment of the state plan. External factors on which 
foreign trade plans primarily depended, represented such elements. This desire to protect the 
economy against undesirable external fluctuations led to attempts to limit as much as possible 
dependence on external resources and to import substitution (Soldaczuk et al. 1983, 362).
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decisions concerning external economic relations were taken at the central level while 
the role of lower level economic organisations consisted in the implementation of 
central directives (Soldaczuk et al. 1983, 345). ^
In organisational terms the monopoly was implemented by granting the exclusive 
right to engage in foreign trade operations to the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which 
conducted all foreign trade activities chiefly through state trading organisations 
specialising in particular commodity groups. Until the reforms of the 1960s individuals, 
production associations and enterprises, were not allowed to deal directly with their 
potential buyers or sellers abroad. The restrictions on purchases by foreign importers, 
aimed at the protection of internal markets, were described in Western literature as 
‘commodity inconvertibility’ (Holzman 1976, 42).
An integral part of the system of central planning was thus the hierarchical system 
of management of foreign relations and rigid administrative separation of domestic 
producers from foreign producers and consumers. By preventing enterprises from by­
passing their own central authorities and establishing direct contacts with enterprises in 
another country, the monopoly of foreign trade served in the foreign trade sector the 
same role as passive money with regard to domestic transactions, namely it prevented 
an enterprise from responding to signals from outside the planning system. The 
monopoly thus supplemented the central planning mechanism in its function of securing 
the autonomy of economic policy and stability in domestic activity.
This separation between the domestic and foreign markets and control by the state 
of external economic relations was complemented by the separation of the domestic and 
international spheres of settlements through the state’s foreign currency monopoly. The
^As Polaczek (in Bozyk ed. 1974, 137) has pointed out, the broad powers of the State to use very effective 
administrative instruments to protect the internal market against imports can be traced back to the Soviet 
foreign trade system established during the first five-year plan in the 1930s which was originally designed to 
protect new industries from capitalist competition, eliminate competition between Soviet purchasing and 
sales agencies on foreign markets and to strengthen the bargaining position of the Soviet state with capitalist 
enterprises. It was subsequently installed without major changes in Eastern Europe.
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need to separate these spheres was linked to the premise of the monetary system in 
centrally planned economies that domestic currencies could be legally used only for 
internal needs, and hence were not convertible. By means of the currency monopoly the 
state exercised its exclusive right to conduct all international settlements, make 
decisions on currency issues, and to allocate foreign currency earnings according to 
centrally-determined priorities. 1The currency monopoly was designed to make possible 
the conduct of independent monetary-credit policy and to protect domestic economies 
from the influx of foreign capital. It also permitted control of the levels and structure of 
domestic prices, which was important in the conditions of an autonomous system of 
domestic prices independent of world prices.
The management of foreign economic relations in CMEA countries was also 
affected by the principles of formation and functions of domestic prices, exchange rates 
and other financial instruments. As mentioned earlier, domestic prices in individual 
CMEA countries were administratively set at the central level, did not accurately reflect 
production costs and were independent of world market prices. Similarly, as a result of 
inconvertibility of domestic currencies, the official exchange rates were set by the state 
at a constant level which did not reflect relative values of currencies. Their main 
function was to serve as a unit of account in domestic settlements between foreign trade 
enterprises and national banks servicing foreign trade (Soldaczuk 1983, 364). They 
were not meant however to be used for comparing domestic prices of CMEA countries, 
and domestic and intra-CMEA prices and world prices. They thus could not be used by 
a domestic producer to calculate the actual production costs in case of imports, or the 
profitability of exports (Soldaczuk et al. 1983, 120, 398).
1 Foreign trade enterprises and other eligible organisations engaged in foreign trade operations had 
to direct all their foreign earnings to the state bank, while enterprises conducting import 
transactions envisaged in the foreign trade plan had to request the required allocation of foreign 
exchange (Soldaczuk et al. 1983, 118).
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The negative consequence of administratively set prices and exchange rates was 
that centrally planned economies, both at a national and enterprise level, did not have 
instruments for the calculation of the effectiveness of foreign trade transactions, 
specialisation and cooperation in production or investments and thus for decisions on 
allocation of resources and the most effective structure of exports and imports.
Furthermore, the financial results of foreign trade transactions had no economic 
significance for enterprises as the differences between foreign prices and the 
corresponding domestic prices calculated at artificial exchange rates were offset through 
a budget account. As a result, there was no mechanism providing economic incentives 
for enterprises to produce for export, to raise productivity and ensure high quality and 
the competitiveness of products in foreign markets. The ultimate result of this 
separation of producers from foreign markets was the development of the national 
economy in isolation from the requirements on the world markets. Even within the 
CMEA the economies of the member states were separated.
Summary
The instruments of economic management and institutions of foreign trade in 
CMEA countries were thus compatible with the logic of a centrally planned economy, 
they were however not suitable for active participation in the division of labour both 
internationally and within CMEA.
In the period examined, CMEA countries made several attempts at the 
improvement of the system of management of foreign trade relations. Foreign trade 
reforms were undertaken in some East European countries, but not in the Soviet Union, 
in the mid-1960s as a part of general economic reforms. In the 1970s, they took place in 
conditions of intense exposure of CMEA economies to developments in the world 
economy. This was due firstly to rapid rise in world oil prices in 1973, which from the 
mid-1970s began to affect also intra-CMEA exchanges. Secondly, at that time several
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countries, particularly Poland, initiated an export-led growth strategy which required a 
new approach to the organisation of foreign trade.
Their broad objectives was to make foreign trade play a more active role in 
national economic development, to increase productivity through exports of 
manufactured products and to make economies more responsive to the requirements of 
the world economy and the CMEA market. The main general characteristic of these 
efforts was a modification of the forms of the monopoly of foreign trade, such as giving 
rights to conduct foreign trade activities to enterprises without the intermediation of 
foreign trade organisations, the subordination of some foreign trade organisations to 
branch ministries, and the formation of joint ventures and joint cooperation agreements. 
The reforms also entailed a variety of measures aimed at providing economic incentives 
to produce for exports. In Poland, special exchange rates were introduced in an attempt 
to link domestic and foreign trade prices, and thus to ensure that the results of external 
transactions would influence the overall financial results of producers (Bakos 1987, 21- 
2).
The reforms did not, however, violate the principle of state control over foreign 
trade activities and the subordination of foreign trade to the central plan. As a result 
these measures had fallen short of creating an institutional framework conducive to 
adjustment to international technological requirements. Their limited character was due 
to the absence of essential reforms of domestic economic mechanisms involving 
domestic prices and other monetary instruments (Bogomolov ed. 1987, 418-20).
Szortyka (1989, 25) has argued that the centralised management of the economy 
stimulates the autonomous reproduction of the principles of centralised management of 
foreign economic ties, notwithstanding attempts and measures aimed at 
decentralisation. This occurs due to economic processes arising from the shortages 
which, as Komai (1980) has convincingly demonstrated, this type of economic
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management has to generate regardless of high or low economic growth. The crucial 
feature of foreign economic relations of an economy characterised by shortages is a 
spontaneous reproduction of import ‘hunger’. The imports are desirable both from the 
point of view of enterprises and central authorities which see them as a means of 
eliminating the imbalances that are constantly arising in the economy. Yet, in the 
conditions of an economy of shortage import needs can not be fully satisfied by exports 
due to mechanisms obstructing the interest of enterprises in export. The lack of interest 
of enterprises in export due to isolation from external markets is further strengthened by 
a domestic ‘seller’s’ market characterised by shortages. In conditions of demand 
exceeding supply it is easier for producers to sell all their products on the domestic 
market rather than to meet the special requirements of foreign buyers in terms of quality 
etc. The majority of producers export only a few per cent of their output. In these 
conditions the state is, on the one hand, forced to the centralised control of imports and, 
on the other, state intervention by means of preferential instruments is also necessary to 
encourage export. This necessity of centralised regulation of foreign economic ties 
logically requires a hierarchical system of management of foreign relations.
The CMEA mechanisms of cooperation. The postulated functioning of CMEA 
mechanism. The main rules and procedures governing joint planning.
The principles governing the economic mechanism of its members described in a 
preceding section were the primary determinants of CMEA mechanisms of cooperation. 
Consequently, CMEA cooperation had a planned character and relied primarily on 
direct administrative methods for the regulation of economic relations between its 
members. CMEA mechanisms also entailed indirect coordination of economic decisions 
by means of the pricing system, monetary and financial instruments, credit system, 
international banks and joint economic organisations. The functions of commodity- 
money instruments reflected the passive role of indirect instruments of management in
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the domestic economies; they were subordinated to planning instruments and did not 
influence decisions regarding the levels and structure of production and exchanges.
Hypothetically, the CMEA, as an organization for economic cooperation of 
centrally planned economies, had a choice between two economic mechanisms to 
elaborate a joint economic policy. One option was to effect the process of coordination 
of the national economic policies of its members through a single central plan for the 
whole region, drawn up by a supranational authority, or by national planning agencies 
working together. Such a supranational plan would allocate specific investment projects 
and production goals to individual member states from the point of view of priorities 
desirable from the perspective of the entire CMEA rather than individual national 
economies.
As discussed in chapter 3, this concept of CMEA as a supranational body with 
powers to allocate resources and issue directives, raised by Khrushchev in 1962, was 
successfully opposed by East European members of CMEA and did not materialise. The 
preservation of formal sovereign rights of individual member countries in the process of 
economic cooperation meant that national governments remained the sole owners of the 
means of production and exercised, at least formally, exclusive rights to decide their 
economic priorities.
As a consequence, the decision-making process within the CMEA had to be effected 
by joint planning activities conducted on the basis of the voluntary agreement of all 
participating countries. This meant that, at least formally, all the joint plans and 
programs of CMEA members could not be independent of individual national economic 
plans but had to result from the targets of the national economic development plans 
independently worked out by each country (Bogomolov ed. 1987, 364).
In this mechanism of CMEA cooperation the main decision-making functions 
were fulfilled by the individual states which decided major economic issues on behalf
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of enterprises, directly participating in cooperation. The central role in the organisation 
of the main aspects of cooperation was exercised by national central planning bodies 
which played a principal role in the coordination of plans, determination of 
specialisation and cooperation directions, negotiating the terms of inter-state agreements 
and were responsible for the coordination of activities with CMEA organs. Their role in 
joint planning activities increased following the adoption of the Comprehensive 
Program (CP) which assigned to them responsibility for not only direct coordination of 
national economic plans but also for joint planning and drawing up of long-term 
economic forecasts (Rodionov 1971, 2). The CP also provided for a greater 
involvement of the chairmen of the CMEA member countries' planning agencies in 
cooperation on the newly established Committee for Cooperation in Planning.
Central planning organs were assisted by national ministries and other central 
bodies and economic organisations of CMEA members which exercised substantial 
powers with regard to objectives and methods of economic cooperation in their 
respective fields. They elaborated the programs of cooperation in their sectors on the 
basis of strategies of cooperation outlined in programmatic statements and decided 
bilaterally issues related to the development of individual sectors, including 
specialization and cooperation, joint investment projects and exchanges of some goods, 
and concluded agreements with their counterparts in other countries (Nosiadek 1986, 
25).
The model of cooperation thus relied primarily on cooperation between states and 
not on direct links between production and trade enterprises. The decisions regarding 
cooperation were taken primarily at inter-state level with the national central bodies, in 
particular planning agencies, playing the decisive role in determining the content of 
CMEA cooperation. Production and trade enterprises which were ultimately responsible 
for the achievement of CMEA aims played a passive role in this process. Direct links 
between enterprises consisted in the implementation of decisions in accordance with the
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terms of agreements previously decided at the central level during the coordination of 
plans. This was consistent with the domestic mechanism which excluded production 
associations and enterprises from direct participation in foreign-economic activity.
The coordination of economic policies of CMEA countries had a directive character 
and dealt with physical quantities. The principal form of joint planning was the 
coordination of national five-year economic plans. It focused on the key sectors of the 
economy such as machine building, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, coal, petroleum, 
gas and chemical industries, transportation services, and joint production projects.
The decision to adopt the coordination of plans as the basis of the CMEA economic 
mechanism was taken by the 4th Session in 1954. The rationale was that the 
coordination would go beyond coordination of mutual deliveries resulting from national 
plans and actively influence the sphere of material production. The assumption 
underlying this belief was that the main production and investment intentions could be 
discussed prior to their approval by individual governments in national plans 
(Bogomolov ed. 1987, 393). It was hoped that in the course of consultations individual 
countries would make production and investment decisions, and determine the basic 
directions of specialisation with consequent adjustments in the national economic plans 
(Ciamaga 1965, 55). The conclusion of long-term trade agreements determining the 
proportions and structure of mutual trade would follow in the wake of coordination of 
production and investment intentions (Deniszczuk in Bozyk ed. 1974, 84-7).
As discussed in chapter 3, the 4th Council Session in 1954 also considered an idea 
of coordination of long-term plans as the basis for the development of joint policy. 
However this concept was abandoned for four years as a result of a Soviet attempt to 
impose its own economic preferences on East European countries directly. The idea 
resurfaced again in 1958 at the 8th Session, which recommended that the coordination 
of the main targets of the five-year plans should be supplemented by drawing up and
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co-ordinating long-term investment plans for a period of ten to fifteen years (Ciamaga 
1965, 217). Since then the combination of coordination of long and short-term plan 
remained a postulated chief CMEA mechanism for the elaboration of joint economic 
policy. The 8th Session also recommended that the coordination should be conducted 
not only on a bilateral, but also on a multilateral basis (Ciamaga 1965, 212).
Instruments of regulation of CMEA exchanges and economic cooperation.
The basic planning instruments of the regulation of intra-CMEA economic ties were 
the inter-state long-term economic agreements, usually for a five-year period, concluded 
by central national planning bodies in the course of coordinating five-year plans. The 
agreements formed economic ties in a direct or indirect way. The agreements which 
formed the ties directly were trade and services agreements, production agreements, 
particularly specialisation and cooperation in production, and scientific and technical 
cooperation agreements. Agreements which formed the ties indirectly included credit 
and settlement agreements (Soldaczuk et al. 1983, 395). The provisions of long-term 
economic agreements were specified every year in the annual protocols also at the 
central level. The agreements contained commitments of individual states on mutual 
deliveries of goods and services. It was impossible to obtain goods and services outside 
their framework. The role of foreign trade organisations consisted in the implementation 
of agreed planned targets for exports and imports specified by the agreements.
The form and scope of the agreements depended on the degree of centralisation 
and the functioning of the state monopoly of foreign trade. In centrally planned 
economies agreements specified in detail intended levels and composition of exports 
and imports by main types of goods and other terms of mutual deliveries. The 
exchanges were balanced bilaterally between individual pairs of countries in total terms, 
in specific main commodity groups and even some key goods (Soldaczuk et al. 1983, 
395).
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The rigid character of agreements and bilateral balancing in main commodity 
groups complemented the centralized system of planning and management relying on 
material balances. Strictly centralised trade allowed the possibility of state control of 
levels of exports and imports to ensure the balance of a domestic plan and balance of 
payments. The system of planned deliveries of specified goods also reduced the 
uncertainty inherent in exchanges with foreign markets.
Bilaterally balanced trade agreements were also expedient because they helped to 
minimise the effect of the shortages which characterised the operation of CMEA 
member economies. The rigid, bilateral character of agreements made possible tying 
exports of ‘hard’, that is desirable, goods for which demand within CMEA exceeded 
supply, to the imports of other commodities in short supply. Bilateral agreements also 
allowed tying the deliveries of ‘hard’ goods to sales of less desirable ‘soft’ goods 
(Orlowski 1971, 12).
A distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ goods originated from detailed direct 
central planning and the resulting shortages in domestic economies which could not be 
satisfied by imports. Commodities regarded as ‘hard’ goods within CMEA included raw 
materials and fuels of key importance for economic development which were relatively 
underpriced on CMEA markets and could be sold on world markets for hard currency, 
and machinery and equipment comparable with world standards. The majority of 
countries, especially those who were net importers of raw materials and fuels, 
considered consumer goods ‘soft’, as they were overpriced and difficult to sell on world 
markets (Szortyka 1989, 28).
As mentioned in chapter 1, in the initial years of CMEA cooperation it was assumed 
that inter-state trade agreements could become the means of indirect coordination of 
national production and investment plans of CMEA members and thus a basic form of 
coordination of economic policies of individual countries. This assumption was based
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on a belief that it was possible to conduct trade negotiations in the course of drawing up 
of national plans, and that their provisions could influence the production and 
investment decisions in individual countries. The 3rd Council Session, held in 
November 1950, recommended that those member countries which had not yet 
concluded such agreements should do so by 1951. The 4th Session, in 1954, the first to 
be held after Stalin's death, acknowledged that the increase in intra-bloc foreign trade 
exchanges which took place during that period was not a result of the coordination of 
national economic plans of member countries. Their ineffectiveness as an instrument of 
initiating a division of labour and specialisation of production was a consequence of 
planning procedures based on material balances, according to which the determination 
of the investment and production plans by individual governments took place prior to 
decisions on exports and imports. This meant that trade negotiations could only 
indirectly and in a limited way influence plan targets which had already been 
determined.
The determinants of the principles of formation of CMEA prices, exchange rates, 
interest rates and the system of settlements and credits. Functions of commodity- 
money instruments.
As discussed earlier each CMEA country had an autonomous system of domestic 
prices, which made impossible the elaboration of economically rational principles of 
formation of CMEA prices on the basis of production costs, a purely internal monetary 
system and arbitrary official rates of exchange. As a consequence they could not use 
their internal commodity-money instruments for international settlements and 
comparison of costs. This led to the need to develop an artificial CMEA pricing and 
monetary system independent of internal systems.
Initially, until 1950, intra-CMEA trade was valued at current world market prices. 
However, during the Korean War, CMEA countries began to rely on an artificial pricing
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system of so called ‘stop’ prices based on ‘cleansed’ and average world market prices 
that is prices on the main capitalist markets of an earlier period (Soldaczuk et al. 1983, 
396-7). For example in 1951-57 in their intra-bloc exchanges CMEA countries used 
prices at the 1949-50 level.1 The basic principle of the ‘stop’ pricing system was that 
intra-CMEA prices should reflect changes in the conditions of world supply and 
demand but be free from the influence of short-term and cyclical, speculative, 
monopolistic and other factors of non-productive nature. The 9th CMEA Session in 
1957 also prescribed uniform rules for price determination in bilateral agreements, i.e. a 
single price was to prevail throughout the bloc for a single commodity (Bogomolov ed. 
1987, 432). In practice, however, prices were determined on a bilateral basis during 
negotiations of a trade agreement which led to different prices for the same products.
These rules of price determination remained fundamentally unchanged until the 
1980s. The modification in 1975 of ‘stop’ prices by the introduction of the ‘sliding’ 
world average price system was limited to an annual change of the basis for CMEA 
prices. Prices were now changed annually on the basis of the average of the preceding 
five year’s world market prices.2 The changes occurred at Soviet insistence one year 
ahead of schedule. The main objective of this modification was to narrow significant 
and increasing differences between CMEA and world prices inherent in ‘stop’ prices, 
unchanged for five years and thus to maximise the immediate increase of revenue for 
Soviet energy deliveries.
The formation of the CMEA contractual prices on the basis of world prices was not 
an obstacle to the fulfilment by prices of their limited accounting functions consistent
^This move away from world prices was officially explained as a result of a rapid increase in 
world prices during the Korean war and a desire to protect domestic economies against cyclical 
and speculative fluctuations of world prices. One of the main methods of ‘cleansing’ of world 
prices, or their objectivisation was a formula of ‘averaging’ world prices over a preceding five- 
year period and maintaining fixed or stable contractual prices for a predetermined period. This 
meant that in 1958 CMEA adopted world prices for 1957-58 as binding until 1965. Actual 
contractual prices for 1966-70 were based on average world prices for 1960-1964. Prices for 
1971-1975 were linked to average world prices for 1965-1969.
2 Contractual prices for 1979 were based on average world market prices for 1974-1978, and prices for 1980 
were linked to average world prices for 1975-1979.
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with the bilateral, detailed agreements. The CMEA pricing system was also consistent 
with the requirements of the planned regulation of economic processes because by 
insulating CMEA countries from fluctuations on international currency markets it 
ensured a certain stability of prices (Zycie Gospodarcze 29 June 1975, 11).
CMEA monetary-financial relations.
Similarly, CMEA countries used in all intra-CMEA settlements an artificial 
currency - until 1964 the so-called clearing rouble and after that the transferable rouble 
(TR). The decision to create an artificial currency stemmed from a premise inherent in 
the principle of central planning that domestic currencies could be used only for internal 
needs. The transferable rouble was to serve as a technical tool of settlements as an 
accounting measure of value. These functions were consistent with the regulation of 
economic relations by rigidly balanced bilateral trade agreements specifying volume 
and levels of exchanges in the forthcoming period where settlements were on a clearing 
basis and there was no room for the active function of currency.
In the examined period, in accordance with the Marxist ideological precepts, only 
the markets for commodities and services were regarded as legitimate areas of 
cooperation. Credit relations among CMEA members were conducted primarily at the 
central level and were regulated by means of inter-government agreements, which 
specified the project for which credit was granted, terms of repayment and interest rates. 
Credits were granted in a form of transfers of the transferable roubles or commodities, 
mostly in the latter form. Due to the ideological objection to recognizing interest as a 
return on capital, interest rates were very low at about 2.5 per cent with regard to 
foreign trade settlements and 2-3 per cent on loans.
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The actual functioning of CMEA mechanisms.
In practice, plan coordination was not an instrument of coordination of national 
economic policies. Instead it was principally a process of exchange of information on 
quantative quotas of imports and exports which were then adopted as a basis for 
concluding inter-state bilateral trade agreements as well as annual trade protocols and 
other economic agreements. Negotiations took place not before, as intended, but after 
national plans were completed and the pattern of investment decided (Miroshnichenko 
1967, 3). The reason was that the priority of national governments was to achieve a 
balanced national economic plan, and the coordination of plans was subordinated to this 
objective.
Coordination was used primarily to secure deliveries of raw materials and fuels 
and high quality types of machinery and equipment, so called ‘hard’ goods, essential for 
the operation of the metallurgical industry and machine-building industries. Priority was 
placed on preventing bottlenecks in the economic development of the CMEA members 
and at eliminating shortages that had developed in the course of production (Alekseyev, 
1971,3).
The coordination of economic policies was limited to the administrative 
determination of those economic sectors where the specialization and cooperation of 
production should take place. Most specialisation agreements consisted of an 
administrative allocation of production by type or size. In terms of economic 
instruments this was the result of the principles of formation of CMEA pricing system. 
As discussed earlier, domestic prices in individual countries could not be compared as 
each country had its own price system. That meant that they could not serve as an 
instrument of comparison of prices and costs of production in different countries and 
determining comparative advantages between domestic production and alternative 
imports. CMEA prices also did not reflect actual production costs in individual
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countries or relative scarcities within CMEA (Soldaczuk et al. 1983, 396-7; Bogomolov 
ed. 1987, 432). Consequently, CMEA members did not have objective criteria to make 
decisions on investments, specialisation and cooperation, exports and imports and to 
develop division of labour.
Another problem for the process of cooperation related to the principles of 
formation of intra-CMEA prices stemmed from difficulties in finding an accurate 
pricing basis. While it was relatively simple to establish world prices for raw materials 
and other primary products, because these are mostly standardized commodities traded 
on the world markets at published prices, there were problems with identifying the most 
appropriate product for comparison in case of machinery and equipment (Bogomolov 
ed. 1987, 434). Furthermore as there was a range of world market prices for a given 
type of products, the comparison by referring to different types of product led to 
significant divergences between intra-CMEA prices and world market prices. Yet 
another reason was that for most manufactured products in trade between countries with 
non-convertible currencies, prices typically tend to gravitate toward the upper end of the 
world market price range because due to a shortage of convertible currencies there is a 
preference to import products of comparable quality from other soft-currency countries, 
which allows the seller to charge the highest possible price (Marer in Terry ed. 1984, 
167).
The result of these divergences was relative underpricing of raw materials and 
relative overpricing of low quality machinery and equipment. While there has been a 
general agreement as to the existence of these distortions the extent of these is a matter 
of controversy. Smith (1983, 165) estimated that prices for manufactured commodities 
were 25.9 per cent higher than world market prices, while raw materials only 15.4 per 
cent. Ausch (1972) claimed that that intra-CMEA prices for machinery exceeded prices 
of identical goods on Western markets by 10-20 per cent. However, Poznanski (1988, 
293), referring to Hungarian studies conducted in the mid-1980s, noted that some
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reduction or even elimination of such excess prices had taken place, at least in the area 
of traditional machinery.
Whatever the actual distortion, such prices did not reflect the actual conditions of 
supply and demand on the CMEA market, which was characterised, on the one hand, by 
a persistent deficit of supply in some natural resources, minerals, foodstuffs and other 
primary commodities and, on the other, by an excess supply of low quality machinery 
and equipment. As a consequence, in order to avoid unfair terms of trade and 
subsidizing other countries the tendency was to balance goods not only globally, but in 
the specific commodity groups, in particular in fuel and raw materials. This 
‘naturalization’ of exchanges thus strengthened the practice of ‘tying’ exports and 
imports of ‘hard’ goods or exports of ‘hard’ goods to sales of ‘soft’ goods, discussed 
earlier in the chapter. This practice was prevalent in particular in trade among East 
European countries (Marer in Terry 1984, 168, 172-3)1 as none of them was prepared to 
run a surplus in these crucial categories. As discussed in the next section, since the early 
1980s this approach began also to characterise Soviet trade.
Another factor which obstructed CMEA cooperation which was related to the 
mechanism of intra-CMEA price determination was their separation from world prices 
and costs of production. This problem was exacerbated by the artificial exchange rates 
of the transferable rouble in relation to convertible currencies. This had a double effect. 
In the short term, breaking any connection between world prices and CMEA prices 
frequently led to the redirection of trade of some types of goods which could be sold for 
convertible currencies away from CMEA market. In the longer term, as CMEA was not 
self-sufficient economically, this separation delayed adaptation of CMEA economies to 
the changing requirements of global markets.
^This is evident from the commodity composition of Soviet trade with six East European states 
combined. See: Table 6.1 on pages 172-3 and the corresponding trade balance by main commodity 
categories in Table 6.2 on a page 173.
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Bilaterally balanced trade agreements were also not effective instruments in 
regulating intra-CMEA cooperation, to the contrary, they had a negative impact on the 
level of trade, the possibility of multilateral cooperation and commodity structure of 
exchanges. The impossibility of the multilateral settlement of accounts in transferable 
rubles was the result of bilateral clearing exacerbated by the varying purchasing power 
of the TR in individual clearing agreements. Formally the TR had equal value in all 
bilateral settlements. However, in reality its value depended on the commodity 
composition of exchanges and the level of prices in a specific bilateral agreement. This 
was related to the fact that despite the agreed principle of a single price for a particular 
product, in the conditions of rigid bilateral trade agreements, negotiations led to 
significant differences in prices for the same product. As a result, the system of 
settlements was segmented into 45 pairs of bilateral clearings with different price bases 
and different exchange rates for the TR, differences in its value ranging from 20 to 30 
per cent. As a result, the actual value of each bilateral clearing balance was different 
and the TR was practically inconvertible (Sergeyev 1990, 40).
The inconvertibility of the TR led above all to the lowering of the level of mutual 
exchanges to the export capacity of the weaker partner. The reason was that additional 
exports in excess of agreed levels or a positive balance would lead to a surplus of 
transferable roubles, which under those conditions, would mean granting involuntary 
transaction credits to the purchasing side which could not be spent. The need to balance 
trade bilaterally was thus substantially reducing the level of intra-CMEA trade and 
ultimately the level of production (Kisiel in Bozyk ed. 1974, 232). This kind of barter 
also weakened interest in increasing exports and improvement in the quality of goods.
The first attempt attempt at solving the problems of inconvertibility of currencies 
and bilateralism was the introduction in 1957 of multilateral clearing settlements 
between CMEA members by means of a so-called clearing rouble. This initiative was
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however limited to exchange of surplus goods which had not been included in regular 
trade agreements, and quickly proved unworkable.
Another unsuccessful initiative was the introduction of a multilateral settlement 
system through the International Bank for Economic Cooperation (IBEC) set up in 
1964. The Bank was responsible for conducting all intra-CMEA settlements, providing 
short-term bank loans to accommodate temporary bilateral imbalances, and helping to 
alleviate structural balance-of-payments problems. The bank also managed special 
funds for financing joint investment ventures expected to play a crucial role in 
advancing the international socialist division of labor (Kisiel in Bozyk ed. 1984, 238- 
39). The multilateral settlements were to be achieved by newly-created transferable 
roubles, so called, because in theory a surplus of transferable roubles in trade with one 
CMEA member could be used to pay off a deficit with another (Ciamaga 1965, 91). 
However, a declaration that a transferable rouble existed did not make it transferable, or 
for that matter, convertible. The introduction of the TR created the organisational but 
not the necessary economic conditions for multilateral trade and payments. The 
objective conditions which resulted in the lack of multilateral settlements, that is the 
regulation of CMEA by means of rigid bilateral agreements with varying prices for the 
same products, and as the TR could not be spent freely on unplanned imports from the 
other Soviet bloc nations no country was prepared to run a surplus (Bogomolov 1987, 
450). The TR was thus only formally a means of multilateral settlements; in practice, 
trade remained as rigidly balanced as before, and the TR remained inconvertible.
Bilateralism also distorted the pattern of trade and specialization by obstructing 
the formation of an effective structure of mutual exchanges. Under rigid bilateralism, 
countries do not necessarily import at the lowest possible cost, thereby encouraging 
specialization according to comparative advantage, but often are forced to buy from less 
efficient producers in order to balance accounts bilaterally. In addition, the consequence 
of rigid bilateralism was the assigning of priority to imports of equipment and raw
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materials, at the expense of consumption goods. This led to a general trend of import 
substitution and ultimately to the slow development of intra-bloc specialisation in 
consumer sector goods.
The CMEA credit system was also counterproductive in the implementation of 
CMEA cooperation. With regard to foreign trade settlements very low interest rates at 
about 2.5 per cent annually could hardly represent a tangible penalty in case of failure 
of the planned fulfilment of deliveries agreed in annual agreements and thus fulfilment 
of settlement obligations (Kisiel in Bozyk ed. 1974, 233). The failure to keep financial 
commitments led during the 1970s to the conduct of a growing share of intra-bloc trade 
at current world market prices and paid for in convertible currency. These transactions 
involved also ‘hard’ goods exported to CMEA partners outside the framework of the 
five-year trade agreements.
With regard to investment flows, the very low rate on loans was one of the factors 
discouraging investment in each other’s economies since higher rates of return could be 
obtained by investing domestically. Another obstacle in the transfer of capital was the 
ban until the late 1980s, on foreign organisations or governments owning the means of 
production in a Soviet bloc country (Zwass 1989, 57-71). In practice the most important 
form of credit were loans for joint investment projects and to alleviate balance-of 
payment problems.
Conclusion
This section demonstrated that CMEA mechanisms had many limitations which 
seriously impaired their effectiveness as an instrument for multilateral cooperation, 
coordination of investments and development of specialisation and cooperation in the 
production sphere. Factors obstructing an increase in economic links included bilateral 
forms of cooperation which relied on allocation of products in physical units by 
administrative methods, difficulties in determining the effectiveness of foreign
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economic ties, investments and industrial cooperation, low mobility of factors of 
production, inconvertibility of the TR, its artificial exchange rates in relation to 
convertible currencies and separation of CMEA market from world prices and costs of 
production. The lack of conditions for multilateral cooperation and problems with 
determining the effectiveness of cooperative projects created barriers for the 
implementation of the regional division of labour based on the rational allocation of 
resources, thus hindering the process of mutual accommodation of CMEA economies.
Ultimately, the sources of inherent ineffectiveness in the system lay in the 
domestic mechanisms of CMEA centrally planned economies whether traditional or 
partially reformed. The individual economies were structurally incapable of genuine 
coordination, let alone integration. As a consequence, the introduction of conditions 
necessary for integration depended on radical internal reforms including a reform of the 
pricing system, the introduction of realistic exchange rates allowing the comparison of 
production costs in individual countries and the introduction of convertibility of 
currencies.
Within the constraints of the Soviet bloc such reforms were impossible. The 
immediate reasons were economic in nature. The introduction of the conditions which 
were essential for integration would require the introduction of market instruments of 
regulation of economic processes, and thus fundamental transformation, if not abolition 
of the existing systems of management of economies relying on directive planning and 
rigid system of allocation of production. For example, full commodity convertibility of 
national currencies would mean that an enterprise in one country could by-pass both its 
own central authorities and the central authorities in other CMEA countries. 
Consequently, the central planning authorities would no longer retain control over the 
allocation of resources within their respective economies. Full commodity convertibility 
was therefore incompatible with central planning by direct controls. Ultimately, 
however, the reasons for the maintenance of this system were political. The CMEA
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mechanism had to conform to the Soviet system of management and in the period under 
discussion the Soviet Union was not prepared to make changes endangering political 
control over the national economy.
The nature of Soviet economic relations with Eastern Europe. The political 
functions of CMEA instruments.
In direct relation to the principles of operation of CMEA mechanism were the 
issues of its relative ‘fairness’, that is the extent to which CMEA members derived any 
advantages from these rules of cooperation. The issue of economic ‘fairness’ defined in 
the literature in terms of ‘exploitation or subsidization’ was directly linked to the 
CMEA pricing system which, as mentioned earlier, led to the relative overpricing of 
manufactures and relative underpricing of raw materials in relation to world market 
prices. Furthermore, the subsidies were caused by delays in adjustment of CMEA prices 
to world levels, as, for example, in the period following the rapid price rises in the mid- 
1970s. This resulted in a perception among the CMEA members that they were 
subsidising others through distorted prices. The issue of political benefits concerned the 
question whether the CMEA mechanisms were used by the Soviet Union as an 
instrument of political pressure on East European policies.
The discussion on the subject of the relative ‘fairness’ of the CMEA pricing 
mechanism and its policy implications has involved numerous estimates and 
interpretations by Western political scientists and economists. It has been generally 
accepted that the Soviet Union was a source of net ‘implicit subsidies4 to Eastern 
Europe during 1972-84. There has been, however, a difference of opinion about the 
magnitude of subsidies as well as interpretation of their functions in intra-bloc relations.
The first well publicised attempt to quantify the transfers of wealth to Eastern 
Europe was made by Marrese and Vanous (1983) who demonstrated that the implicit
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trade subsidy during 1972-84 amounted to approximately 114 billion dollars. 1 Their 
study has argued that the subsidy comprised two main components. One was related to 
the fact that since 1973-74 world prices of energy and many raw materials rose sharply 
and CMEA prices lagged behind them. As a consequence, the Soviet Union as a net 
exporter of energy and raw materials obtained lower prices than current world prices. 
This difference represented an implicit subsidy to Eastern Europe. Another element 
stemmed from the overpricing of machinery in intra-CMEA trade. They claimed that 
the Soviet Union as a net importer of East European machinery was continuously 
paying more for products of lower quality than those offered by Western exporters on 
the world markets. Marrese and Vanous have also argued that subsidies were implicit 
payments in return for non-economic services, such as support of Soviet foreign policy 
initiatives or contribution to the maintenance of Soviet military bases and that the 
Soviet Union rewarded its allies proportionately to their contribution to Soviet 
objectives.
In response to their study, independent calculations were provided by, among 
others, Poznanski (1988, 1993), Marer (1984), Dietz (1986) and Crane (1986). These 
alternative estimates indicated that the subsidies were more likely in the range of 14-37 
billion dollars. According to Poznanski (1988) the Soviet subsidy was in the range of 
29-37 billion dollars, which was one third of the figure produced by Marrese and 
Vanous for 1972-84. He has also argued that in certain years it was Eastern Europe 
which subsidised the Soviet Union. Furthermore, while he has acknowledged that intra- 
CMEA prices for machinery possibly exceeded the world market prices of identical 
goods, and Eastern Europe therefore benefitted from intra-CMEA sales, he has argued 
that this did not mean that the Soviet Union was losing to Eastern Europe through these 
imports. This was because the Soviet Union, to purchase products of the same quality 
from the West would have to pay prices considerably above the world market level. The
during the 1970s Soviet subsidy amounted to 100 billion US dollars and during 1981-84 to 
additional 14 billion US dollars.
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difference was due to the well documented surcharge on Western sales to the East 
possibly related to factors such as the weak negotiating position of Soviet bloc buyers, 
the less favourable payment terms offered by the Soviet bloc, the costs of buy-back 
deals Western firms had customarily to accept, and the cost of conducting negotiations 
(Poznanski 1988, 291-7).
In his second study Poznanski (1993) has provided evidence that not only was 
subsidisation in Soviet-East European trade within the CMEA temporary, but that, 
overall, transfers were rather negligible. He has argued that Soviet subsidies to Eastern 
Europe were basically related to a slow adjustment of CMEA oil and gas prices to the 
two ‘energy shocks’ of the 1970s, but by the end of the 1980s the Soviet Union had 
been fully compensated by Eastern Europe, a result that the CMEA pricing formula was 
expected to ensure. 1 In this study Poznanski has used a modified framework for the 
quantification of trade-related subsidy transfers which included an additional item: East 
European imports of Soviet machinery which were relatively inferior in quality. 2 
Consequently, his study has revealed that Eastern Europe had continuously subsidised 
the Soviet Union through these imports. His overall conclusion is that the trade did not 
involve enormous one-sided subsidisation through its pricing mechanism. In 
comparison with the Marrese and Vanous estimate of 114 billion dollars he has 
calculated 14 billion dollars. This, according to Poznanski (1993, 929), ‘was a rather 
minor sum both in terms of any alleged financial burden upon the Soviet Union and in 
terms of any possible gains derived by the individual economies of Eastern Europe’. He 
has also claimed that ‘considering post-1984 trends in CMEA pricing - specifically the 
tendency of Soviet oil and gas export prices to move above world market prices - these
bntra-CMEA oil and energy prices based on average world prices were indeed below world levels 
in the 1970s. However, in the 1980s due to an increase of the average price of Soviet oil they 
exceeded world levels. If 1979=100 then the price of oil imported from the Soviet Union 
increased by 249.2 per cent by the end of 1985. During that time the price of oil on world markets 
had increased by only 150 per cent.
^Poznanski has assumed (1993, 928) that on average Soviet prices for various types of machine 
tools exported to West Germany were about 25 per cent below those paid to Eastern Europe for 
similar models. This discrepancy would reflect Soviet ‘windfall’ gains when exporting machinery 
to Eastern Europe.
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moderate “implicit subsidies” have been almost entirely offset by East European 
subsidies before the end of the decade’. 1
Many authors have also questioned the interpretation of Marrese and Vanous that 
subsidies represented a deliberate tool to reward East European countries for political 
and military ‘services’. Holzman (1987, 188-99) and Poznanski (1993) have provided 
estimates which suggested that existing data is inconsistent with this interpretation.
They have demonstrated that the amount of ‘alleged’ subsidies, despite appearances of 
favouring more politically compliant nations, had more to do with the levels and 
structures of exchanges than with a deliberate policy designed to favour or punish 
particular countries. Thus the most likely explanation was that the transfers of wealth 
were an integral part of the CMEA mechanism and should not be perceived in terms of 
a deliberate policy of ‘reward’ or punishment for individual countries.
These findings have been also confirmed by Stone (1996, 72-87) whose book is 
based on a premise of the existence of a substantial Soviet subsidy which, moreover, 
allegedly spiralled out of control. On the basis of an analysis of Soviet-East European 
trade statistics and interviews with highly placed East European trade officials he has 
argued that there was no evidence that the Soviet Union used its bargaining position to 
exert pressure on the conduct of their domestic politics, neither in ordinary 
circumstances nor during crisis situations. To support his argument, he has 
demonstrated that there was no variation over time in the Soviet export levels of main 
raw materials and energy, and thus of Soviet trade subsidy, which could be related to 
political or economic concessions or sanctions. In fact, he has argued, exports were set 
in long-term agreements and exports of most key commodities were stable in 
quantitative terms within each five-year plan. Similarly, the ratios of Soviet imports and
hn 1980-85 the terms of trade of European CMEA members with the Soviet Union had fallen by 
more than one third.
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exports to CMEA countries in broad categories of goods remained stable. The trade was 
thus determined by the outcome of negotiations not by political considerations.
To illustrate his point further, he has analysed three ‘crisis’ cases in Soviet-East 
European relations : Czechoslovakia in 1968-72, Hungary in 1968-80 and Poland in 
1980-82. Accordingly, his analysis has shown that Soviet-Czechoslovak economic 
relations were not affected by the Prague spring in 1968. To be precise, the Soviet 
Union apparently attached political conditions to a proposed 400 billion dollars hard- 
currency loan to Czechoslovakia in 1968. This was, however, an initiative outside the 
framework of ordinary trade negotiations. First of all, there was no sustained attempt to 
apply trade sanctions. Moreover, any variations in trade volume could be explained by 
the changes in prices of major commodities introduced in 1965, and decrease of 
Czechoslovak machinery exports in order to reduce the growing Soviet trade deficit 
which emerged in the 1960s because of the steady rise of machinery prices. The 
expansion of trade in 1968-70 also occurred because of Czechoslovakia’s participation 
in joint investments projects, which were agreed before 1968, and increases in Soviet 
exports of oil and gas, and not because of pressure on Czechoslovakia to increase its 
intra-CMEA exchanges (Stone 1996, 89-94).
Similarly, there was no explicit link between the level of Soviet exports to 
Hungary and political issues during 1970-82, the period of implementation of the New 
Economic Mechanism, although the Soviet Union intervened in Hungarian politics. The 
Soviet Union did not use direct threats to cut major commodity exports to exert pressure 
on Hungary. The drop in Soviet oil exports to Hungary was consistent with the slower 
growth in oil exports to Eastern Europe as a whole in 1971-75 in comparison with 
1965-70 (Stone 1996, 94-100). There was also no evidence that Soviet-Polish trade 
negotiations were affected by the rise of Solidarity (Stone 1996, 103-12).
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Stone’s overall conclusion is that the Soviet Union, despite the powerful economic 
leverage it could exploit as a main exporter or raw materials and energy and provider of 
a substantial subsidy to Eastern European countries, rarely made linkages between trade 
negotiations and political issues. In other words he disagrees with the proposition, well 
established in studies of Soviet-East European relations, that Soviet trade and economic 
policy was linked to security objectives and political relations. Implicit in this analysis 
is a view of Soviet Union as either a friendly or incompetent superpower.
However, the lack of evidence that the Soviet Union used trade subsidy as a lever 
of its political influence can not be taken as a proof that it did not treat economic links 
instrumentally for political ends and was a friendly power concerned about the welfare 
of its partners.
First of all, the results of bilateral negotiations between central planning agencies 
show that the Soviet Union used its bargaining leverage to good effect to dictate the 
terms of trade agreements and cooperation and East Europeans had to accept its 
demands.
As discussed in chapter 3 in more detail, until the end of 1960s the level of Soviet 
deliveries was not based on any economic considerations. However, from the late 1960s 
the Soviet Union embarked on a policy aimed at restoring terms of trade in its favour. 
As a temporary measure it began to demand that CMEA countries participate in joint 
construction projects in the development of the raw material base on Soviet territory. 
East European countries were forced not only to take part in these investments under a 
threat of not receiving any increases in Soviet exports of raw materials and energy, but 
also they had to accept prices below the world levels for their contribution to joint 
investments.
In the early 1970s the Soviet Union exerted even more pressure for a revision of 
its terms of trade. First of all, as mentioned earlier, it unilaterally changed in 1974 a
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basis of intra-CMEA prices to maximise its revenues from energy deliveries. 
Subsequently it began to demand hard goods for any increases in deliveries. The Soviet 
Union demanded that its allies also increase their exports of raw materials, and improve 
the quality of the finished goods they exported.
Since the late 1970s the Soviet Union, in a pursuit of a strategy of putting relations 
with its satellites on a commercial basis, began to insist on hard goods even for 
traditional deliveries of oil and gas, not only for increases. While the satellites tried to 
use a variety of bargaining strategies to maintain or increase the current level of 
deliveries, such as pointing to their economic difficulties or to the consequences for 
political stability of cuts in the Soviet exports, the Soviets rarely yielded to these 
arguments. Furthermore, in the second half of 1981 the Soviet Union put pressure on 
Eastern Europe to reduce their trade deficits which had increased significantly because 
of the raise in oil prices. This pressure was exerted regardless of the consequences for 
the stability of their domestic economies and their overall balance of payment. 
Frequently the Soviet Union demanded goods which were in shortage on the domestic 
market or were meant to be sold to the West. The extent of this move is illustrated by 
data (in 1980 prices) comparing deficits in 1981 and 1983. This comparison shows that 
during that period East European countries exported to the Soviet Union 21 per cent 
goods more and imported 18 per cent less and still had a negative balance of payment 
(Vanous 1985, 34).
In the late 1980s the Soviet Union, in the face of a deteriorating domestic 
economic situation, even began to renege on the structure of exchanges agreed earlier 
during the course of trade negotiations. In November 1988 during annual negotiations 
with Poland, the Soviets demanded that Poland export ‘a basket’ of selected goods in 
return for crucial raw materials. It was also not prepared to make any concessions with 
regard to East European participation in joint investment projects. For example, in 
September 1988 when Czechoslovakia refused to participate in the second round of
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construction of the Krivoi Rog combine, the Soviet Union reduced their planned iron 
ore exports to Czechoslovakia for 1991-95 (Stone 1996, 60-1). Similarly, in 1985-86 
Poland was forced to participate in the construction of the Yamburg natural gas pipeline 
under a threat of not receiving increases in gas deliveries.
This account shows that Soviet Union consistently imposed its conditions in the 
negotiating process which determined the levels and structure of exports and imports of 
its partners in order to make East Europeans contribute to the requirements of Soviet 
economic policy. Moscow controlled both the price and quantity of energy deliveries, 
especially oil. The volume of intra-CMEA trade and its imports of East European 
machinery depended ultimately on Soviet capabilities and willingness to export its 
primary goods and Soviet negotiators took advantage of this bargaining strength to 
achieve their goals.
These issues were not only of economic importance. Firstly, the determination of 
the trade levels and the investment contributions was an instrument for subordinating 
Eastern European economies to Soviet economic priorities, which often conflicted with 
the requirements of East European economic and political stability. Secondly, the 
pattern of exchanges was the result of the political determination of the Soviet Union to 
maintain a model of cooperation which was not profitable for the Soviet economy but 
which ensured the continuing dependence of the East Europeans on Soviet markets and 
limited their economic ties with the rest of the world . The Soviet Union tried to resolve 
this conflict between Soviet political objectives in the region and broader economic 
considerations by forcing East Europeans to contribute to the maintenance of the model.
There were also more explicit examples of linkages between trade and political 
issues when political considerations affected the Soviet negotiating position. On the one 
hand, there were instances when the Soviet Union was prepared to make some 
concessions for political reasons. This was related to situations when East European
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countries faced serious economic problems which could endanger the political cohesion 
of the entire bloc and the Soviet Union accepted their demands in the interests of 
‘fraternal socialist relations’. For instance, the Soviet Union temporarily tolerated 
deficits following the increase in oil prices in 1975 and even granted credits to East 
European countries hurt by rising energy prices. The Soviet Union also extended credits 
and granted explicit price concessions to Poland after 1981 when the country faced 
economic crisis. Moreover in 1985-86 when the frail Polish economy, deprived of 
Western credits and burdened with debt, faced grim growth prospects the Soviet Union 
agreed to Polish requests not to participate in joint investments such as the iron-ore 
development at Krivoi Rog. It also agreed to maintain its export levels while accepting 
a decrease in Polish exports of raw materials and energy (Stone 1996, 69-70).
On the other hand, the Soviet Union seemed to have used its bargaining strength 
to indicate its disapproval of certain domestic political developments. Available data 
suggest that with the rapid increase of world prices of oil in the 1970s and early 1980s 
the Soviet Union adopted a differentiated approach to the various East European 
countries with regard to the levels of deliveries of fuel and energy and their prices. 
Those ‘better’ ones such as Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Bulgaria were given 
‘special treatment’, in line with the approach described above, and received 
significantly bigger deliveries of oil and gas, than ‘worse’ ones such as Poland or 
Hungary. Moreover, throughout 1976-80 East Germany paid more than 25 per cent less 
for its oil than Hungary, while the average price to Czechoslovakia was only slightly 
above that for East Germany. Poland and Hungary were also ranked worse than the 
other three by having to satisfy a larger percentage of their oil needs on world markets. 
For any increase in deliveries the second group had also to pay in convertible currencies 
or by investments in the Soviet Union (Hardt in Terry ed. 1984, 206).
Another compelling argument against the proposition that economic relations 
were not an extension of Soviet policy were successful and unsuccessful attempts to use
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CMEA as an instrument of economic subordination of Eastern Europe. This was done 
primarily through enforced investments which increased dependence on the Soviet 
market, in particular through the imposition of export specialization directions and joint 
investments. Another example of this subordination was the introduction in the major 
programs the Comprehensive Program (CP) and the Comprehensive Program for the 
Scientific and Technical Progress of the CMEA Member-Countries up to the Year 2000 
(CPSTP), discussed in the following chapters, of forms of cooperation which would 
enable the Soviet Union to use CMEA cooperation to dictate priorities in key sectors of 
East European economies.
The export specializations of individual countries and the establishment of 
industries within the CMEA as a result of Soviet pressure were major factors 
determining the industrial structures of East European economies. On the one hand, this 
had positive consequences, as export specialization created opportunity for smaller 
CMEA members to undertake the development of ship-building industries, machine- 
building, etc, which allowed a change in the commodity structure of their exports in 
favour of an increased share of manufactured products. For a long time this also meant 
improvement of their terms of trade with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, however, 
export specialisation in Eastern Europe was often not economically rational from the 
perspective of their natural resources and traditions. For example, agrarian countries 
with established light and food industries and agriculture specialised in heavy 
equipment. The economic calculus was based not on current but on future comparative 
advantages (Bozyk 1990, 4). Furthermore, the intra-CMEA specialisation geared to 
Soviet market needs included primarily material- and energy-intensive products. In the 
long term this contributed to the reproduction of energy- and material-intensive 
economic structures imposed by the Soviet Union in the early 1950's (Durka 1992, 11; 
Florczak 1986, 78). This led to the perpetuation of economic dependence and political 
subordination of socialist countries to the Soviet Union insofar as it preserved their
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dependency on the deliveries of Soviet raw materials and blocked resources necessary 
for the modernisation of industrial structures.
This dependence explains also why, as testified by East European negotiators 
(Stone 1996, 56), the Soviet Union did not need to apply consistent pressure on Eastern 
European states to reorient their trade from the West to the Soviet bloc. In their 
reorientation East Europeans were constrained by their ability to pay for Western 
products and pay off Western debts in convertible currencies while for Soviet materials 
they could pay with their products. Consequently, because of their dependence on the 
Soviet Union for raw materials and energy, East Europeans could not severe their 
economic ties without serious consequences for the stability of their economies.
The discussion shows first of all that the pattern of Soviet pressures on investment 
policies and terms of exchanges is inconsistent with the interpretation of Soviet 
economic policy towards Eastern Europe as an area divorced from political 
considerations. While it can be conclusively stated that the differences in prices were 
not designed as a political tool of influence, and that as a rule the Soviet Union did not 
use economic sanctions in ‘crisis’ situations, there is ample evidence that the Soviet 
Union consistently used CMEA instruments such as trade and specialisation agreements 
for political purposes: to facilitate the political and economic consolidation of the 
CMEA grouping by making East Europeans dependent on Soviet resources and market.
The absence of evidence that ‘trade subsidy’ was a deliberate policy tool suggests 
that subsidy arose automatically from the mechanism of intra-CMEA price 
determination and as a result of the commodity structure of exchanges. Consequently it 
was to fluctuate and hurt the Soviet Union as long as it was a net importer of 
manufactures. Therefore, distortions in prices were not perceived by the Soviet Union 
as subsidies and thus as a bargaining tool. This does not mean that the Soviet Union did 
not resent these unfavourable terms of trade. Indeed, as demonstrated in the following
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chapters, it tried to change them by efforts to ‘modernise’ its structure of exports and 
making East Europeans contribute to the costs of investments.
Finally, the evidence that the Soviet Union did not use trade negotiations (which 
does not necessarily equate with a subsidy) in crisis situations to influence political 
behaviour of its satellites does not need to be interpreted as a sign of deliberate policy of 
not using trade for political purposes. The most likely explanation of the ‘failure’ to act 
relates to the fact that both sides were acutely aware of the extremity of their 
dependence on Soviet oil imports. 1 Consequently, the Soviet Union could not cut 
deliveries without both severe economic disruptions and raising strong anti-Soviet 
feelings. The Soviet Union had at its disposal much more effective means of exerting 
pressure that sanctions which could only destabilise the situation further.
Organizational principles of the CMEA. The formal powers of CMEA organs.
It is generally assumed that the fundamental principles of CMEA from the very 
beginning of its operation were the formal sovereignty and full equality of rights of all 
member countries. These principles were not mentioned, however, in the founding 
Communique (Butler ed. 1978, 123). It was only in 1957 that the CMEA Charter - in 
Article 1 - set forth these premises of economic cooperation unequivocally, describing 
the organisation as based on the principles of socialist internationalism, respect of state 
sovereignty, independence and national interests, full equality, and mutual benefit 
(Butler ed. 1978, 125). These principles of economic cooperation were then further 
consolidated in subsequent legal acts which directly followed from the CMEA Charter, 
the rules and procedures of its bodies and the regulations governing the Standing 
Commissions and the CMEA Secretariat.
The principle of sovereignty of individual members formally excluded the 
question of the CMEA as a supranational body with directive powers to allocate
^For relevant Soviet and East European views see Stone (1966, 99, 107).
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resources available in the region, superior to its member governments in power and 
authority (Bogomolov ed. 1987, 208). Economic cooperation was to be realised through 
the cooperation of sovereign socialist states on the basis of state ownership and the 
regulation of economic activities through the state plan. These principles meant that 
national authorities in individual states retained their formal political autonomy to 
decide their economic priorities and exercise complete decision-making authority with 
regard to internal planning and the distribution of economic resources. With regard to 
foreign economic links, each country conducted them on the basis of the state 
monopoly of foreign trade.
The formal rights of member states were additionally secured by other procedural 
means which guaranteed the voluntary participation of each of the countries in any 
CMEA undertaking. Initially, this function was performed by the universality principle, 
which required the agreement of all members in any new cooperative venture before it 
could be embarked upon. Since this principle entirely excluded the possibility of certain 
projects unless the interests of all CMEA members was secured, this stipulation was 
eventually replaced in a 1974 amendment by the ‘interested party principle’ which 
stated that if some CMEA members wanted to participate in a specific cooperation 
project in which others were not interested, they should not be bound by what other 
members decide to pursue. This procedure ensured that no member could be bound 
without its permission by CMEA decisions. The new procedures effectively prevented a 
veto by members not interested in a given project, but they also precluded coercion of a 
member by interested countries. This principle was affirmed by an amended Article 4, 
Point 3 of the revised CMEA Charter which specified that ‘each country has the right to 
declare its interests on any question considered by the Council’ (Butler ed. 1978, 127).
The sacrosanct nature of these principles safeguarding national sovereignty and 
voluntariness within the CMEA framework was emphasised particularly strongly in 
Soviet literature after the failure of the idea of supranational authority in 1962 thus
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creating an impression of CMEA as an organisation where all the countries had equal 
powers. A number of authors stressed that the principle of non-interference was 
observed in all political and economic affairs and that CMEA decisions were taken only 
with the consent of the countries concerned. There was particular emphasis that each 
country independently worked out its draft economic development plan in accordance 
with internal conditions and specific economic and political priorities and that no 
interference could be exercised by one country in the economic planning by another 
during the process of coordination of national plans (Alekseyev 1963, 18-23). The 
interested-party provision was justified by an acknowledgement that as member 
countries differed substantially from one another in their level of economic 
development and in their priorities, the participation of all CMEA members in the 
proposals could not be expected.
These powers accorded to the national governments as the main subjects of 
CMEA economic cooperation determined the formal powers of CMEA organs and 
decision-making procedures and were fundamental to the CMEA decision-making 
process and its organisational structures and mechanisms (Bogomolow ed. 1987, 347). 
The concentration of all major decisions regarding objectives, methods and instruments 
of cooperation in separate national centers with nominally equal powers determined the 
character of the CMEA as an interstate organisation with consultative and coordinating 
functions but without effective powers to enforce policy.
In accordance with these powers of nation-states the Session and other CMEA 
organs could make decisions, which were binding for individual members, only on 
organizational and procedural questions and thus of matters of lesser significance for 
CMEA operation (Butler ed. 1978, 126). However, in questions pertaining to economic 
and scientific and technical cooperation, representing the critical issues of CMEA 
operation, CMEA organs were authorised only to issue recommendations whose 
implementation depended on governments or competent national agencies. Only upon
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their acceptance by CMEA countries in conformity with their national legislation, did 
recommendations become reciprocal international legal obligations of these countries. 1 
This provision had, however, a purely formal character, as in practice, all 
recommendations were approved by the national authorities (Ekon. sotr. stran chlenov 
SEV 1986:5, 85).
These principles and procedures of CMEA operation guaranteeing the rights of 
individual national governments to decide their participation in CMEA projects, had to 
some extent only a nominal character, and their meaning has to be understood in the 
context of power relations in the bloc. The procedural rules of voluntarism and 
interestedness clearly could not prevent the enforcement of cooperation in cases where 
the Soviet Union was in a position to exert pressure on their investment decisions and 
the commodity structure of their imports. But they did exclude the possibility of using 
CMEA as an instrument of coercion for the determination of their economic strategies 
as it was under Stalin. National authorities also retained effective instruments to protect 
their rights and to resist pressures, as ultimately they were responsible for the creation 
of economic, organisational and legal conditions for the realisation of specific 
cooperation ventures.
The organisational structure of CMEA. The formal and informal structures 
involved in the CMEA decision-making process.
The potential for conflict between the formal and actual powers of CMEA 
participants was also apparent in the hierarchy of structures involved in the CMEA 
decision-making process. As argued throughout this thesis the most important decision­
making body influencing CMEA affairs was the leadership of the CPSU. Although
^The CMEA Charter, art IV. 1 (Butler ed. 1987, 126) states that recommendations made by CMEA 
organs are strictly subject to ratification by the member governments’ proper parliamentary 
organs.
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outside the formal structure of the CMEA the CPSU had a central role in determining 
directions and terms of cooperation.
Also outside the formal structure of the CMEA, but in practice the highest, 
official, decision-making body issuing authoritative political guidelines concerning the 
directions of CMEA cooperation were the Conferences of the Secretaries of Communist 
Parties and Leaders of the Governments of CMEA member countries. Their resolutions 
were not formally binding on the CMEA, but because of the status of the Conferences 
they were routinely confirmed by the formal CMEA organs. A Polish legal writer thus 
commented on the relationship between the Conferences and the CMEA: given the 
“role of these parties as the leading political force, the directives adopted by [these 
conferences] are in fact binding and the appropriate organs of the organization are only 
called upon to give them formal legal force" (Klepacki 1975, 50 in Brabant 1989, 133).
A number of Conferences were specifically devoted to the issues of economic 
cooperation and endorsed the strategies and principles of the CMEA's activities. For 
example, the 1958 Conference adopted decisions on the development of intra-bloc 
cooperation on the basis of the international socialist division of labor (ISDL), the 1962 
Conference endorsed the Basic Principles; and the 1969 Conference endorsed the 
concept of ‘socialist economic integration’ and gave authorisation to draft the 
Comprehensive Program.
Direct bilateral coordination of economic relations at the inter-state level was 
conducted by Intergovernmental Commissions for Economic and Scientific and 
Technical Cooperation. The Intergovernmental Commissions coordinated all the 
questions of bilateral economic, scientific and technical cooperation and concretised 
multilateral agreements with regard to bilateral relations. They were headed by deputy 
prime ministers and had executive organs. Their functions overlapped with CMEA in 
many areas, such as consultations on the coordination of plans, meeting fuel and power
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needs, cooperation in expanding the raw material base and specialisation and 
cooperation of production.
The formal CMEA decision-making institutions.
The formal CMEA organisational structure responsible for the elaboration of 
CMEA strategies and realisation of the CMEA's objectives evolved in response to 
launching of major CMEA strategies. For instance, a major expansion of CMEA 
structures and an increase in their functions followed the adoption of the Basic 
Principles in 1961 and the Comprehensive Program in 1971. The institutional 
strengthening of the CMEA also reflected the growing complexity of national 
economies and their diversification into sectors. In comparison with the initial five 
years of CMEA operation, when its organisational structure consisted of the Bureau, 
Secretariat and ad hoc working parties and subdivisions of the Bureau, in 1983 the 
CMEA’s official organs consisted of the Council Session, the Executive Committee and 
its sub-committees, fourteen Standing Commissions, Secretariat, two Institutes and the 
Conferences. Furthermore, under the auspices of these representative organs there were 
more than three hundred permanent and temporary working organs. The majority of 
organs operated in the area of joint planning activities at the multilateral level. The 
system reproduced sectoral structures throughout the CMEA countries.
Organisational forms of cooperation of CMEA members did not have a 
supranational, but an inter-state character. As formal decision-making authority rested 
entirely with the individual countries, each of these bodies did not have powers to issue 
directives binding on national economic and planning bodies but possessed only 
advisory and recommendatory powers. Their recommendations did not have a directive 
character in relation to national planning and economic organs but were based on a 
voluntary agreement.
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Formally the CMEA’s supreme policy-making body was the Session of the 
Council. It was composed of delegations of all member countries with one vote each. 
The national delegations to this deliberative body usually consisted of the Permanent 
Representative to the CMEA, his deputies, high-level members of national governments 
and also, after the twenty-fourth Session in 1970, the Prime Minister, who officially 
headed the delegation. It normally met not less than once a year, rotating among the 
capitals of the member countries.
The Session considered the basic questions of economic and scientific-technical 
cooperation and determined the principal orientations of the activity of the Council. It 
gave recommendations on trade agreements and approved the programs of plan 
coordination, specialization and cooperation of production and the principles of regional 
price formation. It endorsed policy programs, such as the Basic Principles and the 
Comprehensive Program and major institutional changes. The Session also directed the 
activities of the Secretariat and its subordinate organs. It considered proposals and 
reports of the Executive Committee and its Committees and Standing Commissions. 
Furthermore, it was empowered to take decisions regarding setting up new official 
organs and thus the further institutional strengthening of the Council (Butler ed. 1978, 
127-8; Bogomolov ed. 1987, 373).
The Session could adopt recommendations on matters of economic and scientific- 
technical cooperation and decisions on organizational and procedural questions. For the 
Session's recommendations to become binding, they had to be endorsed by appropriate 
State organs. This requirement was of purely formal nature, however, as the 
government representatives heading state organs responsible for the endorsement of 
recommendations participated in the Council Session's.
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The Executive Committee.
The principal executive body of the CMEA was the Executive Committee. It was 
established in 1962 to replace the Conference of Representatives of the CMEA member 
countries. It was composed of deputy prime-ministers of member countries who were as 
a rule also their Permanent Representatives. From 1971 it met once every three months.
The idea which inspired its establishment was the plan to transform the CMEA 
into a supranational authority. According to this conception the Executive Committee 
was to be a planning center with region-wide responsibilities. With the failure of this 
project, the Executive Committee assumed the function of a consultative organ whose 
primary responsibility was the elaboration of policy recommendations and supervision 
of their implementation by CMEA members between Session meetings. Within the 
limits of its competence the Executive Committee could adopt recommendations and 
decisions and make proposals for consideration by the Session of the Council. It 
supervised the work of all other CMEA bodies, determining the main directions and 
areas of their activities.
On the basis of proposals prepared by other CMEA organs the Committee made 
major decisions regarding instruments and forms of cooperation and evaluated the 
effectiveness of proposed measures. Its functions also included directing the work on 
plan coordination, foreign trade agreements and working out the main directions of the 
development of specialisation and cooperation in production and scientific cooperation 
(Butler ed. 1978, 128; Bogomolov ed. 1987, 373).
The first Council committees were set up in the early 1970s in direct support of 
the measures outlined in the Comprehensive Program. They were attached to the 
Executive Committee and were established primarily to provide an institutional 
framework for multilateral cooperation to supplement traditional bilateral coordination 
of national plans. The importance of the Committees lay in the fact that although their
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primary functions were recommendatory and advisory, they were also empowered to 
submit proposals for consideration by CMEA Sessions and to set priorities and make 
appropriate assignments which were binding for other CMEA agencies. This was 
ensured by the participation of top planners and policy makers in their activities. Their 
responsibilities included dealing with the critical components of national plans to attain 
greater consistency in production and consumption, particularly of engineering 
products.
The Committee for Cooperation in Planning set up in 1971 was responsible for the 
deepening of multilateral cooperation in planning. It was the most important of all the 
Committees, as it was composed of the chairmen of the national planning bodies. The 
Committee replaced the Bureau of Executive Committee for Joint Problems of 
Economic Planning which was established in 1962 to supervise the coordination of 
plans. The Committee was charged with forecasting, identifying long-term problems of 
cooperation, preparing investment proposals, organising multilateral consultations on 
the key issues of economic policies, joint planning, the co-ordination of five-year and 
long-term plans and concurrent trade agreements and ensuring the effective 
participation of the central planning agencies in this activity. It played a central role in 
the preparation and supervision of the Agreed Plans and the Target Programs. It could 
issue recommendations which were subject to approval by national authorities.
The Committee had a permanent operating body, a Bureau, which comprised the 
deputy chairmen of the central planning bodies of the member countries. The Bureau 
had the right to submit proposals for consideration by the Executive Committee or 
Session. It organised multilateral agreements between CMEA members in the sphere of 
material production and monitored the fulfilment of commitments undertaken by 
CMEA members following their endorsement of the recommendations of the 
Committee, Executive Committee or Session (Bogomolov ed. 1987, 373).
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The Committee on Scientific and Technical Cooperation was upgraded in 1971 
from the level of a Standing Commission for Coordination of Scientific and Technical 
Research set up in 1962. Its function was the realisation of the scientific-technical 
aspects of the Comprehensive Program. The Committee organized multilateral 
consultations on scientific and technical matters, cooperated with the Committee for 
Cooperation in Planning on the coordination of national economic plans in the sphere of 
science and technology and coordinated the activities of the international organisations 
and research centers (Faddeeyev 1974, 74).
The main task of the Committee on Cooperation in Material and Technical 
Supply, which was also upgraded from a Standing Commission in 1974 was to facilitate 
high-level cooperation in the development and utilization of CMEA resources to ensure 
meeting the needs of member countries in scarce resources and raw materials.
Standing Commissions.
Cooperation at the branch level was conducted in the Standing Commissions. The 
first seven Commissions were established in 1956. By the end of the 1950s, there were 
seventeen commissions and by 1983 the number of commissions had dropped slightly 
to fourteen. The initial increase in their role in organising cooperation took place in the 
late 1950s as a result of the 1958 decision adopting the coordination of plans as the 
mechanism of coordination of economic policies of CMEA members. Their main 
functions related to issues relating to plan coordination. They were responsible for the 
promotion, organisation and development of economic and scientific and technical 
cooperation in concrete areas at the sectoral level, and for the multilateral coordination 
of inter-sectoral specialisation and cooperation of production (Bogomolov ed. 1987, 
374).
They replaced the ad hoc working parties and subdivisions of the Bureau and, 
later, of the Secretariat. The permanent commissions were generally organized along
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sectoral lines of the national economies, such as agriculture, the chemical industry, coal, 
electrical energy, ferrous metallurgy, nonferrous metallurgy, foreign trade, engineering, 
forestry, oil and gas, timber and cellulose, and geology, construction, economic 
questions, transportation and food and light industries. A number of them were 
responsible for functional areas, such as statistics, monetary and financial questions, 
currency issues, standardization, and were concerned only with the elaboration of 
instruments of cooperation. 1
The Standing Commissions were in session at least twice a year, usually in 
Moscow. Their actual work was carried out in the corresponding Secretariat's 
departments and in some national agencies and institutes. They could make 
recommendations concerning cooperation in the corresponding national sectors of 
industry, which had to be approved by the Executive Committee, for presentation to the 
Council Session for endorsement and then approval by the interested member 
governments. The Commissions also elaborated forecasts of future demand for raw 
materials and equipment, monitored the fulfilment of commitments undertaken by 
CMEA members, coordinated plans of joint scientific research and design works, 
organized exchanges of information and established working groups (Bogomolov ed. 
1987, 384 - 5).
1 The Standing Commissions of the CMEA at the end of 1984 were:
1/ The Coal Industry Commission 
2/ The Oil and Gas Industry Commission 
3/ The Electric Power Commission 
4/ The Ferrous Metallurgy Commission 
5/ The Nonferrous Metallurgy Commission 
6/ The Chemical Industry Commission 
7/ The Machine-Building Commission 
8/ The Construction Commission
91 The Commission on Light industry and the Food industry 
10/The Agriculture Commission 
11/ The Transport Commission
12/ The Commission on Cooperation among Council Countries in the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy.
13/ The Foreign Trade Commission
14/ The Commission on Economic Questions
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Standing commissions and Council committees were endowed with only 
recommendatory and advisory powers. Consequently their role in the process of 
coordination of plans was limited to assisting the countries in selecting the areas for 
cooperation.
The Secretariat.
The only permanent CMEA body which carried out the day-to day operations of 
the CMEA was the Secretariat, headed by a Secretary, a Soviet official. It was divided 
into departments generally corresponding to the Standing Commissions and several 
other staff agencies. According to the Charter, the Secretariat was responsible for 
organizing the meetings of other CMEA organs, particularly the Council Session. It 
prepared agendas for its superior bodies and coordinated the work of the various 
subsidiary organs, chiefly the Standing Commissions and Interstate Conferences. It 
undertook preparatory work connected with policy recommendations and their 
implementation. Jointly with Standing Commissions, it worked out proposals for 
multilateral agreements. It was not empowered to enact and impose recommendations 
on the member states on its own initiative (Butler ed. 1978, 131-2; Faddeeyev 1974, 
77).
Institutes.
Under the CMEA auspices there were also established a number of research 
institutes. At the end of 1983 they included the Standardization Institute (set up in 
1962), the International Institute for Economic Problems of the World Socialist System 
(set up in 1971) and the International Research Institute for Management Problems 
(established in 1975). They were concerned with the theoretical aspects of economic 
cooperation, rather than with the application of their studies (Faddeeyev 1974, 85).
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Conferences.
Permanent conferences of officials in charge of ministries and associations of 
CMEA members were also regarded as CMEA organs. These inter-state bodies had 
purely a consultative character and provided venues for the study of problems, for the 
supervision of administrative tasks in a specific area, and for the exchange of views and 
information between relevant national organisations. There were the Conferences of 
Ministers of Domestic Trade (1986), Ministers of Labor Affairs (1974), Heads of 
Technological Inventions and Patents (1971), Price Office Chiefs (1973), 
Representatives of CMEA Members on Legal Questions (1969), Water Administration 
Heads (1962) and Representatives of Freight Transport and Shipping Organizations 
(1951) with a permanent executive organ, the Bureau for the Coordination of Ship 
Charters (1962) (Faddeeyev 1974, 78-82; Brabant 1989,153).
They were subordinated to the Executive Committee and its specialized 
Committees. They could submit proposals to the Executive Committee and convene 
meetings with Standing Commissions. They were not empowered to make 
recommendations, but they could adopt guidelines on procedural and organisational 
matters and conduct consultations within their competences. Given their expressly 
consultative functions they could not impose their decisions on national governments.
Economic Organisations.
An important part of the framework of CMEA cooperation were the institutions 
affiliated with the CMEA: interstate and international economic organisations, and 
inter-governmental economic organizations. According to their constitutive documents 
they were not formally CMEA organs but independent organisations conducting 
relatively independent activities, with their own statutes and regulations. In practice,
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however, their activities were very closely linked with formal CMEA organs operating 
in the same fields. The CP emphasised that they were not supranational bodies and 
should not deal with questions of internal planning (Butler ed. 1978, 77).
The majority of affiliated organs were set up as a result of the recommendations of 
the Council Session and the Executive Committee which drafted legal documents to 
facilitate their establishment and regulate their activities. They cooperated with the 
CMEA on the basis of agreements defining them as specialized agencies. These 
agreements obliged organisations to take the CMEA's recommendations into account in 
their activities and inform appropriate CMEA bodies about the result of the 
implementation of these recommendations.
The interstate economic organisations, such as Interkhim, Interkosmos, 
Interenergomash had been in existence since 1956, but their number more than doubled 
in the 1970s. The inter-state organisations operated primarily at the intergovernmental 
level. The main function of these organisations was the co-ordination of the actions of 
participating countries in the particular branches of the economy through joint 
organisation of research and planning, standardization, specialization and coordination 
of national production plans. They were not involved in production. Their activities 
were governed by the ‘interested party’ principle with unanimity required for ‘key 
questions’ of cooperation (Butler ed. 1978, 77-9).
International Economic Organizations were created to coordinate and to be 
directly involved in activities in production, scientific research, in services and foreign 
trade at the enterprise level (Butler ed. 1978, 79-80). They were hailed as the most 
significant organisational form of integration in the early 1970s. Their main purpose 
was to facilitate direct links between lower-level economic units of participating 
countries, such as enterprises, trusts, associations, research institutes, design bureaus, 
across national boundaries (Rodionov 1971, 2). They were intended to be production-
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oriented ‘amalgamations’ rather than simply coordinating centers, designed to promote 
the ‘internationalisation of production’ in CMEA (Shabalin 1975, 17-8).
Their stated aim was the rationalisation of the use of resources in a given area by 
the allocation of resources of participants in a way which would eliminate parallelism in 
production and bring about the benefits of economies of scale (Marszalek 1988, 36). 
This was to be achieved by means of joint planning. Thus, even though their 
participants formally retained their property and legal and organisational independence, 
they represented the form of cooperation which raised most fears of increased Soviet 
domination through a possible operation of these organisations independently of 
national economic planning and the national state.
International economic organisation also included sectoral and transportation 
organisations. The more important ones included: the Central Dispatching 
Administration controlling the integrated Mir power grid (1962), the Common Freight 
Car Pool (1964), the Bureau for coordinating the chartering of ships, the network of oil 
and gas pipelines, Intermetall (1964) for cooperation in the field of ferrous metallurgy, 
and Interelktro (1973) for the coordination of electrotechnical equipment.
International economic associations
Multilateral joint planning in specific sectors was also conducted by international 
economic associations which were established as a result of agreements between 
participating countries. They coordinated the activities of enterprises, associations and 
research institutes of countries interested in this form of cooperation and were involved 
in production, research and sales activities. They included Interatominstrument, 
Interatomenergo, Interchimvolokno (Soldaczuk et al. 1983, 391).
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Jointly owned enterprises
Joint enterprises were involved in industrial production, the extraction of raw 
materials and transportation activities. They were created chiefly to alleviate the 
shortage of some commodities. They also represented an effective way of by-passing 
restrictions on trade or scientific and technical cooperation. They had their own funds, 
operated on the basis of profitability criteria and enjoyed independent status. However, 
they were subject to the laws of the host country. In the period examined they included 
Haldex 1959, Agromash 1965, Intromash 1965, Druzhba 1972, Erdenet 1973, Service 
1976.
Conclusion
The discussion in this section has sought to demonstrate the decision-making 
authority concerning CMEA cooperation lay outside its formal organs. On the one 
hand, the official CMEA organs did not initiate strategies, they endorsed decisions 
previously agreed at the summit meetings or reached as the result of informal political 
decision-making within the framework of inter-party relations. On the other hand, 
CMEA organs also had no powers to impose their recommendations on its members. In 
particular they were not empowered to issue binding instructions on substantive matters 
of plan coordination and production specialization. While recommendations adopted by 
the main CMEA organs were without exception approved by the authoritative organs of 
member countries, in reality their actual implementation, including the allocation of 
material and financial means was beyond the control of CMEA organs who did not 
have powers to enforce CMEA recommendations.
The very limited powers of CMEA organs were a reaction to the reality of unequal 
political, economic and military power in the Soviet bloc. Given these differences 
between the Soviet Union and East European members it was only natural that smaller 
East European states were wary of procedures or forms of cooperation which could
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encroach upon the rights of their governments to determine their economic policies. 
They were interested in securing cooperation that would have a minimal impact on 
national sovereignty and were reluctant to delegate any powers to CMEA organs.
In order to minimise the danger of the Soviet dominance over East European 
economies through a tighter, even a supranational, CMEA infrastructure, East European 
members insisted on principles of sovereignty and procedural rules which guaranteed 
individual members the right to determine their economic development plans in an 
autonomous way. While these procedures could not protect East European states from 
pressures through indirect economic means, they rendered formal CMEA structures 
ineffective as an instrument of direct Soviet coercion.
The logic of the principles and institutional safeguards governing CMEA, 
stemming from the dominant position of the Soviet Union in the region, was thus an 
important factor constraining the process of formulation and implementation of a 
regional cooperation strategy, as it limited cooperation to the achievement of these 
CMEA goals which would not conflict with the preservation of economic sovereignty. 
East European leaders generally did not object to multilateralism per se as long as 
cooperative ventures did not impinge on matters of internal planning and as long as 
CMEA’s procedural rules ensured decision-making by consent. This meant that the 
Soviet Union, in the absence of direct means to ensure compliance with Soviet 
objectives, had to resort to the creation of a structural dependencies which would leave 
East European states no option but to agree to its demands.
The CMEA was thus an organisation which had no real powers to enforce the 
implementation of its policies. It was purposefully deprived of powers of determining 
the policies of its members by smaller countries trying to secure at least formal rights to 
determine their economic policies. Under conditions of Soviet domination this meant 
denying it the powers of coercion.
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Summary.
This chapter showed the limitations imposed on the process of cooperation by the 
‘internal logic’ of CMEA economic mechanisms and principles and procedural rules 
governing CMEA. The first part described economic mechanisms and their limitations 
as effective instruments of cooperation showing that the functions of CMEA 
mechanisms were consistent with the operation of a centrally planned economy which, 
as argued in chapter 1, had to conform to the Soviet model. In other words the 
mechanisms were structurally determined by the requirements of Soviet political 
domination and the limits of permissible reforms were determined by Soviet economic 
reforms.
The second part showed that the record of negotiations demonstrates conclusively 
that CMEA cooperation was consistently used by the Soviet Union for political ends 
through trade and specialisation agreements and that the terms of cooperation were 
determined by the political importance of the region. Furthermore, while it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to provide an independent verification of susbsidies, and the 
controversy regarding their possible magnitude can be conclusively settled only with 
the access to Soviet data regarding prices, it can be confidently said that the Soviet 
Union did not design ‘implicit subsidies’ as a political tool of pressure.
The third part described procedures governing decision-making and consequent 
obligations of the member countries. It showed that these rules of CMEA operation 
provided opportunities for smaller countries to resist at least direct Soviet interference. 
Thus they gave individual members means of control over their economies despite 
Soviet political dominance and forced the Soviet Union to rely on other means of 
pressure.
In the next part of the thesis I will describe how this ‘internal logic’ of CMEA 
mechanisms provided certain coherent outcomes. I demonstrate how, on the one hand
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these mechanisms and principles of operation constrained CMEA cooperation, and how 
CMEA members could use these instruments for their own benefit to maximise their 
advantages from cooperation, while failing to fulfil commitments which they perceived 
as disadvantageous or unfair.
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CHAPTER THREE
1953-1984: PRESSURE FOR CMEA INTEGRATION.
This chapter examines CMEA objectives, strategies and mechanisms of 
cooperation and the implementation of strategies in the years 1953-1984. It is divided 
into three main sections. The first examines political considerations and economic 
criteria which had a bearing on the process of decision-making concerning CMEA 
cooperation under Khrushchev. The second focuses on the Soviet Union’s political 
and economic priorities and the motives behind the pressure for CMEA economic 
cooperation under Brezhnev. The aim of the discussion in these two parts is to 
identify systemic constraints imposed on CMEA operation by Soviet domination. I 
demonstrate that the constraints derived firstly from the fact that the Soviet Union 
controlled the formulation of CMEA strategies, whose objectives were subordinated to 
the requirements of the Soviet economic policy and were to contribute to the 
maintenance of Soviet power in the region. Furthermore, the requirements of Soviet 
domination determined the choice of CMEA mechanisms which had to conform to the 
system of management of the Soviet Union’s national economy.
The third section examines the implementation of the Comprehensive Program. It 
compares the actual methods and processes of cooperation with the postulated ones 
and explains the reasons for the failure of CMEA strategy. I argue that the processes 
and policy decisions which undermined cooperative arrangements derived from the 
internal logic of the domestic mechanisms of Soviet bloc economies or were responses 
to Soviet attempts at imposing terms perceived by East Europeans as serving Soviet 
interests. By demonstrating that the problems with the implementation of CMEA 
strategies derived from the logic of operation of the Soviet-type model and its 
consequences as well as from the Soviet Union’s attempts at subordinating CMEA to 
its objectives, the analysis supports the main argument of this thesis that the factors
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which ultimately contributed to failure of the CMEA were political constraints on its 
operation imposed by the Soviet Union.
1953-1964: Factors determining pressure for CMEA integration under 
Khrushchev.
Stalin’s death did not change perceptions of the strategic and political importance 
of Eastern Europe in Soviet foreign policy and Soviet priorities in the region. There 
was, however, a perceptible change in Soviet policy direction towards Eastern 
Europe, closely tied to changes in internal Soviet politics, new principles of relations 
with the capitalist countries and intra-bloc dynamics.
The dominant feature of Soviet internal politics from 1953 until 1957 were 
considerable disagreements over policies as a result of the struggle for power amongst 
Stalin’s successors, which ended when Khrushchev removed his rivals from the 
CPSU leadership. The process was accompanied by modifications of the political 
processes entailing the renunciation of Stalinist methods of control and intimidation 
and reevaluation of the role of security services in favour of ensuring legality.
In domestic economic policies this period was marked initially by the New 
Course, launched by Malenkov in August 1953, which entailed fundamental shifts in 
priorities but without questioning the validity of the overall strategy of 
industrialisation. The strategy included the scaling down of investments in the heavy 
industry in order to remove the imbalances in the economic structure caused by 
excessive investment in this sector at the expense of agriculture and the production of 
consumer goods. This course was abandoned when Khrushchev consolidated his 
position in the Soviet leadership and there was a gradual return to emphasis on the 
priority of heavy industry.
In relations with the West, Stalin’s successors initiated a new approach aimed at 
the improvement of relations and creating ‘breathing space’ which would allow a 
reduction in armaments spending and increase investments in agriculture and
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consumer industries. As the basic principle of the Soviet Union’s relations with the 
capitalist countries Khrushchev promoted ‘peaceful coexistence’ which, in his 
interpretation, involved intensified competition between the two systems in all 
ideological, economic, diplomatic areas short of direct military confrontation.
Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe was strictly tied to the policy of reducing 
tensions with the West and a departure from rigid Stalinist policies and autocratic style 
of government at home. The new approach entailed new methods of regulation of 
intra-bloc relations resulting in the increased internal autonomy of the satellite 
countries.
The change of the status of East European countries was initially effected by the 
renunciation of Stalinist methods of direct interference in East European domestic 
affairs and the abandonment of detailed supervision of East European political, 
security police, and military agencies by means of Soviet advisers. In the sphere of 
economic relations it was manifested in the departure from the policy of exploitation 
and direct interference in East European economic policies and more equitable 
commercial ties. The Soviet Union stopped the exploitative measures such as the 
operation of joint stock companies and gradually reduced and eventually put an end to 
reparations payments imposed on ex-enemy states in 1954.1 jn July 1955 the CPSU 
Plenum issued an official condemnation of the policy of direct exploitation and 
interference in the economic affairs of East European economies. Their domestic 
economic policies, however, closely reflected Soviet priorities. Under the New 
Course in 1953-54 East European countries were permitted to abandon the strategy of 
rapid industrialization and put emphasis on the production of consumer goods and 
goods needed by light industry and agriculture.
The position of the satellites in the Soviet bloc was also changed as a result of the 
shift in Soviet policy on the right of East European communist parties to construct
*In autumn 1954 the Soviet Union sold its share in the mixed companies in Hungary, Rumania 
and Bulgaria (Brzezinski 1979, 167).
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socialism with regard to national differences. The new approach to Eastern Europe 
was initially symbolized by the policy of reconciliation towards Yugoslavia which was 
initiated in the autumn of 1954 and entailed the resumption of economic and, later, 
diplomatic relations.
In ideological terms this new attitude was expressed first in an acceptance of the 
ideological legitimacy of the Yugoslav road to socialism. In the Soviet-Yugoslav 
agreement signed in June 1955 Khrushchev declared that ‘the roads and conditions of 
socialist development are different in different countries’. Subsequently, the doctrine 
of ‘separate roads to socialism’ was formally endorsed by Khrushchev in his address 
to the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 when he acknowledged that 
‘ways to socialism may differ’ (Brzezinski 1979, 182).
Early pronouncements that the ways to socialism could vary according to the 
concrete conditions in each country seemingly did not define the limits of legitimate 
diversity. However, very early on it was clear that the right to pursue a national road 
to socialism was qualified by insistence on the conformity of communist parties to the 
common Marxist-Leninist norms and values in their pursuit of a communist goal. 1 In 
November 1956 a Soviet chief party ideologue, Suslow, specified these norms by 
invoking again the notion of universal laws of the transition to communism which 
were to be strictly followed by all communist parties. The laws included the 
establishment of political rule by the working class led by its vanguard, the 
strengthening of the alliance of the working class with the peasantry, the liquidation of 
the capitalist ownership of industrial enterprises, banks, transport and communication, 
the establishment of the public ownership of the basic means of production and the 
consequent planned nature of the economy and the defence of the gains of the socialist 
revolution from the encroachments of the former ruling exploiting classes.
1 This approach was apparent in an article published in Pravda (16 July 1956) which, referring to 
the internationalist solidarity of "fraternal revolutionary parties, adhering to positions of Marxism- 
Leninism", reminded communist parties that they "are moving toward one goal, toward 
communism. It is impossible to move separately or haphazardly toward such a great goal."(cited in 
Brezinski 1979, 248).
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Furthermore, freedom of choice of East European countries in conducting their 
policies was restricted by reference to the doctrine of the advanced stage of the Soviet 
Union on the road to communism in comparison with other states building 
communism. This doctrine, as argued in chapter 1, by definition imposed limits on the 
degree of diversity in other countries by providing justification for a claim that the 
Soviet model represented the manifestation of the operation of universal laws ol 
socialist construction.
Until 1960 this doctrine relied on the distinction espoused by Stalin that the Soviet 
Union was the only state which had completed the construction of socialism while all 
the People's Democracies were still in the process of laying the foundations of 
socialism. 1 This distinction was changed in 1960 when the Soviet Union was defined 
as a country where ‘socialism triumphed ... completely and finally’ and that [was] 
‘successfully carrying on the full-scale construction of a communist society’, while 
other countries of the socialist camp were ‘successfully laying the foundations of 
socialism’, with some of them having ‘already entered the period of construction of a 
developed socialist society.’ (Trybuna Ludu 6 December 1960, 2).2
Notwithstanding the claim of the universal significance of the Soviet experience 
and the self-proclamation of Soviet leadership, Khrushchev's recognition of a limited 
domestic institutional diversity established a more formal ideological basis for the right 
of communist countries to take into account their specific historical conditions, 
national features and traditions in the construction of socialism. This ideological 
conception meant that while the East Europeans were expected to conform to the 
Soviet model of socialism, the rules defining the legitimate political conduct were less 
rigid than in the Stalinist doctrine. To symbolise the new relationship based on the 
extension of substantial autonomy to former satellites and the transformation of the 
bloc into an alliance of socialist states Khrushchev renamed the erstwhile ‘camp’ as
^The significance of these declarations was confirmed by inscriptions in the constitutions of 
Soviet bloc countries according to which the Soviet Union was the only state which defined itself 
constitutionally as a 'socialist state'.
^Statement of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties.
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the ‘socialist commonwealth’ inherent in which was the notion of a free association of 
sovereign, independent states united by a pursuit of common good.
In an effort to further define the limits on East European autonomy Khrushchev 
also restated the principle of socialist internationalism as the basis for relations 
between socialist states. In the Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of 
Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries held in Moscow in 1957 
socialist states declared that it was a moral right, and thus a legal duty to render mutual 
aid to protect one another from the danger of a return to capitalism and to intervene in 
each other’s domestic affairs. Subsequently, the principles of internationalist solidarity 
and mutual assistance were formalised in bilateral treaties of friendship, cooperation 
and mutual assistance.
The renunciation of Stalinist methods of control required new methods of 
managing bloc relations, which would counterbalance disunifying tendencies resulting 
from greater political autonomy. The new Soviet strategy of ensuring a new basis for 
Soviet leadership and maintaining effective Soviet control over Eastern Europe 
entailed the formation of new institutional forms to regulate political, ideological, 
military and economic intra-bloc relations which replaced reliance on primarily 
informal ties in the Stalinist interstate system.
The main mechanism for elaborating a common line binding the Soviet bloc 
countries regarding key ideological and economic issues were, as mentioned in 
chapter 2, Conferences of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of 
member-states of CMEA. In their role as the highest decision-making body they 
replaced the Cominform dissolved in April 1956. They were not convened on a 
regular basis.
Another part of the new institutional framework included multilateral organisations 
whose formal rules were designed to enable participation of Soviet bloc states in 
policy-making through consultations and collective decision-making. They were also
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aimed at precluding member countries joining any other military or economic 
grouping. Thus they represented a more subtle way of achieving the old Stalinist 
policy of isolating of Eastern Europe from the effective political and economic 
influence of the West. In the military sphere these ideas of system-building were 
realised in the formation in May 1955 of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) 
whose Political Consultative Committee was to coordinate foreign policies of socialist 
countries. Furthermore, by formally legalising the stationing of Soviet troops in 
Eastern Europe the WTO formally confirmed the Soviet military leadership in the 
region.
In the economic sphere the management of Soviet economic policy towards bloc 
countries was assigned to the CMEA which until then, as discussed in chapter 1, 
performed basically technical functions. The CMEA, however, assumed its functions 
of coordination of economic policies of its members only in 1956.
Initially, following the 4th Council Session in March 1954, it seemed that there 
would be an immediate radical departure from the existing principles and methods of 
operation of CMEA.1 The Session concluded that the former policy of coordination of 
national economic plans by means of foreign trade agreements was not effective, and 
did not protect CMEA economies from autarkic tendencies and the development of 
similar production structures without a proper raw materials base. It also led to neglect 
of the agricultural and consumption goods sectors. The Session outlined a new 
strategy of cooperation aimed at more rational use of national resources and the 
development of specialisation and cooperation in industrial production to avoid parallel 
economic development. In order to achieve these goals the Session recommended 
changes in the methods of CMEA operation. These included the gradual strengthening 
of CMEA's organizational structure, and steps towards the coordination of national
^Some sources suggest that in 1954 CMEA members came to an agreement as to the need to 
change the original goals, mechanisms and principles of regional cooperation and put them into 
revised statutes. However, their content has never been disclosed in detail (Cizkovsky 1970, 244 in 
Brabant 1989, 53). This information seems to be confirmed by Sprawy Miedzynarodowe 1994:3,
130.
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economic plans, in order to link the economic priorities of East European countries 
with the Soviet priorities (Sprawy Miedzynarodowe 1994:3, 130).
Furthermore, a Soviet representative, Anastas Mikoian, submitted a proposal to 
base the coordination of the main directions of economic development of individual 
countries on their long-term investment plans, supplemented by negotiations on 
production specialisation in key branches of the machine building industry. The 
Session also discussed the necessity of the intensification of trade exchanges with 
capitalist countries within the framework of a common policy of CMEA members. 
Resolutions regarding coordination of investment plans and the development of trade 
with capitalist countries were subsequently adopted by the 5th Session, which also 
assigned the task of elaboration of specialisation agreements to a special commission 
{Sprawy Miedzynarodowe 1994:3, 131). *
This new approach to economic cooperation was abruptly halted, however. In 
March 1955, the Soviet Union requested East European national planning bodies to 
present the drafts of their five-year plans to Gosplan and to coordinate them not within 
CMEA organisations but within a Gosplan Working Commission. This request meant 
that the Soviet Gosplan would effectively assume a supervisory role over bloc 
economies. This request and its implementation meant in practice a rejection of the 
resolution adopted by the 5th Session regarding the coordination of investment plans. 
This decision was reminiscent of the practices in the first years of CMEA existence, 
when the Soviet Union arbitrarily assigned to individual East European countries 
targets for output and mutual deliveries (Sprawy Miedzynarodowe 1994:3, 131).
The coordination of plans in this form was reduced to the simple balancing by 
Gosplan of production of main raw materials in individual bloc countries and their 
arbitrary allocation amongst the CMEA countries. This involved putting pressure on 
some countries like Poland to increase the deliveries of coal and other basic raw
^The commission carried on its work until April 1956.
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materials, without regard for its production capacity and balance of payments, while 
simultaneously ignoring their requirements for com and other essential goods 
(Sprawy Miedzynarodowe 1994:3, 132-3).
This strategy was a Soviet response to shifts in the economic policies of East 
European countries towards greater emphasis on the development of consumer goods 
sectors, as advocated by the New Course. These sudden changes in industrialisation 
policies resulted in a drop in demand for manufactured goods produced by East 
Germany and Czechoslovakia, the most economically developed CMEA countries. As 
a result their ability to purchase foodstuffs, fuels and industrial raw materials 
diminished and they began to experience problems with balance of payments. 
Moreover, with the easing of the Cold War some barriers in East-West trade were 
relaxed and countries which had goods which could be exported to the West, 
primarily foodstuffs and raw materials, began to divert them to Western markets. This 
diversion of trade in favour of Western Europe further contributed to imbalances in the 
CMEA market.
Soviet pressure on regional trade flows was an instrument for solving these 
structural problems and conflicts of interest in favour of maintenance and development 
of selected industries in some countries, in particular East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia, at the expense of others. At the 1956 Conference Khrushchev openly 
advocated the necessity of buying from Czechoslovakia and East Germany their 
surpluses of machinery and equipment. 1 These arbitrary decisions dictating the 
volume of production and exports were strongly resisted by countries like Poland, 
which were effectively forced to finance the development of industries in countries 
favoured by the Soviet Union (Sprawy Miedzynarodowe 1994:3, 133).
Furthermore, at the 1956 Conference, as another solution to the shortages of some 
products within the bloc, the Soviet Union proposed joint financing of production of
1 Khrushchev justified assistance to these countries by referring to GDR and Czechoslovakia as 
‘show cases’ of communist achievement whose standard of living should be comparable to that of 
Western Europe.
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iron ore in the Soviet Union and Poland, and the coordination of production of 
agricultural products and other basic raw materials. The coordination was also to be 
conducted by Gosplan outside the CMEA framework.
Another Soviet proposal for intra-bloc division of labour which Khrushchev 
advanced at the 7th Session in May 1956 involved locating the major sectors of 
machine-building and chemical industries in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. To 
implement this strategy, the Soviet Union sought to transform the coordination of 
plans into an elaboration of balances of key commodities, which would be used to 
work out a scheme of developments of given types of production in individual 
countries to be directly transferred to their national economic plans (Bogomolov ed. 
1987, 392). The underlying principle was that each country was to specialise in 
production in those economic sectors in which it already had a comparative advantage. 
The proposal had its merits from the point of view of the Soviet Union's own 
development plans of securing imports of machinery and equipment. A major 
consequence of this kind of production specialization for the less-developed bloc 
countries, would be the restriction of their opportunities for developing machine- 
building industries which were necessary for technological progress, thus consigning 
them to the role of producers of less technologically advanced products. In the long 
run such a policy of intra-bloc division of labour meant the preservation of existing 
structures and comparative advantages. The less advanced bloc countries must have 
fiercely resisted this proposal which would force them to abandon the comprehensive 
development of their economies because it was presently considered as ‘mistaken' and 
abandoned (Ciamaga 1965, 215).
In the first few years following Stalin’s death, CMEA functioning was thus 
subordinated to the requirements of Soviet economic policy and priorities in the 
region. It was not used as a consultative mechanism to elaborate a common strategy of 
intra-bloc division of labour but served as an instrument of pressure on some East 
European countries to adjust production and exports to the needs of other bloc
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economies without regard to their economic capacities. It was also used to prevent 
redirection of ‘hard’ goods to Western markets which contributed to their shortages 
throughout the CMEA.
The CMEA’s role changed, however, in 1956. The initial impetus seemed to 
have been provided by the 20th Congress of the CPSU and Khruschev’s secret 
speech condemning Stalin. According to Rozanski (1990, 64-6), following the 
speech, East European representatives began more firmly to resist Soviet attempts 
to subordinate the economic policies of their countries to Soviet priorities through 
the arbitrary allocation by Gosplan of plan targets to increase the production of 
selected raw materials without regard for their production capacities.
Already in May 1956 at the 7th CMEA Session there were first signs of a 
departure from the practice of involving Gosplan in the arbitrary imposition of 
economic targets on East European economies. It was also decided that the 
coordination of plans should not be linked to the Soviet priorities but should also 
involve the coordination of plans of individual branches of East European 
economies. Seven Standing Commisions were set up to address this task.
Further impetus to the implementation of these recommendations was 
provided by a reevaluation by the Soviet Union of its policy towards Eastern 
Europe in the wake of the 1956 Hungarian uprising and the Polish October. These 
protests against Stalinist methods of rule and repressive social and economic 
policies demonstrated that local communists would not be able to maintain political 
stability without relaxation of communist party control over society and improved 
economic conditions. Consequently, the Soviet Union was forced to recognize 
constraints on the exercise of its power imposed by the need for East European 
governments to build their own domestic basis for legitimacy based to a great 
degree on economic performance. This realisation marked 1956 as a turning point 
in Soviet economic policy towards Eastern Europe and the final departure from the 
policy of exploitation of its resources. In the wake of these upheavals the Soviet
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government issued a declaration on 30 October 1956 concerning new principles of 
cooperation between the Soviet Union and other communist countries. In this 
document the Soviet Union admitted openly that its relations with its East 
European allies in recent years had not always been based on the principles of 
sovereignty and mutual advantage. Subsequently, the Soviet Union signed with 
bloc countries agreements which included cancellation of the outstanding debts 
incurred during the Stalin's rule and even extended credits to East Germany,
Poland and Hungary to deal with social tensions (Ulam 1973, 593). An example 
of the new Soviet policy was the Soviet-Polish agreement which recognised as 
legitimate Poland's grievances in relation to the terms of trade agreements imposed 
on Poland in 1947. These agreements had forced Poland to sell to the Soviet 
Union coal at prices four times lower than those on world markets. In the 1956 
agreement the Soviets compensated Poland by cancelling its debts. With regard to 
the CMEA the Soviet Union abandoned the notion of involving Gosplan in the 
regulation of East European economies and asked East European countries to set 
up special commisions to put forward proposals for the reorganisation of the 
CMEA (Sprawy Miedzynarodowe 1994: 3, 127-8).
The re-examination of the role of CMEA was also influenced by external factors. 
Tensions with China which began to openly challenge the Soviet Union's claims to 
political and ideological primacy in the communist movement, and the worsening of 
relations with Yugoslavia as a result of Krushchev’s criticism of its model of 
socialism, prompted a search for additional means of strengthening the unity of the 
bloc. Furthermore, the signing of the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 1957 on the 
formation of a European Common Market highlighted the need to find appropriate 
ways of responding to the challenge of economic integration policies of the West.
In response to these developments, the 8th CMEA Session in June 1957 adopted 
measures signifying a change in approach to intra-bloc economic cooperation. The 
Session agreed on the need to elaborate directions of specialization and coordination of
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production on the basis of coordination of long-term investment plans. It also adopted 
recommendations aimed at strengthening its organisational structure through 
expansion of the role of Standing Commissions (Ciamaga 1965, 217).
The increased importance of the CMEA in Soviet economic strategy was evident in 
decisions by the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties 
of Member-States of CMEA, which was held in Moscow in 1958. It was the first 
fully fledged economic summit of bloc countries since the late 1940s. A policy 
statement issued by this summit critically assessed the existing methods of CMEA 
cooperation. The Conference formulated for the first time as the main CMEA objective 
an international socialist division of labor (ISDL) based on specialization and the 
coordination of production (Ciamaga 1965, 228). The Conference adopted as the main 
mechanisms of cooperation the coordination of long-term plans for the basic sectors of 
the national economies and long-term trade agreements. The Conference guidelines 
were subsequently adopted by the 8th and 9th Sessions in 1958.
The formal status of CMEA as the organisation for economic cooperation was 
further confirmed by the adoption in December 1959 of its Charter. Until then CMEA 
had operated without a proper policy document, apart from the founding communique 
which did not elaborate on the purpose and the functions of the organization. The 
Charter identified ISDL as the basis for ‘further deepening and improvement of 
economic cooperation’ between the CMEA members and adopted the coordination of 
plans as the principal CMEA mechanism (Butler ed. 1978, 128).
The main items on the agenda of the Sessions in 1958 and in 1959 were the 
development of a common fuel and power base and specialisation in the machine 
building industry. These Sessions adopted recommendations that East European 
countries specialise in machine building, and other processing sectors. The Soviet 
Union committed itself to expansion of its output and the volume of its deliveries of 
raw materials and oil to other CMEA members (.Pravda 25 March 1958, 5). Members
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also agreed to construct a common power grid and pipeline transporting Soviet oil to 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany and Hungary (Ciamaga 1965, 215-24).
The results of these Sessions indicate that the Soviet Union had decided to 
continue the strategy of cooperation based on the exchange of Soviet raw materials 
for East European manufactures as an effective way of integrating East European 
economies into the Soviet market. This was achieved by the development in satellite 
countries of industries designed to meet Soviet import needs and dependent on Soviet 
raw materials and energy. This model of cooperation was based on the assumption of 
the continuing abundance of Soviet raw materials which were to be exchanged for 
East European manufactured goods produced on the basis of Soviet technology. 
Implicit in this model was a structural and self-perpetuating dependence of East 
European national economies on the Soviet Union. Their industries produced mainly 
for the Soviet market, and in the process they renewed their dependence on Soviet 
raw materials and energy resources. While this model was consistent with the natural 
complementarity between the Soviet Union and peripheral countries, it was not 
conducive to the development of complementary links between East European 
countries.
In the early 1960s another factor which came to have an impact on the CMEA was 
the economic situation of its members. Towards the end of the 1950s Soviet bloc 
countries embarked on the second wave of comprehensive development strategies. 
Party congresses which were held in 1958 announced economic policies which 
spelled out the return to an emphasis on industrial development based on mining, 
metallurgy and machine-building.
These strategies quickly proved unable to produce the expected rates of economic 
growth, especially in the more-developed states of Czechoslovakia and East Germany, 
which experienced a period of negative growth. This led to a search for alternative 
mechanisms of increasing productivity and transition to intensive growth. Two 
Conferences of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of Member-
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States of CMEA which were convened in November 1960 and June 1962 discussed 
the need to develop regional economic cooperation through production specialisation 
as a means of meeting the requirements of intensive economic growth and making the 
bloc more competitive in relation to the West (Ciamaga 1965, 226-8).
The ensuing negotiations resulted in the adoption in June 1962, by the 16th 
‘Extraordinary’ Session, of the Basic Principles o f the International Socialist Division 
o f Labor. The Basic Principles was the first major programmatic document to provide 
the basis for a long-range program of economic cooperation among CMEA countries. 
The document nominated as the primary goal of the CMEA the realization of a regional 
division of labour based on comparative advantage. The international socialist division 
of labor was to contribute ‘to the maximum utilization of the advantages of the 
socialist world system, to the determination of correct proportions in the national 
economy of each country, to the rational location of production factors with respect to 
the socialist world system, to the effective utilization of labour and material resources, 
and to the strengthening of the defensive power of the socialist camp’. The 1SDL was 
seen as an instrument for raising the efficiency of production, achieving high rates of 
growth of national economies, and a gradual diminution of differences in levels of 
economic development (Butler ed. 1978,16).
The document contained concrete recommendations concerning regional 
specialisation and cooperation in those key sectors, which played a decisive part in 
technological progress, e.g. the engineering, machine-building and chemical 
industries, as well as in the development of raw materials, fuel and energy. The 
recommendations in the manufacturing sector and in the metallurgical industry 
suggested that the specialization decisions were based on the existing productive 
capacities and resource base in individual countries. The focus in the second area was 
on the rational utilisation of raw materials, the coordination of investment decisions, 
and the creation of joint enterprises (Butler ed. 1978, 20-5).
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Some of the Basic Principles provisions referred to the allocation of resources 
within the framework of the CMEA from the perspective of the whole community.
This, however, does not seem to be a sufficient reason to interpret them unequivocally 
as Brabant (1989, 66) did, as prescribing adjustment of the developmental priorities of 
individual governments to the common goals determined from a bloc-wide 
perspective. The Basic Principles were, in fact, very careful not to give an explicit 
endorsement of the idea that national interests were subordinate to the goal of 
attainment of an optimal regional economy. The document devoted a whole section to 
the postulate that the ISDL should combine the development of optimal regional 
specialization with the preservation of the integrity of each socialist country's national 
economy, entailing the development within its borders of a rational complex of 
mutually complementary branches of the economy (Butler ed. 1978, 27-9). 1 
Furthermore, recommendations concerning the directions of the division of labour put 
a very strong emphasis on the expansion in less developed countries of sectors critical 
for technological progress (Butler ed. 1978, 23).
By advocating development of specialisations on the basis of the existing 
production or raw material base Basic Principles expressed recognition of the 
economic inefficiency of strategies leading to parallel industrial development. Despite 
emphasis on regional specialization according to comparative advantage as the 
CMEA’s objective, the program did not, however, propose a viable mechanism to 
achieve these objectives. In accordance with the commitment to centralised planning as 
the basic principle of socialist economies the selection of main specialization directions 
and determination of the proportions and structure of mutual trade between CMEA 
members was to be achieved by the coordination of national production and
^The Basic Principles defined as an optimal national economic complex a multi-branch structure 
of interlinked and mutually complementary branches of the national economy combining 
optimally industry and agriculture, the extractive and processing sectors, the production of the 
means of production, and the production of consumer articles. Its development would be primarily 
based on the development of the domestic energy and raw materials industries on the basis of the 
maximal use of their own resources, and whose aim would be growth in those sectors which were 
the basis of technological progress in the national economy, especially machine-building and the 
chemical industry (Butler ed. 1978, 28).
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investment plans in selected sectors with financial instruments playing passive role in 
this process (Butler ed. 1978, 17-8).
Moreover, the program reflected assumptions that planned economic development 
guarantees a high and steady rate of growth which ensures the achievement of 
objectives beyond the reach of wasteful market economies. The belief in the economic 
capacity of the Soviet Union was implicit in claims, advanced at that time by the 
CPSU leaders, of the imminent transition to communism and the overtaking of 
capitalism in economic terms in 20 years. This utopian belief was advanced at the 
Conference in November 1960 when Khrushchev claimed that in 1965 the Soviet 
Union would surpass the USA in volume of production and by 1970 in per capita 
output and confidently predicted that ‘mankind would eventually dump capitalism on 
the garbage heap’ and that socialism would triumph (Trybuna Ludu 6 December 1960, 
2). In the same spirit, a year later, the 21st Congress of the CPSU announced that in 
the Soviet Union ‘socialism triumphed completely and finally’ and adopted its third 
program for the building of a communist society in the Soviet Union within the next 
20 years (Pravda 2 November 1961, 1-9). 1
In practice the strategy outlined in the Basic Principles was not implemented. 
Barely a few months later, in September 1962, the Soviet Union launched a new 
campaign aimed at the transformation of the CMEA into a supranational body invested 
with sufficient decision-making powers to draw up a common plan for the member 
countries.
The Basic Principles only obliquely referred to the concept of a single plan to 
regulate economic cooperation between communist countries with the normative 
statement that ‘[t]he consolidation and expansion of economic links of the countries of 
socialism will further the development of the objective trend pointed out by V.I. Lenin 
toward the creation in the future of a world communist economy regulated by the
1 The Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Pravda 2 November 1961, 1-9).
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victorious working people according to a uniform plan’ (Butler ed. 1978, 16). The 
strategy outlined in an article signed by Khrushchev (1962) was, however, more 
specific. It called for the establishment in CMEA of a single planning organ, entrusted 
with formulating the division of labour among its member states, empowered to 
elaborate common plans and to decide organizational matters. The proposal involved 
coordination of long-term plans for key sectors, including planning of investment 
projects from the point of view of meeting the requirements not only of each country, 
but the whole CMEA, setting up inter-state associations on a commercial and parity 
basis, with fixed shares of capital, for making particular products and increased capital 
lending in the Soviet bloc.
Khrushchev's proposal was approved at the 1962 November Plenary Meeting of 
the Central Committee of the the CPSU. Subsequently its propositions were 
supported by numerous economic analyses in authoritative Soviet journals pointing to 
the inevitability of merging the economy of all the countries belonging to the world 
socialist system into a single, well-knit complex with the coordination of national 
economic plans regulated by a joint planning body as the main means of developing 
and expanding labour division among the socialist countries. 1
The idea of the transformation of the CMEA into a supranational planning 
authority was supported by the establishment of the Executive Committee consisting 
of deputy prime ministers of member countries, which was to be a planning center 
with region-wide responsibilities. The main function of its permanent organ, the 
Bureau for Collective Cooperation in Planning was the elaboration of energy and raw 
material balances for the entire CMEA and the determination on that basis of areas of 
specialisation from a bloc-wide perspective (Ciamaga 1965, 51-2).2
1 See for example Belayev 1963, 15-20; Alekseyev 1962, 51; Kharkin 1962, 19-20.
^In the Bureau each member country was represented by a Deputy Chief of its state planning 
agency.
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In economic terms, supranational economic policy based on these principles meant 
that specialisation would be based on the existing comparative advantages.
Consequently, the less industrialized nations such as Romania, would play the role of 
providing the more advanced countries with the raw materials and agricultural 
products for their further industrial expansion. Furthermore, a single planning 
executive body for all CMEA countries would give to the Soviet Union the effective 
direct means of controlling the economic policies of bloc countries and encouraging 
specialisation which would be most beneficial from the point of view of its priorities.
Fears for their rights to determine economic policies and ensure comprehensive 
development led to an open resistance to this project by the less advanced member 
countries and to the ultimate rejection of the scheme. 1 The main opponent was 
Romania which expressed its opposition openly at the June 1962 and July 1963 
meetings of party leaders of CMEA countries and in a declaration of April 1964. The 
statement of the Rumanian party demanded recognition of ‘a sovereign right of each 
socialist state, to elaborate, choose, or change the forms and methods of socialist 
construction’ as well as ‘the exclusive right of each party to work out independently 
its political line, its concrete objectives and the ways and means of attaining them.’ 
Romanians equated control of the national planning system with the sovereignty of the 
state, and the assumption of control of the state plan by an independent supranational 
body, was for them tantamount to the loss of national independence.
The success of Romania’s resistance was largely due to the Soviet Union’s 
vulnerability in international affairs, which made possible the exercise of a certain 
measure of independence by its satellites. This vulnerability was due to a setback to 
the Soviet Union’s policy experienced during the Cuban missile crisis, and the threats 
to the unity of the bloc posed by the widening Sino-Soviet rift and Albania’s 
independent stance. The Soviet Union clearly wanted to avoid additional tensions in
1 Initially, the idea found support among the leaders of the more industrially developed CMEA members, 
such as East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland (Trybuna Ludu 6 January 1962, Jaroszewicz 1962, 5; 
Ciamaga 1965, 53).
162
the communist movement and making itself open to accusations of seeking to control 
the organisation (Brzezinski 1979, 442-7). The failure of this scheme thus highlighted 
the growing limitations on the exercise of Soviet power to dictate foreign and domestic 
policies to its East European allies.
1965-1984: Soviet-East European relations. Soviet objectives in the 
region.
In the mid- 1960s external factors determining Soviet - East European relations 
were the easing of East-West tensions and the Soviet Union’s increasing rivalry’ with 
China, which continued to challenge Soviet primacy in the communist movement. A 
spectacular act of defiance occurred when in March 1966 China for the first time did 
not send its delegation to the CPSU Congress. The intra-bloc factors entailed 
disunifying tendencies caused chiefly by the attempts of Romania and Poland to 
exploit the differences between China and the Soviet Union, and to pursue 
independent policies towards Western countries and to join Western economic 
institutions. 1 The Soviet Union sought to contain these growing regional pressures 
for increased national autonomy among CMEA members and ensure adherence of East 
European states to the Soviet line in intra-bloc and external policy by relying on the 
existing institutional framework for the management of inter-state relations.
There were, however, new economic factors which had an impact on intra-bloc 
dynamics and which forced the Soviet Union to re-examine its traditional approach to 
intra-bloc economic relations. The first one was a concern with the slowing down of 
the rates of growth of production and productivity and the increasing gap in terms of 
quality and technological standards between the Soviet bloc and Western products.
1 In 1966 Ceausescu declared that all military blocs should be liquidated and asserted his country’s 
determination to trade and develop friendly relations with all countries, irrespective of their social 
systems. Subseqently he put forward a proposal for the convening of a pan-European security 
conference. In 1967 Romania established diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Poland was primarily interested in the expansion of relations with the West and 
participation in international economic organisations.
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These symptoms of diminishing effectiveness of the economic system cast doubts on 
previous claims of the superiority of ‘scientific’ methods of management. 1
The Soviet Union’s response was the introduction in bloc countries of major 
economic reforms whose aim was a transition to an intensive growth based on the 
increased productivity of labor and capital. Central to these reforms were the 
reorganization of the system of management of the national economy, the broadening 
of the operative and economic independence of enterprises and increased reliance on 
economic incentives {Pravda 30 September 1965, 1-3, Pravda 6 May 1966,4; 
Miroshnichenko 1967, 3). The reformers also envisaged structural changes in the 
economies including the accelerated development of sectors which were to increase 
labor productivity, accelerate technical progress, improve quality of products and 
reduce production costs.
The reforms included also foreign trade management, in particular the extension to 
individual producers of the right to engage in foreign trade transactions. However, the 
reform in the Soviet Union was the most conservative. This lack of attention to 
foreign trade stemmed from a Soviet failure to appreciate the potential of foreign 
economic relations as a factor contributing to the acceleration of economic growth. 
Foreign trade had never played a decisive role in the Soviet economy. The share of 
foreign trade in total economic output was insignificant and there was no perceived 
need to improve the effectiveness of foreign trade which could call into question the 
basic principles of a centrally administered economy.
Another economic consideration was the question of the economic viability of the 
existing model of cooperation. Since the late 1950s the intra-bloc trade exchanges 
were a function of the relatively unconstrained availability of cheap fuels and raw 
materials from within the CMEA and comprehensive industrialization based on steady
^For instance, in October 1964, the plenary session of Central Committee of the CPSU called for 
the more rational utilisation of productive forces. Brezhnev in his report to the 23rd CPSU 
congress in 1966 warned that ‘[t]he forms and methods of the management, planning and economic 
stimulation of production did not conform to the new, higher level of productive forces in the 
country and had begun to hamper their development’ (Pravda 30 March 1966, 2-9).
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increases in the supply of capital and labour. With problems with productivity this 
model was becoming perceived by the Soviet Union as too costly because of the 
relative unprofitability of the exports of raw materials. These concerns were first 
addressed by Soviet economists from the prestigious Institute for the Economy of the 
World Socialist System who, in a report written in 1966, urged changes in the 
‘unfavourable structure of Soviet foreign trade’. Another report argued that it was 
substantially more expensive to import machinery from Eastern Europe than to 
produce it domestically (Stone 1996, 36-7).
These economic considerations did not have an instant effect on Soviet decisions 
regarding the CMEA model of exchanges or its operation. They did, however, lead to 
proposals to reform CMEA mechanisms and to elaborate a common strategy for the 
development of economic cooperation. The 20th and 21st Sessions held in 1966 and 
in December 1967 focused on the re-evaluation of the role of currency and financial 
relations and economic accountability in economic cooperation and their compatibility 
with the devolution of authority over decisions in the domestic economies. The 
Sessions addressed these issues in respect to the system of the multilateral settling of 
accounts in convertible rubles among the CMEA member countries, the establishment 
of the International Bank for Economic Cooperation and the more effective utilization 
of instruments of indirect coordination to develop specialisation and cooperation of 
production (Faddeyev 1969, 5). A Dresden meeting of leaders of the parties and 
governments of CMEA in March 1968 concluded that ‘there are many unutilized 
reserves within the framework of the CMEA, numerous possibilities for extending 
economic cooperation’ and proposed to convene a conference at the highest level on 
economic questions including CMEA economic cooperation (Volgin 1968, 3).
Both domestic and CMEA reforms based on the introduction of economic 
instruments were however halted in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
1968. The reforms in Czechoslovakia, in the political sphere, were aimed at the 
limitation of party influence on government, the separation of party and state
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functions, and the increased democratization within the party. Reformers also 
questioned Czechoslovakia’s commitments to the Warsaw Pact and advocated a 
foreign policy more independent of the policies of the Soviet Union. In the economic 
sphere criticism was levelled at the Stalinist economic model and strategy, in particular 
the high share of investments devoted to the defence industry. Reformers envisaged 
changes in the system of management of the economy involving substantial increase in 
the independence of individual enterprises at the cost of central planning authorities 
and restriction of the scope of public ownership of the means of production by 
encouragement of private investment. With regard to foreign economic relations 
reforms presented a threat to economic ties within CMEA, as they questioned the 
profitability of economic relations with other bloc countries, in particular the Soviet 
Union, and proposed the reorientation of Czechoslovak trade towards the West.
If implemented, the process of democratisation and economic reforms would have 
produced a model of socialism distinct from the principles of the Soviet model of 
socialism. Such aspirations thus posed a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the 
Soviet system as well as a threat to the Soviet Union’s ideological and political 
supremacy in the region.
In July 1968, shortly before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev 
restated Soviet position that socialist transformations in individual countries might 
assume different forms in keeping with varying levels of economic development and 
with different national characteristics and conditions. He warned, however, that the 
diverse methods of "constructing the new society" could not undermine the common 
fundamental principles of social-economic and political systems, in particular the 
leading role of the party and public ownership of the means of production as this 
would amount to the abandonment of the communist cause. He stated:
Individual socialist countries set about constructing new social systems in 
different conditions, at varying levels of economic and cultural development 
and with different national characteristics and traditions. All this leads to the 
circumstance, that even with common economic and socio-political
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foundations, the concrete ways to build socialism and the concrete forms that 
socialist social relations assume can differ. . .  . But, with all this, the socialist 
countries are united by common principles and a socioeconomic and political 
foundation common to all of them. Despite all the diversity of forms and all the 
specific national characteristic of each country, this foundation remains 
immutable because if it does not exist, socialism does not exist. Socialism 
does not and cannot exist without public ownership of the means of 
production. ..  . Socialism does not and cannot exist without the leading role 
of the communist party, armed with the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and 
proletarian internationalism (Pravda 4 July 1968, 1-2).
The subsequent Soviet-led military intervention of Soviet bloc countries in 
Czechoslovakia was justified by the principle of socialist internationalism in the shape 
of the Brezhnev Doctrine of ‘limited sovereignty’. According to this doctrine 
communist parties were responsible not only to their own working class but also to 
the working classes of the socialist commonwealth as a whole for the preservation of 
the ‘achievements of socialism’ in their respective countries (Kovalev 1968, 4). 
Accordingly, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries had an internationalist 
duty to defend the fundamental interests of the socialist commonwealth and stop the 
policies of the Czechoslovakian party which were described as ‘shattering the stability 
of the socialist system and encouraging the return to the capitalist path.’ (Pravda 22 
August 1968, 2).l
The pressure for the consolidation of the Soviet bloc’s ‘unity and cohesion’ and 
the maintenance of Soviet influences in Eastern Europe in the wake of the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia was the primary intra-bloc political factor which had an impact on 
Soviet policy in Eastern Europe and renewed efforts at economic cooperation within 
CMEA throughout the 1970s. External political factors which influenced the policy 
shift towards integration were detente and the Soviet Union’s rivalry with China in the 
communist movement, which necessitated finding additional means of securing unity 
within the bloc. The pursuit of East-West detente, in particular, required the
1 Editorial-‘Defense of Socialism is the Highest Internationalist Duty’ in Pravda (22 August 1968, 
2-3) justifying the use of troops.
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coordination of strategies of bloc countries in view of the prospects for the rapid 
expansion of economic exchanges.
The improvement of political relations with the West was a result of the pursuit of 
a foreign policy of ‘peaceful coexistence’ and detente with the West initiated at the end 
of the 1960s. Brezhnev’s leadership saw this strategy as enabling the Soviet Union to 
play the part of a global superpower, and to increase its relative military strength. The 
policy was also motivated by the perceived threat from China and by the immediate 
needs of the Soviet economy, including securing advanced technology available only 
in the West. The policy, which continued despite the invasion of Czechoslovakia, was 
made possible by the readiness of the West to reduce tensions by entering into 
negotiations on arms limitations and settling outstanding political questions in Europe, 
and its interest in expansion of trade relations. Detente did not however affect the 
Soviet perceptions of the strategic and political importance of Eastern Europe as it did 
not mean an abandonment of fundamental ideological differences.
Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe was also affected by its domestic economic 
priorities and the realisation that the maintenance of the traditional model of intra-bloc 
exchanges of Soviet raw materials and energy for manufactured products from East 
European countries had ceased to meet the requirements of the Soviet economic policy 
and that CMEA was becoming an increasing financial burden for the USSR.
Domestically, the perceived need to accelerate scientific-technological progress, to 
modernise production and improve efficiency in the use of energy and raw materials, 
combined with difficulties in satisfying these needs by imports from the CMEA forced 
the Soviet Union to increase imports from Western countries. This required an 
increase of exports of raw materials and energy to these countries which in turn put 
constraints on the possibility of meeting growing East European demand for these 
products.
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Furthermore, the Soviet Union began to perceive the maintenance of the traditional 
model of intra-bloc exchanges as increasingly expensive as easily accessible deposits 
in the European part of the Soviet Union were gradually depleted and the need to 
invest in the development and transportation of raw materials from Siberia raised the 
costs of these materials.1 Moreover, the perception of the unprofitability of exchanges 
was enhanced because East Europeans paid for their imports with manufactured 
products below the technological standards and quality of Western products.
The ideal long-term solution of these tensions between Soviet requirements and 
intra-CMEA trade was a transformation of the stmcture of exchanges to one relying on 
mutual exchanges of manufactured products and reduction of the share of energy and 
raw materials in Soviet exports to CMEA. As a temporary solution the Soviet Union 
pursued two courses of action. Firstly, it demanded an improvement in the quality of 
manufactured products imported from Eastern Europe. Secondly, it presented the 
CMEA countries with the arguments that raw material exports are less profitable than 
machinery exports and therefore they should contribute to the cost of producing of 
raw materials. Consequently, in the course of the trade negotiations for 1971-75 five- 
year plan, which began in 1968, the Soviet Union made it clear that any future 
increases in raw material and energy exports would depend on corresponding East 
European investments on Soviet territory in the development of the raw material and 
fuel sectors and participation in transportation expenditures. In line with this policy, in 
1971 the Soviet Union signed with other socialist countries a number of agreements 
concerning their participation in the extraction of raw materials and in the development 
of transportation facilities by means of capital investment (Pravda 19 May 1971, 2-3).
Soviet foreign policy towards Eastern Europe which sought to achieve these 
political and economic objectives assumed the form of a comprehensive integrationist 
program aimed at establishing new forms of subordinating Eastern Europe, while at
1A report published by the Institute for the Economy of the World Socialist System (IEMSS) in 
1971 estimated that Soviet investments in raw material production would have to rise by 250 to 
300 percent between 1970 and 1980 (Bogomolov et al. 1971 quoted in Stone 1996, 37).
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the same time ensuring their economic viability and decreasing Soviet costs of 
maintaining the CMEA.
In the ideological sphere, the methods used in this drive towards bloc cohesion 
included insistence on systemic uniformity and the universal validity of the Soviet 
model of socialism. Conformity to the Soviet model was justified by a reference to the 
doctrine of the universal laws of the transition to communism prescribing the 
necessary features of socialist development, and a parallel Soviet claim of the right to 
interpret these laws. The Soviet Union asserted its ideological authority on the basis of 
a new concept of the ‘developed socialist society’ or ‘real socialism’, allegedly ‘the 
highest stage of social progress ever achieved by mankind’ whose construction the 
Soviet Union had apparently completed. By contrast, other socialist countries were 
still at different stages of laying the foundations of socialism, with some in the process 
of building of a developed socialist society. As, according to Marxism-Leninism, 
there was only one scientific model of socialism, common to all countries, by 
definition, the Soviet Union’s more advanced stage in the construction of communism 
meant that the specific features of the Soviet model represented a more mature 
manifestation of the general laws (Terry in Terry ed. 1984, 243). The firmer assertion 
of Soviet supremacy in the bloc was also evident in symbolic terms, such as the 
replacement of the term ‘socialist commonwealth’, adopted by Khrushchev, by 
‘socialist community’ which lacked the connotation of equality.
This concept of a ‘developed socialist society’ became a firm part of official 
doctrine after 1966 when the notion of full-scale construction of communism 
proposed by Khrushchev was dropped. By presenting the ‘developed socialism’ as 
only the first phase of the relatively long-term historical period of transition to 
communism it signalled a retreat from the utopian goals of the 1961 program. 1 The
^The ideological concept of ‘really existing’ socialism was also a response to the theoretical 
challenges of Eurocommunism which emerged in the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
Western communist parties called into question the Soviet model of socialism itself and rejected 
the right of the Soviet Union to dictate ideology and policy to the international communist 
movement.
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doctrine defined the ‘legitimate’ socio-economic features of a developed socialist 
society and prescribed the permissible limits of economic management reform, using 
the euphemism ‘perfection of the economic mechanism’. According to the doctrine 
economic reformers ought to focus on ‘rationalisation’ or ‘streamlining’ of economic 
administration, not on measures such as price reforms or decentralisation which could 
lead to a ‘socialist regulated market economy’ (Terry in Terry ed. 1984, 240-3).
In the political sphere, the Soviet strategy of alliance management included the 
strengthening of the traditional institutional stmctures guaranteeing Soviet supremacy, 
such as the Warsaw Pact military structure, its Political Consultative Committee, and 
the introduction of new forms of consultations in the form of regular meetings of East 
European party leaders with Brezhnev during summer holidays. Some of the bilateral 
security treaties with individual East European states were also renegotiated or 
renewed.
With regard to domestic economic policies, out of fear that economic reforms 
could undermine the political underpinnings of the system, the Soviet Union halted the 
momentum for fundamental changes in the system of planning and management. The 
return to a traditional centralised model manifested itself in the abandonment of 
economic reforms in Eastern Europe or their limitation to measures which would not 
encroach upon the control over the economy by the party. The New Economic 
Mechanism inaugurated in 1968 in Hungary was closely monitored and the Soviet 
Union intervened in its implementation by pressure to remove from the positions of 
influence the most reformist members of the communist party.
As an alternative and politically safer way of improving productivity and satisfying 
consumer demands, the Soviet Union encouraged a new economic strategy relying on 
the rapid increase of imports from the West. The assumption was that by gaining 
access to Western finished products, borrowing from the West for domestic 
investments and importing of Western capital equipment and technology to modernize 
bloc economies it would be possible to ensure sustained economic growth and create a
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modern export-oriented sector capable of improved competitiveness on world markets 
and paying off the debts without radical reforms of the system of economic planning 
and management. The announcement by the Soviet Union at the 24th the CPSU 
Congress in March 1971 that it would pursue such an import-led growth strategy was 
subsequently repeated by other Soviet bloc countries, obviously with Soviet consent. 
Apart from indirectly strengthening political cohesion of the bloc by avoiding 
potentially disruptive reforms, the rapid expansion of East-West trade must have also 
been seen as a means of ensuring the improvement of the quality of goods exported by 
East European countries to the Soviet market. Soviet leadership must have also 
expected that direct and indirect transfer of technology would improve the quality of 
Soviet products and ultimately lead to a reduced reliance on raw material exports.
In intra-bloc economic relations the Soviet Union sought to strengthen its ability to 
oversee the reform of the model of cooperation by introducing a new strategy called 
‘socialist economic integration’ (SEI). SEI was announced as the basic policy of 
CMEA members at the 23rd ‘extraordinary’ Session of CMEA in April 1969 attended 
by party and government leaders. It was designed to improve intra-bloc structure of 
trade and ensure the contribution of Eastern Europe to Soviet economic priorities. SEI 
was subsequently endorsed by the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties in 
June 1969. The Comprehensive Program (the CP), which formed the basis of this 
strategy and set forth the specific mechanisms of SEI and a time schedule for the 
implementation of cooperative measures in the 1970s and 1980s, was adopted by 25th 
Session in July 1971.1
Its adoption followed a period of negotiations involving radically opposed 
conceptions of CMEA integration. 2 Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary 
proposed moderate market-type reforms entailing the reform of domestic pricing
^The full title was: The Comprehensive Program for the Intensification and Improvement of 
Cooperation and the Development of Socialist Economic Integration of CMEA Member Countries 
(Butler ed. 1978, 36-120).
^For summaries of East European views on CMEA reform during the period, see Inozemtsev 
(1969, 4), Schaefer (1972, 3-38), Hutchings (1983, 80-83), Stone (1996, 122-3).
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systems towards convergence in the CMEA countries, the introduction of new 
settlement arrangements enabling multilateral clearing, gradual liberalisation of 
trade through the introduction of exchange of non-quota goods and the expansion 
of the rights of enterprises to conduct trade with foreign partners. Poland’s 
proposal was the most radical, containing suggestions for a radical reform of the 
CMEA financial mechanisms including a reform of its pricing system, a gradual 
transition to the convertibility of currencies, the introduction of realistic exchange 
rates (thus enabling cost comparisons to be made between individual countries), 
and granting substantial powers to the International Bank to regulate national 
currency, price and budget policies. 1 The Bank was also to fulfil functions similar 
to those of the International Monetary Fund’s and was to be authorised to negotiate 
debt rescheduling in return for adjustment programs. The Polish proposal also 
included penalties if a country developed a specialisation outside the CMEA 
agreements. Furthermore, to facilitate liberalisation of trade, Poland suggested the 
creation of reserve funds of goods outside the annual trade protocols (Rozanski 
1990, 252- 9).
East Germany, Bulgaria and Romania opposed these reforms completely or on 
a number of points. In general terms they were in favour of the preservation of the 
existing arrangements based on plan coordination, long-term agreements for the 
raw materials and the ‘stop’ pricing system. The three countries were also opposed 
to the introduction of convertibility of currencies, arguing that such a measure was 
impossible in the conditions of shortages. Their opposition to liberal reforms 
reflected their reliance on the central, quantitative planning in the management of 
their economies as the general reform of CMEA mechanisms proposed by the most 
reformist countries was incompatible with central planning by direct controls.
East Germany adopted the most conservative view, urging member countries to 
concentrate on the development of cooperation in specific sectors rather than press for
'Poland apparently believed that economic cooperation based on market instruments would 
undermine Soviet control over East European economies.
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the reform of monetary and foreign trade mechanisms. Bulgaria, however, 
demonstrated a slightly more flexible position by accepting some elements of 
monetary reform and liberalisation of trade with regard to consumer goods. Its 
position included support for the reform of domestic pricing systems to make them 
comparable with other CMEA countries and the expansion of commercial credit in 
CMEA exchanges (Stone 1996, 122-3).
East European positions were consistent partly with the principles of their 
economic reforms, and partly reflected their commercial interests. For example, the 
Polish proposals regarding the introduction of non-quota trade would have led to the 
improvement of the bargaining position of East European importers as they suggested 
that energy and raw material exports would continue to be guaranteed in long-term 
contracts whereas most other goods would be agreed only in general terms. This 
would allow East European negotiators to determine the internal composition of 
exports most beneficial from their point of view while making it difficult for the Soviet 
side to link raw material and oil exports to imports of specific consumer goods (Stone 
1996, 120). A sudden transition to trade in energy and raw materials outside bilateral 
agreements would mean that East European countries would not be assured of their 
stable deliveries, and would also lose their advantageous terms of trade.
The Soviet proposal appeared to affirm East European reformist measures. 
However while using the reformist vocabulary, it imparted to these words a meaning 
different from that attached to them by the reformers. For example, it seemingly 
endorsed realistic exchange rates, gradual progress towards convertibility, and 
expansion of non-quota trade. However the liberalisation of trade was qualified by a 
condition, which was in practice unattainable, that the countries should first ensure a 
surplus of exchanged goods. Similarly, provisions for the reform of financial 
mechanisms were effectively rendered meaningless by the insistence on the 
preservation of the traditional functions of the transferable rouble. The 23rd 
extraordinary Session in April 1969 made clear the possible role of commodity-money
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instruments by stating that, ‘Envisaged intensification of the role of commodity- 
money relations by no means implies a turn to the conditions of market relationships, 
which are incompatible with the planned economies of the fraternal countries’.
The proposal also outlined the principles, procedures and organizational, 
economic and legal prerequisites for the establishment of direct ties among ministries, 
departments, economic organizations and research institutes, and for the formation of 
international economic organizations of CMEA member countries. 1 It was, however, 
clear from the ensuing discussions, that the term ‘direct ties’ was used to describe 
direct links established by administrative orders and subjected to the directives of state 
planning commissions, not the operation of independent enterprises with the full range 
of legal rights to establish relationships with partners in other CMEA countries outside 
the state foreign trade monopoly. Their functions were to be limited to the 
implementation of decisions taken at a higher level within the framework of planned 
deliveries and bilateral or multilateral agreements, but they were not entitled to make 
their own decisions about trade or production and research, or to play a central role in 
plan coordination or in the formulation and implementation of concrete aspects of 
economic integration. Thus, in the Soviet conception of integration the involvement of 
enterprises in the process of cooperation was seen as a means of complementing 
central planning and making it more effective through the development of contacts at a 
lower level (Stone 1996, 136-7).
Thus despite the reformist rhetoric, the Soviet Union’s concept was not really a 
move towards market-type principles, but more a matter of planned integration. The 
meaning of reformist proposals was understood in the context of a centrally planned 
economy where the instruments of indirect coordination were subordinate to planned 
instruments. In line with this reasoning, while the Soviet Union agreed in principle 
that direct links should expand in the areas regulated by long-term agreements, it 
maintained that the decision about cooperation should be taken by the planning organs
1 Communique on the 24th Session of the CMEA (Pravda 15 May 1970, 1).
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of each country. Thus, the Soviet Union in reality opposed non-quota trade and the 
expansion of direct ties in the meaning understood by reformers because they were 
incompatible with its economic system based on centralised commands. As the 
permanent Soviet representative to CMEA, Lesechko (1969,4), stated the Soviet 
intention was the reform of CMEA by means of the introduction of new methods of 
joint planning which would become an effective instrument of the elaboration and 
implementation of the agreed economic strategy of CMEA members in selected 
sectors.
This conception of integration was unanimously accepted as the basis for further 
negotiations at the 23rd Session. It set the permissible framework of CMEA reform 
and with the Soviet delegation controlling the agenda of discussions of working 
groups and their outcomes it was adopted with no substantial changes (Stone 1996, 
130-3).
The final version of the Comprehensive Program defined SEI as a process of 
coordination of economic policy directed by states, aimed at the formation of 
permanent, structural ties in the principal branches of the economy, sciences, and 
technology of participating nations leading to mutual accommodation of their 
economies, and the formation of modem, highly effective structures of their national 
economies; the gradual coming together and equalizing of the levels of their economic 
development (Butler ed. 1978, 37).
According to the CP, integration was to contribute to the rational utilization of 
productive and scientific and technical resources of the CMEA countries, the 
attainment of greater efficiency in the region-wide allocation of resources, the 
accelerated development of the fuel and power base in the CMEA countries and thus to 
the solution of major fuel, power and raw materials problems, the introduction of 
advanced technological processes in the key sectors of the national economy, the 
attainment of the highest scientific and technical standards and an increase in labour 
productivity (Butler ed. 1978, 39).
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In the Soviet economic literature integration was hailed as a ‘qualitatively new 
phase’ of the development of economic relations in the Soviet bloc directed toward the 
attainment of a higher level of the international socialist division of labour (Faddeyev 
1970, 2). Lesechko (1970, 4) and Bogomolov (1987, 293-6) identified as the main 
feature of SEI, distinguishing it from the previous stages of cooperation, the 
internationalisation of cooperation. This was to result from an increase in joint 
undertakings involving increasingly bigger shares of national resources such as joint 
enterprises, international economic organisations and cooperation in international 
finance and banking. The expectation was that this would result in an increase in a 
share of specialised products resulting from joint production activities in intra-CMEA 
exchanges.
According to the CP, the primary role in the implementation of CMEA objectives 
was to be played by planning instruments and central planning bodies having ultimate 
responsibility for plan coordination. The main method of cooperation remained the 
coordination of five-year national economic plans focused on the coordination of 
production and investment decisions in selected sectors. Coordination was to rely on 
bilateral and multilateral consultations during which countries were to exchange 
information about their projected supply and demand for particular products, and 
available resources and production potentials, and agree on integration projects, 
resulting in adjustments in the national economic plans. The intention was that new 
procedures of plan coordination would ensure that coordination would precede the 
adoption of national economic plans and that integration projects would be then 
incorporated in the national economic plans. The program postulated that the 
‘coordination of decisions on basic problems of cooperation will be completed before 
the draft five-year plans are submitted to competent agencies of the countries for 
confirmation.’ (Butler ed. 1978,51).
The CP outlined a number of procedures to ensure the fulfilment of commitments 
arising from the joint planning activities. For instance, plan coordination results were
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to be subsequently ratified in inter-state agreements such as long-term trade protocols 
and agreements on specialisation and cooperation specifying mutual obligations, 
conditions and the material liability of the parties for failure to fulfil their obligations 
(Butler ed. 1978, 50; Bogomolov ed. 1987, 425).
Another major innovation in the CMEA mechanism aimed at an increase of its 
effectiveness was joint planning based on economic calculation of the effectiveness of 
cooperation. Joint planning included the production specialization and cooperation in 
key economic branches and scientific and technical cooperation and the joint 
investment projects in developing raw material resources and energy and priority 
sectors such as mining, engineering, agriculture and transportation (Butler ed. 1978, 
75-7). The activities of participating countries were to be conducted primarily at the 
level of ministries, associations and major enterprises. They were to be coordinated 
and managed by international economic organisations, affiliated with CMEA, set up to 
promote specialised cooperation at the enterprise level. Because of the type of 
organisations involved and the areas of cooperation, these were regarded as 
instruments for supplementing the coordination of plans. At the same time, joint 
planning was seen as a more advanced form of planned cooperation, as it represented 
a form of joint management by organisations from different countries (Inozemtsev 
1969, 4; Rodionov 1971, 2).
The CP also proposed new institutional forms of coordination of economic 
policies of member countries, which were to expand the time horizon of joint planning 
activities. These forms included bi- and multilateral policy consultations on basic 
questions of national, regional and international economic policies, and economic 
forecasts of economic and scientific-technical trends in national and world economies 
They were to be taken into account in the formulation of strategies for the main sectors 
of the national economies and provide a basis for long-term plans (Butler ed. 1987, 
44-9).1
1 Consultations were to be held regularly at all decision-making levels depending on the character of the 
questions.
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The CP gave a rhetorical impression of recognising the need for improvement in 
the monetary-financial mechanism and the credit system. They were to play an 
increased role in CMEA cooperation, in particular with regard to the servicing of new 
types of cooperation: joint planning, the development of direct ties among economic 
organisations and enterprises, the construction and operation of joint enterprises and 
activities of international economic organisations. Sections 6 and 7 in the CP specified 
deadlines for the improvement of price formation, the development of a system of 
multilateral clearing accounts and credit relations by 1980 and a gradual changeover to 
a system of convertible currencies. The CP also proposed the establishment of the 
International Investment Bank (IIB) which was to provide medium and long-term 
credits to finance joint investment projects (Butler ed. 1978, 73-4).
The CP also introduced changes in the system of bilateral trade agreements aimed 
at an increase in the levels of trade including the introduction of mutual exchanges 
outside the highly centralized bilateral barter agreements and allowing more flexibility 
within the framework of the agreed volume of goods. *
This part of the program looked radical on the surface, as it proposed the gradual 
removal of barriers to cooperation stemming from the dysfunctional aspects of the 
mechanism: bilateralism, inconvertibility of currencies and the pricing system. If fully 
implemented, the logical outcome of these measures would be a de-centralised model 
of cooperation relying on market instruments and an active role for enterprises, with 
the role of planning limited to strategic decision-making, creating the conditions 
necessary for multilateral cooperation, the calculation of effectiveness of integration 
projects and the liberalisation of trade.
lOnly the basic types of goods, representing 50 to 60 percent of mutual trade, were to be covered 
as before by fixed quantity quotas established in long-term agreements. For some goods, quotas 
were to be established solely in terms of value. The specific nomenclature of such goods and other 
terms of delivery were to be agreed between the parties involved. For the remaining goods no 
quotas were established, and mutual exchange of these goods did not need to be balanced on a 
bilateral basis. The nomenclature of such goods, their prices and other conditions were the subject 
of agreement between foreign trade organisations in accordance with the general conditions and 
regulations governing intra-CMEA trade (Butler ed. 1978, 64-66).
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The actual meaning of these proposals was, however, the same as in the original 
Soviet concept of integration. It was to be understood in the context of the 
fundamental principle underlying the CP provisions of the ‘organic’ combination of 
joint planning activities with the ‘planned’ use of commodity-money relations 
(Bogomolow ed. 1987, 348). Soviet commentators stressed that integration processes 
within CMEA were to grow in a planned fashion and the instruments of indirect 
coordination were to remain subordinate to planned instruments. This was the 
manifestation of the proposition prevailing in Soviet economic theory and practice, 
that the characteristics of currency and financial relations and their functions must be 
always considered in the context of their relation to planning principle in the 
management of economy, that is they must be seen as the form of planned regulation 
of international socialist economic relations. As Bogomolov (1987, 446) has warned, 
ignoring conditions in which the commodity-money instruments have to function, 
may lead to incorrect prescriptions with regard to the improvement of their functions, 
and assigning to them attributes which they can not, and should not have in the 
conditions of planned regulation of economic cooperation of CMEA members.
Thus, given these caveats, provisions for the reform of commodity-money 
instruments, reformist rhetoric notwithstanding, were not aimed at the introduction of 
these essential conditions for, in practice, SEI was to be implemented chiefly by joint 
planning and the strengthening of the CMEA organisational structure. The instruments 
of indirect coordination were to remain subordinate to planned instruments. The clear 
indication of the limits of the reforms of CMEA mechanisms was the absence of 
operational terms for the functioning of the monetary and financial instruments and 
institutions in the context of plan coordination, or mechanisms which would make this 
combination possible. Furthermore, the CP did not refer to reform of domestic 
mechanisms in individual countries such as exchange rates and the pricing systems, 
which was necessary for the introduction of conditions essential for genuine 
liberalisation of trade, multilateralism and the calculation of the effectiveness of 
economic ties by enterprises. The principle that direct links between enterprises were
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to be established with ‘due consideration for systems of planning and management in 
given countries’ and trade should be conducted on the basis of the state monopoly of 
foreign trade was a clear indication of the limits of reforms in the domestic systems.
The reform of CMEA mechanisms limited to an improvement of the existing 
system based on central planning and management of the economy conformed to the 
principles of Soviet economic system based on centralised commands and the Soviet 
conception of post-1968 reforms discussed earlier. The Soviet Union opposed any 
proposals which might have been incompatible with the Soviet economic system, even 
if their introduction, such as non-quota trade in strategic goods, might have benefited 
the Soviet Union.
The continuing reliance on the planned instruments of CMEA cooperation meant 
that traditional barriers to cooperation, described in chapter 2, were preserved. As a 
consequence, the CP, even at the conceptual level, did not offer a viable program of 
reform of CMEA mechanism. Some authors suggested that it represented more a 
recognition of need rather than a statement of intention, and thus served as a political 
safety valve for the aspirations of reform-oriented CMEA members (Bozyk 1986, 10).
The Joint Plans of Multilateral Integration Projects and Long-Term 
Target Programs: Their principles and objectives.
The main instrument for the implementation of the strategy of CMEA economic 
cooperation formulated in the the CP were the Joint Plans of Multilateral Integration 
Projects and Long-Term Target Programs. The Long-Term Target Programs 
represented an attempt at the coordination of national economic development strategies 
of the member countries around long-term investment programs in five key sectors of 
the economy regarded as necessary for the transition from extensive to intensive 
growth and technological progress. The provisions of Long-term Target programs 
were to be specified in five-year Joint Plans and form a basis for the coordination of 
plans. Their multilateral character and a substantial extension of the time horizon of
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CMEA cooperation were interpreted by Soviet economists as factors considerably 
improving the effectiveness of the CMEA mechanism by enabling more effective 
coordination of production and investment plans (Alekseyev 1971, 3; Bogomolov 
1987, 372, 424-8).
The idea of the elaboration of Joint Plans was raised for the first time at the 26th 
Council Session in July 1972 which stressed the necessity of joint action in the 
development of CMEA raw material and energy sources. The Session announced that 
the strategy of cooperation outlined in the CP would now proceed on two inter-related 
but distinct levels by means of two separate mechanisms of cooperation. At the 
bilateral level, cooperation was to proceed on the basis of traditional foreign trade 
agreements based on the coordination of national economic plans, but which would 
not encroach upon domestic investment planning. At the multilateral level, 
coordination was to be conducted within the framework of Joint Plans organised on 
the basis of joint planning and include joint investment projects and long-term 
agreements of specialisation and cooperation. According to a recommendation of the 
27th Council Session in 1973 Joint Plans were to be elaborated and presented to the 
Session for approval every 5 years.
The intensification of Soviet pressure on East European countries to contribute to 
joint investments came in the wake of a rise in oil prices on world markets. This made 
the East Europeans even more dependent on Soviet deliveries which they could 
purchase within the framework of bilateral agreements without need to spend scarce 
convertible currencies. It also coincided with the failure in 1974 of Soviet negotiations 
with the United States and Japan on long-term financing and cooperative energy 
ventures for developing the massive gas projects and oil pipeline in Siberia (Hardt in 
Terry 1984, 203). To add to the pressure the Soviet Union announced at the 28th 
Session in June 1974 that future Soviet oil deliveries would fall short of initial 
forecasts, thus making clear that participation of Eastern European states in joint 
investment projects was essential not only to ensure increases in deliveries but to
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secure the present level of deliveries. Not surprisingly, then, at the 28th Session the 
Soviet Union obtained approval for plans for the joint construction of the Orenburg 
gas pipeline and expansion of the Mir powergrid (Trend 1974).
This direction of CMEA strategy was formalised at the 29th Council Session in 
June 1975, which adopted the first Joint Plan for Multilateral Integration Measures for 
the years 1976-80. The Session set out as the main areas of cooperation: the 
construction of capital investments projects in the area of fuel and energy resource 
development as well as in electricity transmission and gas transportation and the 
development of specialization and cooperation of production, especially in the machine 
building industry (Zycie Gospodarcze 29 June 1975, 11).
The majority of investment projects provided for the joint participation of 
interested East European countries in the expansion of the productive capacity and 
transportation of Soviet raw materials. Out of seven projects which were already 
under negotiation by the time of the 29th Session, five were located in the Soviet 
Union, one in Cuba, and another in Mongolia. The largest undertaking, involving all 
six East European countries, was the Orenburg gas pipeline project, whose total 
estimated cost accounted for about 50 per cent of the value of all CMEA joint 
investment projects in the 1976-80 period.
The East European states were required to contribute investment funds, machinery 
and equipment, construction materials and labour. In return they were to receive 
guaranteed supplies of the products of the enterprise over a period of twelve to twenty 
years. To ensure the fulfilment of their respective obligations arising from the Joint 
Plan each participating country had a legal obligation to include their contributions to 
these projects in a special section in the annual, five-year and long-term plans 
(Bogomolov ed. 1987, 400-3).
In the area of production cooperation the Joint Plan included long-term bilateral 
and multilateral specialization and cooperation agreements (14 in 1986-90) in
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particular in machine and chemical industries and scientific and technological 
cooperation projects (Nosiadek 1986, 22-3)
The 29th Session also recommended that the Joint Plans should be prepared and 
implemented on the basis of the Long-term Target Programs of Cooperation. This was 
a Soviet proposal which was adopted by other CMEA members without opposition. 
Subsequently, the 30th Session in 1976 adopted the principles and methodology for 
the elaboration of the Target Programs and identified the following five areas of 
economic cooperation which the programs were to cover:
1. The solution of problems concerning the maintenance of adequate supplies of 
energy, fuels, and raw materials;
2. The enhancement of production specialization and the elimination of duplication 
in the machine building sectors;
3. An improvement in the supply of basic food supplies and an increase of 
agricultural output;
4. The improvement of the supply and quality of a wide range of industrial 
consumer goods;
5. The establishment a fully integrated regional transportation system.
Their draft plans were discussed by the 31st Session in 1977, and the 32nd 
Session in 1978. The 33rd Session in 1979 and the 35th Session in 1981 adopted two 
programs including 320 joint integration projects for realisation in the period from 
1981 to 1990. The 37th Session in October 1983 adopted two multilateral programs of 
cooperation until 1990 for the improvement of basic food supplies and for the solution 
of problems in meeting the demand in energy, fuels, and raw materials. 1 On the basis 
of these programs CMEA countries signed 98 bilateral and multilateral agreements on
Nosiadek (1986, 22-4) provides a list of multilateral programs of cooperation until 1990 adopted 
in 1983.
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specialisation and cooperation of production for 1986-90 (Bogomolov ed. 1987,
383).
The political implications of the CMEA strategy of integration.
At one level, the formulation and implementation of joint policy in the form of 
Joint Plans and Target Programs seemed to represent a desirable direction for 
economic cooperation from which all CMEA members could benefit. The participation 
of East European countries in joint investment projects seemed to be advantageous to 
both sides. The Soviet Union received their partial contribution to the costs of raw 
materials and transportation. East European countries were guaranteed on a barter 
basis stable deliveries of Soviet raw materials and energy necessary for the operation 
of their industries at a time when world prices for all forms of energy where soaring. 
Furthermore, the implementation of specialisation and cooperation agreements was to 
contribute to coordination of investment in key sectors of the individual economies, 
and thus to the more rational allocation of resources within the bloc to avoid the 
parallel production of specific machinery and equipment in individual countries. This 
would guarantee the creation of export markets large enough to allow East European 
countries undertake large-scale production and to make investments in technology and 
research which would otherwise be impossible. The agreements would thus also 
become a mechanism enabling the improvement of technological standards and the 
quality of products on the CMEA market and make them competitive on world 
markets (Lesechko 1968 in Stone 1996, 125-8). An increase in the exchanges of 
products of specialisation and cooperation would also contribute to the expansion of 
intra-CMEA trade and an increase of the share of technologically advanced products in 
intra-CMEA trade.
In practice, however, the primary benefactor of the implementation of the program 
seemed to be the Soviet Union. The primary objective of specialisation and 
cooperation agreements was to upgrade export commodities with which the East 
European countries would compensate the Soviet Union for future deliveries of
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energy and raw materials. Improvement in quality and technical standards would thus 
improve the terms of trade in favour of the Soviet Union and therefore the profitability 
of Soviet exchanges. With regard to the Target Program for energy and raw materials 
the main Soviet objectives included the coordination of the CMEA member countries’ 
energy needs and finding ways to force Eastern Europe to contribute to the costs of 
production and transporation of these exports. The Soviet Union also tried to reduce 
its own exports of raw materials by trying to force its partners to increase their 
production and impose upper limits on their demands for additional supplies. In 
particular, a Soviet objective was to reduce East European demand for oil by 
increasing the countries’ reliance on their own coal resources and by stimulating 
further investments in coal production in Poland.
From Eastern Europe’s viewpoint, these terms of participation in the Joint 
Plans were not equally advantageous and during negotiations East European 
countries opposed the Soviet proposals. As a rule they did not want to include the 
raw materials that they exported because they would then be expected to increase 
those exports, which could be sold for convertible currency to the West. Poland 
resisted pressure to develop its local coal supplies in joint investment with 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany by announcing that any exports of coal should 
be balanced by oil and refined oil products.
As this proposal to reduce East European demand for petroleum and natural gas 
met with resistance, the Soviet Union proposed the undertaking of joint 
investments in the construction of two new nuclear power plants. During 
negotiations there were serious differences among future participants.
The Soviet Union insisted on East European contributions and was determined 
that its partners themselves should produce most of the specialised equipment for the 
power plants (Stone 1996, 155-8). East European countries presented, however, a 
united front and refused to undertake production of equipment, demanding that the 
Soviet Union adopt the role of a general supplier of equipment and services for
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nuclear power plants. The reason was that under the existing pricing system the 
production of highly specialised equipment was not profitable. Moreover, production 
which required substantial investments in scarce materials would have no market other 
than the CMEA. The struggle over specialisation dragged on from 1977 to the middle 
of 1979 and finally the Soviet Union was responsible for the two-thirds of the major 
types of equipment coordinated under the agreements.
In addition, from East European perspective the participation in joint investments 
tied up investment funds, equipment, materials and labour which could have been 
directed towards the modernisation of their economies. Thus they conflicted with the 
requirements of economic reform and the structural transformation of their industries 
in favour of development of less energy- and material-intensive sectors.
Both joint investments and specialisation agreements also involved expenditure in 
hard currencies which could not be compensated under existing trade and financial 
arrangements. Firstly, joint investments involved the transfer of financial resources 
from credits obtained in the West. The low interest rate received in comparison to the 
costs of servicing their share of loans in convertible currencies meant actual financial 
loss to East European creditors (Marer in Terry ed. 1984, 171). Moreover, production 
of commodities within specialisation agreements at the high technological level 
expected by the Soviet Union required investments in modem technology which was 
not available within the bloc and therefore had to be paid for with hard currency.
These expenditures due to high Western import content of East European exports 
similarly would not be compensated.
In sum, for East Europeans, participation in Joint Plans contributed to an increase 
in the region’s hard-currency indebtedness. Apart from the burden of large hard 
currency contributions the East European countries also suffered losses in terms of 
future hard currency earnings as the utilization of East European products, labour and 
capital to develop the productive capacity of Soviet energy-related enterprises led to
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the diversion of resources from investment projects which could have been oriented 
towards Western markets.
The program of joint investments was also criticised by East Europeans as 
evidently favouring the Soviet Union since the participants in the joint venture 
received in repayment for their labour and capital only raw materials but were denied 
any share of the profits (Hutchings 1983, 190). Furthermore, even though the 
projects were jointly built and financed, the ownership benefits accrued only to the 
Soviet Union which acquired the exclusive property rights of all plants and facilities. 
Furthermore investing East European countries objected to the high manpower costs 
of these projects and the blatantly unfair prices for construction services which were 
set arbitrarily at Soviet domestic prices, well below world market prices. It was not 
until the late 1980s that the Soviet Union agreed to change these principles of 
evaluation of East European contributions (Polityka 17 December 1988, 18). 
Furthermore, in political terms, the Joint Plans raised fears of enhancing Soviet 
leverage over the region as specialisation agreements would increase Eastern Europe’s 
dependence on the Soviet market while joint investments would increase dependence 
on Soviet energy deliveries.
The cumulative effect of the imposition by the Soviet Union of joint investments in 
the development of Soviet resources was also negative from the point of view of the 
CMEA as a whole. As mentioned earlier, joint investments contributed to the 
preservation of outdated and noncompetitive production sectors while hampering 
structural transformations of domestic industries and withdrawal from energy- and 
material-intensive sectors. This was not conducive to integration because it hampered 
efforts towards the development of complementary industrial structures. East 
European participation in investments also contributed further to the isolation of 
CMEA from world markets, while at the same time some countries incurred high 
debts in the West.
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The choice of methods of implementation of Joint Plans was also primarily 
designed to ensure more Soviet control over the process of cooperation than it was 
possible under existing forms. Joint planning, was designed by the Soviet Union to 
enable the imposition of its own preferences on participants regarding the directions of 
development of specific production branches. The CP emphasised that joint planning 
did not represent attempts at supranational planning. It stated, ‘The independent 
character of internal planning is preserved in joint planning. Under joint planning, 
national ownership o f . . .  production capabilities and resources is retained’ (Butler 
ed. 1978, 53). It went on to say that joint planning was to be conducted on a 
voluntary basis and that decision-making, organisational and technical aspects of joint 
planning remained under control of national organs. In the same spirit Bogomolov 
(ed. 1987, 400) stressed that the implementation of joint plans was to rely on the 
established principles of cooperation of sovereignty and interestedness. The aim of 
these joint planning activities was to overcome barriers of plan coordination without 
encroaching on the sovereignty of individual states. He added that the provisions of 
the programs did not have the character of directives, and that participation in projects 
and their inclusion in national plans was a choice that belonged to individual CMEA 
members (Bogomolov ed. 1987, 376).
However, in practice, if the procedures governing the formulation of a joint plan 
were followed, the joint plan would function as a kind of supranational plan which 
would allocate investment projects to participating countries from a bloc rather than a 
national viewpoint. The principle that the formulation of a joint plan establishing 
common objectives for a given sector or type of production should be completed 
before national plans were approved and their provisions be included in national plans 
presupposed the gradual transfer of planning prerogatives from national authorities to 
central planning organs in CMEA. Given that the Soviet Union had the greatest 
potential leverage in setting the priorities this would considerably increase Soviet
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powers with regard to the coordination of production plans of member countries in 
key economic sectors in line with the priorities of the Soviet economy. 1
Similarly, the Soviet Union as the principal supplier of strategic fuels and raw 
materials was in a position to set unilaterally the terms of agreements. All joint 
investment projects were subject to Soviet control over their conception, planning, 
production and distribution. Direction of their operations was delegated to CMEA’s 
international organisations whose most influential participant was the Soviet Union. 
The supranational implications of these measures were clear and not unnaturally the 
Joint Plan was seen by East European countries, as imposing an international plan to 
which national plans were subordinated (Hutchings 1983, 177) .
Conclusion
This section demonstrated that the strategy of cooperation outlined in the CP was 
designed by the Soviet Union to adjust CMEA mechanisms and forms of cooperation 
to meet the requirements of Soviet policy. Firstly, the Soviet Union set the possible 
limits of the reform of CMEA mechanisms by insisting that the principles of CMEA 
mechanism had to conform to the Soviet model. Furthermore, it developed the 
methods of cooperation which aimed to ensure a decisive position for the Soviet 
Union in the development of new forms of cooperation. In the long-term, the CP 
strategy was seen by the Soviet Union as a means of improving the Soviet foreign 
trade structure, and thus terms of trade, by reducing the share of energy and raw 
materials in Soviet exports to Eastern Europe and reducing the share of East European 
manufactures in Soviet imports. This would ensure an increase in the profitability of 
Soviet exchanges and that the Soviet domination would not be too costly. A political 
objective with regard to SEI was to ensure a change in the model of cooperation and
 ^ According to Bogomolov (ed. 1987, 324) the elaboration of Target Programs was directly aimed 
at adjustment of investment needs in entire industrial sectors in accordance with the collective not 
individual investment needs.
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the structure of trade towards an improvement in the terms of trade without 
endangering links of dependence. Eastern Europe was to contribute to this 
transformation through forced participation in the development of Soviet fuel and 
energy resources and the development of the specialization and cooperation of 
production.
The implementation of the strategy outlined in the Comprehensive 
Program. The actual functioning of CMEA mechanisms.
As discussed earlier, the primary objectives of the Comprehensive Program were a 
shift of the basis of cooperation from trade relations to regional specialization and 
cooperation of production, an increase in the proportion of technologically advanced 
products in intra-CMEA trade and the development of Soviet resources with East 
European contributions. These objectives were not met and from the mid-1970s, and 
more precisely, after the ‘energy shock’, there was no progress in any of the major 
areas of cooperation. The share of intra-CMEA trade in overall trade of CMEA 
members was falling steadily. This trend slowed down during 1981-85 primarily due 
to an increase of tensions in West-East relations which resulted in a decrease of 
exchanges between CMEA and OECD. However even then the value of exchanges in 
the 1980s had fallen by factors of four or five, and the rate of growth in physical units 
by factors of 1.5-2 (Bozyk 1986, 6, 13). The commodity structure of trade remained 
unchanged which meant that the traditional model of intra-CMEA exchanges was 
intact. The CMEA market was also characterised by shortages of high quality goods 
and problems with balancing accounts.
The results of the Comprehensive Program in the area of joint investments were 
confided to a few projects in the development of raw materials and energy resources, 
which were carried out on Soviet territory, such as the Orenburg gas pipeline, an 
asbestos factory in Kiembaevo, a cellulose plant in Ust-Iliimsk, and a power-grid in 
Vinnitza- Albertirsha. In economic terms the significance of the projects included in 
the first Joint Plan was not overwhelming. Their total cost, said to be about nine
191
billion transferable roubles, was estimated to be only 1 to 2 percent of total CMEA 
investment expenditures for the 1976-80 period (Hewett 1977, 190). The failure of 
East European participants, except for Poland, to fulfil their original assignments in 
the Orenburg project, the first major project undertaken as a part of the Joint Plan led 
to a considerable scaling down even of this original modest range of joint investment 
projects to just two projects in the last half of the 1970s (Hutchings 1983, 190-1). 1
CMEA members also failed to implement another major element of the CP 
strategy, the specialisation and cooperation agreements including the program (the 
biggest in CMEA history) of specialisation and cooperation in production of 
equipment for nuclear power plants. These agreements in general poorly fulfilled the 
role of a mechanism of qualitative transformations in production structure. In most 
cases they represented exchanges of final products which could be realized 
independently of specialisation agreements and not the joint development of particular 
types of products. This was a deliberate tactic of the cooperating parties, aimed at the 
creation of the appearance of the development of specialisation in order to satisfy the 
requirements of planning authorities (Gavrilov and Kosikova 1988, 106).2
The abandonment of the Target Programs as a Soviet priority was reflected in the 
removal on the orders of the CPSU Central Committee of all reference to its projects 
in the 1986-90 plan and from the proposals for the CPSTP.
There were several reasons why the objectives of the Comprehensive Program 
were not met. As mentioned earlier, the principal condition of the successful 
implementation of Joint Plans was the establishment of common objectives before the 
countries developed their own plans so that the five year plans could be harmonised 
with the Joint Plan effective for the same period. In the phase of the formulation of the
1 Other participants included East Germany Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
^In 1985 the products of specialisation and cooperation accounted for 22 per cent of CMEA 
foreign trade. In the machine-building industry 40 per cent of mutual exchanges were the result of 
specialisation agreements, while in the chemical industry almost 29 per cent. The products of 
intra-branch cooperation accounted for only 10-15 per cent in machine-building, which was the 
best result among all the industries (Misala 1986, 18).
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Joint Plan this depended on the provision by national planning bodies, before the 
beginning of plan coordination, of accurate information on the projected supply and 
demand for particular products. This was essential in order to design an agreed 
international plan and allocate production and investments in raw materials and 
technology to individual members which would include these targets in their national 
plans. In the phase of implementation a prerequisite for the success of the Joint Plans 
was that national governments assign priority in national plans to their projects and 
allocate sufficient resources for their implementation.
The flaw of this strategy lay in that there was nothing in the existing design of the 
CMEA operation to assume that these essential conditions could be met. CMEA, as 
discussed earlier in chapter 2, did not have the institutional powers to force national 
planners to provide such information or force governments to implement its decisions 
or concentrate resources on a few priority projects. Consequently, the coordination of 
plans was principally a means of exchanging information on import requirements and 
export possibilities which were then adopted as a basis for concluding inter-state 
bilateral trade agreements. The Comprehensive Program did not introduce any 
changes in these arrangements that would ensure that the new methods of plan 
coordination would replace bilateral trade negotiations. The expected effectiveness of 
the postulated mechanisms was based on the assumption that the principle of the 
compulsory and unconditional character of implementation of CMEA 
recommendations would be a sufficient guarantee of the fulfilment by individual 
governments of their obligations. The effective functioning of this principle depended 
on a system of inter-state agreements regulating cooperation, and on securing in 
national plans of sufficient resources for the implementation of cooperative projects. 1
In practice, the problems of establishing joint production plans were 
acknowledged were well known by the time of the 27th Council Session. The
 ^An obligation of individual governments to coordinate CMEA recommendations with national 
plans was proclaimed by Bogomolov (1987, 369) as the one of the most fundamental principles of 
joint planning activities within CMEA.
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coordination of domestic investment plans was strongly resisted by CMEA countries 
who had shown little inclination to subject their development strategies to regional 
coordination (Ausch 1972, 217). As a result, the formulation of the Joint Plan did not 
differ from the traditional process of coordination of plans and did not precede 
national planning. The Target Programs also failed to set a few clearly defined goals 
and to force countries to concentrate resources on selected priority projects. Instead, 
during ensuing negotiations participating countries included an excessive number of 
projects, which meant that they could not serve as effective priorities. Furthermore, 
many of the specialisation agreements for machine building were, as mentioned 
earlier, filled by participating countries with the long lists of existing exports (Stone 
1996, 159-60). Consequently, Target Programs were formulated on the basis of the 
existing agreements on cooperation and specialisation instead of setting priorities for 
the Joint Plan and the next round of plan coordination.
The process of implementation of the Joint Plan was also characterised by the 
failure of East European governments to fulfil their obligations. East Europeans made 
every effort to reduce their contributions to Soviet investments, bargained over terms, 
did not allocate the resources necessary to meet their obligations and failed to make 
deliveries.
With regard to the implementation of joint investment projects the failure of East 
Europeans to meet their obligations can be explained first of all by their doubts as to 
the economic merits of their participation. This was due, firstly, to the absence of 
accurate information about future prices for the commodities used to repay the 
investments and about the opportunity cost of investment participation which made it 
difficult to determine the effectiveness of a project. Secondly, some aspects of their 
participation, discussed in a previous section, were evidently not economical from the 
East European perspective. As a consequence they strongly objected to the terms on 
which these projects were to be implemented and tried to minimise their contributions.
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The difficulties in calculating the effectiveness of projects were also cited as one of 
the main reasons East Europeans failed to fulfil their obligations in regard to 
specialisation agreements (Basiuk in Bozyk ed. 1984, 161; Nosiadek 1986). Another 
reason for East European resistance to specialisation agreements related to the 
perceived unfairness of their participation. As mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union 
regarded agreements primarily as a way of improving the quality and technological 
standards of East European machinery exports and of changing its own structure of 
exports. However, it refused to pay for their contribution to science and research and 
for costly Western technologies which were needed in order to produce high quality 
products. In addition, inadequate protection of copyrights and patents in CMEA 
deprived investing countries of their due profits (Bielen 1996, 31). As a result, East 
Europeans sought to avoid investments in their export industry for which they would 
not receive an appropriate reward. Furthermore, East Europeans had a reason to avoid 
investments in CMEA as their main interest was to obtain products from the West and 
investment in CMEA conflicted with this objective.
Furthermore, in many cases the opportunity to develop intra-branch specialisation 
was not taken up because of intra-CMEA mechanisms. For instance, under the 
existing CMEA pricing system there was no incentive to start new specialisations as it 
was always cheaper to continue the existing products. The lack of interest in the 
development of specialisation production was also due to a practice that new products 
were manufactured despite and outside specialisation agreements. Therefore 
production under specialisation agreements often was not competitive in the world 
markets, in terms of technological level and quality of products, even though it 
commanded prices close or even higher than world market prices. The lack of interest 
in intra-branch specialisation was also a consequence of the fact that complete 
products could not be sold outside CMEA for convertible currencies (Gavrilov and 
Kosikova 1988, 106).
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CMEA institutional mechanisms also obstructed the implementation of intra­
branch cooperation by the traditional cumbersome plan coordination procedures 
according to which specialisation and cooperation agreements had to be integrated 
with commitments arising from plan coordination (Gavrilov and Kosikova 1988,
106).
Domestic and CMEA institutional arrangements were also responsible for the 
failure of international economic organisations to fulfil their intended functions. Thus, 
their effectiveness in creating direct links between CMEA enterprises was limited by 
state ownership of the means of production which did not allow free mixing with the 
property of other economies and whose isolation was further strengthened by 
autonomously functioning domestic economic mechanisms. Other factors obstructing 
their operation included the inadequacy of pricing policies and the lack of convertible 
currency and the consequent lack of the basic financial incentives to form such ties 
(Trend 1976b).
Another reason for the East Europeans’ failure to respond to new Soviet demands, 
also related to institutional arrangements, was the fact that improvement in the quality 
of their exports was dependent on changes in production structures and the 
development of export-oriented sectors in individual economies. These 
transformations could not, however, be implemented within the framework of 
traditional economic domestic systems, which, as discussed in Chapter 2, were 
characterised by the absence of effective mechanisms for adjusting economic 
directions to the requirements of external markets.
An illustration of the effect on CMEA integration of these problems which were 
inbuilt into their domestic mechanisms were the results of the implementation of 
strategies undertaken in the 1970s by some East European countries such as East 
Germany, Poland and Hungary in response to Soviet demands. They were aimed at 
the modernisation of industrial structures, and raising the technical standards of 
products. Poland and Hungary sought to solve looming problems with the
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effectiveness of their economies by reliance on Western credits and technology. As 
demonstrated by Kaminski (1991, 103), the restructuring of economic structures 
carried out within institutional arrangements of centrally planned economies did not 
result in a serious structural transformation of their machine-building industries and 
establishment of a viable, internationally competitive industrial sector. Imports of 
capital used to modernise industry failed to improve industrial competitiveness beyond 
1979.
Problems in the implementation of the Joint Plans were also caused by immediate 
economic difficulties and hard currency balance of payments problems experienced by 
the East European countries from the late 1970s. The economic situation in CMEA 
countries was characterised by shortages of equipment, materials and investment 
funds, unreliability of supplies, and bottlenecks in production. Investment outlays 
were constrained in particular in countries which needed to run a positive balance of 
hard currency trade to service their debt. In Poland under conditions of extreme 
external financial stress enterprises were starved of the resources needed to replace 
obsolete capital. ^The inability to stop the process of decapitalization contributed to the 
lower quality and declining competitiveness of manufactured goods (Kaminski 1992, 
112).
These shortages of equipment and materials and of investment funds had two 
major negative consequences for the implementation of East European commitments to 
CMEA. Firstly, they severely hampered the implementation of the Joint Plan, 
including the production of equipment for nuclear power stations (Stone 1996, 166- 
7). In addition, participating countries were concerned with the standard of imported 
equipment exported by other CMEA countries and preferred to practice import
1 According to some estimates the proportion of obsolete equipment was particularly substantial in 
research and development intensive sectors such as electronics (70 per cent) and machine tools (71 
per cent) (Kaminski 1991, 100). Aging capital stock needed a new capital equipment that could 
hardly be procured in CMEA countries because of necessity to limit external borrowing. As a 
result of significant curtailment of Western equipment exports in the 1980s Poland’s cuts in 
industrial machinery imports were among the largest in the indebted countries. Among CMEA 
countries, Romania implemented similar austerity measures.
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substitution. Secondly, as a result of competition for investment funds, every industry 
had an interest in being included in Target Programs, because this was a way of 
ensuring access to investment resources and imports. On the export side, each country 
tried to include in the program as many of its existing exports as possible to secure 
markets (Stone 1996, 162-3). This was one of the main reasons for the inclusion of 
an excessive number of projects which meant that they could not serve as effective 
priorities and could not be fulfilled.
The flaws of CMEA and domestic mechanisms also affected the behaviour of the 
Soviet Union. The approach of the Soviet side demonstrated that it was not a priority 
of Soviet branch ministries to develop specialisation and cooperation. In practice, 
according to the report prepared by the Institute for the Economy of the World 
Socialist System, during the coordination of plans for 1976-80 the Soviet side did not 
have a clear conception of branch-level specialisation, thus leaving the initiative to 
select areas of cooperation to East European partners. The Soviet proposals lacked 
technical or economic justification. Furthermore, despite Soviet official position to 
demand that East Europeans improve the quality and raise the technical standards of 
their products, the Soviet Union made no consistent effort to force the East Europeans 
to carry out their commitments (Stone 1996, 142-3). This account of negotiations 
indicates that the Soviet lack of interest in the implementation of Joint Plans and the 
initiation of new cooperation agreements was consistent with the limitations of 
domestic and CMEA economic mechanisms, which did not provide incentives to 
undertake specialisation. Furthermore, the lack of Soviet interest in the improvement 
of quality was consistent with competing priorities in the Soviet economy. As a result 
of structural shortages, importers were interested in securing deliveries regardless of 
their quality, and producers preferred to import traditional products as design changes 
could lead to price increases (Stone 1996, 166).
This section demonstrated that while the Soviet Union succeeded in the 
formulation of the CP strategy in conformity with its economic and political
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objectives, it failed to achieve the objectives of the Program in the implementation 
phase. The discussion shows that the immediate reason of problems with the 
implementation of Joint Plans was the failure of East European participants to fulfil 
their obligations. These actions were partly deliberate, due to East Europeans’ doubts 
as to the economic merits of their participation, and to the perceived unfairness of the 
terms of their contributions. Their choices were also caused by the limitations inherent 
in domestic and CMEA mechanisms which could not provide the information needed 
to assess the effectiveness of projects or which provided no incentive to implement the 
strategy. Another reason was that their systems of management did not provide 
incentives for export-oriented production or for the upgrading the standards of 
commodities. These problems with the lack of appropriate mechanisms in national 
economies and CMEA were further exacerbated by the persistent shortages of inputs, 
investment funds and equipment. As a result of these impediments, East European 
countries used CMEA mechanisms to protect their interests and participate in ways 
which would maximise their advantages from cooperation. The lack of interest in the 
implementation of Joint Plans also characterised also Soviet behaviour which, except 
for joint investments, did not put pressure on East European partners to fulfil the 
agreements and did not insist on the improvement of the quality and technical 
standards of their exports.
1980-1984: Soviet-East European relations.
The main political factors which determined Soviet-East European relations 
towards the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s were the Soviet Union’s ambition 
to play the role of a global power, and the deterioration of East-West relations. In 
intra-bloc relations, the greatest impact had been the rise in August 1980 of an 
independent trade union ‘Solidarity’ in Poland and the ensuing 18 months of 
unprecedented challenge to the existing system of exercising power, which was 
brutally stopped by the imposition of martial law by the Polish general, Wojciech 
Jaruzelski.
199
The deterioration of East-West relations followed a period of detente during which 
the Soviet Union obtained from the West recognition of the political and territorial 
status quo in Eastern Europe. The Soviet domination of Eastern Europe was implicitly 
accepted by the 1975 Final Act of Helsinki which formalized the division of Europe 
into spheres of influence. However, towards the end of the 1970s as the result of 
Brezhnev’s expansionist policies Soviet relations with the West were becoming 
increasingly confrontational. The increase in tensions was caused initially by the 
Soviet deployment of the SS-20 in 1977, the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the 
imposition of martial law in Poland. Relations further deteriorated with the 
deployment of intermediate range nuclear missiles (INF), American Pershing-IIs and 
GLCMs in Europe (in response to the Soviet deployment of the SS-20), and the 
announcement by the Reagan administration of the development of the Strategic 
Defence Initiative -SDI- which led to a new round in the postwar arms race. 1
These tensions in East-West relations contributed to an increase in the relative 
importance of Eastern Europe in Soviet foreign policy concerns. The deployment of 
INFs and NATO’s efforts to improve its conventional capability enhanced the strategic 
significance of Eastern Europe as they made it crucial for the Soviets to have access to 
a defensive-offensive base in the region. The political utility of Eastern Europe in 
Soviet global strategy also increased, especially in view of the expansion of its 
influence in the Third World, as it could be used as an exponent of socialist cause.
Economic factors which determined Soviet-East European relations included the 
deteriorating domestic economic situation of Soviet bloc countries, constraints on the 
existing model of intra-bloc cooperation and the growing lag in technological standing 
in relation to the Western nations.
In the early 1970s growth rates increased in most Soviet bloc countries, and 
material living standards improved markedly. This was largely due to the favourable
lrThe Soviet ultimatums on this score culminated in Yuri Andropov's announcement on 24 
November 1983 that the arms control negotiations with the US were broken off.
2 0 0
impact of large-scale imports of Western equipment and consumer goods financed by 
Western credits. By 1975, however, under the combined influence of the dramatic 
increase in OPEC oil prices in 1973-74, global recession and inflation, trade with the 
West began to decrease, as the East European states found it increasingly difficult to 
purchase Western products or find markets for their exports. Faced with a slowing 
down of economic growth some countries that relied on Western technology and 
financing, notably Poland, resorted to taking more credits which were then easily 
available in Western financial markets. Their subsequent inability to service their debts 
led to increasing balance of payments problems.
These difficulties were additionally exacerbated by the intensification of Soviet 
pressure on making East Europe contribute to the needs of the Soviet economy. An 
early manifestation of this policy was was a unilateral, abrupt change in the CMEA 
pricing system in the wake of the rise in world oil prices and a consequent Soviet oil 
price increase implemented in January 1975. These new prices led to a deterioration in 
the regional terms of trade for all East European economies, most of which were 
heavily dependent on Soviet oil deliveries. Another move towards a change in terms 
of intra-bloc economic relations was the announcement at the 33rd Council session in 
1979 of no prospect of increased Soviet oil deliveries.
These developments in the world economy and declining growth rates, soaring 
energy costs and diminishing supplies, mounting indebtedness, and steadily 
deteriorating terms of trade in trade with both West and the Soviet Union were the 
predominant concerns of the East European states in the late 1970s.
Soviet priorities in Eastern Europe remained however the same. The overall Soviet 
strategy towards Eastern Europe was marked by a continuing commitment to 
domination. In response to conflict with the West and the enforced stability in Poland 
Brezhnev and his immediate successors, Andropov and Chernenko pursued policies 
of ideological pressures for conformity and a tightening of Soviet political controls 
over the region. In 1981, addressing the Twenty-sixth Party Congress, Brezhnev
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seemingly acknowledged the right of bloc countries to follow their own national ways 
of building socialism, and denied that there was pressure for uniformity.
Nevertheless, implicit in his statement was the obligation to follow one common line, 
and a very specific reference to the Brezhnev doctrine warning that the Soviet Union 
was determined to secure the interests of the communists and defend the socialist 
gains of the peoples.
In the economic sphere, the basic priority of Soviet strategy was to change the 
structure of intra-CMEA trade in favour of Soviet needs and ensure the prompt 
reduction of trade deficits of East European countries which had significantly 
increased because of the rise in oil prices. Another priority was to find an appropriate 
way to adjust to the structural changes in world markets and the intensified 
competition with the West in the science and military spheres, and the economic 
integration of the European Community, particularly the Eureka program to develop 
competitive technologies in Europe.
These objectives led to renewed pressures for closer integration of the economic 
and scientific potentials of Soviet bloc countries, a policy which had been initiated by 
Chernenko. In June 1984, the Economic Summit Conference of CMEA member 
countries (the first since 1971) adopted a long-term strategy of cooperation of CMEA 
members until the end of 20th century. There was an agreement among CMEA 
member countries about the need to find ways to improve their economic performance 
and successfully compete with the West. The Conference declared the need for the 
reform of CMEA mechanisms and structures and the acceleration of integration 
processes and defined as priority areas for cooperation: the acceleration of scientific- 
technical progress, cooperation in machine building, radio electronics, automation and 
ensuring sufficient supplies of fuels and raw materials to meet the needs of national 
economies (Trybuna Ludu 17 June 1984, 1). 1
1 ‘Oswiadczenie w sprawie podstawowych kierunkow dalszego rozwijania i poglebiania wspolpracy 
gospodarczej i naukowo-technicznej krajow czlonkowskich RWPG.’
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The general agreement as to priorities should not, however, obscure the existence 
of concerns over CMEA’s failure to meet the energy needs of its member countries 
and serious differences over the levels and prices of Soviet energy supplies, the 
quality and availability of East European industrial products, and the impact of debts 
to the West on the ability to meet Soviet requirements. These issues highlighted the 
tensions between the needs of individual countries and the resources at their disposal. 
Their effect on the implementation of strategies will be discussed in the following 
chapter.
The Conference also announced the intention of developing direct ties at the 
enterprise level and the formation of joint ventures. All CMEA members made a 
commitment to authorise their enterprises to form direct links and establish self- 
financing joint enterprises and other international economic organisations.The final 
communique declared: ‘As an important direction for the improvement of economic 
mechanisms of cooperation, the participants of the summit consider broad 
development of cooperation in production and of direct links between associations, 
enterprises and organisations. The conditions will be also created for operation of self- 
financing joint ventures, enterprises and international economic organisations. For that 
purpose member countries will take steps ensuring that enterprises and relevant 
organisations will obtain the necessary rights to form direct links and establish self­
financing joint enterprises and other international economic organisations.’{Trybuna 
Ludu 17 June 1984, 1).
This intention to expand direct cooperation between enterprises of CMEA 
countries was announced earlier in ‘The long-term program of development of 
economic and scientific-technical cooperation until 2000’ signed by the Soviet Union 
and Poland in May 1984. This document did not mention joint ventures. In official 
Soviet and Polish pronouncements the idea of these new forms of cooperation was 
presented as a model for other socialist countries. The statement following the signing
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of the documents declared, ’Thus Poland is becoming a model of the new type of 
economic relations with the Soviet Union’ (Kuczynski 1989,74).
C O N C L U SIO N
This chapter discussed strategies aimed at the development of economic 
cooperation within CMEA from 1953 until 1984.1 demonstrated that both the 
objectives and the choice of the methods of cooperation were subordinated to the 
Soviet Union’s continuing commitment to domination over the region and its 
determination to use the CMEA as an instrument for keeping East European countries 
tied to Soviet objectives. Up to the beginning of the 1970s the Soviet Union was 
prepared to develop economic relations on the basis of exchange of fuels and raw 
materials and import East European manufactures. This model of cooperation was 
beneficial politically for the Soviet Union, as it encouraged East European countries to 
become dependent on it through the development of industries dependent on the 
Soviet market, thus isolating East European economies from the West.
However in the 1970s as a result of the growing costs of the development of the 
fuel and raw material base and the rise in oil prices this model of exchanges ceased to 
be economically viable. This led to a change in the Soviet approach to CMEA. While 
the Soviet Union still looked at economic relations with Eastern Europe from the 
political perspective, and was prepared to maintain an unprofitable model of 
exchanges to secure Soviet control over bloc economies, the Soviet Union began to 
place new demands on Eastern Europe to make CMEA conform to the requirements of 
Soviet economic policies. Taking advantage of the dependence of East Europeans on 
the Soviet economy, the Soviet Union began to seek the improvement of its terms of 
trade by demanding an improvement in the quality of East European exports and 
insisting on contributions to the development of its raw material base.
The Soviet strategy failed partly for objective reasons: the persistence of 
ineffective mechanisms of cooperation mechanisms, and structural barriers, such as
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indebtedness, and shortages of goods and investments funds which from the 
beginning of the 1980s began to limit the ability of CMEA members to fulfil their 
obligations. Apart from institutional constraints the implementation of Soviet strategies 
was hindered by the growing lack of interest of East European countries in 
cooperation because of the technological gap between Soviet bloc and Western 
products, and by their resistance to measures which favoured the Soviet Union. This 
conflict of interest could not be won by the Soviet Union because it lacked effective 
means for enforcing its demands. The CMEA structures and mechanisms lacked 
sufficient powers in this regard. Furthermore, its own economic mechanisms were 
ruled by the same internal logic as the mechanisms of other Soviet bloc countries. 
These mechanisms did not produce incentives for the development of foreign 
economic ties and generated shortages resulting in the undermining of any programs 
aimed at quality improvement.
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CHAPTER FOUR
1985-1990: FACTORS DETERMINING PRESSURE FOR CMEA 
INTEGRATION. THE MAIN PROGRAMS OF CMEA 
COOPERATION AND THE POSTULATED MECHANISMS OF 
THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.
This chapter is concerned with pressure for integration within CMEA and its role 
in Soviet bloc politics from 1985 until 1990.1 will examine the proposed objectives 
and methods of CMEA cooperation as a part of Gorbachev’s strategy to redefine the 
relationship with Eastern Europe and to increase the contribution of the region to 
Soviet objectives. This chapter will provide an analytical framework for an 
assessment of the outcomes of the implementation of CMEA reform which will be 
the subject of the following chapter.
The discussion is divided in three parts distinguished by changes in Soviet 
objectives in the region and the new corresponding methods of managing Soviet- 
East European relations. I will begin each part with a brief overview of the economic 
situation in the Soviet Union, and the main elements of the economic reform 
program adopted by the Soviet leadership to overcome the perceived problems with 
economic performance. The discussion is limited to those aspects of postulated 
changes which were directly pertinent to the subsequent proposals regarding CMEA 
strategy. Attention will be focused only on those aspects of reform which had a 
bearing on CMEA reform and its operation, i.e. the scope for independence of 
enterprises in deciding their objectives, securing supplies and methods of operation.
I will consider changes in CMEA strategies as a function of three major factors: 
the Soviet Union’s domestic political and economic priorities, the principles of 
Gorbachev’s domestic reforms and new directions in foreign policy, and changes in
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the relative importance of Eastern Europe in Soviet policies. The chapter also 
examines the positions of East European countries in the negotiations on CMEA 
reform and their impact on CMEA strategies.
Soviet domestic objectives
When, on 11 March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was elected as General Secretary 
of the CPSU, the Soviet economy was approaching the situation, which, as he 
himself later admitted, ‘virtually signified the onset of economic stagnation’ {Pravda 
26 June 1987). Soviet economic performance was characterised by a persistent 
decline in the economic growth rate, with its levels in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
being the lowest ever recorded in Soviet peacetime history, and by low labour 
productivity and poor efficiency in the utilisation of raw materials, energy and 
investment funds (White 1992, 106). The Soviet Union’s position in the 
international division of labour was not commensurate with the Soviet Union’s 
economic potential, * and the Soviet export commodity structure was typical of a 
developing country with energy and raw materials accounting for around 60 per cent 
of exports.^ The inefficiency and wastefulness of the Soviet economy also 
manifested themselves in the increasing gap in terms of economic efficiency, quality 
of products and scientific-technological progress in relation to the most developed 
countries. According to the Soviet’s own estimates only 15 per cent of manufactured 
products were of world quality (Spandarian and Shmelev 1988, 17).
These apparently intractable problems highlighted a growing level of tension 
between the Soviet Union’s capacity and its domestic needs and global ambitions. In 
the economic sphere, they implied a decreasing ability of the Soviet economy to 
ensure a level of growth sufficient to support the legitimate needs of the population
1 Foreign trade accounted for only about 8 per cent of the Soviet Union's national income, while 
it was close to 15 per cent for the US.
^Shmelev (1987, 154) described the structure of Soviet exports as ‘colonial’.
2 0 7
and to compete successfully with the West. In terms of the global strategy of the 
Soviet Union, they limited its ability to influence international affairs, and 
undermined the viability of the Soviet claim to offer a new alternative model of social 
development, in particular in comparison with China. The measure of the 
diminishing attractiveness of Soviet policies was the waning influence of the Soviet 
Union in the Third World.
In the military sphere, even though the Soviet Union still managed to retain its 
strategic position as a superpower, it was increasingly apparent that it was 
approaching the economic limits of its capacity to sustain the high cost of 
maintaining military spending. ^  This discrepancy between the Soviet economic 
performance and its military strength led some analysts to describe the Soviet Union 
as the ‘incomplete superpower’ (Dibb 1986).
Gorbachev had demonstrated his awareness of the negative aspects of the Soviet 
socio-economic system before his assumption of the CPSU leadership. For 
example, in his address to an ideological Conference of the Central Committee of the 
CPSU on 10 December 1984, which can be considered as his first programmatic 
speech, he examined critically the political and economic situation in the Soviet 
Union and in broad terms outlined the measures essential for ‘deep transformation of 
the economy and the whole system of social relations’. The key to the success of his 
strategy was the transition to intensive economic growth. He declared, ‘Only an 
intensive, highly-developed economy can safeguard a reinforcement of [our] 
country’s position on the international stage and allow her to enter the millenium 
with dignity as a great and flourishing power’. He even used concepts such as 
‘acceleration of social-economic progress’ or ‘perestroika of economic management’
^This was made particularly clear by Soviet inability to construct an equally capable strategic 
defense in response to the announcement by the US in March 1983 of the Strategic Defence 
Initiative.
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which later became catch-words of his reform program. At this point he did not, 
however, seem to have a clear strategy of reform.
Following his election, Gorbachev formulated in a series of discrete steps the 
agenda of the economic reform which was to increase the rate of economic growth, 
close the technology gap, and turn the country into a fully competitive global 
superpower. The initial focus of his reform program was on conservative measures, 
such as new investment policy, organisational changes aimed at streamlining and 
perfecting the traditional system, and the activating of perceived ‘enormous reserves’ 
through disciplinary campaigns (Pravda 24 April 1985; Aslund 1991, 71-72).
The broader framework of the more radical reform program which formed the 
basis of economic strategy until 1989 was set out in his address to the 27th CPSU 
Congress in 1986.1 Central to his strategy was ‘acceleration’ of the country’s socio­
economic development. In his view that was ‘the key to all our economic problems; 
immediate and long-term, economic, and social, political and ideological, domestic 
and foreign’. He believed that the increase in the efficiency of the Soviet economy 
and overcoming the competitive and technological lag with the West depended 
primarily on scientific-technological progress. The transition to intensive growth 
was also dependent on the restructuring of the system of economic management.
The main aspects of the reform included limitation of the responsibility of central 
decision-making bodies such as Gosplan to long-term planning and macro-economic 
matters. Lower levels of management such as ministries were to concentrate on 
technical policies and ensuring high quality products, while enterprises were to be 
responsible for current economic issues, and their management was to be based on 
economic accounting and self-financing (.Pravda 26 February 1986). These 
innovations, however, did not mean that the reform sought to undermine the
^The Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Congress of the CPSU, 
delivered by M.S.Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 25 February 
1986 (Pravda 26 February 1986, 2-10).
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traditional principles of the Soviet economy: central planning and state ownership of 
the means of production were to remain the fundamental features of the socio­
economic order.
The introduction of these changes in the economic mechanism did not take place 
however until early 1988. The resolutions of the 27th Party Congress reflected little 
of Gorbachev’s reform strategy and the Guidelines for the 12th Five Year Plan for 
1986-90, which the Congress adopted, were primarily a reflection of his initial 
traditional, policy measures. The Guidelines set out as their major objectives 
increases in industrial production and labour productivity and a modernisation of the 
economy on the basis of the most advanced science and technology. Their 
implementation, however, still relied on traditional administrative means, such as an 
increase in the share of accumulation in the national income and allocation of 
investment resources to priority sectors considered crucial to ‘the acceleration of 
scientific-technical progress and the technical reconstruction of the national 
economy’ (Aslund 1991,73).1 The investment increases were to be allocated in five 
major ‘complex programmes’ in the areas of food, energy, machine-building, the 
production of chemicals and the electronics-related sectors: computerisation, 
robotisation and automation (Pravda 19 June 1986).2
The basic principles of Gorbachev’s program, as announced at the Congress, 
were incorporated only in the ‘Guidelines for the Radical Restructuring of Economic 
Management’ approved by the Central Committee plenum on economic reform in 
June 1987. Subsequently, they underpinned reform legislation which was adopted 
in early 1988.
^Investment in civilian machine-building was to increase by no less than 80 per cent.
^To the development of these complexes was allocated 80 per cent of the whole increment of 
investments (Pravda 19 June 1986).
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The reform envisaged a decentralised economic system based on indirect 
controls, in particular financial instruments, and allowing greater autonomy for 
cooperative and individual enterprises. Its central premise was the combination of an 
increase in the autonomy of enterprises and the broader use of economic instruments 
with the formation of a much more efficient form of centralised economic 
management concentrated on the strategic issues. The role of central authorities in 
the allocation of targets and distribution of inputs was to diminish and be limited to 
state orders covering only strategic products. Equipment and raw materials were to 
be obtained to a much greater extent through wholesale trade between enterprises, 
rather than from the central authorities. The Guidelines also postulated a radical 
reform of price formation and the finance-and-credit mechanism including a 
reduction in budgetary subsidies (Pravda 26 June 1987).!
A perestroika of economic management clearly did not represent a transition to 
market regulation of economic processes. As Gorbachev put it, the aim was ‘the 
planned mastering and management of the market with consideration for its laws’
(Pravda 26 June 1987). However this blueprint for reform represented a distinctly 
new form of centralised economic management with increased emphasis on 
economic rather than political criteria in decision-making and regulation of the 
economy.
Reform measures were justified in ideological terms as representing a legitimate 
form of ‘developed socialism’. This claim was supported by the reinterpretation of 
the socio-economic nature of socialism. The formerly espoused doctrines which 
regarded such features of the socio-economic order as the class structure of society, 
commodity production, commodity money relations and the market as ‘vestiges of 
capitalism’ was criticised in Gorbachev’s address at the 27th Congress as a
* ‘On the Party's Tasks in the Fundamental Restructuring of Economic Management.’-Report by 
M.S.Gorbachev at the Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee on June 25,1987 (Pravda 
26 June 1987, 1-5).
theoretical error and an ideological defense of extreme, bureaucratic centralism. As 
Gorbachev put it, ‘In an atmosphere of ideological intimidation, attempts to 
introduce economic forms of balancing labor and consumption and commodity- 
money relations which were essential for a shift to an intensive course of 
development were discredited on the grounds that they were of non-socialist origin 
and potentially harmful to socialism. They were used to attack any change in the 
economic mechanism which aimed at the replacement of some directive plan indices 
with economic normatives as departures from the principle of planned guidance and 
as all but a retreat from the principles of socialism’ (Pravda 26 February 1986).
The new official line was that commodity-money relations were not of non­
socialist origin but integral and fully legitimate features of ‘developed socialism’, 
essential for planned socialist development (Butenko 1987, 17). As Gorbachev 
argued, their skilful use was to contribute ‘to the strengthening of socialism’ (Pravda 
26 June 1987).
Soviet foreign trade reform
Soviet leadership also critically assessed the role of foreign trade in the Soviet 
economy and the existing methods of foreign trade management. This assessment 
was prompted by the deterioration of terms of trade with the West, declining 
competitiveness of Soviet manufactures on world markets, and constraints on the 
increase in the production of raw materials and fuels. Since the Plenum of Central 
Committee of the CPSU in April 1985 policy makers and economists began to 
debate seriously the need to increase the role of foreign trade and the development of 
production for export as essential conditions for economic growth (.Pravda 4 March 
1986).
These concerns were addressed in August 1986 by two resolutions: ‘On 
Measures to Improve the Management of Foreign-Economic Ties’ and ‘On Measures
2 1 2
to Improve the Management of Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation with 
Socialist Countries’ which became effective on 1 January 1987 (Pravda 24 
September 1986). These resolutions were regarded as an integral part of the reform 
of the economic mechanism adopted by the 27th CPSU Congress.
The first resolution provided for a significant expansion of the legal and 
economic rights and responsibilities of ministries, production associations, 
enterprises and organizations in the conduct of foreign economic activity. The right 
to conduct relations of this kind was extended to more than twenty branch ministries 
and seventy large associations. These provisions meant that the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade lost its formal monopoly over foreign trade. Its powers were additionally 
restrained by placing it under the supervision of a new superministerial body, the 
State Foreign Economic Commission (GKES) under the USSR Council of Ministers 
whose role was to improve the management of foreign economic relations and to 
coordinate the work of organizations involved in trade, economic, foreign currency, 
financial and scientific-technical links with foreign countries.
The resolution also outlined financial measures aimed at the economic 
accountability and self-financing of enterprises and associations, such as setting up 
foreign currency funds for financing export-import operations and the right to obtain 
foreign-currency credits from the USSR Foreign Trade Bank. All profits from 
activities in the field of international cooperation were to remain fully at the 
associations’ and enterprises' disposal. Their autonomy was, however, limited as 
the central authorities retained the right to set obligatory targets for exports. 
Similarly, their requirements for purchases were to be included in the import plan.
The introduction of these measures was aimed at eliminating the artificial barriers 
which isolated Soviet producers from foreign markets, increasing their economic 
interest in developing exports and modernizing their production facilities, forcing
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them to raise the technical level and quality of products and make prudent use of 
imported resources and developing direct production ties with producers in other 
countries (Pravda 24 September 1986).
The second decree outlined measures related to the granting to Soviet 
associations and enterprises the rights to develop direct ties with enterprises and 
organisations of other CMEA member countries. The underlying assumption was 
that this would accelerate the process of socialist economic integration by ensuring a 
move from primarily trade ties to extensive production specialisation and cooperation 
and scientific-technical cooperation (Pravda 24 September 1986).
According to the decree, production associations and enterprises with rights to 
establish direct links could decide all questions of cooperation independently. This 
included determining areas of cooperation, setting concrete objectives for 
cooperation, selecting partners in the CMEA member-countries, making deliveries 
under cooperative arrangements, signing economic agreements and contracts for 
output deliveries, setting prices for cooperatively produced components and services 
rendered. They could also engage in the joint planning of cooperative production 
facilities, building new and reconstructing existing capacity (Pravda 24 September 
1986).
These changes in the organisation of Soviet foreign trade were supplemented by 
two decrees on the principles concerning the establishment and operation of Soviet 
joint ventures set up in cooperation with capitalist and CMEA enterprises, 
respectively, which were adopted on 13 January 1987. The decree concerning 
cooperation within CMEA, which is of interest to us, provided for the formation of 
joint enterprises, international associations and organizations on the basis of 
common ownership. They were to remain the property of a participating state, but be
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operated jointly in accordance with the existing USSR legislation (Rynki 
Zagraniczne 30 January 1987, 2).^
Joint enterprises were to be economically independent organizations operating on 
the basis of full economic accountability. They were not subject to state planning. 
They had broad rights to determine independently their areas of cooperation, conduct 
their activities in the export-import sphere, set prices and conclude contracts. The 
profits were to be distributed among the participants in proportion to their original 
contributions. Foreign participants in joint ventures had a right to transfer to their 
own countries sums in transferable roubles and other currencies. They enjoyed tax 
relief during the first two years of their operation.
The stated objective of the development of joint ventures was a more effective 
utilisation of scientific-technical potential in CMEA countries, better satisfaction of 
Soviet needs in industrial products, raw materials and consumer goods, introduction 
of leading know-how, the development of specialised export base and limitation or 
substitution of Western technological imports (Rynki Zagraniczne 30 January 1987).
In contrast to the previous rigid Soviet position the foreign trade reform designed 
to encourage more direct links at the level of enterprises and organisations 
represented a seemingly radical measure. However, it was limited and not very 
original. The establishment of economic and organisational conditions for direct 
involvement of producers in trading relations with foreign partners did not go any 
further than the reforms in the foreign trade system in Eastern Europe in the 1960s 
and 1970s which did not undermine the principle of the monopoly of foreign trade. 
As discussed in chapter 2, reforms limited to the removal of formal constraints on 
the autonomy of enterprises were not successful in increasing their interest in export.
1 Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR ’On the principles of establishment and 
operation on the territory of the Soviet Union of Soviet joint ventures, international associations 
and organisations set up in cooperation with CMEA enterprises, discussed in ‘ZSRR: Wspolne 
przedsiebiorstwa z udzialem zagranicznym.’ (Rynki Zagraniczne 30 January 1987, 2).
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The prerequisite for the creation of economic incentives to develop export production 
was the reform of the pricing-financial mechanism of domestic economies, including 
pricing reform and convertibility of national currencies. Measures for the operation 
of enterprises on the basis of limited economic accountability and self-financing 
outlined in the Soviet reform package fell short of introducing these essential 
conditions.
Soviet - East European relations. Soviet priorities in Eastern Europe. 
The role of the CMEA in Soviet policies from 1985 until late 1987.
In the initial period following Gorbachev’s ascent to power the relative strategic, 
political and economic importance of Eastern Europe in the Soviet Union’s policies 
was a reflection of traditional Soviet concerns with securing its strategic interests and 
political control.
In terms of ensuring Soviet security interests, if anything, Eastern Europe 
retained its importance which it had assumed as a result of tensions in East-West 
relations in the late 1970s and the deployment of INFs and NATO’s efforts to 
improve its conventional capability. As the atmosphere of confrontation between the 
two blocs continued in the first two years of Gorbachev’s rule Eastern Europe also 
remained the area of primary political importance. In terms of Soviet global strategy, 
East European countries still had a role to play as a part of the socialist 
commonwealth to support the Soviet position in international forums, and voice their 
opposition to Western policies. They were also used to assist diplomatically, 
militarily and economically in the pursuit of Soviet objectives in the developing 
countries.
At the same time, however, the Polish political situation was in conflict with the 
requirements of Soviet global strategy and posed a threat for domestic Soviet 
stability and Soviet bloc cohesion. Even though General Wojciech Jaruzelski
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managed to contain the Solidarity movement by invasion ‘from within’, the domestic 
political stalemate following the imposition of martial law and the disbanding of 
Solidarity was the most vivid reminder of the fragility of the Soviet-supported 
regime. Moreover, the economic crisis and the failure of economic reform sent 
negative messages about the possibility of effective reform within the framework of 
the one-party state and the Soviet-type economy.
Similar tensions existed in the economic sphere, where the countries of the 
region had potential for becoming more of an embarrassment or liability to the Soviet 
Union than a useful ally. The economic performance of the Soviet bloc countries 
was in many respects similar to that of the Soviet economy. It was characterised by 
decreasing rates of economic growth, a lag in technological standing in relation to 
the industrialized capitalist nations and low productivity of the economies. Attempts 
to switch to intensive growth were not successful; the plan targets were invariably 
never reached; budgetary deficits and material shortages were on the increase and the 
social sphere suffered from chronic underinvestment. The existing shortcomings 
raised serious doubts about the prospects for even modest growth. In addition, their 
indebtedness both to the West and the Soviet Union, and the need to repay their 
debts impaired their prospects of economic growth.
There was also a growing realisation in the Soviet leadership of the limits of 
expanding cooperation within CMEA. The existing model of cooperation had no 
future, and its maintenance was bound to lead to weakening of the Soviet economic, 
and hence political, position in the bloc. This was the result of the declining potential 
of the Soviet Union to maintain existing levels of exports of fuel and raw material 
due to stagnation or even decline in the production of these commodities which 
dominated Soviet exports to Eastern Europe. East European countries faced also 
deteriorating terms of trade with the Soviet Union and increase in their debt. The 
poor technical levels and low quality of largely uncompetitive exports offered little
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incentive for CMEA countries to trade with one another and this led to a sharp 
decline in the real volume of intra-CMEA trade. The Soviet Union was even 
compelled to extend credits. According to Soviet estimates this financial assistance 
together with the price advantages enjoyed by East European countries meant that the 
actual subsidisation of the East European countries amounted to approximately 18 
billion roubles between 1981 and 1984 (Shastitko et al. 1985, 2-3 in Stone 1996, 
43).
These political and economic problems in East European countries highlighted a 
perennial dilemma between cohesion and viability faced by Soviet leaders in 
securing their objectives in the Soviet bloc; that is, what policies could be applied to 
ensure economic growth and internal political stability without endangering Soviet 
control. Soviet options for reforming economic relations to improve the profitability 
of its trade with the European states and for reducing Soviet subsidies to the region 
in the face of the economic inefficiency of its satellites were limited by its own 
domestic economic constraints. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was wary of 
allowing broad ranging economic reforms. They could make East European 
countries more productive, but their political ramifications were bound to question 
the principles of the Soviet model of development, and thus the legitimacy of the 
Soviet Union’s political order. The option of increased economic cooperation with 
the West to solve the problems of the Soviet bloc states was limited because of 
continuing tensions and the high level of indebtedness to Western countries. It was 
also fraught with the danger of decreasing reliance on the Soviet economy and the 
development of disintegrative tendencies within the bloc.
This combination of Eastern Europe’s inability to provide the required goods and 
the Soviet Union’s inability to secure its influence and economic position by means 
of technology exports meant that the traditional model of trade relations within 
CMEA, where Soviet raw materials were exchanged for finished products from
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Eastern Europe had reached its limits. This had implications not only for the 
prospects of economic relations between member countries, but also for political 
relationships within the Soviet bloc. The traditional heavy dependence of East 
European countries on the USSR for energy and raw materials and on the Soviet 
market as an outlet for industrial products provided the basis for CMEA cohesion 
and the instruments for influencing its members. With the breaking down of the 
material basis for cooperation, the Soviet Union was losing important economic 
levers of power and influence and ran a risk of weakening its position in the 
commonwealth.
Gorbachev’s policy towards Eastern Europe
The original approach of the Gorbachev leadership concerning the socialist 
community was conservative. In the first year of his rule Gorbachev did not yet 
question the Soviet Union’s traditional perceptions of the importance of Eastern 
Europe in strategic and political terms, and his policy in the region followed 
directions initiated by previous Soviet leaders. Consequently, he adopted a 
conservative position on the maintenance of Soviet domination and bloc unity. The 
main themes in his initial public statements were the need for unity as well as the 
dangers of East European countries becoming overdependent on the West. The 
continuing subordination of East European countries to the Soviet Union was 
maintained by the traditional institutions and processes of managing bloc relations. 
For example, the Warsaw Pact was renewed in April 1985 for another 20 years 
without any changes in its original Charter.
The conservative position on the Soviet-East European relationship manifested 
itself also in the traditional argument for bloc cohesion based on the uniformity of 
the socio-political systems. The acceptable framework for policies was still defined 
by the doctrine of the general laws governing the construction of socialism, and
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acknowledgment of Soviet leadership. An authoritative article published in Pravda 
in June 1985 defined the laws in the traditional way, as the power of the working 
people with the leading role assigned to the working class; the guidance of society 
by the Marxist-Leninist party, the public ownership of the basic means of production 
and the planned growth of the economy (Vladimirov 1985, 11). The article also 
expressed the traditional attitude to the permissible limits of diversity, which was 
legitimate only with regard to specific historical features of a socialist country.
Shortly after his election, Gorbachev also expressed his continuing commitment 
to the standard principles of Marxist-Leninist socialist internationalism including 
class solidarity, friendship and cooperation, mutual trust, comradely mutual 
assistance as principles governing intra-bloc relations, and fostering ‘broader 
interaction between the fraternal parties’ {Pravda 14 March 1985). An article in 
Pravda (15 June 1986) reminded East Europeans of its validity by stressing that 
national interests must be ‘correctly conjoined’ with the internationalist interests of 
the bloc as a whole and that communists must ‘always and in everything’ remain 
‘loyal to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism’.
The need for cohesion of the bloc and unity of action was also, as in the past, 
justified by the continuing threat from the West. For example, articles in Pravda on 
15 and 21 June 1985 warned East European countries not to pursue foreign policies 
towards the West independent of the direction of Soviet foreign policy in view of the 
aggressive policy of the ‘imperialist’ countries aimed at creating divisions within the 
bloc.
This line was continued well into the next year. At the 10th Congress of the 
Polish United Workers’ Party in July 1986 Gorbachev expressed this position thus , 
’The national economic interests of our countries, the political situation in the world 
arena and considerations of economic security require that we must act together,
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unifying our efforts. We should not allow dependence on the West. Links with the 
West should not be wound up, but they must be used rationally’ (Trybuna Ludu 28 
July 1986, 3).
At the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986, however, there were already 
some indications that Gorbachev had been developing new ideas of desirable 
principles and the methods of managing intra-bloc relations which were different 
from those supported by the traditional doctrines. It was both what he said and 
what he did not say which signified a shift in his attitude to other socialist countries.
First of all, in his address to the Congress, in the part concerning relations 
within the socialist commonwealth, Gorbachev did not mention the scientific laws of 
communist construction as the only legitimate principles of the socialist political 
system and did not insist on a single model of socialism. In fact he warned against 
attempts to use the theory of Marxism-Leninism as a set of universal rules regardless 
of ‘the concrete economic and political situation in each particular period of the 
historical process’. What is more, in a single sentence he seemed to question 
traditional notions of Soviet authority, the universal applicability of the Soviet model 
and the limits of diversity, as the basis for unity among the communist parties. He 
said,
We believe that the diversity of our movement is not synonymous with 
disunity. Just as unity has nothing in common with uniformity, with 
hierarchy, with interference by some parties in the affairs of the other, 
with the desire of any party to have a monopoly on truth. The 
communist movement can and must be strong through its class 
solidarity and the equal cooperation of all the fraternal parties in the 
struggle for common goals. That is how the CPSU understands unity, 
and it intends to promote it in every way.
The change in his concept of the relations within the socialist community was 
also implicit in the absence of any mention of socialist internationalism. Instead,
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Gorbachev emphasised ‘unconditional respect in international practice for the right 
of every people to choose the paths and forms of its development.’ (Pravda 26 
February 1986). ^
These ideas, however, did not immediately become an officially sanctioned 
policy of the CPSU and did not affect the practice of intra-bloc relations. The 
Program of the CPSU (new version) adopted by the 27th CPSU Congress still 
referred to the general laws of socialism as objective laws governing the transition of 
socialism into communism. The diversity of the political order was justified only 
with regard to differences in the levels of the economic and political development of 
countries, their historical and cultural traditions. The Program also explicitly 
endorsed the fidelity of the communist parties to Marxist-Leninist principles, the 
uniformity of social, economic and political systems and the principles of socialist 
internationalism as the basis of the relations amongst the socialist states (.Pravda 7 
March 1986).2 In other words the essential elements of Stalinist doctrines were 
preserved.
Soviet economic policy towards CMEA members.
This political strategy was supplemented in the economic sphere by a two-fold 
strategy in which the CMEA was placed in a crucial position. Its thrust was a stress 
on the contribution of East European economies to the needs of Soviet economy and 
increased emphasis on economic considerations in economic cooperation. In other 
words, the Soviet Union was not any longer prepared to pay so high a price for the 
empire.
One dimension of the strategy had an objective of putting economic relations on 
a more commercial basis and thus redressing the perceived imbalance in the existing
1The Political Report of the CPSU CC to the 27th Congress of the CPSU. Delivered by M. 
Gorbachev on 25 February 1986 (,Pravda 26 February 1986, 2-10).
2The Program of the CPSU adopted by the 27th CPSU Congress {Pravda 7 March 1986, 3-8).
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model of economic cooperation. For example, the Soviet Union’s agreement to 
maintain its 1985 level of deliveries of fuel and essential materials, was conditional 
on its partners’ ability to improve the quality of manufactures exported to the USSR 
and contribute to the development of the raw material base (Pravda 27 June 1985). 
The Soviet Union also tried to narrow the gap between its machinery exports and 
imports, and began to insist on limitations of quotas for East European machinery 
exports, while demanding increases in the imports of Soviet manufactures (Stone 
1996, 229-31).
The second dimension of the strategy, had broader aims and seemed to be a 
search for a formula to achieve both cohesion and viability. Its aim was to improve 
the economic performance of East European states and thus make them economically 
viable, for their own sake, for the sake of the Soviet bloc economic integration and 
for the image of Soviet-style socialism. At the same time they were to contribute to 
the objectives of Soviet domestic strategy, and thus to the improvement of Soviet 
international standing. In terms of its contribution to bloc cohesion and ensuring 
Soviet control, the strategy was to generate alternative forms of economic 
dependence and thus political influence as well as be instrumental in ensuring the 
highest possible degree of independence of bloc countries from imports from the 
West.
The first part of this strategy involved pressure on East European leaderships to 
carry out economic reforms consistent with the Soviet strategy of acceleration of 
economic development. In accordance with this policy, under Soviet instructions, 
communist party congresses which convened in Soviet bloc countries at the turn of 
1985 and 1986 endorsed five-year and long-term economic plans aimed at a 
transition to an intensive type of socio-economic development and an increase in 
productivity on the basis of the acceleration of scientific-technical progress. The 
second part entailed involvement of East European economies through CMEA
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mechanisms in the move from extensive to intensive economic development, and in 
the transformation of the CMEA model of cooperation. Initially this represented the 
continuation of a long-term strategy of cooperation of CMEA members adopted by 
the Economic Summit Conference of CMEA member countries in June 1984. As 
mentioned in chapter 3, the Conference identified as priority areas for cooperation: 
the acceleration of scientific-technical progress, cooperation in machine building, 
radio electronics, automation and ensuring sufficient supplies of fuels and raw 
materials to meet the needs of national economies (.Pravda 16 June 1984).
Accordingly, in the mid-1980s the main emphasis of CMEA strategy was placed 
on cooperation in the machine building industry, primarily in production with a high 
input of modem technology which was regarded as a key determinant of scientific- 
technological progress in all the branches of the national economy (Ekon. sotr.
1986: 6, 18). Hanson (1987b) noted that this strategy was designed to promote the 
new investment in machinery which the USSR for the realisation of perestroika. 
Soviet plans envisaged a rapid growth of investment in new equipment (a 35-40 per 
cent rise in machinery investment) in particular in the engineering sector and the 
electronics-related branches. Growth of that order would, however, required a 
considerable growth in machinery imports. With balance of payments difficulties 
likely to limit Soviet purchasing of Western machinery, the Soviet Union resorted to 
using East European countries as the alternative source.
Another important area of cooperation was securing the requirements in fuels 
and raw materials. In order to meet these needs the 40th Council Session adopted a 
number of major programs such as the Program for Cooperation in Economising 
and Making Rational Use of Material Resources up to the Year 2000, entailing 117 
joint cooperation measures, the program of development of the fuel, power and raw 
material base of the national economies, the program for the construction of atomic 
power stations and atomic heating plants up to the year 2000 including the
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Khmelnitsky Atomic Power Station, and a general agreement on specialisation and 
cooperation in the field of chemical products (Ekon sotr 1986:5, 5).
Following the 41st (extraordinary) Council Session in December 1985, CMEA 
strategy followed the Soviet economic priorities outlined in Gorbachev’s strategy of 
acceleration of economic growth and reform of foreign trade management. The 
fundamental objective of the CMEA was the development and implementation of a 
coordinated policy in science and technology. It was seen as a means to transform 
the CMEA model of cooperation from the predominance of trade ties to 
specialisation and cooperation of production, and the transition from trade in energy 
and raw materials to trade in manufactures and equipment. The strategy was also to 
overcome the West’s lead in technology and strengthen the economic 
competitiveness of CMEA members in the world market by adjusting development 
directions to its requirements (Pravda 4 March 1986; Ekon. sotr 1986:6, 9-20).
The main instrument of this strategy was the Comprehensive Program for the 
Scientific and Technical Progress of the CMEA Member Countries up to the Year 
2000 (CPSTP) which was adopted by the 41st (extraordinary) Session on 17 
December 1985. The Program set out as its specific goals: the development of 
competitive technologies, the expansion of advanced technology industries and the 
intensification of development on the basis of international specialization and 
cooperation in production. This was expected to double labour productivity, 
improve the quality of products, lead to more efficient use of energy and raw 
materials, liquidate backwardness relative to the advanced industrial countries and 
increase independence from the capitalist countries (Pravda 18 December 1985).
The common science and technology policy was to be based on coordinated 
undertakings in the elaboration and application of new kinds of technologies and 
materials in the five areas of scientific research designated for accelerated
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development throughout the bloc. These priority areas included: electronics, the 
comprehensive automation of production processes, particularly in the area of the 
machine-tool and engineering industries, the development of the nuclear power 
industry, the development of new materials and technology, and biotechnology. The 
work on forty developmental projects covered by the CPSTP was to be completed 
and lead to the introduction of new technologies in the course of the 1986-1990 
plan. The program included ninety-three specific projects which were to be pursued 
jointly by seven hundred scientific organisations and research and development 
bodies of the member countries. Their cooperation was to be based on direct 
cooperation between self-financing enterprises and economic organisations of the 
CMEA member countries in research, design and experimental work, and in 
exchanging scientific-technical documentation. The full responsibility for the 
supervision and management of the whole process of development and 
implementation of the cooperation programs belonged to the Leading Organisations: 
Soviet scientific and research institutes and enterprises (Eicon sotr. 1986:1, 2-13).
The objectives of CPSTP were intended to set the investment priorities for the 
1986-90 national plans and be taken into account during the coordination of 
economic plans. Its provisions were obligatory for member countries who were also 
responsible for securing the material and financial means for the implementation of 
CPSTP projects. This was achieved by the imposition on CMEA members of a 
formal requirement to include in their national plans obligations arising from the 
Comprehensive Program (Ekon sotr. 1986:1, 20).
The conception of the CPSTP was a Soviet proposal developed on the initiative 
of the CPSU Central Committee Department for Socialist Countries in the early 
1984. It was patterned after a similar comprehensive program which was developed 
in the Soviet Union in the 1970s. The original proposal of the CPSTP outlined a 
coherent program formulating the goals and proposing creating a structure with
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sufficient authority and resources to develop a science and technology policy for 
CMEA members under Soviet supervision. To this aim it introduced extensive 
organisational reforms of the CMEA structure aimed at creating bodies with 
authority to develop a science and technology policy that would be obligatory for all 
the countries. CMEA members were to include CPSTP projects in the national plans 
and conclude agreements to ensure the implementation of the program. At the top of 
the management structure were five new CMEA committees with considerable 
powers which were to supervise the five priority areas. The second level was to 
consist of five program councils of scientists and specialists responsible for solving 
specific problems connected with the implementation of programs. Finally, for the 
operational tasks of managing five programs there were Leading Organisations 
empowered to make commitments on behalf of member countries including 
allocation of projects and distributing funds. The objective was to introduce an 
element of accountability into the mechanisms by charging the Leading 
Organisations with responsibility for achieving the goals set forth in the program and 
delegating to them enough authority to compel the cooperation of organisations from 
the other countries (Stone 1996, 181). The initial proposals included also the 
formation of a Scientific and Technological Center to monitor the entire process of 
development and implementation of the CPSTP to ensure the logical connection of 
topics of research (Stone 1996, 176-9). 1
Thus the original design of the CPSTP presupposed pooling scientific resources, 
‘breaking the national ties of the cooperating organisations, incorporating them into 
an international system of management to ensure the fulfilment of international 
obligations and creating a structure of accountability that could monitor progress’ 
(Leontiev in Stone 1996, 180). This design was aimed at overcoming those
* Stone has compared eight successive draft versions of CPSTP, including the adopted version and 
analyses the process of elimination of proposals to which East European countries objected for 
political and economic reasons.
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structural barriers inherent in the centrally planned economies and the CMEA 
organisational structure which inhibited the transformation of basic scientific 
research into applied technology and which also obstructed technology transfers 
between sectors in national economies and between organisations in individual 
CMEA countries. These obstacles to technological development resulted from the 
isolation of organisations active in different sectors of national economies, and the 
isolation of organisations working in individual CMEA countries caused by the 
sectoral structure of the CMEA and the institutionalised isolation of national 
economies.
This original proposal represented thus yet another Soviet attempt to solve the 
problems of integration by the imposition of supranational structures which could 
control the implementation of policy by East European countries and a series of 
organisational adjustments. The Program did not however introduce any changes in 
domestic systems of management and traditional mechanisms of cooperation which 
would introduce incentives for enterprises to introduce innovations into production 
and overcome barriers to technological development and transfers of technology 
between individual sectors of national economy and between individual countries.
East European countries approved the original Soviet proposal to develop the 
CPSTP which was discussed and adopted by June 1984 Conference (Stone 1996, 
174-6). However during the ensuing process of negotiations of successive drafts 
they all rejected the proposals of pooling scientific resources and creating 
supranational organisations such as the Scientific Center and five smaller centers to 
supervise priority areas. They also unanimously opposed creating a system of joint 
funding for the projects which would allow the leading organisations to finance the 
projects and purchase the scientific research results (Monkiewicz 1988, 140-1). The 
CPSTP left the issue of the determination of the national shares of participation to be 
decided in the next phase.
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The reasons for their objections were that they saw this strategy as encroaching 
upon their economic sovereignty and as benefiting primarily the Soviet economy. 
Firstly, East European countries feared the political and economic implications of 
incorporating their national economic organisations into an international system of 
management under Soviet supervision (Stone 1996, 177-9). They also resisted 
setting up of joint funds controlled by leading organisations because under CMEA 
rules there were no provisions concerning the legal protection of intellectual property 
and know-how (Bielen 1996, 31). Contributing countries would thus not have 
control over scientific results and in the end their research would increase the 
productivity of industries in other socialist countries. In particular, they feared that 
export of scientific research would ultimately contribute to improving the technical 
level of Soviet manufactures and that they would eventually lose the Soviet market 
for their technological products. According to East European officials involved in the 
formulation and implementation of the CPSTP, East European participants viewed 
the joint funds as serving primarily Soviet interests. In their opinion the CPSTP 
represented a one-way flow of technology to the Soviet Union, a claim supported by 
the withdrawal by the Soviet Union from the program of its own most advanced 
technology, on the pretext that it had military applications (Stone 1996, 187). ^
Another reason for Eastern European’s lack of enthusiasm for CPSTP was their 
interest in Western technology which was superior to Soviet bloc. This interest 
conflicted with the stated Soviet objective that the strategy was to achieve accelerated 
modernisation of the Soviet bloc economies with technology generated primarily 
within the bloc. This direction towards substantial technological independence of 
CMEA countries from imports from capitalist countries was espoused by Gorbachev
1 Needless to say, these claims were vehemently criticised by Soviet analysts who denied that the 
Soviet Union derived any special benefits from the CPTSP. They maintained that CMEA 
cooperation is conducted on the principle of equality. They denied that the coordination of 
economic policies within CMEA was an instrument of exerting economic pressure on East 
European countries.by the Soviet Union (Ekon. sotr. strati chlenov SEV 1986:5, 85).
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at the April Plenum of the CC CPSU in 1985 as essential to strengthen the technical 
and economic invulnerability of the CMEA states to the aggressive policies of the 
USA, Western Europe and Japan, described as ‘the main centers of imperialism’
(.Kommunist 1985: 7, 16-8). At the 40th Council Session in 1985 Gorbachev 
expressed confidence that the CMEA would become more robust and thus ‘nullify 
the policy of economic pressure actively pursued by the West towards the socialist 
countries’ {Pravda 27 June 1985. 1).
From the Soviet perspective this logic was consistent with the continuing 
tensions in relations with the West and its desire to develop an independent 
technological base in fear of sanctions. Furthermore, controlling the degree of 
Eastern European dependence on Western technology allowed the Soviet Union to 
control the development of economic relations with the West which were perceived 
by the Soviet Union as threatening the maintenance of power and stability in Eastern 
Europe (Miller 1991, 116). For the East European economies, however, this 
pressure for their participation in the Soviet strategy of technology-based economic 
expansion meant a relative loss in terms of forgone opportunities of cooperation with 
the West. By participation in the CPSTP they were also forced to direct their 
research and investments towards the specialised Soviet market instead of towards 
the mainstream world market.
The final CPSTP version preserved the original Soviet objectives of using 
CMEA to harness the economic potential of Eastern European countries to 
modernise the Soviet economy and increase its economic control over Eastern 
Europe. Thus, the five designated areas of the CPSTP were evidently the same as 
the sectoral priorities singled out for accelerated development in the Draft Basic 
Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR presented at the 
27th CPSU Congress two months later and adopted in the 12th five-year plan. 
Furthermore, the organisation and management of the process of implementing the
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CPSTP was designed to secure closer organisational integration of selected areas of 
national economies under Soviet direction. In all ninety three specific CPSTP project 
areas the Leading Organizations responsible for the direction and coordination of 
research and for the completion of the projects were Soviet research institutes. The 
overall coordination of cooperation and application of scientific research to 
production also belonged to sixteen Soviet organisations, the so called Inter-Branch 
Scientific and Technical Complexes. The Leading Organisations were given wide 
responsibilities for the organisation and coordination of priority problems, for 
quality control and the completion of the projects by the established deadlines 
(Monkiewicz 1988, 140).
The Soviet Union also managed to retain the policy goal of minimising reliance 
on Western technology. On the occasion of signing of the CPSTP the Soviet Prime 
Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov explained that it was politically necessary to reduce 
reliance on Western high-technology imports as the West was using technology as 
an economic weapon against the Soviet Union and its allies in the form of Co-com 
lists, sanctions and boycotts (Trybuna Ludu 17 December 1985).
However the CPSTP lacked crucial element: the management structures did not 
have sufficient resources and authority necessary to develop a science and 
technology policy for entire CMEA. Without an authoritative superstructure to 
implement Soviet objectives the Soviet Union had effectively to rely on traditional 
institutional arrangements of CMEA economies which created barriers to dynamic 
efficiency by obstructing innovation and improvement of quality.
The direct ties in CMEA cooperation. The general principles of their 
operation and rights of the participants.
As mentioned in chapter 3, the idea of the reform of CMEA mechanisms based 
on the participation of autonomous and self-financing enterprises originated at the
CMEA Economic Summit in 1984. Under Gorbachev the development of direct 
cooperation between enterprises, research institutes and the creation of joint ventures 
became a key instrument of implementation of the CPSTP, one of the main forms of 
expanding ties in CMEA cooperation and subsequently a part of the strategy of the 
development of a ‘common’ CMEA market described in the next part of the chapter. 
Direct cooperation was to include all the stages of research and production as well as 
joint construction of new productive capacity and the development of cooperation on 
the basis of intra-sectoral specialisation (Kurowski 1987, 21).
The principles governing direct cooperation between enterprises, outlined in the 
agreements signed at that time, were consistent with relevant legislation underlying 
Soviet foreign trade reform increasing the rights of enterprises and expanding the 
role for cooperatives and the creation of the organisational, legal and financial 
conditions for their operation. The Soviet Union pressured other member countries 
to make appropriate changes in their domestic legislation and to introduce economic 
and organizational conditions to enable enterprises to conduct foreign trade on the 
basis of full economic accountability and self-financing. It also initiated the signing 
of inter-governmental agreements on direct contracts between their own and Soviet 
enterprises and the creation of joint enterprises with individual CMEA members in 
line with bilateral agreements concluded under the CPSTP.
In line with Soviet legislation, enterprises and other economic organisations 
entitled to establish direct links had a right to choose independently their partners in 
other CMEA countries, determine the objectives and conditions of cooperation, set 
prices, and sign appropriate protocols, agreements and foreign trade contracts, and 
use a part of their foreign earnings for their own production programs (Ekon. sotr. 
1988: 2, 4-9). Similarly, with regard to joint enterprises, the agreements stipulated 
that the enterprises had to be self-financing, profitable and mutually beneficial. 
Article 9 of the Polish-Soviet agreement stipulated that joint enterprises had a right to
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elaborate and approve their own plans of production. Thus they were not subject to 
state planning and state authorities could not set any plan targets for them to fulfil. 
However, in line with the principles of the Soviet economic system, their plans still 
had to be harmonised with the development plans of relevant sectors of both 
countries.
These new forms of participation of CMEA economic organisations were 
proclaimed as a key part of a new, more effective economic mechanism of 
cooperation with less administrative fiat, fewer commissions and committees and 
which placed intra-bloc economic ties on a more economically rational basis (Pravda 
19 April 1986; Pravda 6 November 1986, 4).l The increase in the legal and 
economic autonomy of enterprises was designed to give producers an increased 
interest in expanding the production of goods for export and force them to introduce 
technological innovations and improve the quality of products or face bankruptcy 
(Rynki Zagraniczne 23 January 1987, 3-4). Thus direct links were seen as the most 
effective means of raising efficiency of production, improvement of technological 
processes, assimilation of modem methods and management of production, and 
ultimately improvement of quality and competitiveness of products (Rynki 
Zagraniczne 23 January 1987). They were also regarded as the primary instrument 
for the radical transformation of the traditional model of cooperation by ensuring a 
shift from primarily trade ties to extensive specialization and cooperation links and 
increasing supplies of goods produced on a cooperative basis (Spandarian and 
Shmelev 1988, 18).
These changes in the independence of enterprises and facilitation of their direct 
cooperation were designed to by-pass the state monopoly of foreign trade which was 
the main barrier to direct cooperation between producers and research groups and the 
setting up of joint enterprises in centrally planned economies. Cooperating
^The working session of the leaders of the CMEA countries held in Moscow in November.
233
enterprises could by-pass mechanisms of control over foreign trade inherent in the 
centrally planned economies, and thus operate outside the state controlled system of 
allocation and distribution of resources (Zielinski 1987, 7). Direct ties were also to 
be a remedy against the constraints resulting from the system of rigid bilateral 
agreements (Bogacka 1986, 7). The cooperation of enterprises operating under the 
arrangements of the CPSTP was to overcome barriers obstructing technology 
transfers between individual economies, caused by their institutionalised isolation.
Thus the design of the reform presupposed breaking the national ties of the 
cooperating organisations. This form of cooperation, therefore, implied a violation 
of one of the fundamental ideological principles of the social ownership of the means 
of production allowing the state and its agencies in each socialist country to control 
planning, production and distribution of resources. 1 This principle, which, as 
discussed in chapter 2, was embodied in CMEA procedural rules, enabled East 
European countries to protect their national interests by opposing these forms of 
cooperation which were perceived by them as encroaching upon their decision­
making powers. As a consequence, direct links were seen by East Europeans as an 
attempt to establish an alternative way of participation in economic cooperation 
independent of the national state.
This raised East European fears that joint enterprises and the direct cooperation 
between enterprises could be a more effective way of integration of selected areas of 
bloc economies under Soviet direction than the existing methods of cooperation 
organized at the national level. For example, direct links could enable the 
appropriation of that part of East European high-quality production, that otherwise 
would be directed towards the West. As Staniszkis (1987, 32) observed, production 
of enterprises could be a priori allocated to meet the Soviet Union’s needs, and
*The salience of property relations for economic and political reform in socialist countries at that 
time is discussed by Miller (1989, 430-48).
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would not be subject to the control of the national authorities. This led her to 
compare this form of cooperation to the presence of bridgeheads of the imperial 
centre directly inside the enterprises (Staniszkis 1987, 48).
Another political objective implicit in the strategy of assigning an enterprise an 
active role in CMEA cooperation was the encouragement of systemic changes in 
national economic mechanisms based on increased independence of enterprises. This 
way a high degree of structural uniformity of national economies of member states 
would be ensured, which is a natural prerequisite for integration.
The implementation of this strategy began in 1985 with a Soviet-led political 
campaign promoting these forms of cooperation in Eastern Europe. For example, 
throughout 1985 all Polish-Soviet economic meetings at the higher policy levels 
discussed the need for ‘a transition to a new stage in mutual economic cooperation, 
and search for new, higher forms of cooperation’ (Baczynski 1988, 17). The official 
rationale advanced in support of these measures was to place economic cooperation 
on an economically rational basis. Thus, cooperation links were to be the result of 
the economic interests of partners and not of administrative decisions taken at the 
national level (Kuczynski 1989, 72).
The first results of this campaign came in October 1985 when the Soviet Union 
concluded contracts with Bulgaria on the creation of two joint ventures and the 
establishment of International Research and Production Associations. However a 
real breakthrough in putting policies into practice came in February 1986 when a 
Polish delegation at the highest level, led by the Head of the Polish-Soviet 
Commission on Economic and Scientific-Technological Cooperation and deputy 
Chairman of the Polish Planning Commission signed an agreement with the Soviet 
Union on the development of direct cooperation in the sphere of production and
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science and technology between the economic organisations of both countries and 
the formation of the first five Polish-Soviet joint enterprises (Kuczynski 1989, 73).
The basic principles of the establishment and operation of these new forms of 
cooperation were elaborated a few months later on 15 October 1986 in agreements 
between the Soviet Union and Poland signed by the Soviet and Polish Prime 
Ministers. In addition to the earlier decision to establish five joint ventures, both 
countries agreed to form an additional seven: two in the Soviet Union and five in 
Poland. The protocol also listed 320 pairs of enterprises and research centers which 
were selected for this form of cooperation (Polityka 18 February 1988, 18). Similar 
bilateral inter-governmental agreements on the development of direct ties between 
economic organisations and the creation of joint enterprises were signed between the 
USSR and Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR and Czechoslovakia. In Czechoslovakia the 
agreement listed 76 enterprises, and in Bulgaria 103 {Pravda 9 November 1986).
The manner of making decisions on direct links and setting up joint enterprises, 
and the principles governing their formation and functioning reflected, however, 
more the Soviet determination to ensure a rapid expansion of direct links than a 
concern for their profitability. Thus, despite the stated policy that cooperation 
between enterprises should be supported by economic considerations, in most cases 
the establishment of such links was determined not by enterprises themselves on the 
basis of economic calculation but arbitrarily by administrative decisions from above 
(Zielinski 1987, 3; Pravda 28 September 1987, 5).
In Soviet-Polish relations the selection of enterprises and the facilitation of their 
cooperation was conducted by the Inter-governmental Polish-Soviet Commission 
(.Rynki Zagraniczne 23 January 1987, 3-4). As Zbigniew Kurowski, a Polish 
government representative responsible for the development of direct cooperation 
stated, this approach was based on an assumption that the conclusion of an inter-
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governmental agreement, nomination of enterprises and ordering them to cooperate 
would be sufficient to bring about the expected results (Baczynski 1988 b, 17). This 
‘directive’ approach to cooperation was consistent with the long-standing ideological 
and ‘rationalist’ approach to economic policies characterising Soviet-type policies, 
which was identified in chapter 1. The approach was based on a belief that it is 
possible to manage effectively an economic system by means of control, pressure 
and imposition of objectives on economic organisations. As discussed earlier, this 
manner of thinking continued to characterise the first stage of Gorbachev’s reform, 
which until 1988 was conducted within the framework of the traditional system and 
relied on traditional administrative measures such as allocation of capital investment 
to achieve growth in output and efficiency, and mobilisation of society by campaigns 
aimed at better organisation and discipline to activate perceived reserves in the 
system.
The strength of this belief in the effectiveness of administrative measures was 
indicated by the lists of enterprises selected for this form of cooperation. In the 
Soviet Union at the beginning of September 1986 in the machine industry alone 257 
enterprises were selected for direct links in the sphere of production and research, 
and a further 99 planned to establish such cooperation. In Poland, by the end of 
1986, there were nominated 100 pairs of Polish and Soviet production enterprises 
and 45 pairs of research units (Zielinski 1987, 3).
The extent of Soviet political pressure was also evident in the fact that feasibility 
studies determining the technical, legal, financial, and economic aspects of a 
potential partnership as well as the future tax and duty issues, were not undertaken 
until after agreements on cooperation had been signed (Polityka 20 February 1988, 
17).
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Soviet pressure to establish direct links and joint ventures regardless of 
economic considerations was interpreted by East Europeans as motivated by a desire 
to ensure the exercise of Soviet influence over the cooperation of enterprises. This 
interpretation was further confirmed by the terms of the establishment of joint 
enterprises, proposed by the Soviet side, such as a provision that joint ventures 
should be formed on the basis of common ownership of capital. This would allow 
the Soviet side to exercise control over the operation of the enterprise, even if it was 
not located on its territory. Accordingly, the intention to establish 44 Polish-Soviet 
joint enterprises on terms outlined in Soviet legislation was interpreted by Polish 
both dissidents and policy-makers as representing a threat of incorporating the 
Polish economy into the Soviet management system (Kuczynski 1989, 72).
In order to protect its national interests, the Polish government insisted, 
therefore, on provisions which would minimise the danger of joint enterprises 
making decisions which could lead to unprofitable exports. For example, in 
accordance with the principle of self-financing, the Polish-Soviet agreement 
prescribed strict requirements of profitability for joint enterprises to ensure that they 
could not be created under political pressure and later subsidised by the state. Article 
3 of the agreement stated that a decision to establish a joint enterprise was 
conditional on the positive outcome of a comprehensive feasibility study to 
determine the technical, legal, financial, and economic aspects of a potential 
partnership (Rynki Zagraniczne 23 January 1987, 3-4). Moreover, the Polish side 
used this provision to insist that self-financing extended to the export activities of the 
enterprises. In other words, Poland wanted to preempt the possibility of financing 
the export activities of joint enterprises, which in this context meant also the 
subsidisation of the Soviet side.
Furthermore, in July 1987 Poland raised objections to the Soviet position and 
insisted that the sides participating in a joint enterprise retain their individual property
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rights. Following high-level talks including the Polish and Soviet Prime Ministers 
and Mikhail Gorbachev, the Polish proposal was accepted in May 1988 (Trybuna 
Ludu 28-29 May 1988, 1). The resulting Polish-Soviet agreement allowed for the 
formation of joint enterprises on the basis of Polish legislation which ensured Polish 
control over the Polish part of the capital contribution.
These legal arrangements were, however, specific to Polish-Soviet relations. 
Poland seemed to be the most enthusiastic supporter of these forms of cooperation, 
while at the same time making sure that independent enterprises would not take 
decisions which were economically unsound. Bulgaria acquiesced in inter-enterprise 
contracts with Soviet organisations. Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, 
while paying lip-service to the expansion of direct ties at the CMEA. level, in practice 
avoided involvement of their enterprises in these forms of integration by careful 
monitoring of their initiatives to exclude projects unviable economically. They were 
afraid that under the existing pricing and monetary systems enterprises might be 
obliged to export domestically subsidised goods (Stone 1996, 223-4). Romania 
chose the most radical form of protecting its control over its national economy by 
refusing to participate in the CMEA strategy altogether.
Given the principles of Gorbachev’s economic reforms which envisaged the 
expansion of the rights of enterprises and enhancement of their independence and 
responsibilities within the framework of the centrally planned economy, it is quite 
likely that he believed that direct cooperation of enterprises would be an effective 
method of ensuring economic subordination of CMEA economies to the Soviet 
Union by indirect methods. For this method of cooperation to encroach on state 
control of the national economy enterprises would have to enjoy the genuine 
autonomy. This would require, however, comprehensive reforms entailing the active 
role of economic instruments such as prices, exchange rates and convertibility of the 
currency - which were not considered at that stage in any of the Soviet bloc
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countries. Thus, in practice, the possibility, that these projects would not be fully 
subject to the central planning authorities in each country and could infringe the 
sovereignty of national economies was rather remote. Furthermore, some 
autonomous profit-making enterprises would be interested and capable of 
cooperation with Western firms and thus dependence on the Soviet economy would 
be counterbalanced by economic cooperation with the West.
Conclusion.
This section demonstrated that the decision-making process on CMEA 
integration was dominated first of all by the Soviet Union’s domestic priorities 
which were conditioned by a deteriorating economic performance and by an 
economic reform program including foreign trade reform. Moreover, they were 
influenced by political tensions in relations with the West which limited Soviet 
access to Western technology. Accordingly, CMEA methods of cooperation were 
based on the same assumptions which underlie Soviet domestic policies. Firstly, that 
a combination of administrative instruments and limited autonomy of enterprises 
could create the conditions for the efficient operation of an economic mechanism. 
Secondly, that the Soviet-type economies were able to achieve independently world 
technological standards and eliminate the technology gap between the Soviet bloc 
and Western economies.
The CMEA strategy was also a function of the continuation of the Soviet policy 
of domination of East European countries. Thus CMEA was to serve its traditional 
dual function of a direct instrument of economic cooperation and an indirect one of 
securing the political cohesion of the Soviet bloc countries and effective coordination 
of bloc initiatives toward the outside world. CMEA was also used to ensure that East 
Europeans contributed to the achievement of Soviet domestic economic objectives
2 4 0
and to the improvement of the structure of exchanges, as well as render existing 
trade relations more profitable from the point of view of Soviet interests.
On the other hand CMEA strategy was shaped by Eastern European attempts to 
secure their economic objectives and favourable terms of cooperation. As a 
consequence East European countries began to oppose the CPSTP from the initial 
stages of its formulation. They opposed the creation of bodies and mechanisms 
which could encroach upon the national authorities’ powers, and resisted forms of 
cooperation which could not contribute to their domestic objectives. Their objections 
and assertion of political and economic interests affected the development of 
strategies to the point where the CPSTP represented only a shadow of the original 
Soviet concept. Similarly, East European countries made sure that direct cooperation 
and joint enterprises do not engage in operations which would result in unprofitable 
transactions.
Soviet policies towards Eastern Europe and the CMEA’s functions 
between late 1987 and late 1989. Soviet domestic economic situation 
and the principles of the reform program.
Towards late 1987 Soviet economic reforms assumed a new direction with the 
adoption by the Supreme Soviet in June 1987 of two central reform documents: the 
'Law on State Enterprises' (Associations) and the 'Basic Provisions for the 
Fundamental Restructuring of Economic Management'. In July they were 
complemented by a large number of related decrees on planning, material supplies, 
financial mechanisms, price formation, banking, statistics, branch ministries, 
republican organs and social policy. They came into effect on 1 January 1988. The 
whole process of reform was to be completed before the introduction of the 13th 
Five Year Plan in 1991. This radicalisation of economic reform began when the 
failure of the first phase of reform was evident, as the original measures had not
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resulted in growth in the net material product and the restructuring of investment was 
not successful (Aslund 1991, 88). 1
The main feature of the economic reforms was a significant increase in the 
formal economic independence of enterprises. They were accorded legal rights to 
draw their annual and five-year plans independently. Furthermore, the decree on the 
finance mechanism envisaged a well-conceived system of long-term stable economic 
coefficients and financial norms prohibiting the confiscation of enterprise profits and 
the interference of ministries in the financial activities of enterprises.
However, this formal independence was limited by a number of provisions. For 
example, in exercising these rights enterprises were constrained by an obligation to 
consider four categories of plan directives and instruments of an indirect nature. One 
category was state orders which replaced delivery targets but were to play effectively 
the same role of safeguarding the interests of the state. The only difference was that 
the state orders were supposed to cover particularly important production (Pravda 1 
June 1987).2 Furthermore, although the reform postulated ‘a decisive transition’ 
from centralised allocation to wholesale trade in the means of production, it was to 
be implemented gradually over four to five years, and the distribution of the means 
of production ‘of particularly great economic importance’ was still subject to the 
traditional allocation system (O korennoi perestroike 1987, 111).
The financial independence of enterprises was also limited by the lack of changes 
in the pricing system. Despite the postulated gradual introduction of new prices
1 In the specific areas the realisation of the investment campaign in machine-building resulted in an 
increase in new assets of just 3 per cent after an increase in investment of 15 per cent (Gaidar 
1988, 45). Half of the investment volume remained in raw material extraction and agriculture 
because energy production was necessary for hard currency earnings.
^In August 1987 Gosplan officials said that state orders would on average cover only 50-70 per 
cent of the production volume (Pravda 18 August 1987). The concept of state order was introduced 
in Poland in the economic reform launched in 1982, where state orders were supposed to cover 
particularly important production. Since they were accompanied with better supplies, enterprises 
rushed for state orders, which minimised the marketisation of the economy. The same happened in 
the Soviet Union.
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which should be brought closer to those on the world market, the relevant decree did 
not make provisions for price increases. It also preserved the centralised basis of the 
price-setting process with the acknowledgement of the right of the State Price 
Committee (Goskomsten) to set and control prices of basic kinds of fuels, raw 
materials and of final production of the all-state plans (O korennoi perestroike, 1987, 
150-64).
The implementation of the reform based on these principles failed to achieve its 
objectives and led to a gradual deterioration in the Soviet domestic economic 
situation. According to official estimates, the rates of growth recorded between 1986 
and 1989 averaged 3.7 per cent. This was exactly the rate achieved in the 
‘stagnation’ years of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Independent economists 
calculated the growth of national income in 1988 at the level of 0.3 per cent, and 
noted a virtual decline in Soviet national income in 1989. Furthermore, the 
effectiveness of the economy measured by savings in the use of resources had been 
five time worse than in the first half of the 1980s and the situation in the consumer 
market had deteriorated (White 1992, 120-23).
The deepening domestic economic crisis was exacerbated, moreover, by the fall 
in Soviet hard-currency earnings first registered in 1986, caused primarily by the 
falling levels of Soviet oil production resulting from obsolete equipment, rising 
marginal costs as exploitation moved deeper into Siberia, and strikes. Another 
contributing factor was a drop in world oil prices in the late 1980s. Since four-fifths 
of Soviet hard-currency export earnings in the developed West came from sales of 
oil and gas, this situation was bound to have a significant effect on the Soviet 
economy. The main effects were a growing foreign debt and a reduction of imports 
from the West, which affected the replacement and expansion of production capacity 
and compelled the Soviet Union to make scarce resources available for export
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(.Pravda July 7, 1988). These losses in foreign exchange were further exacerbated 
by agricultural failures which necessitated large hard currency imports of food.
Soviet foreign policy towards the West.
The need to ease domestic economic problems and secure Soviet status in 
international politics prompted a serious re-evaluation of Soviet foreign policy 
objectives. The first indications of a new direction in Soviet foreign and security 
policy aimed at improvement of relations with the USA and Western European 
countries took place soon after Gorbachev came to power. 1 However, it took the 
Soviet leadership another three years to develop this new orientation in Soviet 
policy, described as the new political thinking, into a coherent system of ideas and to 
adopt appropriate means of its implementation.
At the ideological level, central to the new political thinking was the concept of 
the interdependence of all states and the necessity of their cooperation in solving 
global social, economic and security problems. It was also characterised by the 
rejection of a class approach to international relations and aggressive ideological 
prescriptions in determining Soviet foreign policy. This led to an emphasis on 
political and diplomatic rather than military means in attaining foreign policy 
objectives, the peaceful settlement of regional disputes and a commitment to the 
principle of non-interference in internal affairs which, from 1987 was extended to 
socialist states.^. In strategic terms the new political thinking manifested itself, apart 
from idealistic proposals of global disarmament, in concrete proposals on arms
*The first occasion for Gorbachev to outline the agenda of Soviet policy towards Western Europe 
was his visit to France in October 1985. Gorbachev declared that force was a less useful as well as 
less legitimate means for securing foreign policy objectives and hence security should be achieved 
by means of peaceful coexistence, cooperation, detente and disarmament (Trofimenko 1991,9-10). 
^In his book explaining the ideas of perestroika to Western readers he endorsed the principle of 
freedom of every nation ‘to choose its own way of development, to dispose of its fate, its territory, 
and its human and natural resources’ as necessary for the normalization of international relations 
(Gorbachev 1987, 177).
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control at all levels between the superpowers. 1 This initiative was particularly 
important for East European states, because it implied a reassessment of Soviet 
views of desirable methods of ensuring its security.2
The inauguration of a new Soviet foreign policy orientation did not lead 
immediately, however, to an improvement of Soviet relations with capitalist 
countries. Initially, the dominant Western response during this period was that new 
political thinking was largely tactical and did not represent a genuine break with 
previous Soviet foreign policy. For example, the advocacy of arms control was 
perceived as a means to promote splits inside NATO. This scepticism was further 
fuelled by the continuing Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Soviet- 
supported Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Furthermore, the USA was not 
prepared to enter into agreements on arms limitations unless they satisfied its 
requirements for securing defence and deterrence (Miller 1991, 77-8).
In December 1987, however, the signing of the Soviet-American INF 
(Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty meant that the first major breakthrough 
in relations with the capitalist world was achieved. This was followed by 
negotiations on strategic arms limitations (START) and on reductions in Soviet 
military forces in Europe as part of a comprehensive deal with the Western alliance 
on conventional arms.3
lln January 1986 Gorbachev advanced an idealistic proposal to rid the world of nuclear arms by the 
year 2000 (Kommunist 1986:4).
^See as an example the Communique on the Conference of the Political Consultative Committee 
of the Warsaw Treaty Member-States (Pravda 12 June 1986, 1-2) which called for the cessation of 
nuclear tests, the complete elimination on a mutual basis of Soviet and American medium-range 
missiles in the European zone, the achievement of accords on nuclear and space arms, the 
elimination of chemical weapons, a substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional arms on 
a global and regional level, verification of arms reduction and disarmament. It also acknowledged 
that states may pursue different paths to socialism and that difference in economic and political 
systems does not constitute grounds in and of itself for foreign policy disputes.
^The Soviet proposal meant cutting 1.26 million troops and tens of thousands of tanks, artillery 
and armoured vehicles and personnel carriers. The new Soviet proposal would require withdrawing 
at least 45,000 Soviet troops from Eastern Europe beyond the 240,000 troops being eliminated 
unilaterally before 1991.
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The improvement of Soviet relations with the capitalist states also opened up 
new prospects of securing cooperation from the West to assist in the reform of the 
Soviet economy and its technological modernisation. The Soviet Union began to 
indicate its interest in the expansion of economic links with the West in early 1986. 
For example, in February 1986 Ryzhkov advocated the development of East-West 
trade, and promised an opening of the Soviet market to Western investment. He also 
blamed Western discrimination, embargoes and trade and credit restrictions for 
hampering possibilities for a considerable development of economic relations. In 
connection with the reform in foreign trade in August 1986 the Soviet Union also 
changed its long-standing policy towards the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 
(GATT), expressing its interest in becoming a full member. The Soviets also 
changed their position on membership of major world economic and trade 
organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank.
Following the successful conclusion of INF treaty the American and West 
European governments made it clear that they were willing to reward political 
liberalisation and market-oriented reforms in the CMEA with economic support and 
Western Europe resumed commercial negotiations with Eastern Europe (Sobell 1989 
d). 1 They also responded to Soviet invitations to invest in joint ventures which 
increased the possibility of more direct forms of technological transfers through joint 
ventures. The West however continued to maintain barriers to the transfer of 
technology to the Soviet Union through the Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral 
Export Controls (COCOM).
The reevaluation of the relative importance of Eastern Europe in 
Soviet foreign policy.
I^n April 1988 Soviet and the US major commercial firms formed consortia to improve long-term 
commercial relations.
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The first indications of possible changes in the Soviet leadership’s attitudes to 
other bloc countries took place in the second half of 1987. Gorbachev used a series 
of visits to Eastern Europe to distance himself carefully from some of the policies of 
his predecessors and indicated his support for greater autonomy of the bloc states.
This shift was ideologically consistent with the commitment to non-interference 
as a priority principle of the ‘new political thinking’ of Soviet foreign policy. 
Gorbachev specifically referred to the non-interference principle and the right of 
choice as applicable to intra-bloc relations in his speech on 2 November 1987 on the 
occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. His statement 
seemingly reaffirmed Khrushchev's formula of different roads to socialism and the 
principles of relations among socialist countries. While stating that 'all parties arc 
fully and irreversibly independent' and recognizing ‘the responsibility of the ruling 
party for the affairs of its own country’, he still referred to the damage which could 
be done ‘by a weakening of the internationalist principle in mutual relations of 
socialist states, by deviation from the principles of mutual benefit and mutual aid’.
However, Gorbachev clearly had a different understanding from his 
predecessors of the actual meaning of socialist internationalism and the conditions in 
which it should be applied. In an unequivocal manner he recognised the 
unconditional national and social diversity of the world of socialism and rejected the 
notion of a single model. He emphatically stated, ‘unity does not at all mean identity 
and uniformity. We have become convinced that socialism does not and cannot have 
any ‘model’ that everyone must measure up to.’ (Pravda 3 November 1987). 1
Statements unequivocally espousing the complete independence of Soviet bloc 
countries in the pursuit of domestic policies continued throughout 1988. For 
instance the joint Soviet-Polish communique issued after Gorbachev’s visit to
1 Gerasimov proclaimed the free choice principle in an interview in Washington in December 1987 
(Radio Liberty RL 492/87, 4 December 1987, 12)
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Poland in July 1988, while routinely invoking the principles of mutual respect, 
equality and mutual benefit, also stressed each country's right to resolve questions 
of its development as a sovereign state and to determine the ways and means to 
construct socialism independently {Rynki Zagraniczne 11 July 1988, 1).
A very definite sign of the Soviet commitment to a new direction in its foreign 
policy towards Eastern Europe was Soviet reaction in favour of dialogue between 
the Polish party and Solidarity and the prospects of Solidarity’s legalization. For 
example a senior CPSU spokesman Nikolai Shishlin said in an interview with Le 
Monde (6 September 1988) that the question of Solidarity’s re-legalization was 
purely an internal matter for the Polish authorities. He also remarked that ‘The men 
who participated in Solidarity are now capable of playing a more important role’ and 
added that ‘in our religion union pluralism contains no heresy’ (quoted in Sobell 
1988g).
This new approach of non-interference in the internal affairs of Eastern European 
states was reaffirmed in a long series of Soviet statements condemning previous 
methods of pressure. 1 During his visit to Beijing Gorbachev emphatically renounced 
the Soviet Union’s right to prescribe models of socialism and of the obligations 
associated with that right. He admitted that the attempt to prescribe models in the 
past had been the cause of ‘many difficulties in the development of world socialism’ 
and declared: ‘We are not the model’ (The Age 18 May 1989, 7).
hn June 1989 in his speech to the European Parliament, Gorbachev reiterated the Soviet Union’s 
adherence to a policy of non-interference in the affairs of other countries. He stressed that ‘social 
change is the exclusive affair of the people of that country and is their choice’ and that ‘any 
interference in domestic affairs and any attempts to restrict the sovereignty of states, be they 
friends, allies or any others, are inadmissible’ (Pravda 7 July 1987,1). Speaking at the Warsaw 
Pact summit held in Bucharest in July 1989, Gorbachev emphasised that there is no universal 
model for building socialism, and each communist party had to pursue its own strategy in line 
with its national conditions. He also endorsed ’full equality of rights, respect for each fraternal 
party’s independence in solving national questions’ and conceded that no one had a monopoly on 
truth. His remarks were subseqently reaffirmed in the official communique.
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Even though these pronouncements did not directly address the question of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine and did not constitute a formal policy of renunciation of control 
over Eastern Europe, they clearly played the same function. As argued in chapter 1, 
uniformity of the socio-economic order and adherence to the Soviet model based on 
assertion of Soviet primacy were regarded in Soviet doctrine as essential conditions 
for the cohesion of the bloc. Therefore, the renunciation of the right to dictate the 
framework of acceptable policies implied that the Soviet Union was also prepared to 
renounce the methods of direct control and interference to assert its authority. This 
manifested itself in the new Soviet policy of securing its interests in Eastern Europe 
through influence rather than by political domination and control which had evolved 
since late 1987.
The principle of freedom of choice had, by implication, effectively removed the 
threat of Soviet intervention as an excuse for conservative East European regimes for 
not undertaking far-reaching internal reforms. This suggested that the Soviet Union 
no longer accepted responsibility for providing substantive political or economic 
assistance, including maintaining trade arrangements economically disadvantageous 
for the Soviet Union, and that the East European leaderships had to assume 
obligation for their own political as well as their countries economic survival. This 
position was demonstrated in allowing roundtable talks between Solidarity, the 
communist government and the Catholic Church on 6 February 1989 and not 
opposing re-legalisation of Solidarity on 5 April.
In Soviet economic policy towards the region this emphasis on the need for 
East Europeans to assume more responsibility for their economic growth dated back 
to the early 1980s when the price of oil on the CMEA market began to rise and, as a 
result, the capacity of Eastern European to purchase other goods for transferable 
roubles greatly diminished. The Soviet Union, however, insisted on the reduction of 
the deficit even at the cost of the stability of their domestic markets and the
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redirection of goods meant for the Western markets to the Soviet market. This policy 
became even more pronounced since 1985, when the Soviet Union began to demand 
a change in the structure of East European exports, which had been originally 
erected to satisfy Soviet needs. Thus East Europeans were faced with the necessity 
of serious changes in the existing production structures to meet Soviet demands 
while at the same time facing a decline in Western demand for their low quality 
products (Inotai, 1988, 85). They were left with products which could not be sold 
outside the Soviet market.
A transition in Soviet foreign policy objectives in Eastern Europe from 
domination to influence did not mean that the Soviet Union stopped regarding the 
region as an integral part of its alliance system. The limits of their external autonomy 
were clearly defined by the Soviet Union’s insistence on their continuing WTO 
membership and participation in CMEA.
Eastern Europe also featured together with the Soviet Union in Gorbachev’s 
vision of future European political structures, in which the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe would constitute a part of ‘a common European home’ {Polityka 26 March 
1988, 8). The idea of a common European home was launched by Gorbachev in 
April 1987 and expanded in his book on perestroika. It envisaged one Europe with 
two separate blocs and conceded to the United States rights of a visitor, not a tenant. 
While by the end of June 1989 the Soviet Union accepted the United States as ‘a 
natural part of the European international political structure’, Europe was still 
considered a two-bloc structure, albeit closely interacting economically (Pravda 7 
June 1989). This was to change only with the disintegration of the Soviet control 
over Eastern Europe in late 1989, which will be discussed in the last section of this 
chapter.
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CMEA in Soviet economic strategy towards Eastern Europe between 
late 1987 and late 1989.
The strategy which the CMEA was to pursue in connection with Soviet 
perestroika was outlined at the 43rd extraordinary CMEA session, which convened 
on 13-14 October 1987 in Moscow. It had been one year in preparation. Its initial 
provisions were discussed in November 1986 at a working meeting of the leaders of 
the parties of CMEA members and endorsed in September 1987 at a summit of party 
leaders.
The Session set out as a long-term CMEA strategy the gradual formation of 
conditions for an integrated common market among CMEA countries based on free 
movement of goods, services and other factors of production, and the gradual 
introduction of currency convertibility. This process entailed a corresponding reform 
of domestic and CMEA mechanisms aimed at creating conditions for transition to 
multilateral settlements and allowing enterprises the same access to markets in all the 
countries and to participate in direct ties. The participation of individual countries in 
the implementation of specific forms of cooperation was voluntary and based on the 
principle of interestedness (Ekon. sotr. 1988:1, 73-6). 1 The implementation of the 
program was premised on the successful realisation of the CPSTP whose provisions 
provided a frame of reference for the programs of economic and scientific- 
technological cooperation among individual CMEA members (Oniszczuk 1988a, 1).
The process of transition to an integrated market was based on the ‘Collective 
Concept of the International Socialist Division of Labor for the period 1991-2005’ 
which was adopted by the 44th Session in July 1988. It listed as its main objectives
^The less developed non-European members: Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia were also included in 
this program. They were to benefit additionally from their participation as a result of creation of 
conditions for accelerated economic development in line with the objective of ‘gradual equalising 
of the levels of economic development of the European members of CMEA.’ {Ekon. Sotr. 1988:1, 
73-6).
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a litany of traditional goals set for CMEA since 1971: the formation of the 
international socialist division of labour on an economically rational basis, the 
development of specialisation and cooperation, in particular in the machine-building 
industry, transition in cooperation from the sphere of trade to the sphere of 
production, intensification of scientific and technological progress, transition from 
the existing model of exchange of fuels and raw materials for finished goods, to one 
based on intra-sectoral cooperation of production and increase in the quality and 
technological level of production to meet the requirements of the world market 
(Pravda 6 July 1988).
These traditional goals were, however, to be implemented in a new framework. 
The new element of the strategy was the rejection of the idea of a separate socialist 
market, as a self-sufficient economic entity accompanied by the admission of failure 
of the self-imposed isolation from world economy. As Prime Minister Ryzhkov told 
the 44th Session:
At one time, ideas about the status of the Soviet Union and the entire 
socialist commonwealth in the world economy were based on the concept 
of the decline of a single world market, an ever-increasing gap between 
the socialist and capitalist economic complexes and the weakening of 
their ties with each other. Life has shown that this notion failed to take 
into account the scientific and technical revolution's powerful effect on 
modern-day production. Given the increasing interdependence of all 
states, our socialist market will be built in cooperation with the world 
economy and with a view to world market trends (Pravda 6 July 1988).
The postulated mechanisms of the implementation of the integrated 
socialist market.
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The general conditions for the formation of an integrated socialist market were 
set out in ‘The proposals regarding stages of restructuring of the mechanism of 
multilateral cooperation and socialist economic integration and functioning of 
CMEA’ also approved by the 44th Council Session. The proposals outlined the 
following reforms in the areas of plan coordination, trade negotiations, CMEA 
pricing and monetary systems and legal reform of domestic regulations:
- the gradual transition in the area of plan coordination towards broader 
expansion of ‘value’ quotas in goods and the introduction of nonquota trade 
on a larger scale;
- the formation of legal and economic conditions facilitating direct links 
between enterprises, such as an increase in organisational and financial 
independence of enterprises in national economies and their right to conduct 
foreign trade transactions and to participate in direct ties and setting up joint 
enterprises.
- the gradual introduction of world market prices into intra-CMEA trade;
- the gradual introduction of mutual convertibility of national currencies and 
the transferable rouble and convertibility of the transferable rouble into 
convertible currencies;
- the creation of credit and currency markets;
- the development of new forms of direct trade relations between interested 
CMEA countries;
- the formation of a free trade area, then a customs union and a currency 
union;
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- the elaboration and realisation of a common technological policy (Oniszczuk 
1988b, 3).
The introduction of these conditions was to proceed in three stages until 2000. In 
the initial period, until 1990, the Collective Concept provided for changes in the 
existing procedures for plan coordination to accommodate the postulated active 
involvement of economic organisations in CMEA cooperation. These changes 
included the establishment of a third level of plan coordination at the enterprise or 
association level in addition to the existing intergovernmental and branch levels. This 
was to be accompanied by the gradual increase in plan coordination of goods not 
covered by fixed quantity quotas. The reduction of the volume of planned trade was 
to result in corresponding changes in the system of bilateral, rigidly balanced trade 
agreements and to allow greater initiative for enterprises. Liberalisation of trade was, 
however, limited to goods exchanged directly between enterprises within the 
framework of specialisation and cooperation of production agreements (Rynki 
Zagraniczne 7 October 1987,1).
During this period, the principles of formation of intra-CMEA prices and the 
exchange rates mechanism were to remain unchanged. Changes in the financial and 
pricing system concerned only transactions conducted by joint enterprises and 
economic organisations participating in direct links, in the implementation of the 
CPSTP and conducting trade outside bilateral agreements. These changes included 
the use of national currencies in mutual settlements and the introduction of agreed 
prices, which reflected production costs (Ekon. sotr. 1988:1, 82).
Work on the improvement of the methodology for setting intra-CMEA prices 
was to be undertaken only in the second phase in relation to prices for the 1991-95 
period (Karchin 1988; Oniszczuk 1988a). The introduction of proper economic 
conditions for multilateral cooperation, such as full convertibility of national
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currencies or settlements in world market prices was planned to occur in the third 
phase, from 1996 until 2000 (Morag 1988, 12).
Despite terminology borrowed from the concept of West European integration, 
and an explicit commitment to the creation of conditions for the regulation of mutual 
cooperation by means of market instruments, in reality the Collective Concept did 
not represent a strategy towards a ‘common market’ regulated by market-based 
mechanisms of cooperation. Instead, ‘market’ regulation of economic processes 
within a socialist market was to be implemented by central planning bodies by means 
of an ‘organic combination’ of planned methods of cooperation with a growing role 
for commodity money instruments and considerable autonomy of enterprises (Eicon 
sotr. 1988:2, 10-9).
The main instrument for the coordination of economic polices was to remain the 
coordination of national plans, and the traditional system of inter-state bilateral 
agreements was to remain a principal means of regulating intra-CMEA exchanges 
(Rynki Zagraniczne 4 July 1988). Similarly, despite an increase in the independence 
of enterprises the central authorities were to retain considerable powers to regulate 
economic relations. Even in the conditions of a unified market in which enterprises 
and associations would have substantial autonomy, the states were to regulate 
economic processes and exert influence on the operation of enterprises with the help 
of indirect economic instruments that would correct their ‘behaviour’ and ensure the 
priority of mutual economic ties (Izvestiia 16 January 1988; Karchin 1988, 3; 
Nekipelov 1989, 42).
In accordance with the preservation of the principal role of CMEA planning 
mechanisms in regulating intra-bloc exchanges the reform of monetary relations was 
limited to overcoming the shortcomings of the existing financial system relying on 
the transferable rouble by the introduction of mutual convertibility of national
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currencies and convertibility of the transferable rouble into other currencies. The 
ultimate objective was not, however, the abolition of the existing system and 
elimination of the transferable rouble, which was to remain a currency in which the 
major part of settlements was to be conducted (Ekon sotr. 1988:1, 82).
The reformist proposals of ‘common market’ had thus the same meaning as the 
reform of commodity-money instruments in the 1971 Comprehensive Program. As 
discussed in chapter 3, the Comprehensive Program was based likewise on the 
‘organic’ combination of joint planning activities with the ‘planned’ use of 
commodity-money relations.
Soviet reformers still, however, maintained that the principle of ‘organic 
combination’ would transform CMEA into an effective organisation. Shirayev, a 
Soviet representative to CMEA, argued that the active functions of commodity- 
money instruments would allow decision-making process to be made on the basis of 
economic criteria and not political motives. Furthermore, considerable autonomy of 
enterprises was to increase the effectiveness of planning by allowing central bodies 
to concentrate on strategic issues. Consequently, a new three-tier procedure of plan 
coordination was to make possible more effective coordination of economic policies 
of individual CMEA members and more effective allocation of resources in selected 
areas {Ekon sotr. 1988: 1,81).
Stanislaw Dlugosz, a deputy chairman of the Polish Planning Commission, 
outlined the following optimistic scenario assuming the involvement of several 
hundred thousands of enterprises, and thus representing a substantial share of the 
economy. In his vision the rights of enterprises to decide the terms of a transaction 
such as prices, or to use national currencies in direct settlements would generate a 
mechanism encouraging the coordination of national policies with regard to setting 
exchange rates at a realistic level, and forming domestic prices as well as introducing
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various forms of convertibility among the national currencies which would create 
conditions for multilateral settlements. This would eliminate the need for bilateral 
balancing and lead to a reduction of goods covered by physical quotas and 
expansion of non-quota trade conducted by enterprises outside bilateral agreements. 
And conversely, progress in reform of the pricing-exchange rates system and 
changes in the character of inter-state trade agreements would in turn further 
stimulate the development of direct links between enterprises. Ultimately, the 
development of direct links was to contribute to free movement of goods, services 
and other factors of production and ultimately to the formation of an integrated 
common market among CMEA countries (Rynki Zagraniczne 23 January 1987, 3- 
4 ) .1
The reorganisation of CMEA’s structure.
Development of new forms of integration at enterprise level and liberalisation of 
trade agreements raised the issue of corresponding changes in the functions of 
CMEA central organs. Proposals concerning new roles and structures for the 
Council in line with the restructuring of CMEA mechanisms were discussed initially 
at a summit of CMEA members in 1986, and were subsequently endorsed by the 
resolutions of the 43 Council Session.
The logic behind the proposed reorganisation of the CMEA’s institutional 
structure was that the states and their organs, and thus CMEA bodies, were to retain 
their functions of planning and elaboration of strategies of integration while specific 
questions of production and technical cooperation were to be solved directly at the 
level of enterprises or international economic organisations. The highest CMEA 
bodies were to focus on the organisation of multilateral cooperation and on key 
problems of cooperation requiring inter-governmental coordination such as
1 See also an interview with Stanislaw Dlugosz ‘Kazdy zadecyduje o sxvoim interesie. ’ Rynki 
Zagraniczne 4 July 1988, 3 and 5.
257
consultations on long-term economic policies, elaboration of major long-term 
programs and multilateral agreements, reform of mechanisms of cooperation and 
domestic legal reforms allowing enterprises to participate in direct ties (Morag 1988, 
14). The number of permanent organs was to be reduced by half. They were to be 
retained in those areas which required inter-governmental decisions such as the 
machine-buidling industry, transportation, joint planning, electronics, energy, 
scientific and technical cooperation, monetary and currency issues. The ultimate goal 
was to streamline decision-making process by not reproducing the branch structures 
of management that existed in individual countries. Instead the Council was to have 
permanent and temporary agencies to consider specific problems (Rynki Zagraniczne 
11 July 1988, 3).
These recommendations were adopted by the 44th Session which decided to 
abolish and reorganise 19 organs and create by amalgamation six new ones {Eicon, 
sotr. 1988:1, 85; Brabant 1989, 147-8). The number of CMEA standing 
commissions was reduced to 11. CMEA members also discussed plans to establish 
an international commercial bank to finance the operation of direct links and joint 
enterprises {Rynki Zagraniczne 14 October 1988).
Political and economic factors in decision-making.
This strategy was the outcome of the negotiation by individual CMEA members 
of a programmatic statement on CMEA reform, ‘On perestroika of the Mechanism of 
Multilateral Cooperation.’. This document was originally designed by the Soviet 
Union. The objectives and mechanisms of the strategy of ‘integrated socialist 
market’ were consistent with the objectives and principles of Gorbachev’s 
perestroika and Soviet foreign trade reform. Likewise they were based on the 
assumption that the combination of centralised decision making and the autonomy of 
enterprises is an effective method of accelerating economic growth. Furthermore, the
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proposals about gradual transition to negotiated prices and relaxation of physical 
quotas in trade conformed to the advancement of Soviet reform. At that stage 
conditions which would be necessary for the radical reform of CMEA, such as 
convertibility of the rouble were not a part of Soviet reform. The proposal also 
reflected the continuing determination to retain the basic features of the traditional 
model of cooperation, such as the planned regulation of CMEA cooperation 
conducted at the intergovernmental level, which made it possible for the Soviet 
authorities to employ instruments of political pressure on its East European partners.
The process of formulating the reform strategy accommodated East European 
members’ attitudes to economic reforms and their commercial interests in preserving 
their own position in trade with the Soviet Union. East European countries were in 
favour of the radical reform of the CMEA at the most general level. However, they 
wanted the framework of reforms and the concrete means to suit their own political 
goals and particular economic interests. During the negotiations in preparation for 
the 43rd Session these preferences were reflected in fundamental differences 
regarding the proposed transformation. In terms of general principles the positions 
of the countries were consistent with their attitudes toward domestic political and 
economic reform. Given the new principles of Soviet foreign policy and the 
pronouncements that ‘each socialist country has a right to its own road to socialism’, 
with no pressure towards uniformity, countries indeed went ‘their own ways’. This 
resulted in the formation within the Soviet bloc of several distinct groups of 
countries divided over the need to introduce reforms and pursuing different 
economic strategies. One group included countries which initiated substantial 
reforms entailing decentralisation and reform of financial mechanisms, like Poland 
and Hungary, or were reform-oriented, like the Soviet Union. This group supported 
the radical reform of the CMEA economic mechanisms based on a gradual transition 
to market regulation of CMEA processes (Rynki Zagraniczne 23 January 1987, 3-
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4). The most reform-oriented countries like Hungary and Poland supported the 
radical reform of the CMEA economic mechanisms based on the introduction of 
currency convertibility and multilateral cooperation, which they saw as essential to 
solving the stagnation of intra-CMEA trade and the worsening position of individual 
economies. They criticised the Soviet Union for failing to introduce the necessary 
reforms of financial mechanisms and conditions for direct cooperation of 
enterprises. As an alternative measure they put forward proposals for subregional 
integration including countries which were ready to introduce the necessary 
economic conditions for the expansion of integration.
Another group consisted of countries such as the GDR and Romania, which 
refused to accept Soviet proposals, in principle accusing the Soviet Union of 
undermining the principles of socialism. They retained their centralised command 
systems of management and as a result considered any reform of the existing forms 
and methods of cooperation, including direct links, as contradicting their interests. 
This group was in favour of continuing reliance on inter-state agreements, fixed 
quota systems in intra-CMEA trade and the existing system of price formation 
(Stone 1996, 212). East Germany, however, supported the eventual convertibility of 
the transferable rouble, higher interest rates for CMEA credits and a reduction in the 
number of CMEA permanent commissions. Romania refused to adopt the program 
because its implementation would require domestic economic reforms that would 
conflict with its own concept of socialism. The third group comprised Bulgaria and 
Czechoslovakia which initiated moderate reform programs and while cautiously 
supporting moderate reform recommendations remained sceptical of CMEA reform 
going beyond their own domestic reforms. For example, Czechoslovakia advocated 
a socialist market that did not contain unemployment and bankruptcies (Australian 10 
January 1988, 8).
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Furthermore, at the level of particular interests there were significant differences 
related to the extent of non-quota trade, the transition to negotiated prices and the 
limited convertibility of the transferable rouble in settlements (Stone 1996, 217-9).
In the new CMEA market conditions, characterised by very high oil prices and the 
Soviet Union’s new demands of regarding particular exports, East European 
countries were increasingly concerned about maintaining the levels of their 
machinery exports and ensuring deliveries of raw materials. After 1988, during 
negotiations of plans for 1991-95, Soviet negotiators, referring to the disastrous 
state of their economy and a growing trade deficit with most of Eastern Europe, 
overturned successive agreements, imposing further reductions of East European 
export quotas for machinery. Therefore, even countries in favour of reforms and 
gradual liberalisation of trade, were interested in maintaining non-quota trade, at 
least with regard to ‘strategic’ deliveries, to secure stability of their economies 
(Rynki Zagraniczne 23 January 1987, 3-4). At the same time, however, countries 
like Czechoslovakia and Poland, guided by ther commercial interests, proposed 
value-based quotas for certain kinds of machinery and consumer goods to improve 
their export structure (Stone 1996, 217).
As creating a ‘common market’ would require a high degree of coordination in 
reforming foreign trade and financial mechanisms, the existence of groups of 
countries pursuing increasingly diverse economic policies meant that no distinct 
progress could be made in the restructuring of CMEA mechanisms and institutional 
framework (Oniszczuk 1987). As a result the Session did not make any decisions 
regarding radical transformation of CMEA mechanisms. According to negotiators 
these disagreements resulted in an emasculated document amounting to a mere series 
of interesting suggestions (Stone 1996, 220-3). The part regarding the reform of 
trading and financial instruments was very general. For example, the text did not 
explain how value-based quotas were to increase. Its fundamental weakness was
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that the document failed to commit CMEA members to specific reforms or a specific 
timetable which could improve the effectiveness of cooperation making the 
introduction of reforms dependent on the progress in individual countries (Kleer 
1988, 13). The Hungarian and Polish representatives concluded that on the basis of 
this program no fundamental improvement in the effectiveness of mechanisms was 
possible as there were no means for the resolution of problems hindering 
cooperation.
Apart from diverse attitudes to economic reforms of individual CMEA members, 
the primary problem of this strategy was that there were no economic preconditions 
for its implementation. The most serious obstacle to the implementation of this 
strategy was the limited Soviet economic potential, in particular the lack of a proper 
export base in manufactures. Another factor was the incapacity of the Soviet 
economy to bring about the necessary changes in the CMEA mechanism. Soviet 
reformers understood that while in the short-term the limits of reform were set by the 
countries least advanced in their economic reforms, ultimately an essential condition 
for any change in CMEA was the reform of the Soviet economic system itself. For 
example, a move away from detailed coordination of mutual exports in the course of 
coordination of planning, was dependent on the decentralisation of planning in the 
Soviet Union. Similarly, the introduction of negotiated CMEA prices depended on 
the convertibility of the Soviet rouble which in turn could not occur without the 
development of the wholesale trade in the means of production. These changes in the 
Soviet domestic economy combined with Soviet economic potential and significance 
in mutual economic relations would force East Europeans to coordinate their 
economic policies with Soviet ones (Nekipelov 1987 in Stone 1996, 226).
Furthermore, the lack of progress in the implementation of the CPSTP and 
development of direct links between enterprises, which will be discussed in chapter 
5, demonstrated that the CMEA was not viable in its present form. It could neither
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overcome the technological backwardness of its members in relation to the West, nor 
help them solve their economic problems and transform the traditional model of 
cooperation.
The continuing economic slowdown, structural imbalances and shortages and 
the steadily increasing hard currency debt made it increasingly clear that the bloc 
countries were unable to speed up their economic growth without access to external 
sources of financing, which the Soviet Union was not in a position to provide.  ^ The 
only option, especially for Poland or Hungary, burdened by huge foreign debts, 
seemed to be expansion of ties with the West. Their predicament and the lack of 
tangible effects of domestic economic reforms in the individual CMEA countries 
meant also that there were hardly any prospects that they could meet Soviet 
requirements for high-technology goods. There was indeed no possibility that East 
Europeans could, in the short-term, change their production methods and structures 
to provide the Soviet Union with the goods of the required technical quality. 
Furthermore, it was increasingly obvious that there were only limited possibilities of 
increasing Soviet deliveries to Eastern Europe of raw materials and fuels, because of 
the decline in oil production, rising costs of extraction, growing domestic demand 
and their significant position in Soviet hard currency exports.
As shown in Tables 1 and 2, the value of intra-CMEA trade throughout the 
1980s diminished four to five times, depending on the individual country. At the 
same time, the rates of growth of mutual trade decreased one and a half to two times. 
While from 1981 to 1985 intra-CMEA trade grew by 3.2 per cent per annum, in 
1987 this figure was a mere 1.5 per cent. Growth virtually came to halt in 1988, and 
in 1986-1989 period a 2.8 per cent drop was recorded (Zenin 1990, 42). Similar
hn 1981-1985 the rate of growth was 3.3 per cent, in 1986 - 3.7 per cent, but in 1987 only 2.6 
per cent. The evidence throughout the bloc indicated that the rate of return on investment was also 
declining (Kubiak 1989, 57-8). In 1987 the CMEA countries’ hard currency debts increased for the 
third consecutive year.
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trends were recorded in the share of intra-CMEA trade in total trade which was 
consistently on the decline since 1987 for all the CMEA members (see Tables 3 and 
4 ).1
These ‘structural’ barriers to the expansion of cooperation and the limited 
usefulness of CMEA in meeting the requirements of Soviet economic policy led to 
questioning of the expediency of over-reliance on the CMEA. These reservations 
were first articulated in articles published in Soviet authoritative journals in mid- 
1988. Their authors, who previously formulated major Soviet proposals for reform 
of CMEA, urged more active participation in world economic relations and 
cooperation with the West as a more effective means of accelerating economic 
growth. They blamed the traditional policy of isolation from the world economy for 
technological stagnation and low production efficiency, excessive energy 
consumption, and insufficient quality of production and services (Spandarian and 
Shmelev 1988, 10-2). This relative isolation from the West was also seen as a factor 
contributing to the failure of CMEA integration and the relative economic 
backwardness of its members (Izvestiia 12 August 1989). As one of the articles 
bluntly put it, ‘Underrating contemporary world economic realities in the economic 
strategy of the the Soviet Union and the socialist commonwealth as a whole dooms 
socialism to economic backwardness in relation to capitalism’ (Kunitsyn 1989, 55).
Spandarian and Shmelev (1988, 12) also pointed out that the existing 
mechanisms for cooperation within CMEA were not sufficient to achieve the 
objectives of the economic strategy and the acceleration of scientific-progress. In 
particular they criticised the assumption that the implementation of the CPSTP could 
be an effective means of catching up with Western technological standards. They
^For a comparison, the share of trade with CMEA and the West respectively in 1987 (in per cent): 
Bulgaria 79, and 43; Czechoslovakia 74 and 19; GDR 63 and 32; Romania 48 and 26; Poland 43 
and 44.
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argued that while this assumption could be realistic in the long-term, the existing 
mechanisms were not adequate to ensure the appropriate quality of products.
The point of these arguments was not to prove that the success of perestroika 
depended solely on cooperation with the West but to reassess the high level of 
priority assigned to socialist economic integration in Soviet foreign policy and 
‘combine economic cooperation within CMEA countries with a rationalisation of the 
geographic structure of their international economic activity’ (Kunitsyn 1989, 55).
These arguments found expression in actual political practice in the re-evaluation 
of the place of economic integration in CMEA within the overall foreign economic 
strategy which began in August 1988 (Csaba 1991, 194). Soviet objectives in 
relation to CMEA shifted from grand programs of cooperation towards putting 
‘ordinary’ economic relations on a commercial basis. This found expression in the 
imposition of Soviet conditions on trade which were aimed at the restoration of the 
trade balance and a reduction of transactions which could have benefitted East 
Europeans. This new approach was demonstrated during the negotiations for 1991- 
95. Because of the deterioration of the Soviet economy, the fall in energy prices and 
a growing trade deficit with most of Eastern Europe the Soviet Union’s priority was 
to reduce the level of machinery imports and increase East European imports of 
Soviet machinery. In late 1987 Soviet negotiators warned East Europeans that 
machinery exports would have to be reduced after 1990 and that they would have to 
accept more imports of Soviet machinery (Inotai 1988, 85). The Soviets did, in fact, 
implemented this warning by substantially reducing the East European surplus in 
machinery exports by firmly imposing reductions in key commodity imports across 
the board and doubling the quota of machinery that was imported from the Soviet 
Union. The Soviet Union also began to insist on linking of exports of raw materials 
to East European exports of selected types of machinery and consumer goods (Inotai 
1988, 85; Stone 1996, 230-3). The Soviet Union also overturned its earlier
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commitments and imposed a reduction of its exports of raw materials and fuels. It 
began to accept only those East European manufactured products which satisfied 
high technological standards. 1 There were also numerous instances when the Soviet 
Union refused to buy technologically improved Polish products because it 
considered them as relatively overpriced (Rynki Zagraniczne 11 July 1988, 1). An 
illustration of the success of the Soviet policy was a radical reversal in the Soviet 
balance of payments with Eastern Europe. In 1989, the Eastern Europe’s trade 
balance turned from a surplus of 1.3 billion roubles in 1988 into a deficit of 3.6 
billion roubles.
Despite its firmness in insisting on the new conditions of trade exchanges the 
Soviet Union still retained the CMEA pricing system which benefitted East European 
exporters of machinery and was prepared to grant concessions, apparently 
convinced by high-level interventions emphasising the costs for East European 
economies. For example, it agreed to moderate Soviet reductions in oil exports so as 
not to cause a serious crisis. Czechoslovakia was also allowed to withdraw its 
participation in the second stage of construction of Krivoi Rog iron-ore complex and 
the Soviet Union did not carry out its threats and did not decrease its iron ore exports 
(Stone 1996, 232).
This shift in Soviet economic strategy towards de-emphasising of political 
considerations in intra-bloc economic relations was confirmed in January 1989 at the 
meeting of the Executive Committee. The Soviet Union was not willing to increase 
deliveries of energy and materials, and wanted CMEA partners to run surpluses in 
their exchanges with the Soviet Union. It also put forward proposals urging a 
speedier application of actual world market prices in intra-CMEA relations, making 
the transferable rouble convertible, and intra-CMEA exchange rates more realistic.
1 Around 75 per cent of Soviet machinery imports from Eastern Europe could not compete with 
Western products.
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Another telling sign that the re-evaluation of the role of CMEA in Soviet strategy 
was under way manifested itself in the obvious stalemate in CMEA activities at the 
highest decision-making levels. For instance, plans to have a CMEA summit of 
party leaders devoted to economic matters, announced in December 1988 and first 
planned for March 1989 did not eventuate. Similarly, the CMEA Council Session 
which was to be held in June 1989 was first rescheduled for November and did not 
eventually convene until July 1990. Even when the Conference of communist party 
secretaries with responsibility for economic matters convened on 6 and 7 June 1989 
in East Berlin, no genuine consensus was reached. While the official Communique 
endorsed the policy of moving towards a unified market, which had been approved 
at the 43rd and the 44th Council Sessions, it was evident from the deepening 
divisions within the CMEA over the introduction of market-oriented reforms that 
there was no immediate prospect of acting on this recommendation (Sobell 1989e).
Conclusion
In the examined period, CMEA strategy and functions were inexorably 
interlinked with the re-evaluation of Soviet political and economic priorities in 
Eastern Europe in view of its own internal economic situation and the relaxation in 
West-East tensions. In this context one defining feature was the weakening of Soviet 
pressure on CMEA integration. This was partly the result of the existing barriers to 
economic cooperation stemming from the lack of essential reforms and the 
technological weakness of the Soviet economy, and partly because of the 
diminishing political importance of the region in Soviet foreign policy concerns. 
Another distinct feature was the growing influence of the domestic dynamics in East 
European countries on the politics of integration which represented a disintegrative 
force by virtue of their independent and diverse attitudes to economic reforms and 
their preference, whenever possible, to develop economic relations with the West.
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The pattern of political and economic relations between the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe and the objectives and the role of CMEA 
from late 1989 until the beginning of 1991.
The primary factor which influenced Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe and 
the CMEA in the period examined was the domestic political and economic situation 
of the country. It was characterised by an increasingly evident failure of economic 
reform and deepening economic crisis. In 1989 there was only 3 per cent increase in 
GNP, industrial output increased by 1.7 per cent and the first ever trade deficit was 
recorded. 1 A rapid increase in inflationary pressures and severe shortages of 
consumer goods generated social unrest.^ Gorbachev himself admitted that in many 
areas matters ‘not only are not improving, but actually growing worse’ (The Age 16 
September 1989). In 1990 the crisis deepened: GNP had fallen by 2 per cent, and 
national income produced by 4 per cent. Industrial output was down, foreign trade 
fell 6.9 per cent by value (The Australian 10 March 1990). Because of the fall in oil 
output, supplies were barely sufficient to satisfy domestic demand. Furthermore, the 
negative trend in the value of Soviet energy exports was reinforced by the fall in 
world market prices and the decline in Soviet oil production.
These symptoms of economic crisis led to a succession of programs aimed at a 
more radical reform strategy and a transition to a market economy. The first 
proposal, adopted on 20 December 1989, envisaged a gradual dismantling of the 
system of central planning and a slow transition towards a market economy over six 
years (Izvestiia 14 December 1989). By March 1990 this program was, however, 
already judged inadequate in the light of deteriorating performance, and the USSR 
Supreme Soviet adopted on 19 October 1990 more radical ‘Basic Guidelines for
* Prime Minister Ryzhkov announced that the Soviet hard currency debt in 1989 reached 34 billion 
roubles (50 billion US dollars at current exchange rates). It exceeded more than twice the annual 
export earnings (Pravda 10 June 1989, 3).
2 Strikers in Siberia voiced demands reflecting strikes in August which led to Solidarity’s rise 
{The Weekend Australian 28-29 October 1989; Polityka 21 November 1989).
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Economic Stabilisation and Transition to a Market Economy’ (Izvestiia 21 October 
1990).
It was also increasingly obvious that if the economic situation did not improve, it 
would make impossible the realisation of Soviet initiatives such as the creation of a 
common European home and the Soviet Union’s participation in international 
economic organisations. Thus, while in mid-1988 Western economic assistance 
seemed still to be a matter of choice, by 1989 it was a matter of urgent necessity.
The urgent need for Western economic involvement and further measures in arms 
reduction to enable a shift of resources from the military to the civilian sector set the 
course of Soviet foreign policy towards the further improvement of relations with 
the West.
In the strategic area, this direction was marked by preparations for the signing in 
1990 of the Treaty of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). Its terms required 
further drastic reductions of Soviet conventional and other types of armed forces in 
Europe on top of initial Soviet agreements to liquidate imbalances in its favour in the 
conventional armed forces in the European region, which were implemented during 
1989-90. Negotiations also began on a treaty to limit the number of long-range 
nuclear weapons deployed by the two superpowers.
In the economic sphere the Soviet Union continued its policy of rebuilding 
commercial relations with the West, in particular with Europe. In early December 
1989 Gorbachev emphasised that his long-term objective was to integrate the Soviet 
Union into the European and world economies and create a ‘true international 
market' (The Australian 4 December 1989). His efforts to secure Western assistance 
resulted in a series of agreements on access to Western technology and know-how 
and a reduction of trade restrictions. For example, on 19 December 1989 the Soviet 
Union signed trade agreement with the EC reducing trade restrictions on a wide
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range of raw materials and finished products. The EC also agreed to phase out 
quotas on the exports of Soviet manufactured goods to its member countries over a 
five- year period. The United States, for its part, promised that the Soviet Union 
would be granted the same trade status as enjoyed by other countries and withdrew 
objections to the Soviet Union’s having observer status at the GATT.1
In view of the deterioration of the Soviet economic situation these developments 
in the relations between the Soviet Union and the West raised fundamental questions 
as to the nature of desirable political and economic relationships with Eastern 
European countries.
First of all, progress in arms reduction agreements and prospects of the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from the region, which was to be completed by mid- 
1991, and consequent transformation of the entire political-security balance in 
Europe meant that Eastern Europe by 1991 was to lose its former strategic 
significance. As Soviet security interests could be now protected without its military 
presence in Eastern Europe, the importance of the region in Soviet foreign policy 
concerns was also bound to decline. Moreover, Soviet economic priorities in the 
context of growing debt and limited export potential and increasing access to 
Western credit and technology were shifting towards ensuring the exchange of those 
exports which were possible for high quality goods from the West, not substandard 
East European products.
The diminishing strategic and economic significance of East European states 
brought into sharp focus questions about the costs to the Soviet Union of the 
maintaining the existing model of economic cooperation with Eastern Europe. There 
was certainly no longer so compelling a necessity to control its allies or to pay a 
significant economic price for their loyalty.
^The Soviet Union assumed observer status at GATT in 1990 with a view to ultimate full 
membership.
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While these strategic, political and economic ramifications of Soviet relations 
with the West must have affected Soviet perceptions of Eastern Europe, they did not 
determine the ultimate Soviet objectives in the region. The factor which seemed to 
decide the outcome of Soviet calculations were the political dynamics in the region.
In summer 1989, the Soviet Union continued its policy, inaugurated in 1987, of 
non-interference in East European affairs and granting them autonomy in internal 
affairs. It not only acquiesced in but even actively encouraged the process of political 
and economic reform in East European countries. There is, however, no reason to 
believe that at that stage Gorbachev expected or indeed intended that his policy 
would lead to a reduction, let alone a collapse of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.
His calculations were proven wrong, however, when the political 
transformations in Poland and Hungary led to the loss of monopoly of power by 
local communist parties and a transition towards multi-party parliamentary 
democracies with mixed property and market-based economies.  ^ In Poland, the 
Solidarity-led government, the first government in Eastern Europe in four decades 
that had not been dominated by communists, was formed in September 1990. One 
of its first policy pronouncements was an economic program envisaging the 
introduction of market reforms and privatisation of the economy, and an increase in 
Western involvement in the Polish economy. Hungary followed Poland’s lead by 
the establishment on 19 October 1989 of a coalition government. The acting head of 
state proclaimed that Hungary was no longer a dictatorship of the proletariat but an 
independent republic dedicated to the values of ‘bourgeois democracy and 
democratic socialism’ (The Australian 20 October 1989, 10).
* According to Mieczyslaw Rakowski, the Polish communist party's official spokesman, 
Gorbachev had expressed approval of the Solidarity-led government saying that recent Polish 
events would serve the Polish nation and strengthen socialism in the country. Rakowski stated 
that: ‘Gorbachev supported and approved the policies undertaken by our new Government’ referring 
to the new Solidarity-led government. Rakowski added that Gorbachev was actively encouraging 
the changes in Eastern Europe and stressed that the shape and organisation of any party depends 
only on that party (Sydney Morning Herald 13 October 1989, 12).
271
These developments soon forced the local communist parties to accept the 
necessity of abandoning their ideological commitments to Marxist-Leninist ideology 
in response to the needs of the changing political situation. The result was their 
transformation into parties with a social-democratic orientation committed to a multi­
party system, free elections and market-based economies. 1
The disintegration of communist rule in the remaining Eastern Europe countries 
by December of 1989 and the formation of governments with an ideological 
orientation which could not be classified as socialist removed any pretence of 
common interests. The Soviet Union was not willing to intervene to maintain the 
existing Eastern European dependency, and deprived of the ideological basis to 
maintain the claim, was forced to admit the disintegration of Soviet control and to 
redefine its political relationship with Eastern European countries.
The announcement of renunciation of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and 
effectively a declaration of the end of the Soviet bloc came with the long-awaited 
official renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine in December 1989 at a Warsaw Pact 
meeting. In a separate statement condemning the invasion the Soviet Union officially 
denounced the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, and thus formally repudiated the 
Brezhnev doctrine of ‘limited sovereignty’ which had justified the intervention (The 
Australian 6 December 1989).^
This renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine had actually been foreshadowed a 
few days earlier at the Malta summit with President Bush. At the meeting Gorbachev
^The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party dissolved itself and transformed itself into a reformed 
Hungarian Socialist Party (The Australian 1 October 1989, 9). The 16th Plenum of Central 
Committee of PZPR abandoned Marxist-Leninist dogmas of the dictatorship of the proletariat and 
democratic centralism and called for the establishment of a new party (Polity ka 12 November 
1989,2).
^In a joint Communique the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria 
condemned the Soviet-led 1968 military invasion, called it illegal, and pledged a strict policy of 
non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. A separate Soviet government statement said that 
the invasion heightened East-West tension, was ‘groundless, and the decision concerning it was a 
mistake in the light of all facts known today’.
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outlined a revised concept for the common European house. The earlier version 
which, as mentioned earlier, envisaged a partnership between two political-military- 
economic blocs was replaced by a commonwealth of sovereign democratic States 
with accessible borders open to the exchange of products, technologies, ideas and 
wide-ranging contacts between people {The Australian 4 December 1989).
A new Soviet strategy towards Eastern Europe.
Following the renunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine Soviet objectives in the 
region shifted towards so called ‘Finlandisation’ of political relations with the former 
countries of the Soviet bloc, that is securing the pattern where the former 
subordinates enjoy virtually total autonomy in deciding their domestic institutional 
structures and processes of economic and political life, but their foreign policies are 
constrained to take account of vital Soviet interests (Miller 1991, 131). By the end of 
1990 closer ties with Western Europe combined with new international security 
arrangements marked the beginning of withdrawal of the active involvement of the 
Soviet Union from the region, and a return to inter-state relations. The Soviet Union 
began to rely on indirect political means, in particular diplomacy with the West, to 
secure its interests in the region.
At the time of the disintegration of the Soviet bloc the Soviet Union’s domestic 
situation was characterised by a deteriorating economy, a growing balance of 
payments deficit, which sharply worsened in the first half of 1990, and pressures 
for autonomy, if not outright independence in individual republics comprising the 
Soviet Union. 1 In the light of the deteriorating economic performance in the Soviet 
Union it was generally accepted that only cooperation with the West could provide 
the capital and technology required to build a market economy. Stanislav Shatalin, a 
member of the Presidential Council, admitted that all economic reform to date had
^The Soviet Union ‘s debt crisis was exposed by defaulting on payments for imports from 
Western countries (The Australian 8 May 1990, 1-2).
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failed, ‘If anything the situation has deteriorated’ and added that ‘without the 
cooperation with the West we cannot build a market economy’ (The Australian 19- 
20 May 1990, 6).
In international affairs the reunification of Germany within NATO, formally 
recognized on 3 October 1990, marked the completion of a new European 
settlement. In its wake the Soviet Union signed a 20-year non-agression pact with 
Germany. Germany also made a major financial commitment to the Soviet Union 
(The Sydney Morning Herald 10 November 1990, 5).l Gorbachev also discussed 
with European Community leaders the issue of financial help and by the end of 
November all the major West European states had made interim offers of financial 
assistance.
Despite renunciation of its right to control East European states the Soviet Union 
still insisted on maintaining the political and economic institutions of the former 
socialist commonwealth.2 This was a way of ensuring that former allies pursued 
pro-Soviet policies. For example, the chief purpose of maintaining the Warsaw Pact, 
was to use it as a diplomatic tool in the construction of a new Europe with the aim of 
securing the best possible political and financial conditions with particular regard to 
the reunification of Germany, and the relationship with NATO. The Warsaw Pact 
summit in December 1989 was used to put pressure on East European leaders to 
pursue policies consistent with Soviet security interests, specifically to make the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from their soil conditional on the progress in European
* Germany committed itself to aid the withdrawal of troops from the former East Germany, grant a 
three-billion mark interest-free credit, give a guarantee for a five-billion mark credit to Moscow by 
German commercial banks, credit guarantees for trade with the Soviet Union.
^In November 1989, following the opening of the Berlin Wall, Gorbachev, referring to the WP 
and CMEA, declared, ’Now is not the time to break up established international political and 
economic institutions, they should be transformed gradually. Let them be transformed taking into 
account internal processes.’ (Financial Review 16 November 1989).
2 7 4
disarmament negotiations {The Sydney Morning Herald 6 December 1989). 1 The 
Soviet Union also used the existing forms of economic dependence on Soviet raw 
materials and market to ensure that the former bloc countries pursued pro-Soviet 
policies. For instance, in October 1990 the Soviet Union concluded a special deal on 
extra oil deliveries with Czechoslovakia in return for consideration of Soviet 
interests in negotiations on the future of the Warsaw Pact and the new order in 
Europe {Financial Times 31 October 1990).
The implications of the new patterns of Soviet-East European 
relationship for the CMEA.
The activities of the CMEA towards the end of 1989 were characterised by a 
continuing stalemate, with no meeting devoted to discussion of policies since May. 
Finally, some breakthrough seemed to have been achieved with the meeting of the 
Executive Committee at the end of October 1989. The meeting took place when the 
Polish and Hungarian governments had already rejected communist rule and the 
centrally planned system and had announced the transition to a market economy. The 
meeting decided to elaborate a new concept of CMEA structures and mechanisms of 
cooperation until 1995 {Ekon. sotr. 1989:11, 13).^ The main objective of this new 
strategy was to facilitate the CMEA’s return to the international market and to normal 
trade arrangements. Soviet officials were not opposed to radical reform in their 
alliance, in fact they promoted change. Their position was consistent with Soviet 
acceptance that radical market-oriented transformations were a prerequisite for the 
reintegration of Soviet bloc economies into the world economic and trading systems. 
This direction envisaged for the CMEA by the Soviet Union was consistent with 
Shevardnadze’s call on 19 December 1989 for a commission to discuss the
^The 16 May 1990 Declaration at the end of top-level meeting announcing the end of the WP in 
its present form and agreement to tranform it into an essentially political body: a pact of sovereign 
and emancipated states based on democratic principles (The Weekend Australian 9-10 June 1990). 
^Communique on the 132nd meeting of the Executive Committee of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance held on 26-28 October 1989.
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formation of an integral economic complex in Europe which would include all 
existing major trading blocs: the EC, CMEA and EFTA.
At that time East European countries continued to act on the assumption of the 
maintenance of intra-CMEA trade arrangements and the rules of cooperation, 
notwithstanding political changes. An illustration of this approach was the 
expectation of the Polish government in its economic program presented in 
November 1989 of the continuation of the existing trade and payments arrangements 
until at least 1991, when the five-year agreements adopted within the framework of 
the CMEA were to expire. Only then did it envisage the introduction of a new 
system in which the quotas would cover only products of strategic importance, and 
convertible-currency settlements based on current world market price would perform 
a significant role in economic relations with CMEA countries.
The Soviet Union, however, with the renunciation of military and political 
subordination was unwilling to enter any trade agreements which were not based on 
economic considerations. In November 1989 the Soviet Union refused Poland’s 
Prime Minister Mazowiecki’s request to increase deliveries of Soviet oil and gas, to 
reduce Poland’s contribution to the upkeep of Soviet troops on their soil, and to 
postpone repayment of the country’s large debt to Moscow (The Sydney Morning 
Herald 27 November 1989, 12). The Soviet Union insisted also on the repayment of 
East European countries’ debt to Moscow.
The most unequivocal sign of the radical change in the Soviet attitude towards its 
former allies was reflected in the resolution of the 2nd Congress of People’s 
Deputies held in December 1989 to change the basis of exchanges among CMEA 
countries towards world market prices and convertible currencies (Izvestiia 16 
December 1989). The resolution expressed the long-held view that trade relations 
under CMEA were characterised by a one-side crediting of East European countries
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by the Soviet Union, and hence that ‘fraternal assistance’ represented a significant 
burden for the Soviet economy. This led to a belief that by a quick switch-over to 
new conditions in trade relations with the CMEA countries the Soviet Union could 
gain substantial advantages (Durka 1992, 12).
Despite this new Soviet stance, and market transformations undertaken by some 
of the member countries, at the beginning of the last year of CMEA’s existence 
there were no indications of the sudden demise of the organisation. On the eve of 
the last 45th Session, held on 9 and 10 January 1990, none of the members 
supported the outright abolition of the grouping. On one occasion, shortly before 
the Session, Czechoslovakia’s new Finance Minister suggested that CMEA be 
scrapped completely, but he quickly backed away from the comment and suggested 
only sweeping changes to the organisation.
Consequently, when the Session convened, all member countries, including the 
Soviet Union, supported the continuation of the CMEA’s economic cooperation. At 
the same time, however, they agreed on the need to push ahead with the radical 
changes in the structure and functions of the CMEA and the reform of its financial 
and economic mechanisms towards a market trading system. The exception was 
Cuba which expressed the most serious reservations about a wholesale change, 
essentially wanting to preserve the current arrangements.
However, even among those countries which were in favour of market 
reforms, there were differences with regard to the extent and time-frame for the 
projected measures. These differences of opinion were related to the degree of 
advancement of their domestic market reforms, the potential economic outcomes of 
the transition and their perceived political interests.
Accordingly, the hard-line regimes in Bulgaria and Rumania were amongst 
those who were opposed to a rapid transition to a new system of settlements (Zycie
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Warszawy 7 June 1990). The Soviet Union’s proposal entailed a move to trading 
on a hard-currency basis at world market prices starting with the year 1991. This 
statement was qualified by the Soviet Prime Minister’s announcement that trade in 
convertible currencies within CMEA would be completed in stages and in different 
ways, depending on the nations concerned (Vestnik March 1990, 27).
The most reformist governments of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland 
were, like the Soviet Union, in favour of a transition to settlements in convertible 
currencies and the application of world market prices in intra-CMEA relations. In 
addition, Hungary and Poland considered the replacement of the present system of 
coordination of plans with bilateral trade agreements which would diminish the role 
of government agencies. Czechoslovakia wanted an ad hoc commission to present a 
blueprint for the reorganisation of CMEA activities by late February 1990.
However even these most reformist East European countries were not interested 
in the rapid dissolution of existing CMEA trade and industrial cooperation links. On 
the one hand, new East European governments at that time expected that structural 
changes initiated by market reforms would bring substantial gains through more 
efficient allocation of resources. The foreign trade sector was one of those areas 
where structural changes were supposed to manifest themselves most 
conspicuously through a rapid elimination of inefficient trade flows and an 
expansion of profitable transactions. On the other hand, however, they were 
concerned with the potential costs to their economies of the transition to new trade 
arrangements which would entail paying in convertible currencies for the imports of 
Soviet energy, a decrease in prices for their substandard products, and indeed the 
lack of any guarantee that they could sell them at all. ^  There was also an awareness 
of the legacy of the CMEA in terms of dependence on Soviet energy and raw
1 The costs of immediate transition were exemplified by the extent of dependence of East 
European industries on the Soviet market. For instance in case of 150 Polish enterprises, exports 
to the Soviet market constituted 25-90 per cent of their total production.
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materials deliveries and the existence of whole industrial sectors producing 
primarily for the Soviet market which could not be changed immediately without 
heavy social domestic costs. These factors, related primarily to the trade with the 
Soviet Union, had to be taken into account in the transitional period, even if the 
maintenance of outdated industries was doubtful in purely economic terms.
As a consequence, the line taken by East European members was that the 
transition to a market trading system should be gradual. The Polish Prime Minister 
proposed that present commitments regarding the quotas of goods be guaranteed 
until 1995. He also suggested bilateral negotiations with regard to trade and 
payments arrangements depending on the degree of advancement of economic 
reforms. A Czechoslovak representative called for a transition period of two to four 
years saying that his country would be ready to adopt the Soviet-proposed principles 
of settling accounts by the end of the next five-year period, rather than in 1991.
East European members were also interested in the alleviation of the 
consequences of the introduction of the new settlements system by means of a 
proportionate distribution of its burden. As a result, Czechoslovakia and Poland 
insisted on the inclusion of a clause allowing for compensation for the cost of 
making the switch. The Polish Prime Minister Mazowiecki justified this claim by 
arguing that the Soviet Union must pay for 40 years of economic stagnation of the 
East European countries (Bartoszewicz 1991, 17).
These differences among individual countries and their fears of the economic 
consequences of the new conditions in trade relations were reflected in the 
resolutions of the 45th Session. On the one hand, CMEA members agreed that the 
organisation in its present form was unviable and agreed to the establishment of a 
special commission which would prepare proposals for a radical overhaul (Ekon. 
sotr. 1990:8, 9-13). They also reached an interim general agreement about a radical
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transformation of existing trading arrangements and mechanisms of cooperation and 
a transition to settlements in world prices, and a change to a convertible currency 
basis and real exchange rates in trade relations (Ekon. sotr. 1990:11, 22). There was 
however no deadline set for the ultimate transition to market regulation of 
cooperation. CMEA countries emphasised that the transition should be gradual and 
that countries should negotiate the terms of transition on a bilateral basis, making 
sure that no side enjoyed undue advantage (Poprzeczko 1990, 17). Furthermore, 
they agreed on various interim mechanisms to protect their national economies and 
mutual trade against the impact of the new, market-oriented regulations, such as 
maintenance in the transition period of inter-state agreements on deliveries of goods 
of strategic importance for the national economies.
During the final press conference, the Soviet Prime Minister, seemingly 
acknowledging concerns and grievances of its trading partners, expressed an 
opinion that this process of gradual transition should take three years. He also 
acknowledged the need to consider each other’s interests, in particular, a specific 
approach was necessary for Cuba, Mongolia and Vietnam. There was, however, in 
the context of the new Soviet approach to economic relations, an unsettling ring in 
his remark that every country had a right to withdraw from the organisation 
(Vestnik March 1990, 25-7).
For a few months following the Session it seemed that its arrangements could be 
implemented, even though the decision in March 1990 to abolish multilateral 
cooperation and co-ordination of plans, and reduce the role of the Secretariat meant 
that the traditional model of cooperation was no longer operative. However, the 
commission on CMEA reform set up by 45th Session continued its work on the 
Program of action which was discussed on 27-28 June 1990. The Commission set 
out changes in CMEA objectives, organisational structures, mechanisms of 
cooperation, and the principles of its functioning. According to the Program, the
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CMEA was to assume a status similar to that of the EEC. It would not have the right 
to issue recommendations to its members regarding economic policies. Its structure 
would comprise only the Committee of permanent representatives of governments of 
member countries and the Secretariat. The two fundamental objectives of CMEA 
operation were to assist member countries in the development of mutual ties based 
on market principles and the integration of their economies into world economic 
relations, in particular into European economic structures. The operation of the 
CMEA in its existing form was to be completed by the end of 1990. In the future 
CMEA members were to have the right to join other international economic 
organisations and conclude agreements on economic cooperation with other 
countries from outside the CMEA.
These negotiations were, however, unilaterally stopped by the Soviet Union in 
July 1990 when President Gorbachev issued a decree 'On introducing changes into 
the Soviet Union’s foreign economic relations' which committed the Soviet 
government to bringing about a transition in its economic relations with other CMEA 
countries as from 1 January 1991 (Izvestiia 25 July 1990). The decree postulated a 
switch-over of Soviet trade with CMEA partners from the settlements in transferable 
roubles to trade in convertible currencies and at current world market prices. These 
changes in the principles of economic cooperation spelled the actual abolition of the 
traditional CMEA trading system.
The change in the Soviet position regarding the principles of economic relations 
with its CMEA trading partners was a result of its worsening economic and financial 
situation and worsening budget deficit coupled with a drop in the production of oil 
(Poprzeczko 1990, 17-8). In terms of Soviet political interests the unification of 
Germany meant that the Soviet Union did not need to use the economic dependency 
of its former satellites on Soviet raw materials and markets to ensure that former bloc
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countries pursued pro-Soviet policies in negotiations regarding the new order in 
Europe based on the reunificiation of Germany.
The Soviet Union expected that the transition would provide considerable sums 
of foreign currency. It estimated that by a switch to hard currency it would gain from 
each partner between 800 min -1.5 billion US dollars a year and that thanks to the 
transition the deficit in Soviet trade with the CMEA would become a surplus of 
about 1 billion US dollars (Bartoszewicz 1991, 17).
The other CMEA members had to comply with the new rules as their attempts to 
negotiate a transitory period were met with the Soviet Union’s refusal. Forced by the 
Soviet decree, the CMEA countries concluded in the second half of 1990 bilateral 
agreements, establishing a new institutional framework of trade relations. The 
transferable rouble was replaced by convertible currencies as the means of payment 
in all foreign trade transactions, the CMEA prices were replaced by world market 
prices, and the detailed inter-govemmental trade agreements by specific contracts 
concluded between individual enterprises, supplemented by the general trade 
agreement.
The terms of new Soviet trade relations with former satellites can be illustrated 
by an agreement signed with Poland in autumn 1990. The Polish side proposed that 
the deliveries of strategic goods would be covered by inter-state agreements and 
suggested a gradual transition to non-quota trade until 1996. The Poles also expected 
that the Soviet Union would agree to an increase of Polish exports of machinery and 
equipment in response to the deterioration of terms of trade as a result of the 
transition to hard currency settlements. The Soviet Union, however, refused to 
guarantee the level of deliveries of strategic goods, except for those relating to Polish 
participation in joint investment projects. It renounced all its former commitments.
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Furthermore, the Soviets not only refused to increase imports of Polish 
manufactures but decided to decrease their levels (Bozyk 1990, 4)
Formal dissolution of the CMEA, which took place in Budapest in June 1991 
was only a symbolic performance of the last rites of a process of disintegration 
which had been completed much earlier.
Conclusion
In the period examined in this chapter the CMEA's role and its ultimate demise 
were a function of processes and forces set in motion by Gorbachev's political and 
economic reforms. The primary factor was the re-evaluation of Soviet political 
priorities in Eastern Europe as a result of Soviet political and economic calculations 
of the expediency of maintaining an empire in the light of internal economic 
pressures and changing strategic circumstances.
The role assigned to CMEA was directly related to the strategic and political 
importance of Eastern Europe in Soviet foreign policy. As long as the Soviet Union 
saw the domination of Eastern Europe as an important means of securing its 
interests, Gorbachev tried to find ways by which Eastern Europe could contribute to 
the Soviet Union’s objectives. However, when the Soviet Union renounced its 
political and military subordination of Eastern Europe there were no possible 
advantages in maintaining the CMEA, especially since the Soviet Union could obtain 
technology directly from the West.
The maximum limits of permissible reforms of CMEA, proposed during 
Gorbachev’s rule were still determined by the principles and the logic of Soviet 
reform. However, at the other end of the spectrum the possibility of achieving 
reforms was determined by another factor, namely differences in the extent of 
reforms in individual East European members. Those countries which were retaining
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their centralised command systems of management considered CMEA reform as 
conflicting with their interests and tried to obstruct its implementation. The lack of 
unity on the extent and the desirability of reforms was due to the lack of political 
willingness of some governments to introduce reforms and the Soviet Union’s 
decreasing ability to influence the internal affairs of East European countries.
Apart from diverse attitudes to economic reforms among individual CMEA 
members, the primary problem of this strategy was that there were no economic 
preconditions for its implementation. The primary factor was the incapacity of the 
Soviet economy to bring about the necessary changes in the CMEA mechanism. 
Soviet reformers understood that while in the short-term the limits of reform were 
set by the countries least advanced in their economic reforms, ultimately an essential 
condition for any change in CMEA was the radical reform of the Soviet economic 
system which would, in turn, force smaller East European countries to adjust their 
systems of management. Another serious obstacle to the successful implementation 
of CMEA strategies, whether the CPSTP, direct cooperation of enterprises or 
‘common market’ was the limited Soviet economic potential, in particular the lack of 
a proper export base in manufactures.
Ultimately, however, the demise of CMEA was caused not by economic factors 
but by the loss of Eastern Europe’s strategic significance for the Soviet Union, 
which was always the main reason for its existence. Soon after the renunciation of 
military and political subordination of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union also 
renounced any obligations to the region which were not based on economic 
considerations and lost interest in maintaining CMEA.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GORBACHEV’S REFORMS OF CMEA.
In the previous chapter I discussed the main political and economic factors 
which determined the objectives and the strategy of pressure for CMEA integration 
from 1985 until 1990 and the role of CMEA in Soviet policy under Gorbachev. The 
aim of this chapter is to examine the implementation of these CMEA strategies and 
evaluate the reasons for the failure of attempts to introduce new forms of CMEA 
cooperation. To that purpose, I will examine the actual mechanisms for cooperation 
the implementation of CPSTP and the realisation of the program of direct 
cooperation of enterprises and the setting up of joint enterprises. The discussion 
demonstrates that the failure of these programs was caused by the problems with 
introduction of the organisational and economic conditions necessary for the 
postulated operation of enterprises. Another major problem related to conflict 
between the commercial interests of East European countries and Soviet 
requirements. There was no possibility to solve these problems within the existing 
framework of institutional arrangements of Soviet bloc economies and in view of the 
Soviet Union’s relative technological backwardness.
The implementation of CPSTP.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the CPSTP set out five priority areas for 
cooperation, which were then subdivided into ninety-three project areas and then into 
the detailed cooperation programs. The responsibility for the implementation of 
projects belonged to the Leading Organisations, Soviet institutes, which were to 
coordinate negotiations between participants and determine the obligations of each 
party and ensure that all the areas were interconnected. The successful
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implementation of the projects was dependent on each participating country agreeing 
to the priority of projects and allocating the required resources in the national plan.
In practice however the actual implementation of the CPSTP did not conform 
to this ideal. First of all, even at the early stage of the formulation of detailed 
programs of cooperation, during the division by leading organizations of the 
problem areas into detailed cooperation projects, this design was lost. Many projects 
were assigned to several problem areas, or were formulated vaguely and as a result 
individual projects were not properly connected. Furthermore, the priority of East 
European countries was to minimise their contribution. As a consequence, in order 
to minimise investment costs, they included in programs of cooperation projects 
which had been already included in their national science and technology programs 
predating the CPSTP {Rzeczpospolita 4 November 1986, 1-2; Stone 1996, 190-9). 
Furthermore, they attempted to set technical parameters and standards for new 
products under the CPSTP at a low level. The formulation of the detailed 
cooperation programs in this way meant that it was extremely unlikely that the 
projects would meet international standards. Another obstacle in the formulation of 
programs was posed by a decided preference of East European participants for 
bilateral cooperation over multilateral cooperation. This led to a series of bilateral 
contracts between the more technologically advanced countries such as GDR, Poland 
and Czechoslovakia which preferred to cooperate directly with the Soviet Union 
(Monkiewicz 1988, 141; Stone 1996, 190).
The immediate reason for the failure to fulfil the requirements of the CPSTP at 
the stage of formulation of detailed programs was thus the reluctance of East 
European participants to keep their obligations and commit themselves to the 
introduction of new products and the elaboration of new technologies and their 
unwillingness to cooperate on a multilateral basis. However in order to understand
286
the actual reasons of their objections to their involvement it is necessary to analyse 
the motives of their unwillingness to cooperate.
The first explanation of the behaviour of East European countries was their 
desire to protect their own political and commercial interest. Their behaviour was 
perfectly rational from the point of view of maximising their own economic survival. 
East European countries did not think that it made sense for them economically to 
engage in the implementation of the program given the existing technological levels 
within the Soviet bloc where only 15 percent of Soviet and 25 per cent of East 
European machinery production met international standards. Thus given the low 
technological level of Soviet bloc products the goal of attaining international 
standards on the basis of the existing research base was highly unlikely. A much 
more effective means of modernizing their production and raising the 
competitiveness was to import Western technologies. This lack of incentives to 
invest scarce resources in the implementation of a doomed project resulted in the 
inclusion by East European countries in the program projects from their pre-existing 
plans and deliberate effort to negotiate low technical parameters and standards.
Furthermore, East European countries perceived the outcomes of the CPSTP 
from the point of view of their commercial interests as exporters of machinery whose 
main objective was to ensure the greatest possible share of machinery exports to the 
Soviet Union. By 1984, when work began on the formulation of cooperation 
programs, the Soviet Union had begun to demand higher standards of East European 
manufactured goods. This meant that some East European exports that had been 
traditionally exchanged for Soviet raw materials and energy were no longer 
acceptable. The inclusion of a particular product or type of machinery in the CPSTP 
allowed, however, to claim that they had reached acceptable technical level or were 
‘high technology’ exports which attracted higher prices. This would improve the 
prospects for including this product in bilateral trade agreements (Stone 1996,
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188).1 This practice led to the attempt to include as many products as possible in 
each program in programs and to an excessive expansion of programs, which 
undermined their original purpose of focusing on priority areas.
As exporters of machinery, East Europeans were also afraid that investing in 
the CPSTP would ultimately lead to the loss of Soviet markets if the Soviet Union 
appropriated the technology provided within projects. The increase of high- 
technology products in Soviet exports was indeed the stated Soviet objective. Thus 
East European countries could only lose if the Soviet technological standards were 
improved. This was another reason why they attempted to downgrade the norms and 
standards that were set for new products under the CPSTP.
East European states also did not want to participate in the program because 
they believed that it was primarily in the Soviet interest. This conclusion was based 
on the design of the program which sought to ensure the pooling of resources under 
Soviet supervision. It was reinforced by, mentioned in Chapter 4, the Soviet policy 
of withholding from the CPSTP its most advanced technology apparently because it 
had military applications. Furthermore, during the stage of formulation of detailed 
projects decisions were made without proper analysis of feasibility. As a 
consequence East European countries insisted on the preparation of feasibility 
studies to determine whether projects are technologically and economically justified 
before they began to commit their resources (Monkiewicz 1988, 140).
The reason for the East Europeans’ preference for bilateral contracts was the 
inadequate protection of copyrigths in CMEA. This meant that in those projects 
where East Europeans participated in research, the Soviet Union could acquire their 
scientific results (Bielen 1996, 31). Therefore, in order to protect their rights East 
European participants resisted the right of the Leading Organisations to distribute
1 An interview with the former Polish Minister for Science and Technology, Konrad Tott.
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projects to the executors and preferred to organise cooperation on the basis of 
contracts for complete projects or at least tried to dominate those projects in which 
they participated. As the exporter of a final product rather than scientific research 
they could also exercise some control over their trade with the Soviet Union (Stone 
1996, 182-3).
During the implementation stage, East European countries further failed to 
fulfil their obligations. The East Europeans uniformly resisted the creation of joint 
funds for cooperation measures (Monkiewicz 1988, 141). The principle which 
prevailed during negotiations was that contributions were to be dependent on the 
share of utilisations. However, in practice when it came to the signing of contracts, 
East Europeans refused to create such funds, as they would serve Soviet interests 
and would not bring substantial benefits to the contributing countries (Stone 1996, 
184). As a result, provision of funding was left at the discretion of each participant. 
According to the Program each country had to ensure the priority of projects, allocate 
resources and include the necessary tasks in the plan. Each country did this in formal 
terms. However implementation was usually highly selective, and financing by 
central organisations was not consistent, or provided for only part of the projects. 
For example, the Polish policy was to finance only those projects which were 
considered legitimate from the point of view of contributing to the needs of the 
Polish economy and to ignore those which were perceived as meeting Soviet needs 
and objectives. As a rule these projects which were funded usually had already been 
included in national programs before the CPSTP was formulated or were undertaken 
on the orders of economic organisations (Stone 1996, 192, 194). This policy of 
funding projects which were already in the national plan served as a pretence for 
implementing of the program (Stone 1996, 198).
In order to avoid financing projects in which it was not interested, Poland’s 
Committee for Science and Technical Progress of the Council of Ministers, which
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managed Polish participation in the CPSTP interpreted the 1986 financial directives 
of the Council of Ministers in a way which gave responsibility for financing to 
individual enterprises. This provided a justification for not financing the projects. 
This policy was possible because of the substantial economic independence of Polish 
economic organisations in the 1980s, which were permitted to dispose of their 
funds. 1
The implementation of the Program was also obstructed by the absence of 
changes in the institutional system which would have created incentives for changes 
in the structure of production towards a higher technical level of manufactured 
products and improved quality (Monkiewicz 1988, 140).
The reasons for the East European countries lack of interest in carrying out the 
CPSTP were thus similar to those which hindered the implementation of the CP and 
specialisation agreements. East European participants, more interested in Western 
technology and experiencing shortages of investment funds, were unwilling to get 
involved in projects under Soviet auspices and adopted various tactics in order not to 
carry out projects which were evidently subordinated to Soviet needs. The 
difficulties in the implementation of the Program related also to the institutional 
arrangements in domestic economies which did not encourage innovation, such as 
the lack of financial incentives to develop and apply new technologies and 
bureaucratic barriers to technological progress inherent in their economic 
management. Institutional barriers similarly obstructed the Soviet Union’s 
implementation of the Program. The Soviets did not insist on the achievement of 
high technological standards and allowed the East Europeans to downgrade the 
norms and standards that were set for new products under the CPSTP. As Soviet 
officials observed, this coincided with the interest of Soviet leading organisations in
^Tynel (1987, 115-118) discusses shortcomings in legal regulation of scientific-technological 
cooperation of CMEA members, which left the implementation of projects to the good-will of 
participants.
2 9 0
keeping these technical standards low in order to make it easier to fulfil their planned 
targets (Stone 1996, 189).
Furthermore, during the implementation of the program, despite the failure of 
East European participants to fulfil their commitments, the Soviet Union did not 
seriously attempt to exert pressure on its partners to cooperate. In the absence of 
financial incentives to develop and apply new technologies the implementation of the 
Program was dependent on policing of agreements. However, as discussed in 
chapter 4, East European participants successfully resisted the creation of bodies 
with supranational powers and the consequent lack of authority of the Leading 
Organisations meant that the Soviet Union could not enforce these agreements.
This lack of proper arrangements to ensure the implementation of obligations 
was noted as the main reason for the lack of progress in the implementation of the 
Program during a round-table discussion conducted by Izvestiia (10 October 1987, 
8). The general opinion was that the leading organisations that were set up and 
assigned specific areas of scientific and technical progress generally did not have any 
sources of financing, any authority, or any influence over the enterprises that were 
under their ministries’ jurisdiction. For these enterprises, work connected with 
CMEA activities was of a secondary, non-obligatory nature. The exception was the 
area of the development of new materials that was moving forward more or less 
successfully. It had, however, its own scientific-production base and, what was also 
very important, tremendous prestige.
The implementation of CPSTP did not contribute to the modernisation of the 
production base and did not raise the technical level of manufactures within the 
CMEA. Nor did it lead to the creation of an internationally competitive industrial 
sector in CMEA countries and thus to the transformation of intra-CMEA trade 
towards greater exchange of high technology goods. Consequently, the CPSTP did
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not contribute to an improvement of intra-CMEA trade in terms of an increase in the 
quality of goods and the competitiveness of exports. In 1989, out of 1300 new 
technologies and new materials which were to be developed under the program, 
research and experiments were completed only in the case of 300. However, even 
these were not applied in practice (Valkowski 1989, 51). An illustration of the failure 
of CPSTP was the fact that at a time of decrease in intra-CMEA trade exchanges 
there was an increase by 1.5 billion roubles of imports from developed capitalist 
countries of high-technology products.
The implementation of direct cooperation of enterprises and setting up 
of joint enterprises.
As discussed in chapter 4, these new forms of economic cooperation were seen 
as a main means of implementing the new CMEA strategies and the transformation 
of its mechanism towards a greater reliance of financial instruments. Thus their 
success or failure was bound to be of fundamental importance for the results of 
CMEA cooperation. This discussion focuses on the development of cooperation at 
the enterprise level between Poland and the Soviet Union with only marginal 
reference to its implementation in other countries. The limitation of analysis to these 
two countries is justified for two reasons. Firstly, because Poland seemed to 
respond to Soviet initiatives with the greatest interest. Secondly, the analysis of the 
progress of these forms of cooperation in Poland should provide a good indication 
of possible barriers to their development, in view of the further advancement of 
economic reform in Poland in comparison with other bloc countries, and thus 
relatively favourable conditions for the development of direct cooperation. Finally, 
despite many differences in the functioning of economic systems of management in 
individual socialist countries, the experience of these two countries allows to identify 
certain common features enabling to formulate some general conclusions regarding 
the problems of these form of cooperation.
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Within a few months of the signing of the initial agreements the results of 
direct cooperation of enterprises and joint enterprises indicated that neither the 
introduction of formal conditions nor political pressure created sufficient conditions 
for them to become the dominant form of cooperation. The early figures showed that 
the total value of exchanges within the framework of direct links between Polish and 
Soviet enterprises amounted in 1987 to 20 million roubles. This was an insignificant 
amount in comparison with the total value of Polish-Soviet exchanges, which was 
around 13-14 billion roubles annually (Kuczynski 1989, 84).
These results did not improve with time. In 1987-1988 production as a result 
of direct cooperation of enterprises of Soviet and other CMEA members represented 
0.03 per cent of their total turnover (Kormnov 1990, 10). In 1988, direct links 
between Soviet and foreign firms accounted for no more than 1 per cent of foreign 
trade turnover {Pravda 22 January 1989, 5). Similar results were achieved in 
Poland, where direct links accounted for 1.5 per cent of total foreign exchanges 
(Polityka 15 April 1989, 20).
Furthermore, the official number of cooperating enterprises seemed to be more 
a propaganda exercise than a reflection of reality. In Poland in mid-1988 there were 
officially registered 589 production enterprises and research organisations 
cooperating directly with other economic organisations in CMEA countries, 
including 438 with the Soviet Union (Rynki Zagraniczne 11 July 1988, 1). However 
out of these ‘selected’ pairs of enterprises only several dozen signed agreements and 
many of those remained on paper because of the partners’ lack of interests (Rynki 
Zagraniczne 15 July 1988, 1). According to a Polish trade representative in 
Moscow, 50 pairs turned out to be an ‘accidental’ choice (Baczynski 1988b, 17).
While there were no figures of ‘genuine’ links published, the same situation 
must have characterised developments in the Soviet Union. Officially there were two
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thousand registered agreements on direct links and 460 joint enterprises with CMEA 
members (Rybakov 1989, 70). However the actual number of cooperating 
enterprises must have been much smaller judging by the insignificant results of 
cooperation and also by the number of partners in other CMEA countries.
The program of establishing joint Polish enterprises with CMEA partners was 
also implemented with great difficulties. By December 1987 five out of twelve 
Polish-Soviet projects had already been abandoned (Markusz 1987). Ultimately two 
joint enterprises in production were established: the ‘Pollena-Miraculum’ Chemical 
Plant in Cracow in April 1988 with a Polish contribution of 60 per cent and 40 per 
cent from the Soviet Union’s; and ‘Fimbes’ with Ostrzeszow Mechanical Equipment 
Plant in June 1988 (Baczynski 1988b, 18). There were also four joint enterprises in 
construction and publishing: Polsib and Orbita, in Poland and the Sovbud project 
and Somico in the Soviet Union. Poland also set up one joint enterprise with 
Hungary and one with Bulgaria (Rynki Zagraniczne 15 July 1988, 1).
Furthermore, the actual scope of cooperation of enterprises differed from the 
original plans. As mentioned earlier, the main objective of this form of cooperation 
was to establish permanent ties between CMEA member economies on the basis of 
specialisation and cooperation in production. However, in practice direct cooperation 
entailed primarily the exchange of experiences and specifications, the improvement 
and elaboration of new technologies, joint research and construction projects, and 
cooperative deliveries involving exchanges of means of production and tools. The 
majority of transactions had a one-off character, and did not extend to mass 
production.
According to several Soviet studies only between 10 and 17.5 per cent of 
cooperating enterprises were engaged in cooperation in the sphere of production, 
while 36.5 per cent were engaged in singular mutually balanced barter transactions
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or made use of spare production capacities (without exchange of payment in 
currencies), 40 per cent worked on samples of production and prototypes and 61 per 
cent exchanged specifications (.Pravda Ukrainy 29 March 1988, 3). Around 50 per 
cent of enterprises involved in direct links were engaged in research, out of which 16 
per cent were connected with the implementation of CPSTP (Kormnov 1990, 10).
Similar results were noted in the case of direct cooperation of Polish and Soviet 
enterprises. According to a Polish study conducted in major industrial centres, out of 
58 economic organisations, only 30 per cent undertook cooperation in the sphere of 
production, while 75 per cent dealt with the improvement and creation of new 
technologies and 86 per cent were engaged in joint research {Rynki Zagraniczne 23 
December 1988, 8).
Furthermore, some direct cooperation had already been conducted within the 
framework of existing inter-state agreements on production specialisation and 
cooperation. Thus, it entailed an ordinary sale of cooperation deliveries, and was 
strictly balanced within bilateral clearing (Baczynski 1988a, 17; Rybakov 1989a, 
72).
Direct cooperation between Soviet and East German enterprises had similar 
results. According to studies conducted by the Inter-govemmental Commission for 
Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation, direct cooperation did not play any 
role in mass production, had practically no effect on the improvement of productivity 
and did not lead to long-term cooperation (Rynki Zagraniczne 15 July 1988, 1).
Direct cooperation and joint enterprises also failed to meet another objective of 
CMEA strategy, namely the undertaking of cooperation on an economically rational 
basis. They were frequently a result not so much of economic calculations but of 
necessity. For example, they were seen as the only way of overcoming financial or
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supply difficulties, or shortages of hard currencies, which were causing problems in 
the expansion of production (Baczynski 1988a, 17; Kormnov 1990, 12).
This was manifest in particular in the case of Polish enterprises which from 
1987, became formally self-financing as a part of the economic reform program, and 
as a result did not have guaranteed deliveries of materials or the financial means to 
continue investments or undertake modernisation. In the situation of deepening 
economic crisis, they experienced problems with securing reliable deliveries, and 
their operation focused on the solution of short-term difficulties, while the issues of 
the introduction of new technologies or the improvement of the quality of products 
assumed secondary importance. Furthermore, inflation led to depreciation of their 
assets and made difficult the realisation of development plans. In these circumstances 
agreements on cooperation and formation of joint ventures between Polish 
enterprises with their Soviet counterparts, which were typically much bigger, had 
their own research bases, and at that time still enjoyed reliable deliveries and were 
prepared to invest in the modernization of the Polish enterprises, were seen as the 
only means of increasing the scale of production, securing investment funds and 
rationalising outlays from research to investment projects (Baczynski 1988b, 18).
Two examples of such situations of ‘necessity’ were the agreement to set up a 
Polish-Soviet ‘Pollena-Miraculum’ Chemical and Cosmetics Plant in Cracow, and 
the formation of a joint enterprise between a Soviet firm and the Ostrzeszow 
Mechanical Equipment Plant in mid-1988. In both cases a strong motivating factor 
was interest on the Polish side (which had been experiencing difficulties with 
securing deliveries of inputs) in the production and research potential of Soviet 
factories. Furthermore, both Polish factories were long-standing suppliers to the 
Soviet Union and these joint ventures were also perceived as means of securing 
access to the Soviet market, as 60 per cent of final production was assigned for 
export to the Soviet Union (Baczynski 1988a, 17).
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Another reason for establishing direct links was the possibility of substituting 
imports in convertible currencies, through the barter exchange between cooperating 
enterprises of products based on Western licences. (Baczynski 1988 b, 17). This 
reason for cooperation became more frequent with the worsening negative balance of 
payments in the Soviet Union (Ekon.sotmd. 1990:11, 6). Outside this arrangement 
the sale of finished products was impossible due to a general unwritten rule (with 
some exceptions) between Polish and Soviet enterprises not to trade in goods which 
required imports in convertible currencies (Baczynski 1988b, 18).
A clear example of direct cooperation not so much for economic profitability 
but out of desperation because of financial difficulties, was establishing cooperation 
in order to make use of spare production capacity, or for exchange of goods and 
services on a barter basis (Rynki Zagraniczne, 15 July 1988, 1; Ekon.sotmd. 
1990:11, 6).
The sources of difficulties in the direct cooperation of enterprises and 
setting of joint enterprises
This section will discuss barriers in direct cooperation between enterprises and 
the formation and operation of joint enterprises. To that purpose, I will compare the 
actual functioning of the mechanism underlying the results of direct links with the 
conditions essential for the development of these forms of cooperation and examine 
the reasons why these conditions were not met.
There had been a general agreement amongst economists, including CMEA 
experts involved in the Executive Committee’s Commission on Currency and 
Financial issues, regarding conditions necessary for the active participation of 
enterprises in CMEA integration (Soldaczuk et al. 1983, 401-3; Bakos 1987, 23-4; 
Morag 1988, 12; Rynki Zagraniczne 1 October 1987, 1). First of all, for the 
development of their direct cooperation, enterprises had to have rights to make
297
appropriate decisions and to bear responsibility for their realisation; in other words 
they had to be autonomous and self-financing. Secondly, independent, self­
financing enterprises had to have economic instruments to determine the profitability 
of cooperation with foreign partners and the means to access the domestic markets of 
their partners and ensure multilateral settlement. For this they needed prices which 
reflected the costs of production and were tied to current world market prices, single, 
realistic exchange rates linking external and domestic prices, and mutually 
convertible national currencies.
The actual independence of enterprises.
In theory, the first condition of the active participation of enterprises in 
economic cooperation, i.e. the formal autonomy of enterprises, was met. As 
mentioned earlier, all CMEA countries introduced legislation giving or expanding the 
formal powers of economic organisations to conduct foreign trade transactions. In 
practice, however, despite the stated objectives of the reform, the exercise of formal 
independence of enterprises was limited by several factors.
Firstly, the formal autonomy of enterprises was constrained by the substantial 
powers retained by national authorities and the functions of the administrative 
instruments at their disposal at the national and CMEA level. In the Soviet Union, 
for example, the reforms, on the surface, produced important changes in central 
management of the economy. As a result of granting rights to ministries and 
enterprises the Ministry of Foreign Trade apparently lost its monopoly over foreign 
trade, with the diminution of its powers manifest in the cutting of the Ministry's staff 
by 30 percent (Aslund 1992, 140) .  1 The breaking of the monopoly power of the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade did not lead, however, to a decentralisation which enabled
1 Ultimately, in January 1988 the Ministry was amalgamated with the State Foreign Economic 
Commission (GKES) into a new Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations, with apparently new 
functions of managing the export promotion program (Aslund 1992, 140).
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enterprises to act autonomously and did not create the conditions needed to make 
them interested in export, which was a stated prime objective of the reform strategy. 
In November 1987 the majority of the enterprises with formal rights to act on foreign 
markets had not even opened currency accounts with Vneshekonombank, which was 
a precondition for foreign trade activities.
The reasons for this setback in the implementation of the reform were 
administrative and economic in nature. Firstly, the rights of enterprises to participate 
directly in foreign trade remained largely formal. In practice the reform strengthened 
the branch ministries rather than enterprises that were subordinate to them, and in 
some cases republican or local authorities also attempted to usurp the foreign trading 
rights that had supposedly been given directly to enterprises. The monopoly of the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade, as one commentator put it, had been replaced by the 
monopolies of a number of ministries invested with powers to conduct external 
economic activities (Spandarian and Shmelev 1988, 16; Aslund 1992, 138; White 
1992, 120). A prime example of the continuing efforts of central bodies to maintain 
centralised management in spite of the increasing autonomy of enterprises were the 
inter-ministerial agreements to regulate intra-sectoral specialisation (Gavrilov and 
Kosikova 1988; Piotrowski 1986, 3).
The rights of enterprises were also limited by new government regulations 
aimed at protecting them from ‘uncontrolled processes’, allegedly in order to secure 
national interests. In 1988 foreign trade and sectoral ministries were given by the 
Soviet Council of Ministers the right to grant licences for conduct of foreign trade 
activities which were regarded as important to the State interests. Furthermore, 
enterprises had to obtain special permits for barter exchanges with foreign partners. 
The intention was to stop enterprises from gaining profit from non-productive 
activities. In practice, however, this decision encroached upon the capacity of
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enterprises to establish joint enterprises and develop direct links with other 
organisations (Rybakov 1989, 72-3).
Another factor which obstructed the exercise by CMEA enterprises of their 
formal rights stemmed from the long isolation of producers in traditional centralised 
economic systems from foreign markets. This resulted not only in their lack of 
experience and insufficient knowledge of prices and opportunities for cooperation 
within the CMEA, but most importantly in the limitation of production to several 
types of products (Rynki Zagraniczne 23 December 1988, 8). Furthermore, this 
long-term isolation of producers from foreign markets also resulted in a distinct 
propensity of enterprises for self-sufficiency and extreme caution in dealing with 
foreign contractors. This attitude obstructed interest in the development of 
cooperation and specialisation links with foreign enterprises, which were not subject 
to state guarantees {Pravda 28 September 1987, 5).
Furthermore, the degree and kind of limitation on the formal autonomy of 
enterprises varied in individual countries depending on the differences in 
centralisation of management and the extent of economic reforms. Polish enterprises 
were given broad rights to conduct foreign trade activities as early as 1982 (on the 
basis of the Law of 26 February 1982) and by 1986 practically all economic 
organisations had obtained rights to develop direct ties with enterprises and 
organisations, first with Soviet partners, later with other CMEA members. They had 
significant autonomy and it was a simple formality to obtain official registration. 
Polish enterprises also did not need to ask superior organs for permission to enter 
into individual foreign trade operations. Soviet enterprises, however, had to obtain 
such permission in those instances where their rights conflicted with powers 
reserved for superior organs. As a result of differences in the actual autonomy of 
enterprises the negotiations were often complicated by the need to consult superior 
bodies (Pravda 28 September 1987, 5).
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The actual economic independence of enterprises
Another group of factors obstructing the cooperation between enterprises and 
setting up of joint enterprises was related to the actual extent of economic 
independence of enterprises to participate in foreign economic activities.
As mentioned earlier, the effective functioning of the principle of self-financing 
of enterprises and full economic acountability was considered as one of the pre­
requisites of the effectiveness of these forms of cooperation, and CMEA reform was 
ostensibly based on this premise. In reality, however, the actual economic 
independence of enterprises was severely constrained by a number of factors related 
to the functioning of economic mechanisms at the national and CMEA levels. The 
actual functioning and effectiveness of such mechanisms depended on the range of 
economic instruments introduced. However, as will be shown, neither the Soviet 
Union nor Poland introduced sufficient changes in the economic system to make 
enterprises interested in exports and responsive to signals from the international 
economy.
As has been generally acknowledged, among the essential conditions for the 
genuine autonomy of enterprises are the removal of obligatory planned targets given 
to enterprises and the renunciation by central agencies of the right to allocate 
resources. Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 2, the opening of domestic 
economies and the encouragement of direct cooperation with other CMEA 
enterprises was dependent on the abolition of the distinction between the domestic 
and foreign markets. This required the abolition of the foreign trade monopoly, the 
reform of the domestic pricing system to reflect the true costs of production, its 
orientation towards the world market, and the introduction of realistic exchange rates 
of national currencies and at least their partial convertibility.
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In practice, however, despite the postulated increase in the economic 
independence of enterprises, in none of the CMEA countries were these conditions 
fully introduced. First of all, the economic autonomy which enterprises required in 
order to conduct foreign economic activities was limited by the continuing reliance 
on the centralised management of economies. The actual character and extent of 
central intervention in the economy depended on the advancement of reforms of 
domestic economic mechanisms.
As discussed earlier, foreign trade reform in the Soviet Union, was based on 
the assumption of increasing autonomy and economic accountability and self­
financing of enterprises. However, the decrees on foreign trade reform provided 
only rudimentary economic measures to ensure the realisation of this postulated 
economic independence of enterprises and the removal of barriers between foreign 
and domestic markets. This could be explained by the fact that this legislation was 
adopted sixteen months before the adoption of the major legislation of perestroika, at 
the time when reform still relied on traditional administrative measures.
However, perestroika, which commenced in 1988, while acknowledging the 
need for economic accountability of enterprises also envisaged only a gradual 
introduction of commodity-money relations. The basic conditions for the opening of 
the domestic economy and encouraging direct cooperation with other CMEA 
enterprises, mentioned earlier, such as reform of the domestic pricing system, as 
well as the introduction of realistic exchange rates for the rouble and at least its 
partial convertibility, were to be introduced only in the last stages of the reform 
(Spandarian and Shmelev 1988, 17).
In practice the reform did not change sufficiently the functions of the central 
apparatus; central directives, rather than indirect financial instruments, continued to 
determine enterprises decisions (Izvestiia, 24 April 1988). The most effective
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instrument of controlling enterprises were state orders which tended to cover 100 per 
cent of the planned volume of production and thus did not differ in any way from the 
plans which were previously confirmed from above. 1 Furthermore, the ministries 
used the new ‘control figures’ to determine the production.
The continuing reliance on administrative measures led to significant limitations 
of the exercise of these formal rights, as enterprises had first to take into account 
their obligations towards the state (Pravda 28 May 1987, 5; Zycie Gospodarcze 17 
January 1988, 8).2 Furthermore, the absence of the financial mechanism and pricing 
system, which would have imposed budget discipline on enterprises, made the 
effective functioning of the self-financing principle for enterprises impossible 
(Aslund 1992, 132). This also meant that there was no effective financial mechanism 
which would make enterprises interested in production for export, the introduction 
of new technologies or improvement of the quality of products.
Moreover even the very limited reform measures included in foreign trade 
reform decrees to encourage export orientation were ‘proceeding slowly and with 
some deviations from original intentions’ (Izvestiia 10 October 1987, 6). For 
example, incentives aimed at encouraging export production, such as those provided 
in the decree of August 1986, which postulated that enterprises were to retain 30-50 
per cent of their export revenues proved insufficient in the context of the existing 
economic mechanism. Furthermore, given the fact that in intra-CMEA trade there 
was no possibility for using additional transferable roubles, there was no incentive 
for enterprises to export to this market (Literatumaia gazeta 8 July 1987).
hn 1988 Ekonomicheskaia gazeta N ol7, 2 stated that ‘for the majority of enterprises and 
organisations [the production programme] for 1988 is virtually fully composed of state orders. In 
May 1988 Abalkin pointed out in an interview that, ‘Of all the clauses in the Law on Enterprises, 
in which the conception of state order was formulated, only one has been implemented - about its 
compulsory character, the others have not been implemented - the state order is spread to virtually 
all production, and not to the most important part; it is not allocated on the basis of competition; 
mutual responsibility of the sides has not been assured’ (Izvestiia 15 May 1988).
^In a typical case of a failed project, a Hungarian factory was interested in exports, however, its 
Soviet counterpart could not offer anything in exchange because its production was already 
‘owned’ by the state which had set planned targets.
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Similarly, the so-called differentiated currency coefficients which were 
established for various groups of commodities, and whose function was to allow the 
calculation of a domestic rouble value for each item in foreign trade had to be 
discarded because they were poorly conceived. As the reform progressed, the 
number of currency coefficients increased as enterprises demanded more favourable 
coefficients for particular groups of goods. In the end there was one individual 
currency coeffcient for each significant trade commodity (Ekonomicheskaia gazeta 
No 47, 1987).
Thus the Soviet foreign trade reform produced contradictory and undesired 
outcomes. According to Aslund (1992, 145) the Soviet foreign trade system, as a 
result of this reform, ‘remained a not very reformed muddle’. The only practical 
solution was the cutting of the number of currency coefficients and a move towards a 
uniform currency exchange rate {Ekon. sotr. 1988:2, 4-9). However, in practice the 
currency coefficients were replaced by a unified commercial exchange rate only in 
November 1990. At the same time, the commercial rate of the rouble was devalued 
by 70 per cent (Izvestiia 26 October 1990). Domestic prices were changed only in 
March 1990.
Moreover, in the Soviet Union, the continuing reliance on planned directives 
meant that economic reform did not change the traditional mechanism of elaborating 
national plans, which did not take seriously foreign economic ties as a factor in 
economic growth. Thus the level and composition of trade was still determined 
primarily by import needs, with exports regarded merely as means of financing 
imports (Rybakov 1989, 72). As Spandarian and Shmelev (1988, 18) have noted in 
the Soviet Union, this voluntaristic approach to planning exports even strengthened 
as the economic situation and trade balance worsened. This preference for relying on 
the traditional means of administrative commands in the management of foreign 
economic relations was also reflected in the practice of issuing decrees urging
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enterprises to attain world standards in technological level and quality of production 
(Spandarian and Shmelev 1988,16).
In Poland, the so called second stage of economic and foreign trade reform 
launched in 1987 went further than the Soviet one in terms of measures aimed at 
increasing self-financing of enterprises and their interest in foreign trade. The 
principles of economic reform gave enterprises significant autonomy, or at least 
made it difficult for central authorities to use directives (Baczynski 1988b, 17). They 
also included the new principles of setting prices which more accurately reflected 
economic scarcities, the devaluation of the zloty, and the opportunity for enterprises 
to buy foreign currencies at currency auctions. In practice, however, despite the 
attempts to use financial directives to coordinate economic activities, the reform 
measures resulted in pressures which actually increased the scope for direct 
microeconomic intervention by the state (Kaminski 1991, 73-6).
In foreign trade, as Piotrowski (1989, 3-5) has demonstrated, the reform 
measures sought to by-pass institutional barriers between foreign and domestic 
activities inherent in planned economies. For example, domestic prices remained 
separated from world market prices and exchange rates remained artificially set and 
did not reflect the purchasing power of national currencies. In particular, they did not 
affect the problem of the lack of uniform currency exchange rates for roubles, dollars 
and zlotys. In any case, it was still much easier for enterprises to sell their products 
on a domestic ‘seller’s’ market (Zielinski 1987, 3).
Finally, the economic autonomy of enterprises was limited by the design and 
implementation of the reform of CMEA mechanisms. As discussed earlier, the 
conditions for the formation of an integrated socialist market, outlined in the 
‘Collective Concept’, envisaged a gradual liberalisation of intra-CMEA trade 
agreements for 1990-95 by expansion of non-quota and value-based trade, and a
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transition to market mechanisms, such as the gradual introduction of convertibility of 
national currencies and the transferable rouble.
In reality, the reform, as discussed in chapter 4, was not implemented and 
bilateral trade negotiations remained the core of CMEA mechanism. As the volume 
of planned trade had not been reduced (and provisions that deliveries of goods and 
services for their operation were to be taken into account in coordination of plans and 
included in annual and long-term inter-govemment trade and settlement agreements 
remained in force), even those enterprises which were engaged in direct cooperation 
could exchange only those goods which had been earlier agreed at the national level 
within the framework of bilateral agreements. The procedure for including these 
mutual deliveries in such agreed quotas was long and complicated (Baczynski 
1988a, 17; Bakos 1987, 22-3).
Problems with the calculation of profitability of foreign trade 
transactions.
As discussed in chapter 2, CMEA countries did not have adequate domestic or 
joint economic instruments for calculating the effectiveness of their foreign trade 
transactions, including specialisation and cooperation of production, and for clearing 
accounts with CMEA trading partners. Their domestic exchange rates and pricing 
system were determined subjectively and independently, and their domestic 
currencies were inconvertible. A striking example of the lack of coherency of the 
intra-CMEA financial and currency system were exchange rates in CMEA countries: 
one US dollar was worth twice as much as the rouble in Poland, while in the Soviet 
Union the reverse was true. Furthermore, the existing intra-CMEA pricing system 
was also an artificial construct which was not related to the domestic systems of its 
members. An additional problem was the inconvertibility of the transferable rouble
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and its exchange rates which were set at an artificially high level in relation to 
national and convertible currencies.
The program of reform of domestic and CMEA mechanisms, envisaging at 
best a gradual transition to a socialist market economy, meant also that these 
inadequate pricing and financial systems were to remain basically unchanged for 
quite some time and that enterprises interested in direct cooperation or forming joint 
enterprises would not have at their disposal economic instruments to determine the 
financial, and economic aspects of a potential partnership.
The incompatibility of the CMEA financial and currency system with the 
development of these forms of cooperation became apparent at the stage of 
preparation of feasibility studies for joint ventures and preliminary discussions on 
the development of direct cooperation.
First of all, there were immense problems with calculating the profitability of 
projects - a task which required use of both of domestic and intra-CMEA pricing 
systems and arbitrary exchange rates (Zielinski 1987, 3; Rynki Zagraniczne 15 July 
1988, 1). Without proper prices and exchange rates it was also difficult to determine 
not only the amount of initial capital each country had to contribute but also how any 
profits would be divided. Nor could an agreement be reached on the division of 
research costs or the level of final prices (Rynki Zagraniczne 23 January 1987, 3-4).
Moreover, the artificial prices of domestic markets, in particular Soviet prices 
which included high subsidies, did not guarantee a profit on the sale of Polish 
products to the Soviet Union (Rynki Zagraniczne 23 December 1988, 8). This led to 
the abandonment of a potato processing enterprise after a feasibility study had 
showed that with the high subsidies on potatoes in the Soviet Union, the project, 80 
per cent of whose production was to be exported to the Soviet Union, could not be
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self-financing selling its products at Soviet domestic prices. On the same grounds 
Poland withdrew from the Biala Podlaska cotton-mill project (Baczynski 1988a, 17).
Secondly, due to inconvertibility of national currencies, enterprises had limited 
possibilities in clearing accounts with CMEA trading partners. The lack of access to 
national currencies, meant that they could not purchase products on the national 
markets of their partners. The only form of exchange open to enterprises was simple 
barter, and only with those enterprises with which cooperation had been established 
(Zielinski 1988, 1).
In order to eliminate these obstacles individual countries concluded bilateral 
agreements on the use of national currencies or convertible currencies instead of 
transferable roubles for mutual settlements made within the framework of direct ties 
and joint enterprises. They also changed the original provision that prices for the 
products of these enterprises would be determined on the basis of the intra-CMEA 
pricing system (Rynki Zagraniczne 27 December 1987, 8), and agreed on the 
introduction of negotiated prices in accounting for their cooperation. 1 For example, a 
Soviet-Polish agreement signed in April 1988 stipulated that enterprises participating 
in direct cooperation or joint enterprises had a right to conduct settlements for their 
services and goods using mutually agreed prices, expressed in transferable roubles 
or domestic currencies, which could differ from world or domestic prices (Zielinski 
1987, 3; Rynki Zagraniczne 15 July 1988, 1).
These agreements were accompanied by new banking arrangements which 
regulated settlements and accounts in national currencies. The Soviet Union and 
Poland planned to establish a joint financial institution ‘Sovpolinvest’, whose aim
^The agreements were signed between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and 
Bulgaria. East European countries probably concluded similar agreements between themselves, 
however information has not been readily available.
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was to provide and service credits for the operation of joint enterprises (Rynki 
Zagraniczne 15 July 1988, 1).
This partial currency ‘convertibility’, although falling short of a genuine one, 
was to give more flexibility to some enterprises in clearing accounts with CMEA 
trading partners. Settlements in national currencies were expected to enable 
enterprises to purchase products on the national markets of their partners 
(Rzeczpospolita 8 June 1988). These new arrangements were also aimed at by­
passing problems related to the artificial exchange rate of the transferable rouble as 
settlements in domestic currencies at the negotiated prices avoided its use. 1
In practice, however, the new methodology of price formation and new forms 
of settlements provided only a limited solution to problems in the development of 
cooperation between enterprises. This was because these arrangements were not 
accompanied by the institutional changes in domestic economic mechanisms required 
for the actual economic independence of enterprises and to stimulate their interest in 
production for export. The introduction of new financial arrangements, limited to 
specific transactions, by-passed but did not eliminate the problems of the lack of a 
proper pricing system or the inconvertibility of currency which were inherent in 
mechanisms of centrally planned economies.
As a result, given the existing autonomous domestic pricing systems, it was 
difficult to set a price which would satisfy both sides. This was particularly 
important in the case of self-financing enterprises where the level of prices affected 
the wages of their employees. Furthermore, in cases where mutual deliveries of parts 
were involved, their prices had to be related to the price of the final product, which
^The possibility of clearing of accounts without the transferable rouble was particularly important 
for enterprises in countries like Poland where imports in convertible currencies were financed from 
their own foreign earnings. In those cases when cooperation entailed imports in convertible 
currencies, settlements in transferable roubles, due to its heightened exchange rate, negatively 
affected the results of a transaction, and ultimately discouraged enterprises from cooperation with 
their CMEA counterparts.
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should not be higher than world prices. In situations when prime cost determined by 
agreed prices was higher than the sale price, the negative difference between prices 
had to be compensated from the state budget. This meant that the self-financing 
principle was rather illusory as enterprises remained dependent on the state budget 
(.Pravda Ukrainy 29 March 1988, 3).
In these conditions, the expectation that direct cooperation between enterprises 
would constitute the first step in the process which would eventually lead to the 
introduction of commodity-money relations and mutual convertibility of currencies 
within the CMEA did not materialise. As Ostrowski has noted (1989, 22), the 
development of direct cooperation in the situation where bilateral coordination of 
plans remained the primary mechanism of CMEA. cooperation led to the formation of 
two spheres of exchanges: a regulated and a free one, with specific pricing and 
currency systems.
Barriers in cooperation due to the lack of competitive export sectors.
Even if enterprises had been able to exercise full rights and had the economic 
instruments needed to become directly involved in foreign economic activities, this in 
itself would not have been a sufficient condition for their interest in cooperation, 
given the economic constraints on cooperation among CMEA economies, such as 
economic difficulties, shortages and the low technical level of production.
The impact of deepening economic crisis in the national economies of CMEA 
members on the development of direct ties was particularly well illustrated by the 
position of Polish enterprises. Their significant formal and economic independence 
was in practice severely constrained, if not effectively nullified, by problems with 
securing deliveries, by inflation, which intensified towards the end of the 1980s and 
by the lack of financial means, both for domestic and foreign trade purposes. 
Concequently, as mentioned earlier, enterprises were primarily interested in solving
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their short-term production problems not in the development of new technologies, or 
production for export (Rynki Zagraniczne 15 July 1988, 1). The problems of 
securing adequate supplies of materials also affected joint enterprises, which in 
accordance with legislation were not considered in national plans (Tarnowski 1989, 
18; Rybakov 1989, 72).
Structural shortages also had a strong impact on direct ties. They affected not 
only supplies of materials for production, but also rendered meaningless such 
measures as the introduction of settlements in national currencies, as enterprises 
were more interested in concrete goods than in obtaining currency which could not 
be spent on purchases (Baczynski 1988b, 18).
In some cases, as shown before, economic difficulties, paradoxically, led to 
cooperation. However their rationality was rather dubious, as the cooperation was 
the result of desperation and not based on proper economic calculations, and 
cooperation was often limited to mutually balanced exchanges.
The effectiveness of using economic instruments to encourage foreign trade 
activity was also diminished by the lack of an internationally competitive export- 
oriented industrial sector in individual countries. CMEA member economies were 
characterised, albeit in varying degrees, by low levels of technological development, 
declining productivity and decreasing competitiveness in manufactures with Western 
markets and enterprises were more interested in cooperation with the West which 
could provide crucial technology and funds than in direct cooperation within the 
CMEA {Polityka 30 April 1988, 4).l In view of the importance of the Soviet 
economy in CMEA, the development of cooperation in production depended in 
particular on the Soviet Union’s technological edge in the machine-building sector.
Un an interview with Polityka (30 April 1988, 4) a Polish ambassador to Moscow pointed out 
that in economic contacts with Western partners there were similar shortcomings in the economic 
mechanisms, such as artificial exchange rates, as with Soviet partners. However, there were more 
joint enterprises with the West than with the Soviet Union.
31 1
In reality, however as discussed earlier, its exports were dominated by raw 
materials, and its manufactured goods were not competitive, with only 15 per cent of 
manufactured goods being of international standards (Shmelev and Spandarian 
1988, 17).
There were also no prospects in the short term for the improvement of the 
structure of Soviet exports or the competitiveness of Soviet products. The Soviet 
Union’s expectations that the implementation of the CPSTP would lead to an 
improvement in the technological standards of Soviet manufactures did not 
materialise. Furthermore, Soviet strategy aimed at the increase of economically 
justified Soviet participation in the international division of labour failed because it 
was not properly conceived. It lacked proper export promotion measures and focus 
on the development of modem export-oriented sectors in investment policy 
(Spandarian and Shmelev 1988, 12; Rybakov 1989, 69).
Deliberate resistance to CMEA cooperation.
Another major obstacle to the implementation of Gorbachev’s strategy was the 
resistance of some East European countries to ‘imposed’ cooperation, in particular 
joint enterprises. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Poland, while initially taking 
part in the political campaign to impose cooperation from above, later resisted 
politically inspired initiatives and managed to ensure that only economically viable 
joint enterprises could be formed. 1 Similar barriers on direct cooperation between 
enterprises were imposed by Czechoslovakia and Hungary which put strict controls 
on enterprises in their direct trade with other CMEA countries to avoid unprofitable 
transactions or the export of domestically subsidized goods (Stone 1996, 234-6).
Ißy contrast, more politically submissive members, such as Bulgaria, participated without 
reservations in setting up joint enterprises with the Soviet Union. The possible connection 
between the degree of political submissiveness and the development of joint enterprises was 
evident in the number of these ventures in Poland and Bulgaria. For example, in April 1988 there 
were already seven Soviet-Bulgarian joint enterprises, while only one in Poland (Kuczynski 1989, 
76).
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The cooperation between enterprises was impeded by the lack of support or the 
giving of mere lip service to the Soviet strategy by some CMEA members, such as 
Romania and East Germany, who retained their centralised command systems of 
management. This was related to differences in the degree of reform of domestic 
economic mechanisms in individual East European countries which varied 
significantly as a result of the Soviet policy of allowing them to decide the pace and 
forms of economic development independently of Soviet reform. As a result of the 
consistent opposition of these countries to Gorbachev’s restructuring of CMEA, the 
implementation of the CMEA objective of transition to an integrated socialist market 
had to conform to the capacity of the ‘weakest link’.
The significance of such non-commitment for the implementation of CMEA 
strategies depended on the relative significance of an individual country in CMEA. 
Romania’s reluctance to participate in the CPSTP, or its decision to remain outside 
the policy of a unified market (the only CMEA member to do so) did not affect 
greatly the implementation of Gorbachev’s strategy, as Romania accounted for only 
about 3.5 per cent of all intra-CMEA trade. Of a different order, however, was East 
Germany’s decision in 1987 to opt out of the CMEA’s plans for currency 
convertibility. The GDR was economically the strongest, and perhaps the most 
technologically advanced CMEA member which accounted for about 15 percent of 
all intra-CMEA trade. Thus without the GDR’s participation integration within 
CMEA was unlikely to be successful.
Summary: The reasons for the failure of involvement of enterprises in 
CMEA cooperation
This part of the chapter demonstrated that despite political pressure and the 
creation of a legal basis for the development of direct cooperation between 
enterprises and the formation of a common market, the results of Gorbachev’s
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strategy were insignificant. The first reason for the failure of this strategy was the 
lack of appropriate economic mechanisms and sufficient institutional changes which 
would enable enterprises to exercise their legal and economic independence and 
make them interested in foreign trade activities.
As discussed in chapter 2, the domestic mechanisms of CMEA member 
economies were characterised by the absence of an effective financial mechanism 
which would make enterprises responsive to the requirements of the international 
economy and encourage an export orientation. The success of Gorbachev’s strategy 
was thus dependent on the elimination of these structural impediments inherent in 
domestic mechanisms. This required the abolition of the foreign trade monopoly, the 
reform of the domestic pricing system to reflect the true costs of production, its 
orientation towards the world market, and the introduction of realistic exchange rates 
of national currencies and at least their partial convertibility. Such a fundamental 
transformation of domestic economic systems would have to precede the formation 
of direct links.
Reforms undertaken in Poland and the Soviet Union did not, however, remove 
these structural impediments to the participation of enterprises in foreign trade 
activities which were inherent in the traditional Soviet-type of economic 
management. While they introduced half-measures such as the use of national 
currency in mutual settlements, they fell short of introducing measures which would 
ensure genuine self-financing of enterprises. Enterprises still had to operate within 
the framework of artificial domestic prices, exchange rates, and inconvertible 
currencies.
This approach to reforming the CMEA’s mechanism of cooperation was 
consistent with the general principles of Soviet reforms which were not aimed at 
undermining the logic of operation of the economic system, but only at its
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improvement. Furthermore, the Soviet reform of foreign trade at that stage still did 
not seek to open up the Soviet economy to the international market. Ultimately the 
reform of CMEA had to be subordinated to Soviet priorities of reform and the 
success of any CMEA reform was dependent on the state of the system of 
management of the Soviet Union’s national economy. The lack of improvement, 
despite Gorbachev’s reforms, in the area of the formation of wholesale trade and in 
the expansion of the economic functions of enterprises made impossible 
corresponding changes in the mechanism of CMEA cooperation.
The implementation of the reform program was also frustrated by East 
European resistance to the direct involvement of enterprises in CMEA integration. 
This was partly caused by the reliance in a majority of CMEA countries on the 
centralised management of economies and their refusal to introduce conditions to 
increase the autonomy of enterprises. Other, more reform-oriented members, 
obstructed the development of direct cooperation by placing controls on the operation 
of their enterprises for fear of exporting subsidised goods.
However, even if the necessary economic instruments for cooperation had 
been introduced in all CMEA countries and enterprises had been able to exercise full 
rights and had the economic instruments needed to become directly involved in 
foreign economic activities, the development of direct ties would still have been 
hindered by the economic constraints on cooperation among CMEA economies. 
These objective, structural barriers in the development of economic relations within 
the CMEA, such as economic difficulties, structural shortages experienced by 
CMEA members and the low technical quality of production, were a product of the 
extensive-type development of previous decades and a sign of the decreasing 
effectiveness of Soviet-type economies.
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Furthermore, it was doubtful whether enterprises would be interested in trade 
with other countries of the region given the generally low technological levels of 
manufactured products, in particular, the Soviet Union’s lack of technological edge. 
Moreover, East European economies were not complementary and lacked 
internationally competitive industries and were more interested in Western 
technology. This was confirmed by the developments after 1990 when, following 
disintegration of CMEA and the decreased involvement of the Soviet Union, existing 
ties between market economies of former CMEA countries proved to be insufficient 
for maintaining close cooperation.
Conclusion.
The problems with the implementation of CMEA strategies under Gorbachev 
derived primarily from the structural impediments to economic cooperation inherent 
in centrally planned economies - impediments which were not removed by the 
limited reforms of domestic economic systems. The limited character of domestic 
and CMEA reforms was the result of Soviet Union’s own inability to reform its own 
domestic economy. Furthermore, the reforms encountered objective structural 
barriers such as shortages, inflation, indebtedness and the lack of funds, which also 
derived from the internal logic of the domestic mechanisms of CMEA countries.
The discussion has thus demonstrated that the responsibility for the failure of 
Gorbachev’s reform of economic relations rested primarily with the Soviet Union. 
The problems hindering CMEA cooperation were the product of the logic of the 
operation of domestic economic mechanisms based on the Soviet-type model which 
could not be overcome while the Soviet Union maintained its centralised economy.
The implementation of CMEA strategies was also hindered by the effort of East 
European countries to minimise their participation in projects which conflicted with 
their interests. The behaviour of East European members was, however, a rational
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response to protect their interests in the face of the Soviet Union’s attempts at 
subordinating CMEA to its objectives and their need to find resources to modernise 
their economies with Western technologies, while having to operate within the 
constraints of institutional arrangements which precluded them from competing 
effectively in the international markets for manufactured goods.
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CONCLUSION
The process of economic cooperation among Soviet bloc countries was an example 
of several attempts at regional integration undertaken in different parts of the world in 
the post-war period. A key objective these initiatives had in common was the 
improvement of the economic potential of a group of countries on the basis of a more 
rational division of labor. This objective was also at the core of development of 
economic ties within the CMEA. What, however, made the case of this organisation 
different was firstly, that it involved centrally planned economies, and secondly that the 
integration of CMEA countries was not a mutual, voluntary act of interested states, but 
a part of the Soviet strategy of domination of East European countries. Thus apart from 
its economic objectives, CMEA was one of the Soviet bloc’s institutional mechanisms 
whose role was beneficial from the point of view of securing Soviet political interests: 
its economic functions were subordinated to the principal goal of maintaining Soviet 
political influence throughout Eastern Europe by way of its dominance of intra-bloc 
economic relations.
The central argument of this thesis has been that political criteria in Soviet decision­
making regarding CMEA, stemming from the commitment to securing Soviet 
domination, took precedence over economic criteria, and consequently CMEA 
objectives and mechanisms of cooperation had to be functional from the point of view 
of maintaining the Soviet system of political control over Eastern Europe and securing 
the political stability of its domestic system. In accordance with these political criteria, 
CMEA programs were subordinated to Soviet domestic economic priorities, the 
mechanisms of cooperation were not permitted to undermine the political underpinnings 
of the Soviet domestic system and had to conform to the Soviet model of economic
management.
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While stressing the dominance of political criteria in determining key features of 
CMEA operation, I have not argued that the CMEA was established for purely political 
purposes. I have demonstrated that CMEA was an answer to many economic 
considerations such as the need to develop a rational pattem of allocation of resources 
based on specialisation according to comparative advantage. I have also shown that the 
needs of the USSR economy were given high priority in Soviet decision-making 
regarding intra-CMEA economic relations. I have also demonstrated that the Soviet 
Union did not envisage CMEA cooperation as a means of subsidising East European 
economies and that it consistently sought to minimise the economic costs of maintaing 
its empire through the subordination of East European economic policies to the 
requirements of the Soviet economy.
Thus, while not underestimating the importance of Soviet economic objectives in 
CMEA decision-making, I have argued that political criteria were more important than 
the introduction of efficient mechanisms of cooperation or terms of cooperation which 
would have been economically profitable for all CMEA participants. In other words, the 
Soviet Union was prepared to maintain economic relations which w'ere not profitable 
together with inefficient mechanisms of cooperation which obstructed the expansion of 
cooperation, provided they were politically functional. Thus, ultimately, CMEA was 
primarily a political rather than an economic institution whose economic functions were 
determined by its political role as an instrument of Soviet political influence over 
Eastern Europe.
In Chapter 1 ,1 discussed the CMEA’s role in Soviet bloc politics during the 
Stalinist period. I demonstrated that in the first two years of its operation, until the 3rd 
Council Session in November 1950, during which the CMEA had an active role in 
intra-bloc relations, its main role was that of a de-facto supra-national authority with 
decision-making powers to determine the directions of economic development and set 
production targets to be met by key sectors within the individual national economies of
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East European countries in line with Soviet priorities. Moreover, the CMEA presided 
over the enforced reorientation of the foreign trade of member countries towards intra- 
bioc exchanges by exerting pressure for the conclusion of long-term trade agreements.
It served also as an instrument of pre-empting direct bilateral contacts between 
individual East European countries and the formation of a subregional integration 
groups by the establishment of chiefly bilateral economic relations between the Soviet 
Union and its satellites. The CMEA was also used to put pressure on individual East 
European countries to abrogate their trade agreements with Yugoslavia following the 
breaking of political relations with Tito.
I acknowledged that some of these functions, such as the diversion of trade towards 
intra-bloc exchanges, the subordination of East European economic planning to Soviet 
priorities and the separation of East European economies from world markets by 
weakening their trade links with the West, were economically beneficial for the Soviet 
Union, as they contributed to meeting Soviet domestic economic needs and assisted 
Soviet military plans, thus supplementing other economic measures aimed at the 
exploitation of East European economies. They also ensured the dominant economic 
position of the Soviet Union within the bloc and served Stalin’s priority of integrating 
East European economies with the Soviet Union’s.
I argued, however, that while these economic advantages should not be 
underestimated, they were not a primary motive for setting up the CMEA. An analysis 
of CMEA functions demonstrates firstly that its primary objective was to ensure 
political stability and to secure Soviet political interests in the region, and secondly that 
securing Soviet economic dominance within the bloc through measures aimed at forcing 
CMEA members into a relationship of dependency on the Soviet economy and the 
subordination of East European planning to Soviet priorities was primarily a means to 
this end, not an end in itself.
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This argument for the overriding importance of political criteria in decisions on 
CMEA economic functions is supported by the fact that the methods of its operation 
were conceived primarily as means of consolidating the system of political 
subordination of Eastern Europe rather than ensuring cooperation based on the rational 
pattern of allocation of resources. If Soviet decision-making criteria in determining 
methods of CMEA cooperation were primarily economic, then the CMEA would have 
been allowed to perform the functions of an organisation for regional cooperation based 
on the coordination of national economic policies, particularly investment decisions. 
Technically, the investments in these countries could have been made on the basis of 
co-ordination of national plans, and the CMEA might have secured national 
specialization within particular branches of industry consistent with their natural 
resources and technological potential. This was not, however, the case in practice as the 
Soviet Union blocked attempts by its satellites to establish mechanisms for the 
multilateral coordination of economic policies and for determining the areas of 
specialisation. As a result, East European countries, having been forced to implement a 
uniform strategy of economic development based on heavy industry, developed parallel 
high-cost industrial branches without regard for their raw material base, and mutually 
competitive rather than complementary industrial structures within the bloc.
Furthermore, without the Soviet Union’s need to shore up its political position by 
the creation of a separate socialist market, Eastern European countries would not have 
been forced to reorient their trade relations towards intra-bloc trade at the expense of 
their traditional ties with West European countries. Political considerations were also a 
motive behind CMEA activities aimed at establishing the radial pattem of intra-bloc 
relationships which provided the Soviet Union with more effective levers of control 
over policies of its satellites than would have been possible if East European countries 
had been allowed to continue direct interaction without the Soviet Union’s prior 
approval. Likewise, the ban on trade with Yugoslavia served the political objective of
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forcing Tito to accept the Soviet Union’s authority while having a detrimental effect on 
the economic exchanges of its satellites. As a result of the primacy of the political 
criteria these CMEA activities while functional from the point of view of securing 
Soviet political interests in the region, were detrimental to the East European economies 
and the long -term prospects of intra-bloc economic cooperation.
The primacy of political criteria in Soviet decision-making was also apparent in a 
decision to reduce the CMEA’s role to the elaboration of procedures for trade 
agreements once Stalin had decided to rely on direct interference in the planning 
systems and primarily informal ties to maintain Soviet control over Eastern Europe. If 
the CMEA had been allowed to play the role of an organisation for multilateral regional 
cooperation which sought to coordinate plans and elaborate a common economic policy, 
this could have influenced the allocation of industries on a more rational basis than the 
one imposed later by the direct interference of the Soviet Union.
The main objective of Stalinist economic policy towards Eastern Europe was thus 
not the integration of the bloc economies by means of a common strategy based on 
production specialisation and comparative advantage but the securing of greater control 
over Eastern European economies as a means for securing their political subordination. 
As a result of the primacy of political criteria in CMEA decision-making only those 
objectives and mechanisms of cooperation were allowed which were functional from 
the point of view of the objective of Soviet political domination.
Following Stalin’s death, the new Soviet leadership seemed to have acknowledged 
the negative economic consequences for member countries of the dominance of political 
criteria in the determination of their economic policies and of the reliance on foreign 
trade agreements for the coordination of their economic strategies. It was not, however, 
until 1957 that the CMEA was allowed to assume the function of coordinating the 
economic policies of its members. In the meantime, the coordination of economic plans
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was conducted effectively by Gosplan, which arbitrarily assigned to individual East 
European countries targets for output and export levels without regard to their own 
production capacities, import needs or balance of payments.
Thus, as under Stalin, the Soviet Union used CMEA mechanisms to dictate 
economic policies to Eastern Europe and organised the cooperation and structure of 
exchanges which would be most efficient from the point of view of the political criteria 
of securing control over the region, rather than allowing countries to pursue economic 
policies consistent with their economic priorities and developmental needs.
There was, however, a change in the Soviet approach to the functions of intra-bloc 
economic cooperation after 1957. The impulse came from a gradual shift in Soviet 
policy towards an increase in the internal autonomy of the satellite countries, 
subsequently reinforced by protests in 1956 in Hungary and Poland against the Stalinist 
methods of rule. These upheavals led to the recognition by the Soviet leaders of the 
need to renounce the policy of direct interference in East European economic policies 
and replace it with new methods of bloc management which recognised the need for 
East European governments to build their own domestic basis for legitimacy based to a 
greater degree on economic performance. Furthermore, the signing in March 1957 of 
the Treaty of Rome which established the European Economic Community posed a 
challenge to socialist countries to find appropriate ways of making the bloc 
economically competitive in relation to the West. As a result of these intra-bloc 
developments and external pressures the Soviet Union moved finally away from the 
exploitation of East European resources towards the establishment of more equitable 
commercial ties. It also took steps towards regional economic cooperation which 
would, on the one hand, meet the challenge of the integration policies of the West, and 
on the other, allow East European governments to secure economic growth in line with 
their domestic needs and technological capacities. The result of taking into account these 
political and economic considerations was the formulation in 1958 as the main CMEA
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objective the development of an international socialist division of labor (ISDL) based on 
the specialisation and the coordination of production. The ISDL was proclaimed as an 
instrument for the rational use of national resources and for avoiding parallel economic 
development, raising the efficiency of production, achieving high rates of growth, and 
gradually diminishing the differences in levels of economic development between 
member countries.
The rejuvenation of the CMEA and the re-orientation of economic policies towards a 
more rational allocation of resources was thus motivated to a large degree by economic 
considerations. The policy was not, however, carried out in disregard of Soviet political 
domestic and regional interests. The renunciation of Stalinist methods of terror and 
direct interference required new methods of managing bloc relations and political criteria 
continued to be a decisive factor in determining CMEA mechanisms and forms of 
cooperation.
The primacy of political motives was evident first of all in the choice of the methods 
of CMEA cooperation. The principal mechanism for the coordination of economic 
policies of CMEA members was the coordination of national production and investment 
plans in selected sectors with financial instruments playing a passive role in this 
process. The dominant role of administrative instruments was consistent with the 
commitment of the Soviet leadership to centralised planning as the basic principle of the 
system of management and with a claim that planned economic development guaranteed 
a high and steady rate of growth. The conformity of the principles of cooperation with 
the basic principles of the Soviet model was also essential from the point of view of the 
maintenance of legitimacy of the Soviet domestic system. This choice was, however, 
doubtful judging by the criteria of economic rationality, as inherent in its logic were 
limitations which seriously impaired the effectiveness of CMEA mechanisms as 
instruments for multilateral cooperation, in particular the coordination of investments 
and the development of specialisation and cooperation in the production sphere.
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Moreover, the methods of implementation of CMEA strategies were subordinated to 
the Soviet Union’s desire to ensure the continuing integration of East European 
economies and their systems of management into the Soviet system. Accordingly, the 
coordination of plans, which was the basis for selecting the main areas of specialization 
and for determining the structure of intra-bloc trade, was aimed at ensuring that the 
priorities of economic development of East European members were linked with the 
targets of Soviet economic plans. This policy was beneficial, if judged by the political 
criterion of securing greater control over the member economies to ensure that East 
European economic strategies did not undermine the Soviet Union’s dominant 
economic position in the bloc. Similar considerations lay behind Khrushchev’s 
proposal of transforming the CMEA into a supranational body with the national 
planning agencies subordinate to its authority.
The political considerations were also evident in the continuation of the Stalinist 
policy of the development in satellite countries of industries producing mainly for the 
Soviet market and dependent on Soviet raw materials and energy. While, admittedly, 
this model of cooperation enabled the development in East European states of the 
machine-building industries, the specialisation for the Soviet market was not 
economically viable in the long-term as it encouraged development of material and 
energy-intensive industries which were isolated from the conditions of the international 
economy. Furthermore, it had a negative effect on the prospects for economic 
integration, as it was not conducive to the development of complementary links between 
East European countries. These economic criteria were, however, assigned a secondary 
place to the Soviet priority of maintenance of a self-perpetuating and structural 
dependence of East European national economies on Soviet supplies and markets.
In sum, Soviet policy towards the CMEA under Khrushchev evolved from using it 
as an instrument for the arbitrary imposition of Soviet objectives on East European 
economies, to the development of economic cooperation which allowed East European
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members some degree of economic autonomy and provided mechanisms to elaborate a 
common strategy of intra-bloc cooperation. However, despite this increased emphasis 
on economic criteria, the political motives of ensuring conformity with the Soviet 
model, and securing for the Soviet Union a dominant economic position in the region 
were more important than the introduction of efficient mechanisms of cooperation and 
economically-justified bloc-wide specialisation. In other words, principles of CMEA 
cooperation dictated by the logic of securing the Soviet political position through 
perpetuating economic dependence and control were more important than the potential 
economic benefits which could be obtained through the introduction of efficient 
mechanisms of cooperation and specialisation directions in line with domestic economic 
conditions and world market requirements.
Brezhnev and his two successors continued this policy of using CMEA for 
fostering intra-bloc economic cooperation, while ensuring that it could be used as 
potential levers of control over East European policies. In comparison with 
Khrushchev’s approach the emphasis was shifted again towards increasing the 
contribution of East European states to the needs of the Soviet economy. An emphasis 
on political criteria in decision-making was reflected in the introduction of mechanisms 
of cooperation which secured Soviet control over East European economies, but did so 
at the expense of their efficiency and by inhibiting modernisation of bloc economies and 
the acceleration of scientific-technological progress, which would have increased in the 
long-term economic viability of the bloc.
In the first years of Brezhnev’s rule economic considerations guiding Soviet policy 
towards CMEA were related first of all to the growing concerns among its members 
with finding appropriate strategies to overcome the slowing down of the rates of growth 
of production and declining productivity and the increasing gap in terms of quality and 
technological standards between the Soviet bloc and Western products.
3 2 6
For the Soviet Union itself a major economic consideration was also the question of 
ensuring the economic viability of the existing model of cooperation based on the 
exchange of Soviet raw materials and energy for manufactured products from East 
European countries. This strategy was increasingly perceived by the Soviet policy 
makers as too costly, as the rising costs of the development and transportation of raw 
materials rendered their exports relatively unprofitable. Moreover, the perception of the 
unprofitability of these exchanges was enhanced because East Europeans paid for their 
imports with manufactured products below the technological standards and quality of 
Western products but valued at world market prices.
These issues did not have purely economic importance, but had political implications 
for the maintenance of Soviet influence as well. The structural problems with ensuring 
the economic viability of Soviet bloc countries held serious possibilities for 
undermining the political stability of individual countries as well as bloc cohesion. 
Moreover, while the model of cooperation was relatively unprofitable, it had the distinct 
political advantage of perpetuating dependence of East European economies on the 
Soviet market and energy supplies and could not be abandoned without jeopardising 
Soviet political domination. The task of finding appropriate solutions to these problems 
became even more urgent after 1968 as the consolidation of the Soviet bloc’s ‘unity and 
cohesion’ was placed high on the Soviet agenda in the wake of the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, and as a result of disagreements in the communist movement and the 
prospects for a rapid expansion of economic exchanges with the West.
These economic and political concerns were addressed in the 1971 Comprehensive 
Program (CP) which outlined the strategy of socialist economic integration. The 
economic objectives of the CP included the attainment of greater efficiency in the 
region-wide allocation and utilization of productive and scientific and technical 
resources, the development of specialisation and cooperation in individual branches of 
production, in particular in the machine-building industry, and the introduction of
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advanced technological processes in the key sectors of the national economies. The 
implementation of the CP was intended to transform the traditional model of 
cooperation from a reliance primarily on trade ties to one in which relations between 
member economies were based on regional specialization and cooperation in the 
production sphere. A related outcome was to be an improvement in the structure of 
intra-bloc trade as a result of a transition from trade in energy and raw materials to trade 
in manufactures and equipment and an increase in the proportion of technologically 
advanced products in intra-CMEA trade.
While this strategy appeared to be guided by economic considerations, sharing the 
benefits of cooperation among all members, in practice integration strategy was the 
outcome of Soviet calculations of its potential political and economic gains and losses 
with political criteria ultimately of overriding importance.
The dominance of political criteria was implicit first of all in the Soviet Union’s 
decision not to change the pricing system towards more equitable terms of exchange, 
despite a perception that CMEA’s trade was becoming an increasing financial burden. A 
decision made on the basis of economic criteria and the renunciation of the trade 
arrangements which ensured the perpetuation of the dependence of Eastern Europe on 
the Soviet economy, while bringing immediate economic benefits, would have been 
tantamount to foregoing the political advantages of this model which provided the 
means of exerting political pressure on the Eastern European states. This model of 
cooperation allowed the Soviet Union to use its leverage as the supplier of raw materials 
and energy to achieve political submission of its satellites by determining the terms on 
which trade agreements were conducted i.e. the levels of Soviet deliveries or prices 
were dependent on the degree of conformity with Soviet policy directives. For example, 
under Brezhnev, East Germany and Bulgaria got disproportionately large deliveries of 
oil as a reward for the pursuit of pro-Soviet policies. The Soviet Union’s decision to 
maintain a model of cooperation which was not profitable for the Soviet economy but
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which encouraged the continuing dependence of East European members on the Soviet 
economy was thus the result of the political determination to forsake its short-term 
economic advantages for long-term political gains.
Moreover, the Soviet Union did not intend to subsidise Eastern Europe indefinitely. 
The integration strategy was primarily designed to ensure in the long-term a decrease in 
the Soviet costs of maintaining the existing model of exchanges at a substantial cost to 
East European economies. The measures aimed specifically at minimising the perceived 
losses incurred through trade and entailed a number of ‘reverse subsidies’ imposed on 
its satellites through forced participation in the development of Soviet fuel and energy 
resources and specialisation agreements. These ‘subsidies’ entailed sharing in 
transportation expenditures related to joint investments, provision by East European 
members of cheap credits raised in the world financial markets, provision of labour and 
services below world market prices and imports of costly Western technologies, paid in 
convertible currencies, which were needed in order to produce the high quality products 
demanded by the Soviet Union.
From the mid-1970s the strategy of seeking an increase in East European 
contributions to Soviet priorities resulted in cuts in Soviet deliveries of raw materials, 
pressures for an improvement in the quality of East European machinery exports, and 
specific demands regarding the composition of exports. East European states were also 
forced to subsidize less developed Soviet Third World client states by importing their 
products. Poland for instance, an exporter of sugar herself, was obliged to import sugar 
from Cuba.
Furthermore, the Soviet policy-makers expected that intra-branch specialisation 
agreements would lead to the improvement of the technological standards of Soviet final 
products, and thus the improvement of the Soviet terms of trade by an increase in the 
share of manufactured products and a reduction in the share of energy and raw materials
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in Soviet exports to CMEA. The Program aimed to improve the Soviet foreign trade 
structure, and thus terms of trade, by reducing the share of energy and raw materials in 
Soviet exports to Eastern Europe, and reducing the share of East European 
manufactures in Soviet imports.
The terms of trade agreements, the forced contributions to joint investment projects 
and specialisation agreements often conflicted with the requirements of East European 
economic development strategies, as they resulted in the diversion of national resources 
away from investments in modernising their economies. Moreover, specialisation 
agreements interfered with the viable development of the East European economies, as 
they fostered the specialisation within one market instead of allowing East European 
enterprises to develop production which w'ould meet the requirements of international 
markets.
Soviet disregard for East European economic interests continued in the early 1980s 
when the Soviet Union implemented measures aimed at the prompt reduction of East 
European trade deficits which had significantly increased as the price of oil on the 
CMEA market began to rise. It insisted, for example, on the redirection to the Soviet 
market of East European goods meant for Western markets, thus diminishing their 
earnings of convertible currencies, or demanded imports of products which were 
essential for the operation of their national economies. When oil prices began to fall and 
the output of Soviet oil began to stagnate, the Soviet Union, in order to maintain its 
foreign currency revenue, responded by reducing sales to the CMEA by over 10 per 
cent and increasing exports to the West.
Another sign of the subordination of CMEA decision-making to Soviet political 
interests rather than to economic criteria of efficiency was evident in the choice of 
CMEA methods of cooperation. The CP was to be implemented chiefly by joint 
planning and the strengthening of the CMEA organisational structure, with the
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instruments of indirect coordination playing a passive role in foreign trade transactions. 
The continuing reliance on the planned instruments of CMEA cooperation was a direct 
consequence of the decision of the Soviet leadership following the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia to limit economic reforms in Soviet bloc countries to the streamlining of 
the existing system of economic planning and management, with any increase of the 
independence of enterprises subordinated to the overriding role of central planning. 
Brezhnev was afraid that more radical reforms involving decentralisation of decision­
making could undermine the political underpinnings of the system. This meant that the 
barriers to cooperation, inherent in the economic mechanism of centrally planned 
economies, described in chapter 2, were preserved. In the absence of a reform of 
CMEA pricing, planning and currency systems, specialisation agreements were 
ineffective and formalistic, as under CMEA and domestic pricing systems there were no 
financial incentives to invest in technology and develop intra-branch specialisations.
The persistence of ineffective mechanisms of cooperation hindered the 
implementation of strategies in several ways. Firstly, these mechanisms did not provide 
sufficient incentives for enterprises to produce for export, to increase productivity and 
ensure high quality of products. Secondly, they contributed to the continuation of the 
dependence on intensive and material-energy technologies. The third negative 
consequence was the impossibility of developing multilateral cooperation and the lack 
of economic incentives for the development of production for export and intra-branch 
specialisation agreements. This underlying mechanism affected the performance of all 
CMEA members who failed to fulfil their commitments in particular with regard to the 
implementation of specialisation agreements. As a result, none of these apparently 
rational measures, which were intended to contribute to a breakthrough in mutual ties 
and shift the basis of cooperation from trade relations to regional specialization and 
cooperation of production, were successful.
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The outcome of political calculations was also the introduction of new procedures of 
plan coordination, including joint planning, which were to ensure that the 
implementation of the strategy was subject to Soviet control. The formulation of a joint 
plan was based on a principle that the establishment of common objectives for a given 
sector or type of production should be completed before national plans were approved 
and that these objectives should be included in the national plans of each participating 
country. The new procedure of ‘pre-plan coordination’ presupposed the gradual 
transfer of planning prerogatives from national authorities to central planning organs in 
CMEA. This would considerably increase Soviet powers with regard to the 
development of specific production branches in line with the priorities of the Soviet 
economy. In other words, the joint plan would function as a kind of supranational plan 
which would allocate investment projects to participating countries from a Soviet rather 
than a national viewpoint. The subordination to Soviet preferences was also ensured in 
the case of joint investments which were subject to Soviet control over all their main 
aspects: conception, planning, production and distribution.
In Chapter 4 ,1 examined decision-making criteria regarding intra- bloc economic 
relations under Gorbachev. I showed that during that period CMEA’s role and the 
relative importance of political and economic criteria in CMEA decision-making 
underwent three changes directly related to shifts in Soviet foreign policy priorities in 
Eastern Europe.
In the first phase, lasting until the end of 1987, economic considerations in Soviet 
policy towards CMEA were related first of all to the state of the Soviet economy which 
was characterised by a persistent decline in the rate of economic growth, poor efficiency 
in the utilisation of raw materials, and an increasing gap in terms of quality and 
technical level of manufactures in relation to industrialised countries. These symptoms 
of worsening economic performance also characterised other bloc countries. Moreover, 
it seemed that the costs of maintaining an ‘empire’ could only increase, as the Soviet
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Union was even compelled to extend credits to some East European countries to 
alleviate their economic problems.
Another major Soviet economic consideration was the constraint on the 
development of the existing model of intra-bloc exchanges of Soviet raw materials for 
finished products from Eastern Europe evident in a sharp decline in the real volume of 
intra-CMEA trade. This was the result of the combination of Eastern Europe’s inability 
to provide the required goods and the declining potential of the Soviet Union to 
maintain existing levels of exports of energy and raw materials and meet growing East 
European demand for these products. Furthermore, the competitive nature of East 
European economies, poor technical levels and low quality of their largely 
uncompetitive exports offered little incentive for CMEA countries to trade with one 
another.
In terms of political considerations, the Soviet Union still regarded as an overriding 
priority the securing of its strategic interests and the maintenance of the system of 
political control in Eastern Europe, and viewed with apprehension the constraints on 
expanding cooperation within CMEA. With the breaking down of the material basis for 
cooperation, the Soviet Union was in danger of losing the instruments for influencing 
its members as well as the basis for CMEA cohesion. There was no immediate 
alternative, as the Soviet Union was unable to secure its influence and economic 
position by means of high-technology exports.
Soviet strategies for solving these domestic and intra-bloc problems included two 
CMEA initiatives: the CPSTP and the development of direct cooperation between 
enterprises and the creation of joint ventures. At the level of formal pronouncements 
these two strategies seem designed to improve the economic performance of all member 
states. The strategy of cooperation outlined in the CPSTP was aimed at the 
modernisation of the production base through the introduction of modem technologies
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and methods of management of production. It was seen as a means of increasing the 
quality and technological level of production thus leading to an increase of high- 
technology products in CMEA exports and their competitiveness in the world market.
The strategy of developing direct participation of economic organisations in CMEA 
cooperation was based on an increase in the legal and economic autonomy of 
enterprises which was designed to give producers an incentive to expand the production 
of goods for export and force them to introduce technological innovations and improve 
the quality of products. Accordingly direct links were seen as the most effective means 
of raising efficiency, and ultimately improving the quality and competitiveness of 
products. They were also regarded as the primary instrument for the radical 
transformation of the traditional model of cooperation by ensuring a shift from primarily 
trade-based ties to extensive specialization and cooperation links and increasing 
exchanges of goods produced on a cooperative basis.
An examination of their objectives and methods of cooperation demonstrates, 
however, that the actual objective of these measures was primarily to secure, in the 
long-term, the dominant Soviet economic position in intra-bloc economic relations 
through an improvement in the technological standards of Soviet manufactures and the 
generation of alternative forms of economic dependence. The political criteria also 
determined the methods of cooperation which were primarily aimed at extracting the 
highest possible contribution to Soviet projects from its partners through subordination 
of East European economic planning to Soviet priorities and the control of the 
implementation of the program by Soviet organisations, rather than the development of 
cooperation based on an active participation of CMEA members in world economic 
relations.
With regard to the CPSTP this motive was evident first of all in the selection of 
designated areas of the program which were identical to the sectoral priorities adopted in
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the Soviet 12th five-year plan. These objectives of the Program set the investment 
priorities for the 1986-90 national plans of East European countries and were to be 
taken into account during the coordination of economic plans. In accordance with these 
provisions, East European states were responsible for securing the material and 
financial means for the implementation of CPSTP projects. The subordination of the 
CPSTP to Soviet political and economic objectives was also indicated by the Soviet 
Union’s withdrawal of its own most advanced technology from the program, on the 
pretext that it had military application. This behaviour combined with the lack of 
adequate protection of copyrights, which enabled the Soviet Union to appropriate the 
technology provided within the projects by East European participants, meant that the 
Soviet Union used the CPSTP as a one-way flow of technology.
Furthermore, the primary political functions of the CPSTP were implicit in the 
notion that new technologies introduced under the program should be generated 
primarily within the bloc. From the Soviet perspective this strategy of CMEA 
technological self-sufficiency was consistent with the continuing political tensions in 
relations with the West, which limited Soviet access to Western technology. It was also 
in conformity with the Soviet desire to control the development of Eastern European 
economic relations with the West, which were perceived by the Soviet Union as 
threatening the maintenance of power and stability in Eastern Europe. However, this 
logic was in conflict with the East European preference for importing technology from 
the West as the most effective method of improving the efficiency of their economies. 
Furthermore, by participation in the CPSTP they had to forego opportunities to develop 
particular sectors in line with the requirements of world markets, as they were forced to 
direct their research and investment towards the specialised Soviet market instead of 
towards the mainstream world market.
The overriding importance of political criteria was similarly evident in the design of 
CPSTP management structures which were to ensure the exercise of direct Soviet
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control over the implementation of projects by East European organisations and the 
integration of East European scientific and technological networks into the Soviet 
infrastructure.
A political objective of incorporating key areas of East European economies into the 
Soviet management system was also implicit in the Soviet pressure for the development 
of direct cooperation and setting up joint ventures. This motive was indicated by the 
terms of the establishment of joint enterprises, proposed by the Soviet Union, which 
allowed the Soviet side to exercise control over the operation of enterprises, even if they 
were not located on its territory.
Finally, the political criteria of conformity with the Soviet model and with the 
principles of Soviet foreign trade reforms, rather than the economic criteria of 
efficiency, determined the mechanisms of implementation of these strategies. Soviet 
reforms removed some of the formal constraints on the autonomy of enterprises but did 
not deviate from the principle of the monopoly of foreign trade which was the main 
barrier to direct cooperation between producers and research groups and the setting up 
of joint enterprises in centrally planned economies. The underlying assumption was 
that, instead, the changes in the independence of enterprises would make it possible to 
by-pass the state monopoly of foreign trade. By the same logic, it was expected that the 
cooperation of enterprises operating under the arrangements of the CPSTP would 
eliminate departmental fragmentation which inhibited the resolution of key inter-branch 
scientific and technical problems. Cooperation between individual enterprises was thus 
seen as a way of overcoming the barriers obstructing technology transfers between 
individual economies, caused by their institutionalised isolation. These inherent 
limitations of the reform meant, however, that it did not introduce sufficient changes to 
create economic conditions which were necessary for the direct cooperation of 
enterprises, and as a result the envisaged mechanisms of cooperation could not operate 
effectively. This meant that CMEA countries had to rely on the traditional and inefficient
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mechanisms of cooperation which created institutional barriers to efficiency by 
obstructing technological innovation and a pro-export orientation of production.
In the second phase of Gorbachev’s rule, covering the period until the end of 1989, 
the main CMEA program was the ‘integrated common market’ strategy adopted in 
1988. The strategy outlined the stages for the gradual formation of the conditions for a 
socialist ‘common market’ based on free movement of goods, services and other factors 
of production, with the active involvement of economic organisations in intra-bloc 
cooperation. In contrast to the previous 39 years of CMEA operation, the socialist 
market was to be built in cooperation with capitalist countries and by adjusting the 
development directions of its participants to the requirements of the world economy. 
This shift in policy came in the wake of the admission by the Soviet leaders of the 
failure of the self-imposed isolation from the world economy and their 
acknowledgement of the need for active participation in world economic relations as the 
most effective means of accelerating economic growth. This shift in policy signified 
giving greater importance to economic criteria in the development of CMEA economic 
cooperation and implied a new Soviet understanding of the importance of national 
economic interests in relation to political interests in its policy towards Eastern Europe.
Despite the new rhetoric, the primary objective of the common market strategy was 
to ensure the expansion of Soviet control over their economic policies, thus enhancing 
the Soviet Union’s political leverage over CMEA members. This motive was implicit in 
the Soviet Union’s opposition to any reforms which would drastically change the 
traditional system of inter-state bilateral agreement towards a more liberalised system of 
exchanges and a CMEA pricing system based on more equitable principles. The reason 
was that the traditional model of cooperation ensured the preservation of trade 
arrangements which kept Eastern Europe dependent on the Soviet economy and any 
liberalisation would have led to a loss of the levers of political influence.
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The political criterion of conformity to the principles of the Soviet economic model 
also had a decisive importance for the limited and evolutionary character of the reform 
of CMEA cooperation mechanisms. Gorbachev’s program for the restructuring of the 
system of economic management combined the increased economic and financial rights 
of enterprises with centralised economic management because of the fear of the Soviet 
leadership that more radical changes might endanger its control over the national 
economy. In effect, the reforms did not remove structural barriers which were inherent 
in the traditional Soviet-type economic management and did not introduce the 
organisational and economic conditions necessary for the the participation of enterprises 
in foreign trade, as such changes necessitated market-oriented reforms in the domestic 
wholesale and monetary system. As a consequence, despite an explicit commitment to 
the creation of conditions for the regulation of CMEA cooperation by means of market 
instruments, the strategy envisaged only a limited role for commodity-money 
instruments and only limited autonomy for enterprises. The main instrument for the 
coordination of economic polices was to remain the coordination of national plans, and 
bilateral trade agreements were to remain a principal means of regulating intra-bloc 
exchanges. Accordingly, the reform of monetary relations was limited to overcoming 
the shortcomings of the existing financial system which relied on the transferable 
rouble, by the introduction of mutual convertibility of national currencies and 
convertibility of the transferable rouble into other currencies, without however 
dismantling it completely. Similarly, despite an increase in the independence of 
enterprises, the central authorities were to retain considerable regulatory powers over 
economic relations.
Thus, despite a reformist rhetoric, the actual meaning of the common market 
proposal had to be understood in the context of a centrally planned economy and the 
planned regulation of CMEA cooperation conducted at the intergovernmental level, 
which made it possible for the Soviet Union to employ instruments of political pressure
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on its partners. These principles also meant that despite the renunciation of the idea of a 
separate socialist market as a self-sufficient economic entity, enterprises still did not 
have the necessary instruments for the comparison of prices with conditions prevailing 
in world markets. Instead, the expectation was that direct cooperation between 
enterprises would constitute the first step in a process which would eventually lead to 
the introduction of commodity-money relations and mutual convertibility of currencies 
within the CMEA and to overcoming constraints resulting from the system of rigid 
bilateral agreements.
In the end, the strategy of the socialist ‘common market’ was not, however, 
implemented in practice. After mid-1988 there was a shift in Soviet policy towards the 
re-examination of the expediency of the maintenance of the existing model of economic 
cooperation with Eastern Europe within the overall foreign economic strategy. On the 
economic side, this was the result of domestic economic imperatives to modernise 
production and improve efficiency in the use of energy and raw materials. In the context 
of growing debt and limited exports, combined with increasing access to Western credit 
and technology, Soviet priorities were shifting towards imports of high quality goods 
from the West, not substandard East European products. Moreover, the continuing 
economic slowdown, structural imbalances and the steadily increasing hard currency 
debt of East European countries made it increasingly clear that they were unable to 
improve their economic performance without access to external sources of financing, 
which the Soviet Union was not in a position to provide. In fact to maintain the system 
of political control the Soviet Union would need to subsidise East European economies 
to the point of endangering its own national economic interests.
On the political side, the new approach to CMEA signified the reevaluation of the 
relative importance of Eastern Europe in Soviet foreign policy. The need to ease 
domestic economic problems and secure Soviet status in international politics prompted 
a serious re-evaluation of Soviet foreign policy objectives, which led to a series of
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initiatives aimed at the improvement of relations with the West. This new policy 
orientation led to progress in arms reduction agreements, which opened up the 
prospects of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the region, to be completed by mid- 
1991. The implication of these developments was the possibility of the transformation 
of the entire political-security balance in Europe, which would entail the diminishing 
strategic and political significance of East European states. From the Soviet perspective, 
these developments meant that there was no longer so compelling a necessity to control 
its allies and to maintain economic relations which were unprofitable economically but 
were perceived as useful for the perpetuation of political subordination.
The new Soviet perception of Eastern Europe and appropriate ways of securing its 
interests led to a shift in Soviet foreign policy towards securing its interests in Eastern 
Europe through influence rather than political domination and control. This was 
reflected in a new Soviet policy of non-interference in East European internal affairs and 
departure from the insistence on one model of development. This policy, by 
implication, effectively removed the threat of Soviet intervention as an excuse for 
conservative East European regimes for not undertaking far-reaching internal reforms 
and signalled to East European leaderships that they had to assume responsibility for 
their own political as well as their countries’ economic survival.
With regard to CMEA this shift in Soviet policy towards influence rather than 
domination resulted in the development of a new model of economic relations based 
increasingly on economic rather than political criteria. This found expression in the 
imposition by the Soviet side of conditions on trade agreements which were aimed at 
the restoration of its trade balance and a reduction of transactions which were perceived 
as benefiting East Europeans. In accordance with this new approach the Soviet Union 
overturned its earlier commitments and reduced the levels of its exports of raw materials 
and fuels and began to accept only those East European manufactured products which 
satisfied high technological standards and were not relatively overpriced. Furthermore,
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it substantially reduced the East European surplus in machinery exports by firmly 
imposing reductions in key commodity imports across the board and doubled the quota 
of machinery that was imported from the Soviet Union. This shift towards profitability 
of intra-bloc exchanges was still conducted, however, within the framework of 
intergovernmental agreements and a pricing system which enabled the Soviet Union to 
take advantage of the dependency of its partners to retain the degree of influence needed 
to advance its political interests.
In the period from late 1989 the primary factor in Soviet decisions towards CMEA 
was the need to ease the domestic economic problems of the country, which included an 
increasingly evident failure of economic reform and deepening economic crisis. In the 
light of the deteriorating economic performance it was generally accepted that only 
cooperation with the West could provide the capital and technology required to build a 
market economy and secure Soviet status in international politics. These internal 
economic pressures, in the context of the diminishing strategic significance of Eastern 
Europe resulting from progress in arms reduction agreements, led to the reassessment 
by the Soviet leadership of the expediency of maintaining its empire. In political terms, 
this process of re-evaluating Soviet foreign policy priorities found its reflection in the 
policy of non-intervention in the process of the disintegration of communist rule in 
individual East European countries. With regard to intra-bloc economic relations, the 
renunciation of political control meant that the economic interests of the Soviet Union 
were given precedence over political interests, and consequently its leadership began to 
consider a gradual move away from these CMEA economic mechanisms and forms of 
cooperation which were not based on economic criteria but were designed to engender 
dependence and perpetuate subordination.
The announcement of the shift towards the primacy of economic criteria in CMEA 
decision-making found expression in the adoption by the 2nd Congress of People’s 
Deputies in December 1989 of a resolution to change the principles of Soviet economic
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cooperation with CMEA partners from settlements in transferable roubles to trade in 
convertible currencies and at current world market prices. This strategy was confirmed 
at the 45th Session in January 1990 where the Soviet Union proposed a move to trading 
on a hard-currency basis at world market prices starting with the year 1991 and by the 
decision in March 1990 to abolish co-ordination of plans.
The Soviet Union, however, decided to proceed with the new trade arrangements 
only from 1 January 1991. Until then it continued to use the economic dependency of 
its former satellites on Soviet raw materials and markets to ensure that former bloc 
countries pursued pro-Soviet policies in negotiations regarding European disarmament 
and the new order in Europe based on the reunification of Germany. The Soviet 
Union’s decision to abandon the existing model of economic cooperation with Eastern 
Europe only when the region lost its foimer strategic significance and Soviet security 
interests could be now protected without its control of Eastern Europe highlighted the 
role of CMEA as an instrument for securing primarily Soviet political interests in the 
region /maintaining Soviet political influence throughout Eastern Europe by way of its 
dominance of intra-bloc economic relations
Additional analysis of CMEA integration was conducted by applying the 
integrationist criteria set forth in the neo-functionalist paradigm, in particular Nye’s neo­
functionalist model. By demonstrating that the process mechanisms and the ‘integrative 
potential’ of the region which had been identified as being of crucial importance for the 
expansion of integration were either insignificant or had little applicability in relation to 
CMEA it was possible to provide additional reasons for the failure of CMEA 
integration.
First of all I have shown that in relation to the level of transactions, the only 
significant increase which took place was in a sphere of exchanges where there was an 
increase in the volume of intra-CMEA trade. I have noted, however, that the initial
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expansion of intra-CMEA trade occurred mostly because of Soviet political pressure, 
and that even this expansion of trade, did not signify an expansion of integration 
processes, as production ties were of marginal importance and only a small percentage 
of intra-bloc economic exchanges resulted from specialisation and cooperation in 
production. After the mid-1960s, the level of exchanges was primarily a function of 
Soviet willingness to supply its partners with raw materials and energy in return for 
East European manufactured products. By the mid-1980s, however, as this model of 
cooperation encountered increasing barriers to growth, there was a sharp decline in the 
real volume of intra-CMEA trade.
Similarly, the discussion of the implementation of CMEA major programs 
demonstrated that there was little evidence of pressures for intensified cooperation as a 
result of the operation of linkages amongst sectors. On the contrary, the implementation 
of CMEA programs was hindered by the isolation of organisations active in different 
sectors of national economies, and by the isolation of organisations working in 
individual CMEA countries caused by the sectoral structure of the CMEA and the 
institutionalised separation of national economies.
As a group of process mechanisms which had little applicability to CMEA, I 
identified regional group formation, elite socialisation and the development of a sense of 
collective identity. I have shown that while coalition formation is regarded as an 
important potential process force, in the CMEA no informal coordination in favour of 
integration took place among national political leaders, central planners and interest 
groups because of their conflicting commercial interests, in particular the competition 
for hard goods, and fears among some members for their economic sovereignty. On the 
contrary, CMEA cooperation was characterised by the continued existence of divergent 
national interests articulated by different countries in the region which led to the 
formation of coalitions usually aimed at satisfying some particularistic rather than 
collective objective.
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In the earlier stage the lines of division were defined by the degree of economic 
development, with industrially advanced countries strongly supporting specialisation on 
the basis of current comparative advantages which would have given them a privileged 
position. The less developed countries at times formed coalitions demanding improved 
terms of trade and investment capital for the development of sectors critical for 
technological progress in order to help reduce the differences in levels of economic 
development among the CMEA members.
From the late 1960s some countries began to form coalitions in favour of reform 
measures or in opposition to Soviet proposals which they saw as serving primarily 
Soviet interests. This was a result of new economic conditions characterised by 
increasing energy costs, the Soviet Union’s demands regarding East European 
contributions to the development of its raw material base and its refusal to maintain 
existing levels of deliveries. In Chapters 4 and 5 I have discussed how the objectives of 
CPSTP conflicted with the commercial interests of East European states as exporters of 
machinery to the Soviet Union, and with their interest in the imports of technology from 
the West which were perceived as necessary for domestic economic stability.
Facing these new challenges East European countries began to look for new ways of 
securing their economic stability and growth and favourable terms of cooperation. As a 
consequence they opposed the creation of bodies and mechanisms which would 
encroach upon the national authorities’ powers, and resisted forms of cooperation 
which could not contribute to their domestic objectives or which would result in 
unprofitable transactions. In Chapters 3 and 4 ,1 discussed how these differences of 
opinion affected negotiations of the Comprehensive Program (CP) and the CPSTP. 
While in the case of the CP the reformist countries did not prevail on the ultimate shape 
of the policy, due to Soviet opposition, in the case of the CPSTP a group of East 
European countries successfully opposed the setting up of supranational organisational
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structures which would have allowed the Soviet Union to control the implementation of 
their research policies.
I have also demonstrated that another process mechanism, the involvement of 
external actors, ultimately had a negative impact on the progress of cooperation, as trade 
with the non-communist world caused huge indebtedness in East European countries 
which put constraints on the implementation of economic policies.
Furthermore, I have demonstrated that the structural and perceptual conditions were 
also not conducive to integration. First of all, in terms of structural conditions, the 
‘integrative potential’ of Soviet bloc countries was weak because of the differences in 
the levels of economic development, and in the natural resource endowments among 
individual countries and the similarity of national industrial structures. In addition, the 
capacity of member states to adapt and respond to signals and pressures originating in 
the integrative process was low, both because of the unwillingness of members to act in 
concert with each other, and because of their inability to do so. The former was largely 
due to the perception of CMEA as a primarily political rather than economic integrative 
device operating largely for the benefit of the Soviet Union. CMEA was perceived as 
fairly costly and having negative impact on the prospects of their modernisation, as 
CMEA specialisation involved major costs by forcing the participating East European 
countries to restructure their economies or to specialise in energy and material-intensive, 
uncompetitive industries. Successful cooperation was assured only when the countries 
had a real economic interest in the completion of specific undertakings. The latter was 
largely due to the fact that the actual power of political and economic decision-makers to 
control the economy was severely constrained as a result of the introduction of 
economic reforms giving enterprises more independence, and by the lack of workable 
mechanisms to implement policies effectively. The main reason for this limited capacity 
was inherent in the internal logic of domestic and CMEA mechanisms, which did not 
provide proper incentives for the development of production for export and production
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specialisation. Moreover, the inadequacy of pricing policies and the lack of a 
convertible currency led to the bilateralism of CMEA economic relations whose negative 
impact on the level of intra-CMEA trade, the possibility of multilateral cooperation and 
ultimately the levels of production and interest in increasing exports and improvement in 
the quality of goods could not be overcome by integration policies formulated at the top 
and imposed on the ministries and enterprises.
Other structural conditions had little relevance to CMEA. For instance, interest or 
pressure groups which have played a major part in strengthening integrative tendencies 
in Western Europe were not an important factor in CMEA political and economic 
decision-making. One of the reasons was that the political and economic elites, 
including managers, were not interested in exports, and powerful interests groups 
under the conditions of incentives inherent in the central planning system had a vested 
interest in the maintenance of the status quo rather than in the introduction of new 
technologies or raising the standards of production. Finally, there was little value 
complementarity among CMEA policy-makers who since the mid-1960s began to differ 
over the preferred pace and direction of economic reforms and the extent of their 
participation in CMEA projects.
By evaluating CMEA integration against the neo-functionalist model I have 
demonstrated that both the process mechanisms, that normally influence political 
decision-makers to move towards integration, and the integrative potential of the region 
were relatively weak. I have argued that the main reasons for the weakness of these 
factors were ‘structural’ conditions independent of the integration process, in particular 
the impediments to cooperation related to the lack of effective mechanisms for 
participation in the international division of labor, a deficiency inherent in the internal 
logic of the domestic economic mechanisms of Soviet bloc countries. I have 
demonstrated that the persistence of ineffective mechanisms of cooperation hindered the 
implementation of strategies and expansion of integration in several ways. Firstly,
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these mechanisms did not provide sufficient economic incentives for a rational basis for 
allocating resources, developing export-oriented sectors and improving the quality of 
manufactures. Secondly, they contributed to the continuation of the dependence on 
intensive and material-energy technologies and the development of industries in 
isolation from the requirements of world markets which led to the deterioration of 
technological standards of CMEA manufactures. The third negative consequence was 
the lack of instruments for multilateral cooperation and incentives for specialisation 
agreements. These limitations of the CMEA mechanism affected the performance of all 
CMEA members who failed to fulfil their commitments commensurate with their 
economic capacities, in particular with regard to the implementation of specialisation 
agreements.
As another factor hindering the progress of integration I identified economic 
constraints such as indebtedness, shortages of goods and financial constraints, and the 
Soviet Union’s relative technological backwardness which from the beginning of the 
1980s began to constrain both the capacity of CMEA members to fulfil their obligations 
and their interest in responding to integration pressures. These barriers resulted from 
the operation of the system itself and were evidence of the decreasing effectiveness of 
Soviet-type economies.
The third factor responsible for the failure of integration was the lack of shared 
values among policy-makers and no evidence of the development of a sense of 
collective identity. As stated earlier, the neo-functionalists regarded shared values and 
perceptions among policy-makers and interest groups, and the development of a sense 
of identity, as the prerequisites for the expansion of integration resulting from spillover. 
They argued that crucial to an expansion of integration processes were mutually 
beneficial intergovernmental bargains which resulted from a convergence of national 
government preferences. They claimed that once a bargain had been made, there could 
be an expansion of integration processes as a result of linkages amongst sectors, as
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envisaged by the functionalist theory. In their view intergovernmental bargains were 
conditional on shared objectives with respect to proposed integration policies, and on 
subjective similarity - a belief on the part of the policy-makers that a similarity of 
objectives exists. In the CMEA case, however, there was no shared perception among 
its members that a greater involvement in integration would be beneficial for their 
economic policy goals. This was partly the result of the pursuit of nationalist economic 
policies and partly of the East Europeans’ perceptions of CMEA projects as the Soviet 
Union’s attempts at subordinating CMEA to its objectives and detrimental to their 
commercial interests or jeopardising their long-term economic stability.
The combination of inadequate economic mechanisms and the absence of the 
perception that a greater participation in CMEA cooperation would be beneficial for their 
economies meant that CMEA members were unable to respond constructively to 
pressures from the global economy and to growing economic competition from Western 
economies and implement common policies in order to attain economies of scale and the 
technological capability essential to compete successfully in world markets.
Instead, East European countries tried to avoid participation in projects which were 
perceived as conflicting with their domestic economic policies and their commercial 
interests as exporters of machinery to the Soviet market. For instance East European 
countries minimised their contribution to the implementation of the CPSTP which could 
have led to the acquisition by the Soviet Union of the results of East European 
technological research and consequently to the decrease of their exports. Also, the low 
technical level of Soviet products made them more interested in the purchase of Western 
technology.
The discussion in this thesis presented the outcomes of cooperation as the result 
of the rational actions of individual countries seeking to maximise the benefits to be 
derived from cooperation within the constraints imposed on CMEA by Soviet
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domination and the institutional limitations to integration imposed by the central 
planning system. I have demonstrated that the failure of CMEA integration was caused 
by the lack of effective mechanisms of cooperation, the decreasing effectiveness of 
Soviet-type economies and the resistance of East European countries to the Soviet 
Union’s attempts at subordinating CMEA to its objectives. As the institutional 
arrangements of the economic system of CMEA members were imposed by the Soviet 
Union, CMEA failure can be explained as a result of the Soviet political leadership’s 
unwillingness and inability to bring about the necessary changes in political and 
economic structures which would have enabled the introduction of mechanisms 
allowing intensive growth based on technological innovation. Thus, the analysis 
supports the main argument of this thesis that, ultimately, the factors which were 
primarily responsible for the failure of the CMEA were the constraints on its operation 
imposed as a result of CMEA’s functions of securing effective Soviet control over the 
region and the primacy of political criteria in Soviet decision-making which hampered 
the creation of the conditions necessary for successful cooperation.
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